
GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE



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Figures 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 and 3.1, equivalent figures in the Executive summary, and analysis on pages viii, 3, 4, 6, 8 and 35 were revised on 29 July 2025 to reflect corrections provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark correcting an error in IHA as reported to OECD DAC.

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Thank you



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Indonesia. 2025.

Cash assistance programme in
Pekalongan, Indonesia, February 2025.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2025 shows a humanitarian sector entering financial crisis. Cuts in international humanitarian funding by many of the top government donors in 2024 delivered the biggest drop ever recorded. With further reductions announced for 2025, the public funding available for humanitarian action could contract by between 34% and 45% by the end of the year compared to 2023 levels. Reforms to increase effectiveness, such as funding to local and national actors and anticipatory action, have also seen stagnation and reversal – a trend that upcoming cuts may serve to accelerate if left unchecked. Countries experiencing protracted crisis are more vulnerable than ever; humanitarian assistance has overtaken development assistance as their dominant source of external concessional support, and the average protracted crisis pays double the amount in debt payments compared to a decade ago. This leaves serious questions about how they can find sustainable pathways out of crisis. A 'humanitarian reset' announced by the United Nations' Emergency Relief Coordinator reflects a sector facing up to this new and unprecedented challenge.

About this report

The Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) report is the world-leading annual assessment of the state of international humanitarian financing. Produced by Development Initiatives for 25 years and now by the ALNAP Network,¹ the GHA report provides a critical body of evidence to inform the sector about its financial size, how its finances are distributed, and what key trends require our focus if we want to protect and improve the funding response to crisis.


Global humanitarian assistance is defined as the total international financial resources available for humanitarian action and comprises public funding from government donors alongside private funding from sources such as philanthropy and individual giving.

The GHA Report 2025 sets out the scale and nature of disruption affecting humanitarian funding, providing a critical tool for navigating an unprecedented moment of political and economic change. Humanitarian action faces a "crisis of legitimacy, morale and funding".² Escalating geopolitical tensions, economic stagnation and rising debt mean the humanitarian responsibilities that once received wide support are being abandoned, as many countries prioritise security and competition over multilateralism and shared norms. Meanwhile, low- and middle-income countries seek equitable partnerships, rejecting outdated paternalistic models of aid, and crises fuelled by conflict, climate emergencies and economic instability continue unabated. Against this backdrop, the humanitarian sector has entered a period of high turmoil, with calls for a humanitarian reset³ and related reforms to respond to this moment with a new vision and approach.

Funding trends

Humanitarian financing fell by 10% in 2024, before the cuts announced in 2025

Total international humanitarian assistance, 2020–2024



Source: ALNAP based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and our unique dataset for private contributions.

Notes: Figures for 2024 are preliminary. Totals for previous years differ from those reported in previous GHA reports due to updated deflators and data. Data is in constant 2023 prices. The methodology used to produce total international humanitarian assistance is detailed in the 'Methodology and definitions' chapter. This figure was revised on 29 July 2025.


Record cuts began in 2024, reversing over a decade-long upward trend. International humanitarian assistance fell by 10% – nearly US \$5 billion – in 2024, the largest cut ever recorded. This marks a clear departure from the trend since the early 2010s of steady and substantial commitment to humanitarian funding, which had seen volumes double between 2011 and 2017, climbing to a peak of US \$46.1 billion overall in 2022. These cuts were driven by 15 of the 20 largest donors reducing their humanitarian funding alongside a smaller but notable fall in private contributions.

This unprecedented reduction means that the humanitarian sector experienced a significant funding shock even before aid cuts from major donors in 2025. Reliance on a relatively small number of large donors has always made the system vulnerable to shocks. Now, with the political context shifting dramatically for many donor countries at once, the impact is potentially catastrophic.



The majority of top donors cut humanitarian funding in 2024

20 largest public donors of humanitarian assistance in 2024, and change from 2023



Source: Based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF.

Notes: 2024 data is preliminary. Data is in constant 2023 prices. 'Public donors' refers to governments and EU institutions. 2023 figures differ from the 2024 *Falling short* report⁴ due to final reported international humanitarian assistance data and a different year for constant prices. * Numbers for Germany are calculated using preliminary data provided by the German Federal Foreign Office as well as OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF. UAE = United Arab Emirates.


The majority of donors providing international humanitarian assistance reduced funding in 2024. The largest cuts in volume terms came from the United States (-US \$1.7 billion; -10%), Germany (-US \$0.8 billion; -23%) and EU institutions (-US \$426 million, -13%).

However, the shape of the funding landscape has not shifted overall. The top 10 donors still provided 84% of all public humanitarian assistance in 2024, compared to 83% in 2023. Private donors⁵ contributed an estimated US \$7.0 billion in 2024, down from US \$8.3 billion in 2023 (and down by over a third from the peak in 2022).

Humanitarian funding cuts

Funding from governments could drop by 34% to 45% in 2025 from its peak in 2023

Three scenarios for humanitarian funding from public donors in 2025



Source: Historic data based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF. 2025 scenarios are based on publicly available information regarding ODA or humanitarian budgets.

Notes: 2024 data is preliminary. Data is in constant 2023 prices. 'Public donors' refers to governments and EU institutions. Historical figures differ from the 2024 *Falling short report*⁶ due to final reported international humanitarian assistance data and a deflation. Methodological notes on how the 2025 scenarios were constructed are detailed in the 'Methodology and definitions' chapter. This figure was revised on 29 July 2025.

Deeper cuts in 2025 could see humanitarian assistance from government donors drop by nearly a half (45%) by the end of the 2025 compared to the peak reached in 2023. While scenarios must be taken with caveats,⁷ based on donor announcements made through April 2025 it is possible to assess the potential volume of cuts coming in 2025. The optimistic scenario is that funding will fall by over a third (34%) by the end of 2025 compared to peak funding levels in 2023. The pessimistic scenario sees a reduction in funding from government donors of almost half (45%), which would put the sector back by a decade to 2014 funding levels from public donors.

Almost half of the largest 20 humanitarian donors announced cuts to their future aid spending, including three of the top four

Changes in ODA and humanitarian assistance budgets for the 20 largest donors of international humanitarian assistance, 2025

Donor (2024 donor rank)	Share of 2024 public international humanitarian assistance	Future budget trend indication	
		ODA	Humanitarian
US (1)	43%	▼	▼
EU institutions (2)	9%	◻	◻
Germany (3)	8%	▼	▼
UK (4)	6%	▼	?
Saudi Arabia (5)	4%	?	?
Japan (6)	3%	▲	?
Sweden (7)	3%	▼	?
UAE (8)	3%	?	?
Norway (9)	3%	▲	▲
France (10)	2%	▼	?
Korea (11)	2%	▲	▲
Netherlands (12)	2%	▼	▼
Denmark (13)	2%	▼	▼
Switzerland (14)	2%	▼	◻
Canada (15)	2%	?	?
Australia (16)	1%	◻	◻
Belgium (17)	1%	▼	?
Ireland (18)	1%	▲	?
Qatar (19)	1%	?	?
Italy (20)	1%	▲	?

▼ Decrease
 ▲ Increase
 ◻ No change
 ? Data not available

Source: Authors based on Donor Tracker data, press reports and government budget documents.

Notes: Sweden's ODA in 2025 remains stable compared to 2024 levels, however a decrease is indicated in the table because the Swedish government has decided to cut ODA by 5% for 2026–2028. Directional arrows indicate any trend in budget as per sources, regardless of the magnitude of the increase or decrease. A question mark denotes that the trend is unknown. UAE = United Arab Emirates. This figure was revised on 29 July 2025.


The outlook for humanitarian financing is bleak, with almost half of the top 20 humanitarian donors announcing cuts to their ODA budgets for 2025. This includes three of the top four humanitarian donors. However, there is still a large degree of uncertainty regarding the impact on the humanitarian sphere. High-level announcements do not always have the sufficient detail regarding humanitarian spend versus the rest of ODA, and some budgetary decisions are yet to be agreed.

Parts of the humanitarian system are greatly exposed to the cuts coming from donors. This includes specific countries – 10 of the top 30 recipients of humanitarian assistance received more than 70% of their funding from donors that have announced cuts – as well as specific humanitarian sectors, including nutrition and food security and agriculture, which both relied on the United States for over half of their funding. UN agencies are also at risk, with humanitarian funding to the World Food Programme, International Organization for Migration, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East dependent to at least 60% on the donors that have announced cuts. In protracted crisis contexts, specific development sectors are particularly reliant on donors that have announced cuts to funding, including the government and civil society sector, which is 92% funded by these donors.

Humanitarian reform

The share of international humanitarian assistance to local and national actors fell in 2024

Proportion of direct and total (direct and indirect) funding to local and national actors, 2019–2024



Source: Based on UN OCHA FTS.

Notes: 2024 is the second year the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has published granular data on its partnerships that can be independently verified against the Grand Bargain definitions of local and national actors, making only a direct comparison with 2023 possible. Comparisons across a longer period are done by excluding UNHCR.

There has been backsliding on commitments for reforms to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian funding.


Direct and indirect funding to local and national actors⁸ fell to just 7.5% of total assistance in 2024, and cash and voucher assistance⁹ fell both in volume terms (by 15%) and as a proportion of total international humanitarian assistance. Funding for anticipatory action¹⁰ stagnated in 2024 despite around one-fifth of humanitarian response needs being as a result of highly predictable shocks.

Donors have struggled to deliver on commitments for reform made back in 2016 as part of the Grand Bargain,¹¹ and 2024 saw even further backsliding. There is a clear risk that the cuts coming in 2025 will only serve to accelerate these trends as donors grapple with upheaval in their budgets.

Beyond humanitarian funding

Humanitarian funding now outgrows development funding in protracted HRP contexts when Ukraine is excluded

Share of ODA to development, humanitarian, peace and climate from DAC donors to protracted HRP contexts, excluding Ukraine



Source: Based on OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

Notes: Recipients vary between years. Data is in constant 2023 prices.

Humanitarian assistance overtook development assistance for the first time in 2023 as the dominant source of external concessional support for countries experiencing humanitarian crisis for five years or more. Increases in funding from multilateral development banks to crisis contexts have also stalled, returning back to pre-pandemic levels in 2023.

The average protracted crisis context is now paying double on government debt payments in 2024 than a decade ago. Every dollar spent servicing debt is one less dollar available to provide basic services that can reduce crisis risk and support recovery.

Looking ahead

We are entering a new era for international humanitarian response. After 15 years of overall growth in humanitarian assistance, donors are rolling back support. Shifts in the political landscape in many donor countries have created a difficult environment for the aid sector that has not been seen before.

Humanitarians now face tough short-term operational decisions alongside the need for strategic longer term shifts to respond to the impacts of this new reality. At the operational level this means cutting costs through workforce reductions and potential agency mergers; narrowing geographic and thematic focus to prioritise the most critical needs; and scaling back or redefining existing programmes due to limited resources. At the strategic level, the mooted humanitarian reset is focusing on maximising crisis responses with current resources, reforming operational approaches, and shifting power to local leaders and affected communities. Alongside it, the Grand Bargain is exploring efficiency and structural reforms.

The two major questions that must now be answered are: how should the sector change its approach to mobilise new and additional funding for humanitarian action in this new global context? And if the system needs to reform, or transform, to meet the needs of affected populations – regardless of the funding level – what does it prioritise?



Palestine. 2024.

Man carrying bag of flour in Hamad City,
north of Khan Younis in the southern Gaza
Strip, December 2024.

Credit: Anas-Mohammed / Shutterstock

Chapter 1: The humanitarian funding landscape

The humanitarian sector is at an inflection point. After years of unprecedented growth in funding, the sector is now in reverse gear. Total international humanitarian assistance declined by just under US \$5 billion in 2024, the largest funding drop ever recorded. A range of scenarios produced for this report show that funding from public donors could drop between 34 and 45% in 2025 from their peak in 2023.

This is at a time when 305 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance globally.¹ Large-scale conflicts in Gaza, Sudan and Ukraine in recent years have put increasing pressure on the humanitarian system, whilst many of the protracted crises that have year-after-year interagency appeals risk being forgotten in an era of cuts.

This new era started before 2025, as data shows that the majority of donors started reducing humanitarian expenditure in 2024 (and some even before this). The 'prioritisation' exercise that started at the end of 2023 – which included reductions to the funding requirements of interagency coordinated appeals – is yet another sign that the turmoil currently facing the sector has been evident for a while.


Despite this, the current chaos in the humanitarian sector has felt sudden and is difficult to navigate. Individuals and organisations are discussing the impact of spending cuts on affected populations, whilst also trying to find the space to imagine a sector that is fit for the future. Aid agencies are stripping back services and having to lay off thousands of staff worldwide.

The story of this chapter is one of retreat. The year 2024 would have marked a watershed moment for the sector even before funding cuts by the US, which contributed 43% of public humanitarian assistance in 2024. Examining the trends that were already underway, even before the changes announced in 2025, can help to make sense of the future and provide a starting point for conversations about where the sector goes from here.

What was the trend in humanitarian financing leading into 2025?

Figure 1.1: Humanitarian financing fell by 10% in 2024, before the cuts announced in 2025

Total international humanitarian assistance, 2020–2024



Source: ALNAP based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and our unique dataset for private contributions.

Notes: Figures for 2024 are preliminary. Totals for previous years differ from those reported in previous GHA reports due to updated deflators and data. Data is in constant 2023 prices. The methodology used to produce total international humanitarian assistance is detailed in the 'Methodology and definitions' chapter. This figure was revised on 29 July 2025.

Total international humanitarian assistance declined in 2024 by just under US \$5 billion, equating to 10% of funding to the sector. The decrease was due to reductions in both funding from public donors (governments and EU institutions) and private donors (such as foundations and the general public), with public donors making up the bulk of the overall drop. This followed a slight decline in overall international humanitarian assistance in 2023, which was driven solely by a drop in private funding (public international humanitarian assistance increased slightly in 2023).

A drop of this magnitude comes after decades of long-term growth. The first ever Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) report in 2000 recorded overall humanitarian assistance of US \$7.2 billion in 1998.² Just under 25 years later, the sector hit a peak in 2022 of over five times this value at US \$46.1 billion.³ Within this context, a decline of around US \$5 billion is unprecedented for the sector.

Public funding for international humanitarian assistance fell sharply in 2024 after peaking in 2023. The decline in total international humanitarian assistance in 2024 is largely reflective of a widespread movement by public donors to cut humanitarian spending, with the majority of the top 20 donors cutting humanitarian expenditure in 2024 (see a donor breakdown in Figure 1.3):

- Funding from public donors fell from US \$37.5 billion in 2023 to US \$34.0 billion in 2024. This is the biggest ever fall in funding in absolute terms for public donors and the biggest percentage drop (–9%) since 2012 (when public donors gave 11% less compared to the year before).
- Public donor funding has returned to levels just above those of 2021, and not close to the amount received in 2022. This reflects the diminishing impact of the ‘Ukraine effect’, which significantly boosted humanitarian funding in 2022. A fall to around 2021 levels of public funding means that the gap between needs and funding is even wider than it was then, with the number of people in need rising by nearly 70 million people across 2021 to 2024.
- There were significant cuts from three large donors, the US, EU institutions and Germany, with other donors unable to step in to fill the gap – only four of the top 20 donors actually increased their budgets by over 5% in 2024.

At the same time, private funding remained an important part of funding for the sector and mirrors the trends seen in public funding, with both notably exhibiting a waning ‘Ukraine effect’ post-2022:

- Private donors contributed an estimated US \$7.0 billion in 2024, down from US \$8.3 billion in 2023 (and down by over a third from the peak in 2022).
- Private funding peaked in 2022 when the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine appeared to drive greater appetite for contributions from private actors – but 2022 increasingly looks like an outlier.
- The contraction to US \$7.0 billion in 2024 reflects a downward trend in the short term, but nevertheless it fits within the historical norm.
- Despite a decline, private funding remains an important source of funding for the international humanitarian sector, contributing 17% of total international humanitarian funding in 2024. This is also in line with the how much the sector received from private donors in 2020, 2021 and 2023, which was 17%, 18% and 18%, respectively.

This funding data confirms the reports throughout 2024 that organisations were already cutting back, including the International Committee of the Red Cross,⁴ Save the Children,⁵ the World Food Programme⁶ and the International Rescue Committee.⁷

The situation was already deteriorating going into 2025 – the question now is: how much more constrained will funding become?

Box 1.1: Scenarios for 2025: How much could public humanitarian funding fall this year?


Each GHA report focuses on the previous year's financial data in order to provide a robust evidence base on humanitarian financing trends. However, as the sector faces unprecedented aid cuts in the first half of 2025, this edition of the GHA report offers a set of scenarios on what the funding totals for 2025 may look like. These scenarios are speculative and readers should use these – and any other projections offered by others – with caution and to complement other data in their strategic planning. For details on how these projections were constructed and their assumptions, see the 'Methodology and definitions' chapter.

Three scenarios have been examined: an 'optimistic scenario', a 'moderate scenario', and a 'pessimistic scenario'.

These scenarios are based on publicly available information at the time of publication and account for the uncertainty in size of changes, when changes will be made, whether cuts hit other forms of official development assistance (ODA) or humanitarian funding specifically, as well as for the usual fluctuations in humanitarian funding. Private funding is not examined, and countries that are not members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are assumed to contribute the same as in 2024.

Figure 1.2: Funding from governments could drop by 34% to 45% in 2025 from its peak in 2023

Three scenarios for humanitarian funding from public donors in 2025



Source: Historic data based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF. 2025 scenarios based on publicly available information regarding ODA or humanitarian budgets.

Notes: 2024 data is preliminary. Data is in constant 2023 prices. 'Public donors' refers to governments and EU institutions. Historical figures differ from the 2024 *Falling short report*⁶ due to final reported international humanitarian assistance data and a deflation. Methodological notes on how the 2025 scenarios were constructed are detailed in the 'Methodology and definitions' chapter. This figure was revised on 29 July 2025.





All three scenarios show a significant drop in humanitarian funding from public donors – the pessimistic scenario shows a drop of nearly half of funding from public donors in just two years:

- The optimistic scenario shows a decline to US \$24.6 billion – this would equal a 34% decline on the peak of US \$37.5 billion received in 2023 (a 28% decline on 2024). This scenario would lead to the sector going back to somewhere between 2016 and 2017 levels of public funding, rewinding 8 to 9 years. This is the upper end of the simulations run (97.5th percentile).
- The moderate scenario shows a decline to US \$22.7 billion – this would equal a 39% decline on the peak (a 33% decline on 2024). This scenario would lead to the sector going back to 2016 levels of public funding, rewinding 9 years. This is the median value in the simulations that were conducted (50th percentile).
- The pessimistic scenario shows a decline to US \$20.8 billion – this would equal a 45% decline on the peak (a 39% decline on 2024). This scenario would lead to the sector going back to 2014 levels of public funding, going back 11 years. This is the lower end of the simulations run (2.5th percentile).

To understand the scale of these percentages, it may be useful to look at parallels where economies have shrunk by similar percentages – usually because of an external shock or war-like conditions. For example, in the first year of the war in Ukraine, its economy shrank by 28%,⁹ whilst the COVID-19 pandemic caused a shock to the UK economy of 20% between April and June 2020.¹⁰

The shock that the humanitarian sector is experiencing is large enough to set the sector back by 9 to 11 years in terms of funding levels from public donors.

To understand which scenario may be more likely, improved information regarding the cuts is needed. If the US confirms cuts to its humanitarian funding by anything less than 50%, and other donors prioritise humanitarian over other forms of ODA, then the optimistic scenario may be more likely. However, if donors make humanitarian cuts that match their overall ODA cuts (or deprioritise humanitarian assistance), together with US cuts by around the 75% mark, then the pessimistic scenario starts to become more likely.

Whether any of the three scenarios presented pan out in reality remains to be seen – it may well be better or worse than any of these three scenarios. However, whichever scenario plays out in reality, no hypothetical data point is needed to understand the real-world effect of the cuts happening now for people affected by humanitarian crisis. In:


- **Uganda:** Food rations have been stopped for a million refugees and asylum seekers fleeing conflicts in Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan and Sudan.¹¹
- **South Sudan:** Local health facilities have been closed as a direct result of the cuts, with reports that this has directly resulted in deaths.¹²
- **Afghanistan:** Community resource centres, which support returning and internally displaced Afghans with housing, food and legal assistance, have been closed.¹³
- **Kenya:** Food distribution was suspended in the Dadaab refugee complex following a reduction in food rations by 40% and subsequent clashes.¹⁴

The above scenarios are a reflection of the general direction of travel in the sector – the majority of donors are cutting their budgets, and 2024 data shows that this is not a new direction but an accelerating trend.

Which donors contributed the most in 2024?

Figure 1.3: The majority of top donors cut humanitarian funding in 2024

20 largest public donors of humanitarian assistance in 2024, and change from 2023



Source: Based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF.

Notes: 2024 data is preliminary. Data is in constant 2023 prices. 'Public donors' refers to governments and EU institutions. Contributions of current and former EU member states to EU institutions' international humanitarian assistance is shown separately. 2023 figures differ from the 2024 *Falling short* report¹⁵ due to final reported international humanitarian assistance data and a different year for constant prices. * Numbers for Germany are calculated using preliminary data provided by the German Federal Foreign Office as well as OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF. UAE = United Arab Emirates. This figure was revised on 29 July 2025.

The majority of donors to international humanitarian assistance reduced their funding in 2024. Of the top 20 donors, 15 cut their humanitarian spending in 2024. This is a continuation of a trend in recent years:

- In 2022, 13 of the top 20 donors increased their contributions substantially (more than 5%), compared to 3 donors that decreased their contributions substantially. This split evolved in 2023 to only 9 of the top 20 donors upping contributions substantially versus 7 decreasing funding substantially. In 2024, this trend continued with only 4 of the top 20 donors increasing funding substantially compared to 14 decreasing funding substantially.

Of those that cut funding significantly in 2024, this included large reductions by some major humanitarian donors:

- The biggest reductions were by the US (–US \$1.7 billion; –10%), Germany (–US \$0.8 billion; –23%), EU institutions (–US \$426 million; –13%), Canada (–US \$347 million; –40%), Norway (–US \$274 million; –22%) and France (–US \$134 million; –16%).
- Reductions in funding from Germany and Canada continued a downward trend from both donors. Humanitarian spending peaked in 2022 for both, but funding in 2024 was around half of what it was only two years before for these two donors (Germany down 46% in two years; Canada down 53% in two years). However, an increase is expected for Canada in 2025 due to the phasing of 2024/25 financial year disbursements occurring in the 2025 calendar year.
- Decreases in funding from Japan and Norway represent a decline on a historic peak in 2023, but funding is still above 2022 levels and Norway has budgeted for an increase in the 2025 ODA and humanitarian budgets (see Figure 3.1).¹⁶
- Only a handful of donors increased their funding in 2024, albeit with large increases from some donors.
- The largest increases in international humanitarian assistance are from: Saudi Arabia (+US \$553 million; +60%), the UK (+US \$578 million; +40%), and Korea (+US \$504 million; +257%).

Despite reductions in funding from the largest donors, the shape of the funding landscape was largely similar in 2024 to previous years. The top three donors gave 59% of all public donor funding (similar to 61% in 2023), whilst the top 10 donors gave 84% of all public donor funding (similar to 83% in 2023).


Another perspective to analyse donor contributions is by comparing it to donor countries' national economic capacity. A voluntary target of 0.07% of Gross National Income (GNI) was established in 2023 by the EU for its member states, but few countries meet this benchmark. When including multilateral contributions, 9 DAC countries met the threshold in 2024: Luxembourg (0.22%), Sweden (0.19%), Norway (0.19%), Denmark (0.16%), Ireland, (0.08%), Netherlands (0.07%), Belgium (0.07%), Iceland (0.07%), and Germany (0.07%). However, with further funding reductions coming from a number of donors, it is hard to see more reaching this benchmark in the near future.

The growing trend towards cutting humanitarian budgets, as illustrated by how many donors were already reducing spending in 2024, is accelerating in 2025. This includes cuts announced by some of the major European powers, such as Germany, the UK and France, which are grappling with the politics of international aid at a time when there is pressure to increase defence spending (for more on specific donor cuts see Chapter 3).

Box 1.2: How does international humanitarian financing compare to domestic costs of refugee-hosting costs that count as ODA?

Figure 1.4: Donor country refugee-hosting costs that are counted as ODA are often multiple times the size of their international humanitarian spend

In-country refugee costs counted as ODA compared to international humanitarian spend for top donors in 2024



Source: Based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF.

Notes: Based on preliminary 2024 data. Due to a lack of available data several countries are omitted from the analysis, including: Australia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. EU institutions are also excluded. This figure was revised on 29 July 2025.





In recent years, the cost of hosting refugees in donor countries has become an increasingly salient political debate. Put within the context of international humanitarian spending, domestic humanitarian spending that counts as ODA now dwarfs international humanitarian spending by several multiples for some countries.

Canada, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, the UK, the Netherlands, and France all spent at least as much of their ODA on hosting refugees domestically as they did on their international humanitarian spend. The financial implication of this is that donors do not have to spend as much internationally on ODA, as a portion of the hosting costs counts towards their ODA total – although not part of the international humanitarian numbers presented in this report.

The chart above also shows that some countries don't spend as much on hosting refugees as international assistance, for example for Japan and Korea where international assistance far outstrips domestic spend on hosting refugees.

It should be noted, however, that the data presented here does not show the complete cost of hosting refugees: donors report based on different calculations (for example Sweden has a cap on the amount that can count as ODA),¹⁷ in-donor costs only count as ODA for the first year after a person's arrival, and only expenditures for 'temporary sustenance' are allowed, such as food and shelter.


The rationale for including in-donor refugee costs within ODA is that it 'underlines that refugee protection is a legal obligation and that assistance to refugees may be considered a form of humanitarian assistance'.¹⁸

However, regardless of the methodological points, it is clear that the domestic humanitarian spend that governments are allowed to count as ODA often far surpasses the international humanitarian spend of many Western donors.

Which countries were the largest recipients in 2024?

Figure 1.5: Palestine was the largest recipient of humanitarian assistance in 2024

10 largest recipient countries of international humanitarian assistance



Source: Based on UN OCHA FTS.

Notes: Values in constant 2023 prices. DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The sustained acute humanitarian crisis in Gaza has seen funding to Palestine almost triple since 2022. Donors provided an additional US \$1 billion to Palestine in 2024, which overtook Ukraine and Syria as the largest recipient of international humanitarian assistance.

More broadly, while there has been a significant refocusing of allocations, the makeup of the 10 largest recipients of humanitarian funding has changed very little in 2024. The same crises are absorbing the majority of humanitarian assistance, with overall funding remaining heavily concentrated in protracted crises.

- Palestine was the largest recipient of international humanitarian assistance in 2024, receiving US \$2.9 billion, an increase of 51%. This followed an increase of 88% in 2023.
- Funding for Ukraine has continued to taper – from US \$3.9 billion to US \$2.8 billion – falling by a quarter for the second year in a row after its peak in 2022.
- Funding to Syria has also significantly fallen; it received less than half of the funding it received in 2023, from US \$3.5 billion to US \$1.7 billion in 2024.
- At the same time, a resurgence of violence drove notable increases in funding to Lebanon (+53%), Sudan (+31%) and Democratic Republic of the Congo (+29%).

Beyond these funding reallocations, the makeup of recipients has not changed in 2024 and all of them are facing protracted crises. Eight of the 10 largest recipients of funding in 2024 were also present in the top 10 of 2023 (see more on protracted crises in Chapter 4).


- Funding remains concentrated among a small number of recipients. In 2024, the top five countries received 41% of country-allocable international humanitarian assistance, the same percentage as 2023.
- The vast majority of international humanitarian assistance continues to be provided to countries experiencing protracted crisis – in 2024, 94% of country-allocable humanitarian funding was provided to protracted crises, an increase from 2023 (89%) and 2022 (84%).

With funding set to decline in 2025, it is likely that donors will need to further prioritise their allocations, potentially leading to an even greater concentration of funding to a small number of countries.

Was humanitarian funding sufficient?

Figure 1.6: Prioritisation means humanitarian requirements fell but the funding gap remains the second highest on record

Funding and unmet requirements, UN-coordinated appeals, 2015–2024



Source: Based on UN OCHA FTS, Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) dashboards and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Refugee Funding Tracker

Notes: Data is in current prices. The percentage of requirements met in 2020 includes all funding, for COVID-19 and other responses, against all requirements that year. GHRP = Global Humanitarian Response Plan.

Funding requirements for UN-coordinated appeals have significantly increased over the past decade, reaching a peak of US \$56.1 billion in 2023. With a record-breaking funding gap of US \$29.7 billion, 2023 felt like a tipping point for the sector. In an attempt to address the growing gulf between the funding requested and the funding provided, the interagency appeals process underwent a prioritisation exercise in 2023 for the following year.

The aim of this exercise was to narrow the focus of humanitarian response plans to core lifesaving needs to reflect more realistic funding availability, while at the same time attempting to draw clearer boundaries around what falls under a humanitarian mandate and what is the responsibility of development agencies.

As a result, overall funding requirements fell for the first time since 2014 (excluding the year after the COVID-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan) as both the number of people identified as being in need fell and the proportion of those targeted through the plans fell to the lowest ever proportion. The Global Humanitarian Overview noted that while this was due to some improvements in humanitarian contexts, it was also due to a more 'nuanced' methodological approach.¹⁹

However this substantial reduction in requirements has done little to improve the overall funding situation in 2024, and the funding gap remained the second largest on record.

- Appeal requirements decreased by 12% in 2024 to US \$49.5 billion.
- Despite this drop, only 51% of requirements were met. In 2024, appeal funding totalled US \$25.3 billion, slightly less than 2023 (US \$26.3 billion).
- As a result, the gap between requirements and funding in 2024 was US \$24.2 billion, less than for 2023 (US \$29.7 billion) but still the second highest funding gap on record.
- Funding to individual plans varies wildly with escalations of ongoing protracted crises experiencing higher growth in appeals than other crises, as the system prioritises fast-breaking emergencies. For example, Palestine was up by 51% and Sudan by 31% in 2024, whilst the average across the rest of the top 20 recipients of humanitarian assistance was a decrease of 3%.
- Other than the Ukraine Humanitarian Response Plan, the plans with the highest proportion of funding requirements met were all flash appeals (Libya, Lebanon, Palestine and Madagascar) or appeals for sudden-onset emergencies (Nepal and Burundi).

The appeals were modified further in a prioritisation exercise in spring 2025, as sector-wide funding cuts from key donors increased pressure on an already-overloaded system. Requirements to date for 2025 show that humanitarian response plans continue to be squeezed, so far totalling US \$46.2 billion, despite the number of people in need rising.

A further subset of the overall funding requirement is expected with country coordination teams asked to further prioritise their funding requirements into a 're-prioritised' funding requirement. As of early June 2025, the average (median) response plan has cut their funding requirement by 41%, however there is a large variation between plans. Plans that have cut their funding requirement the most include Somalia (-74%), Nigeria (-67%) and Burkina Faso (-65%), whilst Haiti (-17%), Myanmar (-32%) and Cameroon (-32%) have cut their funding requirement the least.

It is unclear whether there is a consistent methodology behind the reprioritisation. Published documents point towards the prioritisation being "driven by financial constraints rather than updated needs assessments"²⁰, and responses being focused on "implementing critical life-saving activities"²¹. However, these documents point towards different severity levels being used for the reprioritisation exercise in different contexts, whilst the strategic objectives in scope are not consistently clear across reprioritised plans.


However, the messaging is clear – humanitarian actors are focusing on 'time-limited, disaster-driven' responses and attempting to pull back from high levels of sustained support for protracted crises, while ramping up efforts to improve cost efficiency and effectiveness.²²

With the full impact of cuts from the US and other donors not yet known, it is uncertain whether this approach will actually lead to a smaller funding gap, and the extent to which this will conceal the true reality of humanitarian need as more people are no longer targeted by response plans. Meanwhile, the implications of a 'humanitarian reset' for future appeal planning processes remains unclear.




UNITED STATES 1

Total funding US \$14,488m




Closure of USAID and large cuts to foreign assistance announced. Scale and fallout not yet clear though FY26 discretionary budget request shows humanitarian budget sinking to \$4bn with \$1.5bn of the total at the discretion of the President.

TOP SECTORS




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
EU INSTITUTIONS 2

Total funding US \$2,938m




Humanitarian budget stable until 2027 under current Multiannual Financial Framework. Political negotiations for new framework underway. Individual country allocations reduced for regional investment envelopes in 2024 under Global Gateway approach.

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


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
GERMANY 3

Total funding US \$2,596m




Humanitarian funding cuts announced - draft 2025 budget reduced humanitarian assistance by 53% before the election in February 2025, with this cut expected to go through. New humanitarian strategy emphasises localisation as a key priority.

TOP SECTORS




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
UNITED KINGDOM 4

Total funding US \$2,026m




ODA budget will fall as the current target of 0.5% of GNI is lowered to 0.3% by 2027, with cuts expected immediately and increasing to 2027/2028. Unclear how this will affect the humanitarian assistance budget.

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


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
SAUDI ARABIA* 5

Total funding US \$1,474m




Historically focused funding on responding to escalations in regional crises (with a large chunk going to Yemen), with little forward-looking budget or humanitarian strategy information published.

TOP SECTORS




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
JAPAN 6

Total funding US \$1,163m



ODA budget to increase in 2025, not anticipated to be more than a 5% increase.

TOP SECTORS




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
SWEDEN 7

Total funding US \$1,136m




ODA budgets cuts announced for 2026-2028 following earlier decision to abandon the commitment to spend 1% of GNI on ODA. Unclear how this will affect humanitarian assistance budget.

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


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
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 8

Total funding US \$1,057m




Historically focused funding on responding to escalations in regional crises (with more than half going to Palestine in 2024); little forward-looking budget or humanitarian strategy information published.

TOP SECTORS




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
NORWAY 9

Total funding US \$996m




Despite a decrease in funding in 2024, Norway announced an increase of 8.6% to the 2025 ODA budget including a 10% increase in humanitarian assistance.

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
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FRANCE 10

Total funding US \$711m




ODA budget for 2025 cut by about 19% and target of allocating 0.7% of GNI to ODA postponed until 2030. Unclear how this will affect the humanitarian assistance budget.

TOP SECTORS



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
KOREA 11

Total funding US \$700m




ODA budget increased in 2025 by 3.8% with 'increased focus on humanitarian assistance'. New five-year comprehensive plan for international cooperation in preparation.

TOP SECTORS




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
NETHERLANDS 12

Total funding US \$698m




Plans announced to cut EUR2.4 billion in development aid from 2027, including EUR1 million less for NGOs from 2026. The Netherlands is co-convening the Grand Bargain Risk Sharing Community of Practice.

TOP SECTORS




TOP CONTEXTS



DENMARK 15

Total funding US \$641m




Humanitarian assistance expected to remain largely stable. New strategy for development cooperation under development.

TOP SECTORS



TOP CONTEXTS



SWITZERLAND 13

Total funding US \$602m




ODA budget cut in 2025 in part to prioritise defence spending but effect on humanitarian budget unclear. SDC leading the intermediaries and partnerships workstream in the Grand Bargain Community of Practice on localisation.

TOP SECTORS




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
CANADA 14

Total funding US \$527m




Humanitarian aid strategy under new government not yet clear though suggested that foreign aid will not be cut. Overall ODA expected to fall slightly in 2025.

TOP SECTORS




TOP CONTEXTS




AUSTRALIA 16

Total funding US \$398m




2025 ODA budget increased though ODA as a proportion of GNI at lowest level ever. Multi-year humanitarian funding announced for Myanmar and Bangladesh. New humanitarian policy launched in 2024.

TOP SECTORS




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BELGIUM 17

Total funding US \$334m




Development cooperation funding to be cut by 25% over five years - this includes cuts to multilateral organisations, humanitarian assistance, civil society and Enabel.

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


TOP CONTEXTS



IRELAND 18

Total funding US \$285m




Ireland has nearly doubled its humanitarian expenditure over the past decade, reaching \$336m in 2024. 40% of total ODA in 2024 was due to in-donor refugee costs. No drastic changes are expected in 2025.

TOP SECTORS



TOP CONTEXTS





Yemen. 2024.

Aid distribution in Hajjah, Yemen,
September 2024.

Credit: Mohammed Al-Wafi / Shutterstock

Chapter 2: Reforming amidst crisis

With international humanitarian assistance declining, efforts to build a more efficient, effective and equitable sector are more urgent than ever. Yet in 2024 progress towards reforming how funding is channelled and delivered to people in crisis continued to fall short.

Despite many years of advocacy and policy efforts to promote a more locally led humanitarian system, progress made to increase funding to local and national actors reversed in 2024. The reduction in total humanitarian assistance disproportionately hit local and national actors, with direct funding down by 31% (US \$1.2 billion) and total direct and indirect funding down by 22% (US \$2.5 billion), accounting for 7.5% of all international humanitarian assistance. At the same time, the bulk of humanitarian funding remained concentrated among international organisations, with 61% of public funding provided to multilateral organisations.

Pooled funds are an increasingly popular tool for channelling funding to the local level. The UN-managed country-based pooled funds (CBPFs) have steadily increased the proportion of allocations to local and national actors, which reached 35% (US \$322 million) in 2024. Yet overall donor support for pooled funds has not increased – still making up around 4% of overall international humanitarian assistance. Looking forward, new Grand Bargain and Emergency Relief Coordinator proposals to channel more funding to CBPFs could, if met, have a seismic impact if they include targets for local and national actors. Yet there remains a need to pursue other funding mechanisms and approaches, beyond just the UN-managed pooled funds, if sector-wide localisation commitments are to be achieved.


Efforts to fund more cost effective and efficient interventions have been less successful. After years of growing support for the cash agenda, the volume and proportion of international humanitarian assistance provided as cash and vouchers fell in 2024. At 19.6%, the share of cash and vouchers of total international humanitarian assistance was the lowest since 2021. There is also growing policy support for anticipatory action approaches, however funding available for anticipatory action frameworks stagnated in 2024 (US \$305 million) and the volume disbursed fell (US \$111 million). Progress has been made on defining, tracking and evidencing anticipatory approaches, but a lack of collective targets may limit accountability for providing the 'fuel' money to deliver these approaches at a meaningful scale.

It is not yet clear the extent to which the current funding crisis in 2025 will prove a catalyst for meaningful change, or whether new existential funding threats will mean the little hard-won progress is lost. However, the drop in funding to local and national actors in 2024 in particular suggests they will continue to feel the ongoing impact of budget cuts most acutely.

What is the trend in funding for local and national actors?

Figure 2.1: The share of international humanitarian assistance to local and national actors fell in 2024

Proportion of direct and total (direct and indirect) funding to local and national actors, 2019–2024




Source: Based on United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS).

Notes: 2024 is the second year the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has published granular data on its partnerships that can be independently verified against the Grand Bargain definitions of local and national actors, making only a direct comparison with 2023 possible. Comparisons across a longer period are done by excluding UNHCR.

Figure 2.2: Total trackable funding to local and national actors fell by nearly a quarter in 2024

Breakdown of funding to local and national actors, 2019–2024



Source: Based on UN OCHA FTS.

Notes: 2024 is the second year UNHCR has published granular data on its partnerships that can be independently verified against the Grand Bargain definitions of local and national actors, making only a direct comparison with 2023 possible. Comparisons across a longer period are done by excluding UNHCR.

Funding to local and national actors is not increasing despite many years of sustained advocacy, donor commitments and policy reform efforts (see Figure 2.1). In 2024, trackable funding provided directly to local and national actors fell substantially, though it remained above 2022 levels. This was partly driven by a decrease in funding from Gulf actors for specific crises following improvements in their reporting in 2023. However, overall direct funding volumes remain paltry, and the system has failed to meaningfully shift funding patterns to the local level.

- In 2024, direct funding to local and national actors fell by 31%, to US \$1.2 billion. As a proportion of total trackable international humanitarian assistance this represents just 3.6%.
- Improved reporting and inconsistent funding allocations of several Gulf donors have partly shaped this downward trend. The increase in funding in 2023 was mainly attributed to large funding flows totalling US \$1 billion from the government of Saudi Arabia and the Red Crescent Society of the United Arab Emirates (previously very limited reporters to the Financial Tracking Service (FTS)), which fell again in 2024: US \$89 million and US \$227 million less, respectively.
- The lack of progress to increase funding to local and national actors is stark when just looking at the funding flows of Grand Bargain signatories. The volume and proportion of funding provided directly to local and national actors by this donor group fell to 0.5% (US \$140 million) in 2024 from 0.6% (US \$174 million) in 2023.

It is difficult to quantify how much additional funding trickles through the humanitarian system to local and national actors in order to assess the overall funding picture. While there have been improvements in transparency due to new reporting from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) since 2023, there remains a critical information gap on the total volume of funding that reaches local and national actors through one or more intermediaries (see Figure 2.3). This makes it challenging to fully assess progress made against the Grand Bargain aggregate target of 25%, limiting accountability.

Assuming that reporting practices remained consistent between 2023 and 2024 – and the data ‘gap’ remained the same – it would seem that funding to local and national actors was disproportionately cut in 2024 compared to the sector as a whole. Total trackable funding to local and national actors fell by 22% in 2024 compared to the 10% contraction of the sector (see Figure 1.1).


- US \$1.3 billion of indirect funding can be tracked to local and national actors in 2024, around half of which (US \$662 million) is funding reported by UNHCR.
- Trackable direct and indirect funding totalled an estimated US \$2.5 billion in 2024, a decrease of nearly a quarter (22%) from US \$3.2 billion in 2023. This funding makes up 7.5% of all trackable humanitarian flows.
- The proportions of total funding to different local and national actor groups remained similar to previous years.
- Local and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) remained the largest recipient group (58%) followed by government actors (39%). UNHCR reporting contributed over a third of funding to local and national NGOs, providing just over half a billion in 2023 and 2024.
- However while local and national governments received most funding directly from donors, local and national NGOs continued to receive the majority (79%) of international funding through at least one intermediary.

Looking forward, the announced budget cuts by key humanitarian donors will undoubtedly affect the slow progress made to increase funding to local and national actors. Until the recent decision to drastically reduce its official development assistance (ODA) budget, the US was leading the way on funding transparency, with a target to increase its funding to local and national actors to 25%. According to a memo published in March 2025 outlining decisions on United States Agency for International Development (USAID) award retentions and terminations, more than half (US \$18 million) of direct humanitarian funding obligations to local actors in place at the beginning of 2025 were to be cut.¹ The memo suggested that across all sectors 66% of USAID awards to local and national actors would be axed, a much higher proportion than awards to international partners (39%), again implying a potentially disproportionate impact on local and national actors.

The impact of the funding cuts on local actors downstream of USAID’s international recipients is likely to be even greater and less visible given the lack of timely and public data on indirect funding. For instance, a survey by the NEAR Network (a network of local and national NGOs) found that, as of 10 February 2025, 83% of its members had paused their programmes due to the US funding cuts.²

Figure 2.3: The majority of international humanitarian assistance continues to be channelled to multilateral organisations

Channels of delivery, 2024



Source: Based on UN OCHA FTS, CBPF data, CERF Data Hub, and UNHCR 2023 partner budget information.

Despite the substantial shifts in volumes of funding provided by donors for international humanitarian assistance (see Figure 1.1), how funding is channelled to crises has changed remarkably little over the past decade. Looking at the bigger picture, donors continue to provide the bulk of funding to multilateral organisations and international NGOs (INGOs).

- In 2024, 61% (US \$17.4 billion) of public donor funding (as tracked by FTS, pooled funds and UNHCR data) was provided to multilateral organisations. The largest recipients were the World Food Programme (US \$7.9 billion) and UNHCR (US \$3.3 billion).
- After multilaterals, the largest recipient group was INGOs, which received 18% (US \$5.1 billion) of primary donor funding.


This direct funding is either implemented by the recipient organisation or passed on to other humanitarian organisations, often through long funding chains. However, despite the fact there have been multiple multi-stakeholder processes to address this,³ the sector still struggles to account for exactly how this funding moves through the system before reaching the targeted population. While agencies provide detailed reporting on implementing partnerships to their donors, this information is not made publicly available. It is therefore not known how the vast majority of funding (89%) received by first-level recipients is delivered – whether it is directly implemented or passed to other organisations. This lack of transparency hampers coordination, targeting and accountability. It also makes tracking commitments made to increase aggregate (direct and indirect) funding to local and national actors very challenging.

- Of the funding that could be tracked to secondary recipients in 2024, most (US \$2.1 billion) was provided to other international actors. Just US \$1.0 billion was tracked at the second tier to local and national actors – including local and national NGOs and local or national government bodies – of which most came from UNHCR (US \$614 million) and UN pooled funds (US \$334 million).

Are pooled funds increasing in use, and are they working for local and national actors?

Figure 2.4: Total volumes allocated through CBPFs are decreasing

CERF and CBPF allocations by partner type, 2019–2024




Source: Based on CBPF data, CERF Data Hub and annual reports.

Notes: Data is in constant 2023 prices. 2024 subgrant data for CERF is not currently available. Figures differ from previous GHA reports due to new data availability and deflation.

Figure 2.5: CBPFs are channelling a greater proportion of funding to local and national actors

CERF and CBPF share of allocations to local/national partners, 2019–2024



Source: Based on CBPF data, CERF Data Hub and annual reports.

Notes: Data is in constant 2023 prices. 2024 subgrant data for CERF is not currently available. Figures differs from previous GHA reports due to new data availability and deflation.

Pooled funding mechanisms have received increased focus over the past few years, yet the share of total donor funding delivered through them has not grown and remains small. In 2024, 6% (US \$1.7 billion) of public donor funding was provided to UN pooled funds (see Figure 2.3) – little change from previous years.

Despite this, pooled funds are considered a key vehicle to localise more funding and promote more inclusive and locally led humanitarian action.⁴ Efforts to increase the proportion of CBPFs provided to local and national actors have paid off to an extent – the UN OCHA-managed CBPFs channelled nearly half of its funding to local and national actors in 2024.

- CBPFs allocated 35% of funds (US \$322 million) directly to local and national actors in 2024. Including sub-grants, total funding to local actors reached 45% (US \$414 million), the highest share on record.
- As direct funding to local and national NGOs has increased, direct funding to UN agencies has fallen, from 25% in 2023 to 7% in 2024.
- The CBPFs allocating the largest proportion of funding directly to local and national actors were Colombia (100%), Somalia (78%) and Yemen (70%), while the lowest were Sudan (1%), Burkina Faso (16%) and Mali (21%).

Despite an increase in the proportion of CBPFs allocated to local and national actors, the overall volumes being allocated fell to below 2022 levels. In line with the overall reduction in humanitarian assistance (see Figure 1.1) most donors dropped their contributions to the CBPFs, some disproportionately so.

- Following a peak in 2022 (US \$1.3 billion), funding allocations fell again in 2024 to US \$914 million, a fall of 28%.
- The largest drops in funding provided between 2022 and 2024 were from the Afghanistan CBPF, which fell 82% (a US \$244 million decrease) and the Syria cross-border CBPF, which fell 55% (a US \$82 million decrease).
- There were large drops in contributions to the CBPFs from some key donors, disproportionate to their overall change in humanitarian spend (see Figure 1.3), including Germany, which halved its funding to the CBPFs to US \$440 million in 2024 from US \$213 million. In addition, UK funding fell by 10% from US \$202 million to US \$185 million, despite overall UK humanitarian spend increasing, and Canada funding fell by 60% from US \$89 million to US \$36 million.

Funding from the Central Emergency Fund (CERF) can only be allocated to UN agencies. Onward funding to local and national actors fell in 2023, along with overall volumes of CERF funding. This sub-granted funding does not technically count towards the Grand Bargain target as it is channelled through more than one intermediary.

- In 2023 (the latest year for which data is available), 10% (US \$69 million) of CERF allocations were sub-granted to local and national actors. This is a decline from the period 2019–2021 when 14% of CERF funding was consistently localised.
- Overall allocations from the CERF fell to US \$563 million in 2024, the lowest volume in the past six years.

Though overall volumes to the UN-managed pooled funds dropped in 2024, it is possible that this trend reverses in the context of donor cuts and shrinking budgets. Donors may choose to channel a larger proportion of funding through the pooled funds, as well-established mechanisms for funding local and national actors. Most recently, the Grand Bargain has proposed a target to channel more funding through pooled funds that directly fund local and national actors. A proposal to channel a third of international humanitarian assistance through the CBPFs has also been tabled as part of the Emergency Relief Coordinator's call for a humanitarian reset (see Box 2.1).⁵


As well as the UN OCHA-managed funds, there are several other pooled funds that are growing in support including NGO-led and locally led pooled funds that aim to provide greater autonomy to local actors.

- The UN Women-managed Women's Peace and Humanitarian Fund has disbursed US \$249 million to local and national civil society organisations since it was established in 2016.⁶ In 2023, US \$46 million was mobilised through the fund, of which the majority (87%) was channelled to local and grassroots civil society organisations. Nearly half of these had never before received financing from the UN.⁷
- Through its country-based and global pooled fund, the Start Network disbursed £27.2 million (US \$33.8 million) in 2023, of which 43% was channelled directly and indirectly to local and national organisations.⁸
- In 2025, Network for Empowered Aid Response (NEAR) launched a new Bridge Funding Window within its Change Fund to specifically support NEAR members, 83% of whom have been affected by the freeze on United States Agency for International Development (USAID) spending.⁹

Box 2.1: How pooled funds might change under Grand Bargain and Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) proposals

Figure 2.6: Grand Bargain and the ERC's proposals on pooled funds could both significantly increase funding to local and national actors, but with varying implications for international actors

Direct funding from UN-managed CBPFs by organisation type, 2022–2024, with hypotheticals under the Grand Bargain and ERC proposals based on 2024 numbers



Source: ALNAP based on data from the UN OCHA CBPF data hub.

Notes: Scenarios presented represent proposals by the Grand Bargain and the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). Under the Grand Bargain proposal, 15% of humanitarian response plan (HRP) funding would be secured for CBPFs, of which 70% would go directly to local and national actors. Tom Fletcher, the ERC, proposed in a speech on 15 May 2025 that a third of funding should go through CBPFs. Because no specific target for local and national actors was mentioned, the current percentage of direct funding to local and national actors (35%) was assumed. For more details regarding the methodology of this scenario refer to the 'Methodology and definitions' chapter. LNAs = local and national actors. Figures presented in Figure 2.6 differ from those in Figure 2.4 due to the use of current prices.

Pooled funds are receiving growing attention in response to humanitarian funding cuts. As part of efforts to leverage the Grand Bargain, a set of 'achievable' concrete measures have been proposed that include a new target for pooled funds to increase funding to local and national actors: to 'collectively secure 15% of humanitarian response plan (HRP) funding to CBPFs that can provide at least 70% of funding directly to LNAs [local and national actors]'.¹⁰ The Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) is also considering proposals that would see one third of global humanitarian funding channelled directly through the CBPFs as part of the humanitarian reset.¹¹

These proposals would see an enormous increase in the volume of allocations for CBPFs (see Figure 2.6) – a tripling to US \$2.8 billion under the Grand Bargain proposal and US \$6.2 billion under the ERC's proposal using 2024 figures.



Both proposals would also provide a substantial – and similar – boost in the volume of funding reaching local and national actors. Using 2024 figures, funding to local and national actors would have increased to US \$2.0 billion under the Grand Bargain target, compared to US \$329 million actually allocated in 2024. The ERC's proposal does not specify a target for CBPF funding to local and national actors. Applying the same funding proportion that went to local and national actors from CBPFs in 2024 would mean the ERC's proposal would have seen a similar amount reach local and national actors (US \$2.2 billion) as the Grand Bargain target, despite the calling for more than double the amount of funding to CBPFs (a third compared to the Grand Bargain's 15%).


On the other hand, funding to UN agencies and INGOs – as the largest recipients currently – would enormously increase with the overall jump in volume proposed by the ERC, from US \$605 million to US \$4.0 billion when 2024 figures are applied. The Grand Bargain proposal would see allocations to international organisations slightly increase. As a result, both of these proposals would have only slightly increased the share of total humanitarian assistance to local and national actors in 2024, from 7.5% (see Figure 2.1) to between 10% and 11% – not even half the Grand Bargain target of 25%.

This reinforces the importance of reforming how the CBPFs allocate funding and ensuring funding for local and national actors is ringfenced if the pooled funds are to be a vehicle for 'localising' funding and giving an 'electric shock' to the system. While these proposals would go some way to increasing the volume of funding provided to local and national actors, applying them to 2024 figures shows that wider sector transformation would be more limited as things currently stand.

How much funding was available for anticipatory action?

Figure 2.7: Growing policy support for anticipatory action has not yet translated into a growth in funding

Total budget available for anticipatory action frameworks and disbursed through activations, and proportion of international humanitarian assistance, 2022–2024



Source: ALNAP based on Anticipation Hub data.

Notes: ALNAP adapted the Anticipation Hub dataset by including missing activations in the active frameworks data for any given year. Caps on the total amount available under UN OCHA-coordinated frameworks in specific contexts have been taken into account to avoid double counting. Additional funding for frameworks under development (but nevertheless available) have been included in the total for 2024.

Around one-fifth of humanitarian response needs are the result of highly predictable shocks.¹² Anticipatory action – one form of pre-arranged finance – provides pre-agreed support in the window between a shock warning and its impact, much earlier than more traditional crisis response mechanisms. Anticipatory action has seen growing support from the humanitarian community as one means to shift towards a more proactive and risk-informed response model that limits humanitarian needs while also protecting development gains. The evidence base on the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of this approach is developing,¹³ with one Food and Agriculture Organization study finding that every US dollar invested in anticipatory action yields up to US \$7 dollars in avoidable losses.¹⁴

Despite the growing interest and support for anticipatory action, the volume of funding made available for anticipatory action frameworks stagnated in 2024 (US \$305 million) and the volume disbursed fell (US \$111 million) from the previous year despite the number of activations increasing. The overall reduction in total international humanitarian assistance meant there was a marginal increase in the share of anticipatory action funding, but this remained at just 0.7% of total international humanitarian assistance in 2024, a marginal increase from 0.3% in 2022 and 0.6% in 2023.

- The number of anticipatory action framework activations steadily increased from 47 activations in 2022 to 124 in 2024, predominantly for weather-related events. Despite this, the average disbursement per activation fell from US \$2 million in 2023 to US \$892,000 in 2024.
- In total, 56 countries had anticipatory action funding available to them in 2024 but the majority of total funding activated (72%) was absorbed by a small number of countries (Ethiopia, Somalia, Bangladesh, Mozambique, Madagascar, Niger and Chad).
- The UN remain the largest coordinating body of anticipatory action frameworks. In 2024, 83% of the total value was made available to UN-managed frameworks, followed by INGOs (10%) and the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement (6%). There is limited data on the involvement of local and national actors in anticipatory action frameworks as detailed in the report *Falling Short? Humanitarian funding and reform*.¹⁵

Despite the growing frequency and predictability of climate-related shocks, the potential of anticipatory action remains unrealised. To advance progress, a Grand Bargain caucus on scaling up anticipatory action was established in 2024, which agreed a common definition and established a methodology for tracking funding for anticipatory action. Donors also agreed to 'substantially' increase funding for anticipatory action and are encouraged to set individual targets of 5% of humanitarian budgets, in line with the G7 commitments.¹⁶ There is also an emphasis on the provision of 'fuel' money – the financing channelled through anticipatory action frameworks – as donors have previously provided greater support for 'build' money – the financing required to establish and maintain anticipatory action frameworks.


It is unclear the extent to which support for anticipatory action will be continued or sidelined as the current funding crisis challenges policy priorities. However, as the humanitarian community seeks to double-down on efficiency measures, the full potential of anticipatory action to shift towards a more proactive response that mitigates the humanitarian impacts of predictable hazards while building resilience to future shocks remains untapped.

Box 2.2: How much support is delivered by cash and voucher assistance?

Section written and researched by the CALP Network

Figure 2.8: Humanitarian CVA volumes fell in 2024 for the second year in a row, and are predicted to drop further

Total humanitarian CVA transfer values and proportion of international humanitarian assistance, 2018–2024 and 2025 forecast



Source: Data on CVA volumes was collected by the CALP Network from implementing partners and supplemented with data from the UN OCHA FTS, HPC Projects Module and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement's Cash Maps.

Notes: CVA volumes data for 2024 is initial as some organisations have not yet provided data or have provided partial data only. For a limited number of organisations that have consistently reported over the past eight years but weren't able to submit in time this year, an estimate was used equivalent to 80% of their 2023 reported volume, based on an average decrease of 20% from 2023 to 2024 amongst reporting organisations. Double counting of CVA programmes that are sub-granted from one implementing partner to another is avoided where data on this is available. Transfer values for funding captured on FTS and HPC Projects are estimates based on the average ratio of transfer values to overall programming costs for organisations with available data. Data are not available for all included organisations across all years. Data is in current prices. Methodology for the forecasted estimates for 2025 can be found later in this section.

Cash and voucher assistance (CVA) volumes fell in 2024 for the second year in a row, from US \$7.8 billion transferred in 2023 to US \$6.6 billion in 2024, based on initial data. This constitutes a 16% drop, compared to a 9% drop in international humanitarian assistance in current prices.¹⁷ CVA as a share of international humanitarian assistance has also declined: peak CVA share occurred in 2022 at 23.9%, rather than 2023 at 23.3%, as previously reported.

While the high point remains similar, it occurred earlier than initially thought due to revision to the international humanitarian assistance baseline (rather than a change in reported CVA volumes).¹⁸

The relative percentage of cash as a proportion of CVA¹⁹ increased slightly in 2024, up to 82%, compared to 81% in 2022 and 2023. From 2019 to 2021, cash constituted 71% to 72% of CVA.

While a further decline in CVA volumes in 2024 may have been expected given the broader drop in humanitarian funding, the further decrease in the proportion of international humanitarian assistance delivered as CVA (estimated at 19.6% in 2024) indicates a return to 2019 levels and signals a sustained decrease in international humanitarian assistance being delivered as CVA.

The reasons for the fall in CVA volumes in 2024 are manifold and vary across organisations and responses. Funding constraints were undoubtedly a contributing factor, though they differed by country and appear to have been largely general rather than specific to CVA.






As has been noted in previous analyses, the scale of specific responses and the relative feasibility and use of CVA within them can significantly impact global volumes. Several organisations noted a drop-off in 2024 after completing large, CVA-heavy responses in 2023 – for example responding to the Türkiye/ Syria earthquake and the large-scale humanitarian response in Afghanistan. This reflects the usual ebb and flow of responses, but other dynamics also appear to have had an influence. For example, in Ukraine, the humanitarian response to the ongoing conflict remained the largest CVA response globally despite a significant decrease from 2022 and 2023; CVA was only 24.5% of the 2024 response compared with 49.6% in 2022. This marked a relative shift to in-kind assistance²⁰ in a context where cash remains feasible and appropriate.

Context-specific operational constraints, access limitations and local policy directives have also been noted by several organisations as impacting CVA. The implementation of ‘cash bans’ by numerous administrations, particularly in the Sahel,²¹ was cited by several organisations, often requiring modality shifts to in-kind.

Importantly, revised CVA share figures suggest a complex relationship may exist between international humanitarian assistance totals and CVA volumes. Data shows that the percentage share of CVA tends to disproportionately rise when international humanitarian assistance totals increase and disproportionately fall when they decrease. This pattern suggests that CVA may be particularly sensitive to funding shifts – relatively easy to scale up, but also easy to quickly scale down (the CVA scale effect).

Despite the above, feedback collected in the survey does not indicate a consistent policy-level shift away from CVA at organisational level. While the general trend across organisations was a decrease in 2024, some reported an increase in or stable CVA volumes. There are also examples of organisations increasing their number of projects and country programmes using CVA, even while overall volumes fell.

Figure 2.9: The proportion of CVA delivered by UN agencies and their implementing partners declined in 2024
Annual CVA volume distribution across organisation types, 2018–2024



Source: Data on CVA volumes was collected by the CALP Network from implementing partners and supplemented with data from the UN OCHA FTS, HPC Projects Module and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement's Cash Maps. RCRC = Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

Notes: Where possible and identifiable, this reflects the type of organisation that distributed the funds, such as an NGO receiving a sub-grant from an intermediary. However, not all organisations provided this level of detail in their reporting.





UN agencies and their implementing partners continued to deliver the majority of CVA in 2024, at 53% of reported total annual volumes.²² However, available data indicates a significant decrease in the UN's percentage share of CVA, which was 59% on average over the previous six years. At the same time, NGOs were calculated to have their highest recorded CVA share at 35%, notably above the average of 23% between 2018 and 2023. The primary driver of this shift is likely to be the large decrease in CVA volumes for some, but not all, UN agencies. Further research is needed to fully determine other factors.


The data continues to show that very limited funding for CVA is directly provided to local and national actors, compared to international organisations. The data also provides little insight into the roles local and national actors play as implementing partners.

Looking ahead to 2025, CALP has updated its preliminary analysis of the projected impacts of the 2025 US funding cuts on CVA.²³ Using survey responses on projected organisational CVA in 2025, it calculated an average decrease of 31%²⁴ and applied this to the 2024 figures, generating an estimate of US \$4.5 billion in transfers to recipients –the same amount as 2019. However, given the ongoing funding uncertainties this year, this figure should be treated as speculative at this stage.




The total number of people in need has doubled in the last decade

The number has remained high since a spike in 2020




Forced displacement is increasing

Most are displaced within their own country



Political violence has increased


Particularly in the last two years



The number of aid workers killed or injured has increased in the last decade

National staff overwhelmingly make up the greatest proportion of those killed or injured

Food insecurity is more prevalent and more severe than ever before




Crises are becoming more severe

More countries are experiencing crisis than ever before.

Severity, number of countries experiencing:

Low (green) Medium (blue) High (red) Very high (purple)





Uganda. 2024.

Water transport by bicycle in Uganda,
September 2024.

Credit: Vladimir Bronnikov / Shutterstock

Chapter 3: Humanitarian finance in the age of cuts

The immediate direction of travel for the humanitarian sector is clear – the decrease in funding in 2024 will continue into 2025 and most likely beyond. As of June 2025, nine of the top 20 humanitarian donors have announced cuts to their official development assistance (ODA), including three of the four largest humanitarian donors. Among these four donors, only the budget of EU institutions is stable for the coming years. Yet the specific implications of many of the announced donor ODA cuts for humanitarian budgets remain unclear.

Building on Chapter 1's estimates for 2025 cuts (see Figure 1.2), this chapter takes the approach of examining which parts of the humanitarian system have the greatest exposure to donors that have announced cuts to ODA in 2025. These donors are referred to as 'focus donors' throughout this chapter.

Many humanitarian recipients are heavily dependent on donors that have announced cuts in 2025. In 2024, five contexts received 75% or more of their funding from these focus donors, with Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) being the most exposed. Many of these contexts have already experienced donor fatigue in recent years. UN agencies are also dependent on high levels of funding from donors that have announced cuts, specifically the World Food Programme (WFP), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), which all receive more than 60% of their humanitarian funding from these focus donors.

Specific humanitarian sectors are also more exposed to funding cuts than others. In 2024, the US was the largest donor across all humanitarian sectors analysed, and four sectors – nutrition, multi-purpose cash and basic needs, food security and agriculture, and logistics – all received more than 60% from the US, UK and Germany combined. Development funding to social sectors in protracted crisis countries, which is often critical to build resilience to crisis and mitigate future shocks, is also significantly exposed to ODA cuts. The most recent data shows that in 2023 up to 92% of development funding for key social sectors came from donors that have announced ODA cuts.

Although there is still uncertainty about exactly where the aid cuts will happen, this analysis of exposure suggests which areas of the humanitarian landscape are most vulnerable.

Which humanitarian donors are expected to make cuts?

Figure 3.1: Almost half of the largest 20 humanitarian donors announced cuts to their future aid spending, including three of the top four

Changes in ODA and humanitarian assistance budgets for the 20 largest donors of international humanitarian assistance, 2025

Donor (2024 donor rank)	Share of 2024 public international humanitarian assistance	Future budget trend indication	
		ODA	Humanitarian
US (1)	43%	▼	▼
EU institutions (2)	9%	◼	◼
Germany (3)	8%	▼	▼
UK (4)	6%	▼	?
Saudi Arabia (5)	4%	?	?
Japan (6)	3%	▲	?
Sweden (7)	3%	▼	?
UAE (8)	3%	?	?
Norway (9)	3%	▲	▲
France (10)	2%	▼	?
Korea (11)	2%	▲	▲
Netherlands (12)	2%	▼	▼
Denmark (13)	2%	▼	▼
Switzerland (14)	2%	▼	◼
Canada (15)	2%	?	?
Australia (16)	1%	◼	◼
Belgium (17)	1%	▼	?
Ireland (18)	1%	▲	?
Qatar (19)	1%	?	?
Italy (20)	1%	▲	?

▼ Decrease
 ▲ Increase
 ◼ No change
 ? Data not available

Source: Authors based on Donor Tracker data, press reports and government budget documents.

Notes: Sweden's ODA in 2025 remains stable compared to 2024 levels, however a decrease is indicated in the figure because the Swedish government has decided to cut ODA by 5% for 2026–2028. Directional arrows indicate any trend in budget as per sources, regardless of the magnitude of the increase or decrease. A question mark denotes that the trend is unknown. UAE = United Arab Emirates. This figure was revised on 29 July 2025.

Almost half (9) of the 20 largest donors of humanitarian assistance have already announced reductions to their ODA budgets for 2025 or beyond. This comes on the back of 15 of the 20 largest donors reducing their international humanitarian assistance contributions in 2024 (see Figure 1.3).

The announced reductions by three of the four largest international humanitarian assistance donors from 2024 are of particular concern given the increasing reliance of the humanitarian system on them – in 2024, these four donors (US, EU institutions, Germany, and the UK) provided almost two-thirds (65%) of all international humanitarian assistance from public donors.

Of that group, only EU institutions have kept development and humanitarian budgets stable up until 2027, within its Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Political negotiations for the 2028–2034 period began in March 2025, but it is too early to know what the implications of economic and political pressures on EU member states will mean for aid allocations under the new framework.

The ripple effects of the sweeping changes in the US to its foreign assistance and to its primary foreign assistance agency, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), are significant, and information about the scale of cuts and changes is still developing at the time of writing. Greater transparency on where the cuts will fall is urgently needed to track their impacts and for other actors in the system to adjust their focus accordingly.¹

Announcements of intended cuts to aid have caused uncertainty and confusion – not least because it is challenging to translate high-level announcements into specific percentage decreases in the largest donors' ODA or humanitarian assistance. In most cases, these budgetary decisions have yet to be agreed – or in the case of the US are not reliably available in the public domain. This has significant consequences for programming and financial planning, especially for those already facing liquidity challenges.²

At the time of writing, the following information is available on ODA or humanitarian budget cuts among major donors, aside from the US:

- Germany's draft budget for 2025 proposes reductions to humanitarian assistance by 53%, and the budget for the Development Ministry was reduced by 8%. The newly formed government indicates in its coalition treaty the intention to reduce Germany's ODA share as a percentage of gross national income (GNI), which might lead to further reductions.
- The UK government will cut its foreign assistance budget from the current target of 0.5% of GNI (already lowered from 0.7%) to 0.3% by 2027, partly to fund greater spending on defence. Current plans indicate cuts of around US \$639 million in 2025/26 will be followed by much greater cuts of US \$6.1 billion in 2026/27 and US \$8.3 billion in 2027/28.³
- France cut its ODA budget for 2025 by about 19%, including a 37% reduction in the 'ODA mission' budget line, and postponed its target of allocating 0.7% of GNI to ODA by five years to 2030.
- Sweden has cut its ODA budget for 2026–2028 to US \$5.1 billion from US \$5.4 billion in 2023–2025, aligning with its earlier decision to abandon the target of allocating 1% of GNI to ODA.
- Switzerland announced cuts of US \$282 million to its ODA budget for 2025.

Only four of last year's top 20 humanitarian donors have indicated increases in their ODA or humanitarian budgets: Japan, Norway, Korea and Ireland. For Japan, Korea and Ireland, the anticipated percentage changes are within 5% and therefore much lower than the decreases by other donors (in relative and absolute terms). Norway announced an 8.6% increase in its 2025 ODA budget, including a 10% increase in its humanitarian assistance.

It is uncertain what role the Gulf donors – Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – might play in the international humanitarian system in 2025 and beyond given the lack of forward-looking data on their foreign assistance budgets. However, their geographical focus historically has been in the region, reacting to escalations in specific crises rather than driven by a publicly stated humanitarian aid policy. Their choice of partners is also different from other donors, with a much larger share of funding being channelled directly through recipient governments compared to UN agencies.


The remainder of this chapter examines the exposure of the humanitarian system **only** to donors that have announced cuts in either humanitarian budgets or total ODA budgets (where there is a possibility that humanitarian budgets will be cut as a result). All of the following statistics in this chapter examine these 'focus donors' only.

Therefore, the following sections **do not** examine donors that have not announced cuts as of April 2025. For example, other top 10 donors such as EU institutions, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Norway and the United Arab Emirates are not included in the graphs or statistics below.

How might anticipated cuts affect recipients?

Figure 3.2: One-third of top 30 recipient countries of humanitarian assistance received 70% or more from donors that have announced cuts

Share of international humanitarian assistance from donors that have announced cuts to recipient countries by region, 2024



Source: Authors based on UN OCHA's Financial Tracking Service (FTS). Also see sources for Figure 3.1.

Notes: The 10 countries displayed present in descending order the greatest reliance on donor funding from donors that announced cuts to their foreign assistance out of the 30 largest international humanitarian assistance recipient countries in 2024. Funding data includes international humanitarian assistance to each country for all donors, including governments, private funding and global pooled funds, as reported to FTS. DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The exposure of recipient countries to proposed donor budget cuts varies. The heavy reliance of some recipients on a few donors reflects challenges facing the wider system. Out of the 30 largest recipients of international humanitarian assistance in 2024, 10 received 70% or more of their humanitarian funding from donors that announced cuts to their ODA and/or humanitarian budgets for 2025 and beyond (Figure 3.3).

- DRC's donor makeup in 2024 leaves it the most exposed to cuts, with 85% of its funding coming from donors that have announced aid cuts.
- Colombia, Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya all received 75% or more of 2024 funding from these donors.

The US is the largest donor to the 10 most exposed countries. The USAID memo published in late March 2025 containing a summary of terminated and retained projects paints a bleak picture for US foreign assistance in these countries, though accuracy of published information is unclear.

- Analysis of this memo in conjunction with other available data suggests on average the terminated share of USAID funding obligations across the 10 most exposed countries is expected to be 63%. This ranges between 35% (Somalia) and 92% (Colombia).

Reliance on other donors that have announced future budget cuts is far less concentrated, but nevertheless significant.

- Of the 10 most exposed recipients, the countries most reliant on German humanitarian funding were Jordan (14% of humanitarian funding) and Somalia (9%).
- The countries most reliant on UK humanitarian funding were Nigeria (14%), Ethiopia (14%) and Kenya (11%).

Some of the recipients most exposed to funding cuts were already experiencing growing donor fatigue, seen through the poor response to appeal funding requirements in 2024. These funding gaps are likely to grow in 2025, though that will ultimately depend on where donors choose to direct their possibly reduced funding envelopes and the revised requirements for these contexts.

- Ethiopia had the lowest share of response requirements met in 2024 (30%) out of the 10 contexts with the highest exposure to possible donor international humanitarian assistance budget cuts, followed by three contexts that were part of regional refugee responses: Uganda (34%), Colombia (41%), and Jordan (46%).⁴
- The remaining contexts received more than half of their response requirements, up to 71% in South Sudan.

Some of the largest recipients in 2024 are less reliant on the donors highlighted in Figure 3.2; they may be less exposed because of other donors, notably regional neighbours, directing greater attention to them.


- Palestine was the largest recipient of international humanitarian assistance in 2024 (see Figure 1.5) but received less than half of its funding (46%) from the eight donors with announcements of foreign assistance cuts. This is due to the United Arab Emirates (US \$383 million), Qatar (US \$102 million) and Saudi Arabia (US \$92 million) providing large amounts of funding, alongside the EU institutions (US \$187 million).
- Similarly, Yemen, the third largest recipient in 2024, may also be less exposed to donor cuts due to very high funding from Saudi Arabia in 2024 (US \$817 million).
- Ukraine, the second largest international humanitarian assistance recipient in 2024, received large bilateral humanitarian support from Norway (US \$263 million), the EU institutions (US \$253 million) and Japan (US \$123 million) in 2024. However this does not factor in broader development cooperation, such as direct budget support, for which the US was a major donor in previous years alongside EU institutions and other actors.

What is unclear from the data is the exposure of recipients to budget cuts from donors that channel a greater share of their funding through multilateral actors.

Which humanitarian sectors are most exposed to cuts?

Figure 3.3: Food security, nutrition and multi-purpose cash sectors were among the most dependent on funding from donors that announced budget cuts

Share of donor funding by global humanitarian sectors, 2024



Source: Authors based on UN OCHA's FTS data.

Notes: Funding both within and outside of response plans is included in the graph. Emergency telecommunications are included under logistics. Camp coordination/management is included under coordination and support services. Funding to multiple clusters, multi-sector or other field clusters is excluded. Funding data is in constant 2023 prices. MPC = multi-purpose cash.

Reductions in budgets announced by large humanitarian donors will hit humanitarian sectors differently because exposure to this donor pool varies widely across sectors. Given the volume of funding from the US, sectors that are highly dependent on US funding are the most exposed (such as nutrition, multi-purpose cash and basic needs, food security and agriculture, and logistics):

- The US ranks as the top donor to 9 of the 11 sectors analysed, and the top focus donor to all. This includes nutrition where nearly 6 in every 10 dollars (59%) came from the US in 2024, whilst just over 5 in 10 dollars (52%) to Food security and agriculture came from the US. Multi-purpose cash and basic needs (51%) and logistics (47%) are also highly exposed to US cuts. WFP is a major actor in all of these sectors – with three quarters of funding received for food security and agriculture going to WFP.⁵
- Many sectors are also exposed to cuts from Germany, which is the second top donor to 3 of the 11 sectors analysed. In particular, early recovery (14% of the total), protection (13%) and logistics (11%) are particularly exposed.
- The UK also ranks as a top 3 donor in 4 of the 11 sectors analysed, including multi-purpose cash and basic needs (12%), nutrition (9%), education (6%) and water sanitation hygiene (4%).


The best-funded sectors in 2024 UN appeals are also the most exposed to funding cuts, which could have a levelling-down effect on funding gaps between sectors. However, the full effect is unknown as donors may choose to redirect funding and budget cuts could end up widening existing sectoral funding gaps.

- Logistics (58%), nutrition (54%) and food security and agriculture (49%) saw the largest proportion of their funding appeal requirements met in 2024. However, they are also among the most exposed to likely donor budget cuts, particularly due to their over-reliance on US funding.
- The remaining sectors, albeit mostly less exposed to likely donor budget cuts, were already under-funded in 2024. Share of requirements met included 20% for early recovery, 30% each for education and shelter/non-food items, and 43% for health. While at the time of writing the scale of revisions to response requirements is still under discussion, any additional donor budget cuts – as several have been announced already – are likely to deepen the degree of underfunding and unmet humanitarian needs in those response areas.

How exposed are different humanitarian organisations?

Figure 3.4: WFP and UNHCR are among the UN agencies most exposed to future donor budget cuts

Share of funding by humanitarian donor to UN agencies and pooled funds, 2024



Source: Authors based on UN OCHA FTS, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and IOM data, the CBPF data hub, CERF data, and on the Global Humanitarian Assistance dataset on private humanitarian funding.

Notes: Funding for UNICEF only reflects core funding ('regular resources') and humanitarian funding ('other resources (emergency)'). All funding is included for WFP and UNHCR. Only funding captured on IOM's crisis response dashboard is included. Funding to UNRWA, WHO, UNFPA, FAO and OCHA is based on FTS data. CBPF = country-based pooled fund; CERF = Central Emergency Response Fund; FAO = Food and Agriculture Organization; OCHA = Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; UNFPA = United Nations Population Fund; UNHCR = United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNICEF = United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund; UNRWA = United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; WFP = World Food Programme; WHO = World Health Organization.

UN agencies vary widely in terms of how exposed they are to cuts. WFP received over two-thirds (68%) of its funding in 2024 from the donors that have announced cuts (46% from the US alone), whilst the humanitarian activities of WHO and FAO are the least exposed to humanitarian budget cuts according to FTS data, with only 41% and 35% from these donors:

- WFP and UNHCR (two of the largest UN agencies) are most exposed to donors that have announced cuts, receiving 68% and 62% from them, respectively.
- UNICEF, the other large agency delivering humanitarian assistance, is slightly more insulated with 45% of their funding coming from the focus donors.
- Exposure to the US is the biggest risk factor across nearly all UN agencies, as the US ranks top for all but one of the UN agencies analysed. Exposure to Germany and the UK is the next biggest concern for many agencies where they rank second in many cases, with between 7% and 10%.

As a result of their exposure to budget cuts, UN agencies have announced cuts in recent months. WFP announced a reduction of up to 30% of staff;⁶ UNHCR announced a reduction of costs by 30% and reduction in the number of senior positions in half;⁷ UNICEF said it is planning to operate with 20% less funding in 2026;⁸ OCHA announced staff cuts by around 20%;⁹ and IOM announced a reduction in donor funding of 30% and subsequent cuts of 20% of headquarters staff.¹⁰

In addition to workforce reductions, structural changes are underway. UNHCR has said it may close some country offices and rely on multi-country offices;¹¹ a merger of whole UN agencies as part of the UN80 Initiative is being considered, as well options to combine the operational aspects of the big UN agencies focused on aid.¹²

UN-managed pooled funds are also exposed to donor cuts, but not in the same way. The US is a smaller donor than other countries to the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and country-based pooled funds (CBPFs), which have a broader base of funding:

- Germany (21% of CBPF total), the UK (17%) and the Netherlands (10%) are the largest donors to CBPFs that have announced budget cuts.


The CERF also has a wide base of funding, including from donors that have announced cuts, including Germany (19%), the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK (all 12%). Over 70% of CERF's 2024 funding came from the eight focus donors. The pledges for CERF contributions in 2025 were 16% less than for the previous year.¹³

Despite recent cuts to the CBPFs and CERF, the 'humanitarian reset' and efforts under the Grand Bargain might position CBPFs well to attract a greater share of shrinking funding envelopes given their established position in channelling international humanitarian funding to local and national actors (see Figure 2.4). Most recently, it was announced that a proposal for one-third of global humanitarian assistance to be channelled through the CBPF, with additional funding for the CERF, is being explored as part of the humanitarian reset.¹⁴ Reduced donor budgets may also lead to smaller donor grant management teams and reduced geographical presence, which could lead the same donors to instead channel more of their funding through CBPFs where they no longer have a country presence.

How exposed are countries in protracted crises from wider cuts to development ODA?

Figure 3.5: Up to 92% of ODA for key social sectors in protracted crises came from donors that announced international assistance cuts

Share of ODA to protracted crises by sector and DAC donor, 2023



Source: Authors based on OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System data.

Notes: Protracted crisis countries included in this graph are contexts with five or more years of country-specific humanitarian response plans in 2023. ODA data includes disbursements from DAC members.

Donor cuts will have far-reaching impacts on countries experiencing long-term crisis, beyond a reduction in humanitarian assistance – compounding the challenges these countries face (see Chapter 4).

Key social sectors in countries experiencing protracted crises are profoundly exposed by the announced cuts. In 2023, the latest year with complete data, up to 92% of development funding for key social sectors came from donors that have announced ODA cuts. The sectors most historically reliant on donors that have announced funding cuts are the government and civil society sector (92%) – which comprises different forms of support to the public sector and broader civil rights initiatives, including to women's rights, human rights and ending violence against women and girls – and the population and reproductive health sector (91%). The US was the largest donor to these sectors in 2023.

- The US reports the bulk of its ODA to Ukraine under the government and civil society sector, which made up US \$10.1 billion in 2023 and brought its share of funding to this sector across all protracted crises to 87%. Even discounting for the US funding to Ukraine, the nine donors highlighted in Figure 3.4 would make up half of the total funding to the government and civil society sector in protracted crises in 2023.
- The US was also the largest provider of health development funding to protracted crises in 2023 at US \$862 million (44% of total), followed by Germany (11%) and France (7.9%). This funding includes support for the control of malaria, tuberculosis and infectious diseases, and for basic health care and nutrition – critical complements to humanitarian response.

The other social infrastructure and services; education; water supply and sanitation; and conflict, peace and security sectors in protracted crises all relied relatively less on US funding in 2023 but remain exposed to anticipated donor budget cuts.¹⁵


Around half of the bilateral development finance for agriculture in protracted crises in 2023 came from the US (31%), Germany (12%) and the Netherlands (6.4%) combined. The overall dependence for this sector on donors that announced cuts to their foreign assistance was 62% in 2023. Given the even higher exposure of humanitarian food-related sectors to funding cuts (see Figure 3.3), this risks further destabilising food systems in protracted crises.



As the United States makes significant cuts in 2025 and beyond, this was their humanitarian footprint in 2024

US funding doubled between 2015 and 2023 to reach over US \$16bn


US international humanitarian assistance 2015–2024




The average context with a response plan depended on the US for 50% of its funding

● US proportion of funding —● Funding US \$ millions

Most exposed




Least exposed




UN agencies affected

US funding as a share of its humanitarian assistance



Sectoral exposure

US funding as a share of sector funding



Local actor funding

US \$ millions to local actors



Notes: US international humanitarian assistance numbers in constant 2023 prices. Most and least exposed countries to US funding excludes countries with a requirement under an RRP of less than US \$100m in 2024, and excludes countries with funding of less than US \$10m in 2024. Methodology notes for UN humanitarian funding data are found with Figure 3.4. Sectoral exposure includes funding both inside and outside of response plans. Data on localisation based on USAID's localisation self-report dataset. WASH = water sanitation hygiene. For full notes see the Methodology and sources chapter. Published by ALNAP as part of the *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2025*.



Vietnam. 2024.

Residents use boats to reach their homes in riverbank districts of Hanoi after Typhoon Yagi, September 2024.

Credit: Vladimir Bronnikov / Shutterstock

Chapter 4: The shifting tectonic plates of broader crisis financing

Humanitarian assistance to countries affected by crisis sits within a wider funding landscape of ODA, including aid for development, peace and climate. Between 2014 and 2023, multilateral development banks (MDBs) increasingly engaged in fragile settings, tripling their funding to the top 20 humanitarian crises from US \$3.5 billion to US \$10.3 billion. However, in recent years these annual increases have stalled, returning to 2019 levels (i.e. before the COVID-19 pandemic) in 2023.

The steady increase in humanitarian funding contrasted with stagnating development and peace programming in crisis contexts between 2014 and 2023.¹ In 2023, the share of ODA for humanitarian assistance increased again for all protracted humanitarian response plan (HRP) contexts, excluding Ukraine. This trend is in direct contrast to the aims and commitments of the OECD DAC Nexus recommendation, which promotes 'prevention always, development wherever possible, humanitarian action when necessary'.² As a result, humanitarian actors have been stretched across the spectrum of responses needed in crisis contexts, with inadequate funding for tackling root causes. Reduced funding for prevention also resulted in a rise of violence, insecurity and socioeconomic turmoil in fragile settings.³


While protracted crisis countries have become ever more reliant on humanitarian funding as the primary form of ODA, these countries are now seeing a stagnation and will likely see significant cuts to this funding. Preliminary data for 2024 suggests higher proportional cuts across humanitarian portfolios – even before the seismic impact of the 2025 donor cuts.⁴ As the US now turns away from multilateralism, both the reduction in resources and the fundamental shifts in policy agendas are felt across institutions and sectors, with climate, gender and development programming deprioritised. This was evident in the recent 2025 Spring Meetings, as the World Bank communicated a return to focusing on jobs and infrastructure.⁵

Against the backdrop of an escalating global trade war, countries in humanitarian crisis face the dual challenge of reduced ODA combined with escalating debt levels. As humanitarian budgets are cut and the sector looks to return to providing assistance for basic needs, adequate reassurance that donors are stepping in to provide longer term development assistance to fill in the gaps and tackle protracted conflicts and their root causes remains to be seen. Addressing the financial needs of protracted crises will be a key issue for the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, which acknowledges the humanitarian–development–peace nexus in its draft outcome document.⁶

What is the mix of humanitarian, development and peace funding reaching protracted crises?

Figure 4.1: Increased funding to Ukraine hid a stagnation of wider crisis financing to protracted crises

Volumes of ODA from DAC members for development, humanitarian and peace to protracted HRP contexts



Source: Based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Creditor Reporting System (CRS).


Notes: Recipients vary between years. Data is in constant 2023 prices.

Over a decade ago, MDBs pivoted their strategies to provide more support to fragile, conflict and violence contexts as a way of enhancing stability and promoting sustainable development. As a result, volumes of wider crisis financing increased significantly to protracted crises. However, total ODA funding to humanitarian contexts has stagnated over the past five years, overshadowed by a large increase in assistance to Ukraine following the 2022 invasion.

- Protracted HRP contexts received 24% of all DAC donor ODA funding from 2019 to 2023. The volume of ODA from DAC members to protracted HRP contexts increased substantially between 2019 and 2023, from US \$28.8 billion to US \$67.5 billion. However, 97% of this increase is attributed solely to increased funding to Ukraine.
- Excluding funding to Ukraine, all other protracted HRP contexts received a steady US \$28 billion of ODA per year over the same five year period – with the exception of 2021 (US \$31 billion).

Figure 4.2: Humanitarian funding now outgrows development funding in protracted HRP contexts when Ukraine is excluded

Share of ODA to development, humanitarian, peace and climate from DAC donors to protracted HRP contexts



Source: Based on OECD DAC CRS.

Notes: Recipients vary between years. Data is in constant 2023 prices.

Previous Global Humanitarian Assistance reports detailed the increased share of humanitarian funding going to protracted crises, and consequently the increased reliance on humanitarians to work on prevention, crisis response and resilience.⁷ As a protracted crisis, Ukraine is an extreme outlier; it receives a significantly higher proportion of development funding than other protracted HRP crises. It is therefore important to understand trends in protracted HRP contexts both with and without Ukraine included. The share of humanitarian assistance in protracted HRP countries reduced from 41% in 2021 to 25% in 2023, but this is due almost entirely to the large volumes of development funding allocated to the Ukraine crisis. When excluding Ukraine, the share of humanitarian ODA continued to increase in 2023 as per previous trends, surpassing development ODA in 2023 when it recorded its highest percentage share of ODA in protracted HRP contexts thus far.

- Development funding to protracted HRP contexts increased by 235% from 2019 to 2023 – the vast majority of this was allocated to Ukraine.
- Recipients with the highest share of development funding included Ukraine (88%), Mozambique (80%) and Cameroon (80%), and those with the lowest shares were Libya (30%), the Central African Republic (32%) and South Sudan (32%).
- The share of humanitarian ODA in protracted HRP contexts excluding Ukraine increased from 39% in 2019 to 48% in 2023 and now outmatches development ODA in these contexts. Venezuela, Yemen and Syria received the highest share of humanitarian funding, all at around 75%.

This large influx of development and humanitarian funding for Ukraine resulted in the relative reduction in the share of peace and climate funding across HRP contexts. Funding for peace programming remained comparatively low. Similarly, despite the heightened climate vulnerability of humanitarian contexts,⁸ and the increase in volume from US \$1.6 billion in 2019 to US \$2.8 billion in 2023, climate finance made up a small share of ODA to HRP countries.


- Peace funding was a mere 5% of ODA in 2023 (US \$3.2 billion), down from 12% in 2020 (US \$3.7 billion).
- Libya, Iraq and Mali received the highest share of peace funding, at 43%, 23% and 19%, respectively. Cameroon, Ukraine and Yemen received the lowest proportions, at around 3–4%.
- Over this period, the relative share of climate finance across ODA averaged 5%, in comparison to 14% for non-HRP contexts.
- Excluding funding for Ukraine from the analysis reveals a smaller reduction in peace funding (13% to 8%), and an increase in climate funding from 6% in 2019 to 9% in 2023.
- The highest recipients in terms of share of ODA of climate finance were Burkina Faso (16%), Burundi (15%) and Mozambique (14%), which each received around the average for non-HRP contexts. The lowest recipients were Syria (1%), Ukraine (1%) and Venezuela (1%).

Most recent preliminary data for 2024 suggests the picture of nexus financing may be changing, as donors reduced humanitarian aid in relation to overall ODA.

How do individual donors fund assistance across the triple nexus?

Figure 4.3: The largest humanitarian donors spend most of their funding on development aid

ODA from the top 20 DAC members for humanitarian, development and peace in 2023



Source: ALNAP based on OECD DAC CRS.

Notes: Humanitarian–development–peace classification follows the methodology of Development Initiatives' research paper, *Leaving no crisis behind with assistance for the triple nexus*.⁹

Beyond the global trends, there is a large variation in terms of how much assistance each donor allocates across the humanitarian–development–peace and climate nexus. The United States is an outlier in providing a significantly higher proportion of humanitarian funding than other donors, while other large donors prioritise development spending.

- Across the top 20 donors, the average nexus split was 13% to humanitarian, 79% to development and 8% to peace in 2023.
- The United States gave the highest share of ODA to humanitarian assistance (26.5%); in contrast, France gave the lowest at 4.7%.
- Some of the largest humanitarian donors only contribute a small percentage of their ODA to humanitarian assistance, including Germany (9%), the EU (9%) and the UK (8%).


Peace funding is the lowest priority across the nexus for nearly all donors, with the exception of Sweden and the Netherlands. A handful of northern donors prioritise peace spending to the same extent as humanitarian, suggesting the implementation of intentional nexus financing strategies.

- Norway, Sweden and Denmark all contribute over 19% of their portfolio to humanitarian and over 10% to peace.

As the United States cuts wider development and peace funding – coupled with the generalised reduction of ODA budgets in favour of increased defence budgets – a narrowed focus on life-saving humanitarian action would leave a growing gap in development finance. However, the largest DAC donors have little margin for manoeuvre for filling this gap, as Germany, the EU, the UK, Japan and France already give more than 83% of their portfolio to development. In this context, in-country nexus financing coordination becomes ever more relevant, through evidence-based financing strategies, joint planning and outcomes, promoting flexible and predictable funding, and supporting local leadership.

What is the trend in financing from multilateral development banks to humanitarian contexts?

Figure 4.4: Volumes of funding from MDBs to humanitarian recipients have returned to pre-pandemic levels
ODA funding from MDBs to the top 20 humanitarian recipients



Source: Based on OECD DAC CRS, UN OCHA FTS.

Notes: Totals are ODA in the form of grants and loans from MDBs that report their funding to the OECD DAC CRS. The top 20 recipients of humanitarian assistance vary each year. Data is in constant 2023 prices.

Between 2014 and 2023, MDBs increasingly engaged in crisis settings and fragile contexts through a range of tools and financing mechanisms for providing grants and low-interest loans. This is evidenced by the increase in volume of funding to countries experiencing humanitarian crises, from US \$3.5 billion to the largest humanitarian recipients in 2014 to US \$10.3 billion in 2023 – a total of US \$89.5 billion over 10 years. However, in parallel to the stagnating provision of development assistance to crisis contexts from DAC donors, these annual increases in volumes from MDBs have overall stalled.

- Across contexts and MDBs, there was a surge in funding from MDBs in 2021 during the pandemic, with US \$12.9 billion disbursed to countries in crisis in 2021.
- By 2023, MDB grants and loans to crisis contexts were back to 2019 levels.

Funding from MDBs to crisis contexts remains largely developmental, focusing on long-term economic recovery. Only 4% of ODA provided by MDBs has a humanitarian purpose code. However, the top humanitarian recipient countries receive around 30–40% of funding of all MDB disbursements, a trend that has remained steady since 2016 (again except for 2021, when this rose to 45%). Yet while 10 years ago there was a relatively even split between the provision of grants and concessional loans, since 2021 64–67% of funding to the top humanitarian recipients has been disbursed in the form of loans.

- Over the past 10 years, grants to humanitarian crises have doubled in volume, whereas loans have tripled.
- Nevertheless, top humanitarian recipients have received a higher share of grants than other countries; over the same period, 78% of funding to countries not part of the top 20 humanitarian recipients was through loans.

The World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) remains the main channel of MDB financing to humanitarian crises, providing 81% of all MDB ODA funding to the top 20 humanitarian recipients between 2014 and 2023. IDA also provided the highest proportion of its funding to humanitarian recipients (38%) in comparison to other banks, whilst also providing the lowest proportion of grants after the Asian Development Bank. However in the past few years there has been a proportional decrease of IDA disbursements to crisis settings, and the United States contribution to the upcoming IDA replenishment is likely to be US \$2.8 billion lower than pledged under the previous administration.¹⁰

- Since 2021 (IDA19, the replenishment from 2020 to 2023), IDA has decreased its share of disbursements to the top 20 humanitarian recipients. In 2021, 49% (US \$10 billion) of its funding targeted these contexts. In 2023, the share reduced to 35% (US \$8.7 billion).
- Estimations show that IDA may see a 15–20% reduction if current pledges are not honoured,¹¹ which in turn could lead to a US \$1.5–2 billion loss in funding to the top 20 humanitarian recipients.


MDB funding to countries experiencing humanitarian crises is not allocated and disbursed equally across different contexts, with most funding channelled to a handful of crises, which are usually in countries with more established private sectors and state structures.

- From 2014 to 2023, Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Nigeria received 53% of all received disbursements.
- In contrast, despite being in the top 20 humanitarian recipients for all of the last 10 years, Syria received less than 0.1%. Similarly, a top 20 recipient for 9 years, Iraq received 0.1%, whereas Pakistan (a top 20 recipient for 2 years) received 5.5%.

What is the debt burden for protracted humanitarian crises?

Figure 4.5: The average protracted crisis context is paying double on government debt payments in 2024 than a decade ago

Average (median) government external debt payments as % of revenue (protracted crisis contexts)



Source: ALNAP based on Debt Justice.

Notes: The figure includes data for protracted crisis contexts with an HRP in 2024; countries without data for the whole series were not included in the analysis.

Countries experiencing humanitarian crises are especially vulnerable to global economic instability, including the escalating uncertainty around trade, fluctuating commodity prices, inflation driving up exchange rates and capital flight.¹² Sovereign debt is on the rise, as is the cost of loan repayments.¹³

Across humanitarian contexts, governments are spending increasing proportions of their revenue on servicing commercial and concessional debt.¹⁴ Current data on debt is available for 17 countries in protracted crisis; of these, governments were paying twice as much on average than they did a decade ago in external debt payments.

- A decade ago, only 3 of the 17 contexts in this subset were paying more than 10% of their government revenue to external debt payments; in 2024 the majority (11 of 17) of these contexts were paying more than 10%.
- Protracted crisis contexts that spent the highest proportion on external debt payments in 2024 were Sudan (42%), Cameroon (21%), Nigeria (20%), South Sudan (17%) and Niger (16%).

With overall aid budgets reducing and greater proportions of national revenue spent on debt servicing, there is less spending available for public services such as health, education and social protection, and climate action, risking further prolonging humanitarian crises. Furthermore, as climate disasters increase, countries are taking on ever larger loans to finance response and recovery¹⁵ often prioritising economic policies favouring extractive industries to service these loans, further accelerating the climate crisis.¹⁶

Over recent years, the debt panorama has shifted in countries classified by the OECD as facing high fragility.¹⁷ This classification is based on a country's vulnerability to a range of factors; in 2024, out of 25 countries with an HRP, 11 were listed as facing extreme fragility and 10 as high fragility.¹⁸ China was the largest bilateral creditor to contexts experiencing high fragility in 2022, and the second-largest creditor overall after IDA. Debt to private creditors has also increased over the past 10 years, although this remains limited in extreme fragility contexts¹⁹ due to their lack of access to private markets.²⁰ As a result, there is a risk of countries moving away from multilateral structures to source borrowing, whilst in parallel there are increasing calls for a more inclusive multilateral treaty body on debt.²¹

During the pandemic there was a concerted effort to provide international support for debt sustainability, especially through the US \$650 billion general allocation of Special Drawing Rights and the Debt Service Suspension Initiative, yet the OECD notes that these measures provided buffers that have now eroded, and the debt-to-GDP ratio of contexts with high and extreme fragility has increased.²² Multilateral efforts to restructure sovereign debt, through the G20's Common Framework for Debt Treatments, have been slow to take off.²³ At the 2025 World Bank IMF Spring Meetings, the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable released a new playbook for low-income countries,²⁴ aimed at improving transparency and coordination in debt restructuring processes. In addition, this Jubilee Year, policymakers and campaigners continue to present debt relief through a justice lens, in terms of both the unequal financial systems that have locked lower income countries in debt and the climate and historic debts of higher income former colonial powers.²⁵

The potential transformational power of debt relief for countries facing humanitarian crises varies widely according to contexts and types of crises. While unlocking finance for governments party to internal armed conflicts or perpetrating human rights violations would not support the reduction of humanitarian need, countries hosting large numbers of refugees or facing the impacts of natural hazards and climate change could benefit significantly from debt relief.

- Three countries (Cameroon, Nigeria and Mozambique) paid more debt servicing costs (principal and interest repayments) than the total amount needed to fund their HRPs. Cameroon spent over three times as much on interest repayments than the HRP value (247% more), Nigeria spent more than twice as much (173% more), and Mozambique spent 9% more.
- In 2023, debt servicing costs were the equivalent of 86% of the Myanmar HRP, 48% of the Ukraine HRP, 41% for Mali, 40% for Chad, 35% for Ethiopia and 26% for Burkina Faso.
- Of the 19 contexts examined, 10 would have benefited more than 25% of their HRP funding requirement value if interest repayments were foregone.
- Debt relief for all protracted crises in 2023 could have unlocked US \$8.1 billion in additional finance for these contexts (although 57% would have been destined solely to Ukraine, Nigeria and Ethiopia).
- However, for nine contexts debt servicing costs were below the equivalent of 25% of the HRP; this includes six contexts with over US \$2 billion in HRP funding requests (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan and Syria).

NOTES

Executive summary

- 1 Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in humanitarian action.
- 2 UN OCHA, 2025. The Humanitarian Reset, Letter from Tom Fletcher, Chair of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. Available at: <https://www.unocha.org/news/humanitarian-reset>
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- 4 Development Initiatives, 2024. Falling short? Humanitarian funding and reform. Available at: <https://alnap.org/help-library/resources/global-humanitarian-assistance-report-2024/>
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- 7 Calculations are based on data and information available relating to aid cut announcements by donors up to and including May 2025.
- 8 Funding to local and national actors ensures it goes to organisations that have vital local knowledge, networks and cultural understanding, giving them a uniquely important role in ensuring effective humanitarian response.
- 9 Cash and voucher assistance is quicker, more flexible and offers greater dignity for people affected by crisis.
- 10 Anticipatory action reduces the humanitarian impacts of a forecast crisis before it occurs, or before its most acute impacts are felt.
- 11 An agreement to reform the delivery of humanitarian aid that was proposed at the World Humanitarian Summit in May 2016.

NOTES

Chapter 1

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NOTES

Chapter 2

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- 17 In order to allow comparability between CVA volumes and total international humanitarian assistance figures, international humanitarian assistance in this analysis is in current prices. Therefore, the 9% drop in international humanitarian assistance here (current prices) is not comparable to that presented in Chapter 1 (10% drop), which is expressed in constant 2023 prices.
- 18 CVA volumes for 2018 and 2023 remain unchanged in this analysis from previous years, however the CVA as a share of international humanitarian assistance has been restated for this analysis. This data was previously reported in Development Initiatives (DI), 2024. Falling short? Humanitarian funding and reform. Available at: <https://alnap.org/help-library/resources/global-humanitarian-assistance-report-2024/>, in which CALP provided CVA volume data and DI researchers compiled international humanitarian assistance totals. For that report, the international humanitarian assistance figures used for the CVA comparison were based on a combination of UN OCHA's FTS and OECD's DAC data. For this analysis, ALNAP researchers revised the methodology to ensure consistency with international humanitarian assistance totals used elsewhere in this report. The reinterpretation primarily affects 2022 and 2023, as these years previously used FTS data for specific donors but are now based on DAC data, in line with the methodology used for other years. Minor differences also reflect retrospective updates made by funders to prior-year DAC submissions.
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- 24 In the survey conducted by CALP, agencies were asked to share their views 'on the likely/predicted impact of funding cuts and other factors on your organisation's CVA volumes and programming in 2025?'. Responses were categorised into five groups: a significant decrease (around 40% or more), a moderate decrease (20–40%), a slight decrease (5–20%), no change or stable (0%), and unclear or too early to estimate. A weighted average was then created of n=18 responses to create an estimate of a 31% reduction, which was applied to the 2024 volume to calculate the projected 2025 figure.

NOTES

Chapter 3

- 1 The picture emerging so far is based on the following published information:
 - Calculations based on a memo of retained and terminated USAID awards estimate the proposed US cuts to be in the range of 38% of total assistance and over 20% of humanitarian assistance. The final extent of the cuts in 2025 will not be known until after the end of the fiscal year. Source: Center for Global Development (CGD), 2025. USAID Cuts: New Estimates at the Country Level. CGD Blog, 26 March 2025. Available at: <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/usaids-cuts-new-estimates-country-level>.
 - Subsequent announcements of US funding cuts to Yemen, Afghanistan and other large-scale humanitarian crises will likely contribute to an even larger reduction in humanitarian funding. Source: OneAID Community, 2025. FLASH Update on USAID Humanitarian Award Terminations. OneAID Community Blog, 7 April 2025. Available at: <https://www.oneaidcommunity.org/post/usaids-humanitarian-assistance-award-terminations>.
 - The White House budget request for 2026 proposes cutting international humanitarian assistance to US \$4 billion, a staggering 73% drop from 2024 funding levels. This remains a proposal and the final amounts will not be known until the request has been considered and approved by Congress. Source: CGD, 2025. Redefining America's Interests? Trump's FY2026 Budget Proposes Sweeping Cuts to US Foreign Aid. CGD Blog, 7 May 2025. Available at: <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/redefining-americas-interests-trumps-fy2026-budget-proposes-sweeping-cuts-us-foreign-aid>.
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- 4 This percentage is calculated by adding up requirements and funding for the Uganda country components in 2024 across South Sudan, Sudan and Democratic Republic of the Congo Regional Refugee Response Plans, whilst the Colombia percentage is calculated by adding up requirements and funding for the Colombia Humanitarian Response Plan and the Venezuela Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan. Jordan is one of the countries within the Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) Plan.
- 5 The USAID memo on terminated and retained awards published in late March 2025 indicated that over 99% of USAID's humanitarian funding obligations to WFP were retained, making the organisation an outlier in terms of the high share of retained awards. However, the extent of the cuts remains unclear and further decisions on cuts and retentions continue to be made: since March further reports indicated that US humanitarian funding to Afghanistan and Yemen were cut, both with high levels of food insecurity. While the impact of this on WFP's core costs and programmes remains unclear, in the context of this high exposure to the declining donor base WFP announced to reduce its workforce by up to 30% by 2026.
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- 15
 - Funding for other social infrastructure and services – which includes employment, social protection and other basic social services – came primarily from Germany in 2023 (58%). Almost 80% of funding for other social infrastructure and services in protracted crisis countries came from donors that announced budget cuts, despite hardly relying on US funding (2.9%). This funding was mostly for multi-sector aid for basic social services in multiple crisis contexts (Ukraine, Afghanistan and Ethiopia were the largest recipients). The UK provided 6.9% of the total under this sector to protracted crises, mostly for social protection (e.g. in Ethiopia and Yemen).
 - Germany was the largest provider of development finance for protracted crises to education (31%), water supply and sanitation (27%) and to conflict, peace and security (24%) in 2023.
 - France provided 11% of ODA from DAC members to education in protracted crises in 2023 while the Netherlands (10%) and Belgium (7.0%) were both significant providers of development finance to water supply and sanitation.

NOTES

Chapter 4

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