



# MYANMAR COUNTRY REPORT

THE STATE OF THE  
HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM 2026

## ACRONYMS

|               |                                                       |
|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>CBO</b>    | Community-based organisation                          |
| <b>CSO</b>    | Civil society organisation                            |
| <b>EAO</b>    | Ethnic armed organisations                            |
| <b>FGD</b>    | Focus group discussion                                |
| <b>HCT</b>    | Humanitarian Country Team                             |
| <b>HDP</b>    | Humanitarian–development–peace (nexus)                |
| <b>HNRP</b>   | Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan                  |
| <b>IDP</b>    | Internally displaced person                           |
| <b>INGO</b>   | International non-governmental organisation           |
| <b>KSDF</b>   | Karenni State Development Fund                        |
| <b>NGO</b>    | Non-governmental organisation                         |
| <b>SAC</b>    | State Administration Council (Myanmar military junta) |
| <b>SOHS</b>   | The State of the Humanitarian System                  |
| <b>ULA/AA</b> | United League of Arakan/Arakan Army                   |
| <b>UN</b>     | United Nations                                        |
| <b>USAID</b>  | United States Agency for International Development    |



Caption: Distribution of  
supplies to communities  
affected by the  
2025 earthquake

Credit: Nyan Corridor researcher

# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 The crisis context

Myanmar is experiencing one of the most complex and multidimensional humanitarian crises in the world. The military coup of 1 February 2021 set in motion an accelerating cycle of armed conflict, economic collapse and mass displacement that has fundamentally altered the lives of millions of people across the country (International Crisis Group, 2026). By the start of 2026, nearly one-third of Myanmar's population required humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2025a).

The crisis is driven by intensifying armed conflict between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) or Tatmadaw, also referred to as the State Administration Council (SAC) or military junta, and a broad coalition of EAOs and People's Defence Forces. In the first half of 2025, Myanmar ranked second globally for conflict intensity and fourth most dangerous country for civilians, with more than half of the population exposed to active hostilities (OCHA, 2025b).

Displacement has reached catastrophic levels. Approximately 4 million people are internally displaced, many having fled multiple times – living in informal shelters, displacement camps or with host families, with severely limited access to basic services (OCHA, 2025a). Among the most acutely vulnerable are the Rohingya, with approximately 550,000 remaining in Rakhine, who are subjected to systematic discrimination and restrictions on movement (ibid.).

On 28 March 2025, a 7.7-magnitude earthquake struck central Myanmar near Sagaing and Mandalay, followed minutes later by a 6.7-magnitude aftershock. The disaster damaged over 40,000 homes, nearly 2,000 schools and approximately 70 health facilities (OCHA, 2025b). Official figures recorded at least 3,400 deaths, though the real toll is likely higher owing to communication blackouts (ibid.). The earthquake compounded an already alarming humanitarian crisis: an additional 2 million people were pushed into urgent need, bringing those requiring immediate assistance to 6.3 million and deepening a food crisis already affecting 8.5 million people (OCHA, 2025a).

The 2026 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) for Myanmar (ibid.) highlights how economic collapse is



**Myanmar ranked second globally for conflict intensity and fourth most dangerous country for civilians.**



**The earthquake compounded an already alarming humanitarian crisis: an additional 2 million people were pushed into urgent need.**

compounding the humanitarian toll. The 2021 coup triggered a banking crisis, cash and foreign currency shortages, and rampant inflation that drove poverty back to 2015 levels and pushed millions out of their livelihood activities. Public services – such as health, education, and water, sanitation and hygiene – have deteriorated severely or collapsed in large parts of the country. More than a third of school-age children are out of school, with the highest out-of-school rates among displaced and stateless children. The health system has endured over 1,800 incidents of violence since the coup, with 441 health facilities damaged, destroyed or rendered non-functional. The direct human toll on health and humanitarian workers has been equally severe: 160 health workers have been killed and 40 kidnapped since 2021.

Myanmar's crisis is distinctly gendered. Women, girls and individuals who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, queer and other gender identities (LGBTQ+) face disproportionate protection risks. These include gender-based violence, sexual exploitation, forced marriage and trafficking, and they face access barriers compounded by discriminatory norms and documentation constraints (UNHCR, 2025; UNHRC, 2024; UNFPA, 2025).

## 1.2 Humanitarian response

The Myanmar humanitarian response is coordinated through the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT), which provides strategic direction across the cluster system (OCHA, 2025a). The principal framework guiding the response is the HNRP, an annual planning instrument issued under the Humanitarian Programme Cycle. The 2026 HNRP – issued in December 2025 – identifies 16.2 million people in need across 227 townships (approximately two-thirds of the country), and targets 4.9 million people for life-saving and protection assistance, prioritising 2.6 million people in the most severe need. The total financial requirement stands at US\$890 million, of which US\$521 million is prioritized (ibid.).

Access constraints represent one of the most severe operational challenges in Myanmar. Interviews with UN agencies and local and international actors consistently revealed that these constraints arise from SAC-imposed registration requirements for humanitarian organisations, particularly those operating in resistance-held areas. They risk administrative and criminal penalties, and they face bureaucratic constraints on the movement and supply of goods and on telecommunications. These constraints have, therefore, meant that access to areas that are affected by conflict and hard to reach has been structurally limited for international actors especially, resulting in a response that is access-driven rather than needs-based. This reflects a historical pattern with junta-controlled areas receiving disproportionately higher levels of international assistance, as they are more accessible (Sida, 2025).



**Local and national humanitarian actors ... have become the primary conduit for assistance across large areas of the country.**

In response to these constraints, local and national humanitarian actors, including Myanmar civil society organisations (CSOs), mutual aid networks and community-based responders, have become the primary conduit for assistance across large areas of the country beyond the reach of international actors. Recognising this reality, the HCT has been developing a localisation strategy to strengthen local and national ownership and decentralise decision-making within the response architecture (Naw et al., 2025).

Chronic underfunding has severely constrained the reach of the response (Bloem et al., 2026). The 2024 HNRP received only 39.6% of required funding, leaving an estimated 1.4 million people who were identified in the most severe need without any assistance (OCHA, 2023). The scale-back of US humanitarian funding in early 2025 and reductions from other donor governments and funding streams during the 2022–2025 period intensified the pressure across an already underfunded response, forcing difficult prioritisation across sectors and partners (Sida, 2025).

### 1.3 Why Myanmar for the 2026 SOHS?

Myanmar was selected for in-depth primary research for the 2026 SOHS because it represents a paradigmatic polycrisis: protracted armed conflict, political collapse, economic breakdown and the March 2025 earthquake are layered atop one another. It raises fundamental questions about humanitarian action under contested governance and the dilemmas for actors operating within the traditional scope of the neutrality principle.



**Protracted armed conflict, political collapse, economic breakdown and the March 2025 earthquake are layered atop one another.**

Myanmar is also a critical test of localisation in practice, with local actors serving as de facto first responders yet receiving insufficient recognition or direct resources.

With the HNRP consistently underfunded and major donor withdrawals in 2025, Myanmar illustrates the gap between humanitarian need and the system's actual capacity to respond – making it a barometer for the global humanitarian system at a moment of unprecedented strain.

