ALNAP

GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

2026

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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF DENMARK

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

3RP	Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan
CBPF	country-based pooled fund
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CVA	cash and voucher assistance
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU	European Union
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (UK)
FTS	Financial Tracking Service
GHA	Global Humanitarian Assistance (report)
GHO	Global Humanitarian Overview
HDP	humanitarian–development–peace (nexus)
HPC	Humanitarian Programme Cycle
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOM	International Organization for Migration
INGO	international non-governmental organisation
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdon
UN	United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	water, hygiene and sanitation (sector)
WFP	World Food Programme

Afghanistan, 2026.

People affected by floods receive relief items in Kandahar, Afghanistan, April 2026

Qudratullah Razwan/EPA/Shutterstock

CHAPTER 1.

THE CHANGING DONOR LANDSCAPE

SUMMARY

2025 was the worst year in recent history for the humanitarian system. Budget cuts affected development and humanitarian programmes alike, with devastating impacts for people receiving assistance that relied on a stable but insufficient system. Donor decisions to cut funding have taken centre stage and, as such, this chapter places the focus solely on trends in humanitarian donor funding.

The humanitarian system suffered the biggest decline in funding on record by over US $8 billion in 2025 – this is in large part due to the closure of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and drastic reductions in spending from the US. This comes on top of cuts of nearly US $6 billion in 2024, leaving the humanitarian system 30% smaller than it was in 2023.

There could still be more to come, with further cuts anticipated in 2026, although not at the same magnitude. The question is, when will the humanitarian recession reach its lowest point? And has it found a new equilibrium with lower budgets from Western donor capitals, notably the US and Germany? Whilst traditional donors continue to retreat, Gulf donors, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, have now become the fourth and fifth largest donors to the humanitarian system, supplanting Germany's place as a top four donor.

The choice by traditional donors to reduce official development assistance (ODA) budgets also comes with other choices, including what to fund within those budgets. Despite some donors signalling that they will prioritise humanitarian spending in their budgets, there is limited evidence that humanitarian spending is always being prioritised over wider development spending.

With the funding landscape changing so rapidly in 2025, the collective power of different donor blocs has also changed. The traditional top four donors now contribute less than half of humanitarian funding, European donors now contribute nearly twice as much funding as the US, whilst Gulf donors collectively contribute funding worth around three quarters of US contributions. As a result, power is spread more widely, increasing the importance of donor coordination in a fragmented donor landscape.

HOW MUCH FUNDING DID THE HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM LOSE IN 2025?

Figure 1.1: Humanitarian funding fell for the third year in a row, with a 20% drop in 2025

Total international humanitarian assistance, 2021–2025



Source: ALNAP based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and our unique dataset for private contributions.

Notes: Figures for 2025 are preliminary. Totals for previous years differ from those reported in previous GHA reports due to updated deflators and data. Data is in constant 2024 prices. The methodology used to produce total international humanitarian assistance is detailed in the 'Methodology and definitions' chapter (online).

Primarily due to funding cuts from major humanitarian donors, the humanitarian system contracted by 20% in 2025 to US $33.3 billion. This is the third year in a row that the sector has shrunk, and the largest fall in recent years. The reduction is a consequence of both reductions in funding from public donors (e.g. governments and EU institutions) and private donors (e.g. individuals, corporates and foundations).

As a result, the humanitarian system as a whole now receives as much funding as it did in 2017. However, humanitarian needs have changed substantially: in 2017, 141 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance compared with 300 million people at the end of 2025. The fall in recent years is unprecedented, with the sector now receiving 30% less than it did at its peak in 2022 – in absolute terms this is US $14.1 billion.

This reduction in humanitarian funding is devastating for the ability of humanitarian responses to provide assistance to the millions of people facing some of the world's worst disasters and conflicts. As a reference to highlight how reductions in activity by

around a third can have severe and lasting impacts, the US economy shrunk by 29% during the Great Depression, whilst the Ukrainian economy shrunk by 29% in 2022.[1]

However, the contraction in funding is far short of the claim that 'global humanitarian funding has shrunk by 50%' from the International Rescue Committee in December 2025, or that 'the humanitarian sector has contracted to just one-third of its size from 10 months ago' from Tom Fletcher, the Emergency Relief Coordinator in September 2025.[2]

Public funding for international humanitarian assistance has been hit by large funding cuts from key donors in 2025, notably the US and Germany:

- Public funding for international humanitarian assistance fell by 22% in one year, and by 32% over two years.
- Funding from the US fell from US $13.5 billion in 2024 to US $6.1 billion in 2025, whilst funding from Germany fell from US $2.3 billion to US $1.5 billion.
- The continuing fall in humanitarian assistance comes after the peak in 2022 when the escalation of the war in Ukraine drove higher humanitarian contributions.
- Historical figures have been revised slightly upwards due to increased reporting of funding for previous years from some donors (Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE).

Private funding has been an increasing focus of attention for the humanitarian system – with dwindling budgets from the public sector and governments, aid agencies are looking to the private sector, such as philanthropies and foundations, to fill the funding gap. However, data shows that private funding to the humanitarian system fell for the third year in a row:

- Private donors gave an estimated US $6.8 billion in funding in 2025, down from US $7.3 billion in 2024 and US $11.3 billion in 2022 when the conflict in Ukraine boosted private giving.
- Private funding has decreased to levels not seen since 2021, though not by the same magnitude as public funding; public funding fell by 22% in 2025, compared with a 7% decline for private funding.
- Private funding has decreased to just above the pre-Ukraine average – between 2016 and 2021, private funding stood at just over US $6 billion per year.

The budget cuts by donors in recent years has led to a humanitarian 'great depression'. However, it is not clear what the future trajectory of funding is for the humanitarian system: will there be a recovery in an 'V shape' or a 'U shape', will it flatline in an 'L shape' and not recover to previous heights, or will funding fail to stabilise and keep falling?

SCENARIOS FOR 2026: HOW MUCH COULD PUBLIC HUMANITARIAN FUNDING FALL THIS YEAR?

Through examining publicly available information from donor governments, two scenarios have been constructed to show the trajectory of humanitarian funding in 2026. The scenarios presented are speculative and based on a degree of uncertainty, as donor disbursements rarely match initial budgets. This may reflect several factors, including reallocations or additional disbursements during the year, initial pledges not being approved in finance bills, disbursements being made late and rolling into the next financial year, and limited visibility of humanitarian budgets within broader budget lines, which makes it difficult to determine what is actually allocated in the first instance.

Therefore, these scenarios should be considered speculative. Readers should use these – and any other projections offered by others – with caution and to complement other data in their strategic planning. For details on how these projections were constructed and their assumptions, see the 'Methodology and definitions' chapter (online).

Figure 1.2: Decreases in humanitarian funding from public donors are anticipated in 2026, but to a lesser extent than in 2025

Two scenarios for humanitarian funding from public donors, 2026



Source: Historic data based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF. 2026 scenarios based on publicly available information regarding ODA or humanitarian budgets.

Notes: 2025 data is preliminary. Data is in constant 2024 prices. 'Public donors' refers to governments and EU institutions. Historical figures differ from those reported in the *GHA Report 2025* due to updated final reported international humanitarian assistance data and a different year for constant prices. Methodological notes on how the 2026 scenarios were constructed are detailed in the 'Methodology and definitions' chapter.

Both scenarios show a drop in public humanitarian funding in 2026, albeit by differing amounts:

- The optimistic scenario shows a decline by 2% on 2025, equivalent to a reduction of US $450 million. Taking a medium-term perspective, this would mean that the public humanitarian funding is 33% smaller than its peak in 2023.
- The pessimistic scenario shows a larger decline of 11% on 2025, equivalent to a reduction of US $3 billion. This would equal a 39% reduction on the peak of public funding in 2023.

Both scenarios reflect a humanitarian system that may be reaching the trough of its current decline. In the first year of the decline in public funding (2024), funding declined by 13%, before cuts accelerated in the second year (2025) and public funding declined by 22%. Both scenarios suggest that the cuts are likely to continue but will decelerate.

The primary reason for the future deceleration of cuts is that US funding has already fallen a large amount. As noted in the next section, the US cut funding by US $7.4 billion in a single year, declining to US $6.1 billion – this fall in magnitude won't happen again in 2026 with US funding projected to stabilise. In FY26, the US has made US $5.5 billion available for humanitarian assistance, whilst current FY27 proposals from the Administration and Congress range between US $4.5 billion and US $5.1 billion.[3]

However, despite the deceleration, there is still uncertainty in the projections. This is partly due to ambiguity over how US funding will materialise in FY27 and the difficulties in aligning financial and calendar years. There is also a lack of forward-looking budgetary information from Gulf donors as they do not publish planned funding strategies but tend to allocate pledges on an ad-hoc basis. This is compounded with uncertainty in light of the Iran war and whether their budgets will be reallocated towards domestic priorities.

WHICH DONORS CONTRIBUTED THE MOST IN 2025?

Figure 1.3: The majority of top donors cut humanitarian funding in 2025

20 largest public donors and EU institutions of humanitarian assistance in 2025, and change from 2024



Source: Based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF.

Notes: 2025 data is preliminary. Data is in constant 2024 prices. 'Public donors' refers to governments and EU institutions. Contributions of current and former EU member states to EU institutions' international humanitarian assistance are shown separately to avoid double counting. Figures for 2024 differ from the *GHA Report 2025* due to updated final reported international humanitarian assistance data and a different year for constant prices. UAE = United Arab Emirates.

The majority of top humanitarian donors reduced funding in 2025, with 13 of the top 20 donors cutting their humanitarian spending, including the US and Germany.

Together, these two donors accounted for 88% of total cuts in 2025.

- The largest cuts in humanitarian funding in 2025 were by the US (–US $ 7.4 billion; –55%), Germany (–US $ 814 million; –36%), Saudi Arabia (–US $ 268 million; –14%), Japan (–US $ 234 million; –29%), South Korea (–US $ 82 million; –11%), France (–US $ 80 million; –11%) and Türkiye (–US $ 76 million; –18%).
- However, a number of donors deviated from this trend and increased funding in 2025, including: the UAE (+US $ 645 million; +54%); Qatar (+US $ 642 million; +189%); Canada (+US $ 218 million, +38%) and Italy (+US $ 45 million; +15%).
- Despite the large movements in funding by many countries, a significant number of countries held stable (within 5% of last year's disbursements), including EU institutions, the UK, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands and Australia.

Whilst the steepness of the cuts in 2025 outstripped the previous year, there does appear to be some change in collective donor behaviour. Whilst 13 of the top 20 donors reduced funding substantially in 2024 (by more than 5%), only eight of the top 20 donors did so in 2025. Similarly, only four of the top 20 donors increased funding substantially in 2024, whereas six of the top 20 donors did so in 2025. Although it appears that the humanitarian system is still experiencing declining levels of funding, this subtle shift in donor behaviour, taken together with the scenarios presented above, may be the first indication that the sector could stabilise in the near future and find a new equilibrium.

This year also marks a significant shift amongst the lead donors in the humanitarian system. Between 2013 and 2024, the top four donors had been the US, EU institutions, Germany and the UK. However, more comprehensive, as well as retrospective, reporting has allowed greater visibility for certain donors. Whilst the previous top four donors did retain these ranks between 2013 and 2020, the UAE and Saudi Arabia now occupy fourth and fifth position as lead donors in 2025, ahead of Germany in sixth, with these donors also occupying top four positions in previous years (for more on retrospective reporting, see **Box 1.1**).

Humanitarian funding from the US decreased by 55% in 2025. This is the largest cut of any donor in both absolute and percentage terms in 2025. However, as noted above, US funding may be stabilising in the near future at a lower equilibrium. Germany ranks second in terms of funding reductions in absolute and percentage terms. German funding in 2025 fell to US $1.4 billion, similar to levels seen a decade ago, with the nearest comparable figure being 2015 (US $1.2 billion), after peaking at US $4.5 billion in 2022. This is a 68% reduction in three years for Germany.

Germany's decline as a humanitarian donor strangely occurs at the exact moment when it has become the top ODA donor globally despite cutting ODA in general.[4] Germany appears to be prioritising other ODA spending over humanitarian – the cut in humanitarian funding was twice as much in percentage terms than the rest of the ODA cut.

Over the past year, some donor statements suggest they will safeguard humanitarian budgets over general ODA (e.g. Switzerland[5]), aligning more closely with narratives about ODA that donor governments can justify publicly. However, the picture on whether donors are prioritising humanitarian assistance in reality is mixed:

- Analysis of preliminary 2025 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) ODA data shows that, among donors for which data is available for both ODA and humanitarian spending, 20 favoured humanitarian spending over other forms of ODA, while 18 donors favoured the remainder of ODA. This is calculated by looking at whether the percentage change in humanitarian spend is higher than the percentage change in the rest of ODA.
- A relatively even split between favouring humanitarian and other forms of ODA is also evident when examining DAC donors only (16 favouring humanitarian funding versus 17 favouring other ODA), donors providing more than US $100 million in humanitarian assistance (11 versus 10), EU institutions and EU member states (12 versus 14) and the traditional top four donors (two versus two).

Therefore, there is inconclusive evidence that the prioritisation of humanitarian assistance is widespread amongst donors amidst the cuts in 2025. One clue as to why this may be the case comes through examining finance types. Preliminary 2025 data from the OECD DAC shows that bilateral grants experienced the largest decline amongst finance types, with a cut of 29%, followed by multilateral ODA, which saw a 27% cut. These are both finance types that humanitarian assistance is likely to sit in. This compares to bilateral ODA loans, which only saw a 10% drop, indicating a prioritisation for loans over grants.[6] Germany, for example, is looking to replace grants with more loans, according to Devex.[7]

With growing gaps between resources and needs, there are renewed calls for humanitarian budgets to be more intimately linked with set criteria, such as the EU proposal for a 0.07% of Gross National Income,[8] or a proposed fair share model that links humanitarian needs with donor's economic strength.[9] However, the voluntary EU target is rarely met. In 2025, only eight donors met or exceeded this benchmark, including the three large Gulf donors (Qatar, 0.49%; UAE, 0.35%; Saudi Arabia, 0.13%), as well as a handful of DAC donors (Luxembourg, 0.23%; Norway, 0.19%; Sweden, 0.16%; Denmark, 0.14%; Iceland, 0.08%). A further three donors almost hit the 0.07% benchmark (Netherlands, 0.069%; Ireland, 0.069%; Switzerland, 0.068%).

HAS THE POWER BALANCE IN HUMANITARIAN FUNDING SHIFTED FOR GOOD?

Figure 1.4: The relative donor share changed more in 2025 than in previous years, with the top four DAC donors accounting for below 50% of total funding

Share of public donor funding by donor category, 2016–2025



Source: Based on OECD DAC, UN OCHA FTS and UN CERF.

Notes: 2025 data is preliminary. Data is in constant 2024 prices. 'Public donors' refers to governments and EU institutions. 'Top four DAC donors' comprises the US, EU institutions, UK and Germany. 'Gulf' covers Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain. Historical figures differ slightly from the *GHA Report 2025* due to updated final reported international humanitarian assistance data and deflation.

As a result of the funding cuts by major donors in 2025, the humanitarian funding system has become more fragmented and more multipolar.

Over the past decade, the traditional top four donors (the US, EU institutions, UK and Germany) consistently accounted for between 61% and 67% of all public donor funding, whilst other DAC members contributed between 23% and 27%. Whilst there was slightly greater variation amongst Gulf donors (6% to 15%), the humanitarian funding system was stable between these three blocs.

However, the mix of public donors funding international humanitarian assistance shifted more in 2025 than in any year in the past decade. The combined share of the traditional top four donors fell sharply from 61% in 2024 to 47% in 2025. This was by far the lowest share for these four donors over the previous decade, and down from a peak of 67% in 2017:

- This change was largely driven by funding cuts; combined funding from the top four DAC donors fell 40% from US $20.8 billion in 2024 to US $12.5 billion in 2025, against an overall contraction in public international humanitarian assistance of 22% (see **Figure 1.1**).

- Significant cuts from the US and Germany drove the fall in the top four donors' share, as the US share of public international humanitarian assistance fell from 40% in 2024 to 23% in 2025, while Germany's fell from 6.6% to 5.4%.
- The share of EU institutions and the UK both increased slightly, from 8.8% to 11% and 6.1% to 7.6%, respectively, largely reflecting flat absolute contributions against a shrinking global total, as opposed to funding increases.

As a result, the humanitarian funding system is no longer anchored to the traditional top four donors that previously formed its core funding base.

At the same time, other DAC donors (predominantly North American, European and East Asian donors), now account for their highest share in a decade. All other DAC donors combined now represent 34% of public donor funding, up from 27% in 2024. This reflects relatively stable overall funding (US $9.2 billion in 2024 and US $9.1 billion in 2025) against a falling global total.

Whilst not represented in **Figure 1.4**, it should be noted that EU institutions and EU member states now represent 36% of overall public humanitarian funding, up from 30% in 2024 (a three-year high). Combined with other European donors, such as Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein, this 'EU plus' bloc represents 42% of all public donor funding (up from 35% in 2024). Whether EU or 'EU plus', this bloc now holds considerable power given that the US only constitutes 23% of all public donor funding in 2025.

Gulf donors also reached their highest share of public international humanitarian assistance in the last decade, accounting for 17% in 2025, up from 10% in 2024, and above the previous peak of 15% in 2018. Their combined contribution rose by almost a third, an increase of over US $1 billion (US $3.5 billion to US $4.5 billion). This stands in strong contrast to overall global reductions in funding, bringing the Gulf states' share far closer to that of the US, when considered together.

- Within the Gulf, growth was led by Qatar, which almost tripled its international humanitarian assistance (an increase of 189% to US $980 million), and the UAE, which increased by over half (funding rose 54% to US $1.8 billion).
- These rises more than offset a 14% reduction from Saudi Arabia (down to US $1.6 billion).
- The UAE and Saudi Arabia were the fourth and fifth largest individual public donors of international humanitarian assistance in 2025 (see **Figure 1.3**).

Without forward-looking budgets and planning documents, it is difficult to predict whether this increase from the Gulf will be sustained, with some arguing that Gulf states may focus more on national priorities in light of costs associated with the recent war with Iran.[10] However, the increased prominence of Gulf donors within the donor mix does have implications. Gulf donors have concentrated much of their funding on a small number of contexts over the past decade (e.g. Yemen, 46%; Palestine, 16%), whereas DAC donors have given more widely with no individual crisis context receiving more than 10% of DAC funding over the past decade. Furthermore, there is evidence that Gulf donors give humanitarian funding via bilateral channels,

with a recent paper noting that most of the funding from Saudi Arabia in 2024 went to local and national actors (69%), the vast majority of which went to local and national governments.[11]

Other non-DAC donors continued to account for a small share of public international humanitarian assistance at 1.6% in 2025, compared with 1.8% in 2024. Türkiye accounted for four fifths of this category in 2025.

Whilst there has been a large reduction in funding from two of the largest donors, public humanitarian assistance continues to be concentrated amongst a small number of donors, albeit less concentrated. The (new) top four donors represent 49% of all public funding (down from 61% in 2024 for the previous top four donors), the top 10 donors represent 75% (down from 81%), and the top 20 represent 95% (down from 96%).

Overall, 2025 marks a step change in the composition of public international humanitarian assistance. Following a decade where the previous four largest donors (i.e. top four DAC donors) consistently accounted for close to two thirds of funding, their combined share fell nearly 15 percentage points in a single year. With US and German budget cuts becoming the new norm, this marks a new equilibrium for the humanitarian donor mix. This is forcing a sector previously dependent on a narrow group of DAC donors to adjust, as further cuts will likely entrench donor concentration changes more in 2026, creating several implications.

Firstly, whilst the funding mix has become more diverse by default, this also creates additional pressures. In a context of reduced funding, high humanitarian need and donor power now spread more evenly, stronger donor coordination becomes more important. A more diverse donor base can also mean greater fragmentation, with a risk of different donor blocs or ecosystems not coordinating and pursuing their own priorities in parallel. This in turn may create pressure on UN agencies and international non-governmental organisations, as the main recipients of assistance, to act as 'clearing houses' across a wider range of diverse interests.

Secondly, changes in donor behaviour at the global level has implications for individual contexts. As **Figure 2.2** shows, a significant number of contexts has seen changes in the lead donor (primarily away from the US), with a smaller yet more diverse funding mix. It is in individual contexts where donor coordination becomes even more important.

Lastly, whilst there may be a temptation to believe that US power in the humanitarian system has weakened (which it surely has given the cuts), the US continues to be the largest donor by some margin and still has agenda-setting power. An illustration of this is how US funding has influenced the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)-managed pooled fund system.

Box 1.1: Trends in reporting practices

The GHA report relies on data made available on public platforms, such as the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS), as well as UN OCHA's Financial Tracking Service (FTS), amongst others. These systems have their own characteristics in terms of what data is included, and the quality of such data. To better enable other users of humanitarian funding data to perform analysis, three key trends have been identified that warrant attention.

1. Non-traditional donors are more visible in the data

As noted in this chapter, non-traditional donors such as Gulf states have risen in the donor rankings this year. This is partly due to increased reporting by some governments; however, alongside 2025 reporting, there has also been significant retrospective reporting that has altered previous-year totals.

Across all donors, in 2025 an additional US $7.1 billion in funding was newly added to FTS for the years 2021 to 2024, with the majority being 2024 funding (US $3.7 billion additional funding). The largest retrospective reporter was Saudi Arabia, which newly reported US $2.9 billion of funding across this period, including an additional US $749 million in 2024, followed by UAE with an additional US $510 million for 2024, and Türkiye with an additional US $424 million for 2024.

The increase in reporting also makes visible trends that were not clear before – we can now see that Saudi Arabia was in fact the fourth largest donor in 2021, whereas last year's analysis would have showed that Saudi Arabia had not been a top four donor in recent history.

Whilst the increase in reporting, particularly from Gulf donors, is a welcome development, it also reflects the fact that datasets don't stay static, and thus neither are GHA analyses. This can make year-to-year comparisons across reports difficult, and any financial analysis based on FTS that is not using a live online source needs to be read with the understanding that the numbers can, and do inevitably, change.

2. Data quality still varies

Analysis of data from FTS comes with challenges, as certain data fields vary in quality. There remain projects that are reported with one-word or blank descriptions (3.5% of 'new money' projects in 2024, worth US $900 million), and a large amount of projects are still reported as 'multi-sector' or 'unspecified' in cluster (24% of funding in 2025), which makes sectoral analysis inevitably incomplete – although it should be noted that multi-sector often, but not always, relates to refugee assistance.

There has also been a growing share of new funding represented by very large projects (greater than US $100 million) – which account for 16.5% of new funding in 2025 reported in FTS. This matters as these funding flows may break down into smaller flows not visible on FTS. In other cases, they may represent core funding to agencies, which blends humanitarian and development spending, or they may represent flows that are not humanitarian in nature at all (see trend three).

3. What should be counted as 'humanitarian funding'?

Whilst it is difficult to assess accurately, this analysis indicates that there has been an increase in projects included in FTS that are not humanitarian (or not solely humanitarian) in nature.

Through matching FTS project identifiers with those reported to the CRS, we can identify whether projects in FTS are also classified as humanitarian in the CRS. Since 2016, the share of FTS-reported projects simultaneously recorded in the DAC CRS under solely humanitarian purpose codes has fallen, from an average of 80% in 2016–2018 to 61% in 2024. Projects that carry a humanitarian purpose code alongside other non-humanitarian purpose codes have increased substantially, from an average of 5% in 2016–2018 to a high of 17% in 2022, and 12% in 2024.

This points to a potential increase in funding across the nexus. Among the sectors most likely to carry both humanitarian and non-humanitarian codes are food assistance, ending violence against women and girls, and social protection.

This is not necessarily a problem, as projects that work across the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus should not be excluded from the FTS in entirety. However, this does raise wider definitional issues regarding what constitutes a humanitarian dollar versus a development one – a debate that may be futile conceptually, but important practically.

Separately, there are also financial flows reported to FTS that appear to be non-humanitarian by their own description and stated purpose. For example, there are large financial flows of over US $100 million from some DAC donors made to the Global Fund, and other flows made as core funding to Gavi. Whilst important, such funding is better understood as global health investment and should not be counted within donor humanitarian totals.

As a result, new checks have been introduced into the GHA methodology this year to exclude projects determined to unambiguously and solely represent funding for general budget support; global programmes oriented to long-term goals, economic development or commercial operations outside of crisis response; or large-scale construction projects. Full details regarding exclusion criteria are found in the 'Methodology and definitions' chapter (online).

GHA REPORT 2026

TOP DONORS

Key figures and policy developments for the top donors, ranked by the volume of humanitarian funding they gave in 2025.

UNITED STATES 1

Total funding US $6.1bn ↓

AS A % OF		
	All donors	23%
	GNI	0.02%
	ODA	21%

US humanitarian funding appears to be stabilising around US $5bn. An additional US $1.8bn to OCHA's pooled funds in May 2026 brings the total to the pooled funds at US $3.8bn. The reinstated global gag rule restricts organisations from providing or advocating for abortion access.

TOP SECTORS
- Food | 51%
- Multi-sector | 19%
- Nutrition | 9%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Palestine | 17%
- Sudan | 12%
- South Sudan | 8%

EU INSTITUTIONS 2

Total funding US $3.0bn ●

AS A % OF		
	All donors	11%
	GNI	N/A
	ODA	6%

2026 allocations total €1.9bn with an additional €415m reserved for sudden-onset crises. The future long-term budget, the Multiannual Financial Framework 2028-2034, proposes a humanitarian budget of €25 billion over the 7 years, with humanitarian aid as part of the EU's 'Global Europe' instrument.

TOP SECTORS
- Food | 19%
- Health | 17%
- Multi-sector | 14%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Palestine | 9%
- Ukraine | 8%
- Sudan | 8%

UNITED KINGDOM 3

Total funding US $2.0bn ●

AS A % OF		
	All donors	8%
	GNI	0.05%
	ODA	13%

UK ODA is on course to be cut to 0.3% of GNI by 2027/28. Reports on the impact on humanitarian assistance are mixed: BOND reports a decline in humanitarian spend over the period, while the government says it will increase its share of bilateral aid directed to fragile and conflict-affected settings to 70%.

TOP SECTORS
- Food | 29%
- Multi-sector | 26%
- Nutrition | 11%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Yemen | 15%
- Sudan | 11%
- Ethiopia | 9%

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 4

Total funding US $1.8bn ↑

AS A % OF		
	All donors	7%
	GNI	0.35%
	ODA	47%

The UAE ranks 4th globally due to an increase from US $1.2bn to US $1.8bn, breaking up the group of traditional top donors (US, EU, Germany, UK). For 2026, the UAE has pledged US $550m for the GHO, and current data suggests a continuation of high

TOP SECTORS
- Food | 44%
- Health | 41%
- Multi-sector | 8%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Palestine | 90%
- Chad | 4%
- Sudan | 2%

SAUDI ARABIA 5

Total funding US $1.6bn ↓

AS A % OF		
	All donors	6%
	GNI	0.15%
	ODA	5%

Saudi Arabia continues to give significant resources to the humanitarian sector and ranks 5th for the second year running. However, the impact of the Iran war is unclear with some uncertainty whether budgets will be reprioritised to focus on domestic priorities.

TOP SECTORS
- Coord. | 32%
- Education | 19%
- Health | 16%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Yemen | 47%
- Syria | 25%
- Palestine | 9%

GERMANY 6

Total funding US $1.4bn ↓

AS A % OF		
	All donors	5%
	GNI	0.03%
	ODA	6%

Germany's humanitarian budget is expected to stay at roughly the same level in 2026. Department S - responsible for crisis-related programmes including humanitarian, is being dismantled with a pivot to departments based around regions.

TOP SECTORS
- Food | 40%
- Multi-sector | 30%
- Protection | 13%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Ukraine | 19%
- Syria | 10%
- Palestine | 10%

SWEDEN 7

Total funding US $1.0bn ●

AS A % OF		
	All donors	4%
	GNI	0.16%
	ODA	19%

Sweden cut aid budget by SEK 3bn in 2026. Humanitarian budgets are expected to remain stable, with ODA reallocated from fragile states towards cooperation with Ukraine. Sida's 2025-2029 humanitarian strategy emphasises life-saving activities, and greater effectiveness of assistance.

TOP SECTORS
- Multi-sector | 36%
- Protection | 29%
- Food | 11%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Palestine | 15%
- Sudan | 10%
- Syria | 9%

QATAR 8

Total funding US $980m ↑

AS A % OF		
	All donors	4%
	GNI	0.49%
	ODA	13%

Qatar's humanitarian spend nearly tripled in 2025 to just under US $1bn – the highest amount on record. The year-on-year increase was largely driven by contributions to Palestine (an increase of US $315m).

TOP SECTORS
- Early recovery | 42%
- Education | 18%
- Multi-sector | 12%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Palestine | 46%
- Syria | 14%
- Tajikistan | 9%

NORWAY 9

Total funding US $975m ●

AS A % OF		
	All donors	4%
	GNI	0.19%
	ODA	20%

Norway is holding firm to its commitment of 1% of GNI budgeted to ODA. 'Project Turning Point' (the review of development policy) is to report back to parliament in 2027. Early indications point to an increased focus on reform and support to Ukraine.

TOP SECTORS
- Multi-sector | 36%
- Protection | 27%
- Food | 13%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Ukraine | 39%
- Palestine | 11%
- Multi country | 9%

NETHERLANDS 10

Total funding US $852m

AS A % OF		
	All donors	3%
	GNI	0.07%
	ODA	12%

A new cabinet in 2026 has outlined plans to reduce ODA and align it with Dutch interests. A late 2025 election led to a new cabinet in 2026, which has outlined plans to 'invest in development cooperation' and 'step up efforts on humanitarian assistance'.

TOP SECTORS
- Multi-sector | 32%
- Water san. | 20%
- Health | 15%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Palestine | 36%
- Sudan | 17%
- Ukraine | 9%

CANADA 11

Total funding US $790m

AS A % OF		
	All donors	3%
	GNI	0.03%
	ODA	8%

Canada's ODA budget is set to be cut by CAD $2.7bn over four years, in particular to global health. During the election campaign in mid-2025, the Liberal Party pledged to maintain an international humanitarian assistance budget at no less than CAD $800m per year.

TOP SECTORS
- Multi-sector | 42%
- Food | 32%
- Nutrition | 7%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Syria | 11%
- Palestine | 10%
- Sudan | 10%

KOREA 12

Total funding US $662m

AS A % OF		
	All donors	2%
	GNI	0.03%
	ODA	17%

Following a decade-long rise in ODA disbursements by South Korea, ODA fell slightly in 2025 and is set to fall further in 2026, with number of projects and participating agencies set to decline. Humanitarian assistance is set to fall by over 40 percent in 2026.

TOP SECTORS
- Food | 45%
- Health | 19%
- Early recovery | 11%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Ukraine | 12%
- Syria | 11%
- Palestine | 10%

DENMARK 13

Total funding US $637m

AS A % OF		
	All donors	2%
	GNI	0.14%
	ODA	20%

Denmark's overall development budget is increasing by 3% in 2026, with humanitarian budgets up by 2%. Denmark published its new development cooperation strategy in 2025, which commits Denmark to 'fight for respect for international humanitarian law, international refugee law, and human rights'.

TOP SECTORS
- Food | 28%
- Protection | 20%
- Multi-sector | 14%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Palestine | 18%
- Ukraine | 16%
- Sudan | 9%

SWITZERLAND 14

Total funding US $633m

AS A % OF		
	All donors	2%
	GNI	0.07%
	ODA	15%

Budget cuts affect Switzerland's International Cooperation Strategy 2025–2028, with ODA set to drop this year and next. Initial indications suggested that the cuts did not affect humanitarian aid, but it is unclear if this will continue. Some media outlets report humanitarian cuts in the 2026 budget.

TOP SECTORS
- Protection | 49%
- Food | 14%
- Health | 7%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Ukraine | 16%
- Syria | 9%
- Sudan | 8%

FRANCE 15

Total funding US $618m

AS A % OF		
	All donors	2%
	GNI	0.02%
	ODA	5%

France has announced large cuts to general ODA and humanitarian-specific budgets in 2026. The latter has declined from €895m in 2024 to €294m in 2026. The Humanitarian Emergency and Stabilization Fund, food assistance, and UN voluntary contributions were cut. France co-leads the Global IHL Initiative.

TOP SECTORS
- Food | 36%
- Multi-sector | 16%
- Health | 14%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Palestine | 15%
- Syria | 11%
- Sudan | 10%

JAPAN 16

Total funding US $573m

AS A % OF		
	All donors	2%
	GNI	0.01%
	ODA	4%

Despite a pivot towards Official Security Assistance and a new government deprioritising the importance of ODA, Japan's overall ODA budget is expected to remain stable in the near-term. Humanitarian assistance remains a small part of Japan's overall ODA budget.

TOP SECTORS
- Food | 28%
- Health | 18%
- Multi-sector | 12%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Multi-country | 10%
- Syria | 9%
- Myanmar | 6%

AUSTRALIA 17

Total funding US $402m

AS A % OF		
	All donors	2%
	GNI	0.02%
	ODA	12%

Australia is expected to maintain current levels of spending on ODA, with a slight increase in the current financial year in nominal terms - this, including an increase in the humanitarian budget. Three-quarters of Australia's total ODA targets the Indo-Pacific region (a 40-year record).

TOP SECTORS
- Multi-sector | 34%
- Food | 20%
- Health | 16%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Myanmar | 33%
- Bangladesh | 19%
- Afghanistan | 16%

ITALY 18

Total funding US $285m

AS A % OF		
	All donors	1%
	GNI	0.02%
	ODA	5%

Italy's ODA spend is tightly linked to the 'Mattei Plan' which is Italy's framework for engagement with Africa. Overall budgets are expected to remain broadly stable in 2026. The current planning framework (2024–2026 Programming and Policy Planning Document) was adopted mid-2025.

TOP SECTORS
- Protection | 36%
- Multi-sector | 20%
- Food | 17%

TOP CONTEXTS
- Palestine | 13%
- Syria | 10%
- Ukraine | 8%

Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) ***Notes:*** Figures for total funding from donors are for 2025, expressed in 2024 constant prices to align with other analyses in the report. These figures exclude imputed EU contributions to humanitarian assistance. Likewise, the percentage of all public donors pertains to donor totals excluding EU imputations, and public funding only. Spend as a percentage of 2025 GNI data taken from the OECD DAC latest preliminary data as released in April 2026. GNI comparisons for Saudi Arabia are based on 2024 data due to a lack of DAC preliminary data for 2025. Spend as a percentage of ODA uses the same OECD DAC preliminary data release. Spend as a percentage of ODA figures for Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE uses 2024 data due to a lack of 2025 data; both numerator and denominator are from the OECD DAC. Data for top sectors and top contexts are taken from FTS with data extracted in April 2025. Multiple sectors, multi-sector, and multipurpose cash have been combined into one category. Multi-sector often refers to multisectoral assistance provided by UNHCR for refugee settings. Agriculture has been combined with food security. Top contexts excludes funding to 'global' projects or unspecified locations, but includes funding to multiple countries. Published by ALNAP as part of the *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2026*.

Jamaica. 2025.

A person works inside the regional hospital, severely damaged by Hurricane Melissa, in Falmouth, Jamaica, November 2025.

Credit: Orlando Barria/EPA/Shutterstock

CHAPTER 2.

CRISIS CONTEXTS AMIDST THE CUTS

SUMMARY

The aftershocks of funding cuts to the humanitarian and development systems continue to reverberate across the world. Decisions taken by traditional government donors have had far reaching consequences, with the vast majority of contexts with an international humanitarian response experiencing significant decreases in funding. These began before 2025, and their cumulative impact across the last few years has led to humanitarian actors re-evaluating their activities and priorities.

International aid actors are prioritising their resources and reducing their footprint in a variety of ways. The humanitarian coordination system is going through its own process of prioritisation, redefining who is targeted for assistance and what falls within the scope of the humanitarian sphere. The increasing focus on life-saving assistance has narrowed the parameters of humanitarian action, with increasing questions regarding what happens to people and activities that fall outside of this reduced scope.

Responses from national governments have been relatively limited in the humanitarian sphere compared to other areas (e.g. health), perhaps reflecting a lack of capacity to step into the gap left by humanitarian actors.[12] At the same time, development actors are also experiencing cuts in finance and funding, and whilst the share of development assistance to protracted crisis contexts increased in 2024, it remains to be seen whether this trend will withstand the brutal cuts experienced in 2025.

The aftershocks of the cuts are also changing the mix of donors present in each context. The lead donor has changed in many of the top contexts, primarily away from the US, while the EU is now the top donor in a growing number of contexts. The EU and its member states have surpassed US funding in 18 out of 20 top receipient countries, whille Gulf donors are increasingly visible in the top donor funding mix.

What is not clear is whether the humanitarian system will continue to experience more aftershocks and more change, or whether it has settled into a new equilibrium with funding cuts 'priced in' to how humanitarian actors and donors operate. The analysis presented here provides some clues as to what a new equilibrium may look like in crisis contexts: reduced funding except for a small number of contexts; a smaller but more diverse donor pool; an intensified focus on life-saving assistance through the framing of prioritisation; an international architecture that is still focused on protracted crises; and an unclear outlook on the role of development funding in crisis contexts.

HOW HAS HUMANITARIAN FUNDING CHANGED TO THE LARGEST RECIPIENT CONTEXTS?

Figure 2.1: Almost all of the largest recipient countries of humanitarian assistance experienced funding cuts in 2025

Recipient countries of international humanitarian assistance, 2023–2025



Source: Based on UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) data.

Notes: Data is in constant 2024 prices. Totals for previous years differ from those reported in previous GHA reports due to deflation and updated data. DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo.

Significant reductions in humanitarian assistance in 2025 meant funding fell for 18 of the 20 largest recipient countries. Despite these reductions, the makeup of the top 20 recipient countries remained fairly constant. In fact, 18 out of the top 20 recipients in 2025 were also in the top 20 list in 2024 and the countries in the top 10 list remained unchanged across the two years.

Funding increased to only two of the 20 largest recipients in 2025 – Myanmar and Palestine:

- Myanmar saw a funding increase of 11% to US $555 million in 2025, following a fall in 2024 of 2%.
- Palestine was the only context where humanitarian assistance increased in both years since 2023, against a backdrop of falling international humanitarian assistance. As the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza continued, Palestine was the largest recipient of humanitarian assistsance in 2025 – receiving US $4.4 billion, an increase of US $562 million (a 15% rise) compared to 2024. This followed an increase of 90% in 2024 and 91% in 2023, meaning humanitarian assistance to Palestine in 2025 was quadruple that of 2022.

However, funding to the vast majority of contexts declined in 2024. These decreases compound declines experienced in the previous year: since the peak of public donor funding in 2023, funding has fallen significantly to 16 of the top 20 recipient countries:

- Syria – the largest recipient of humanitarian assistance in 2023 – has seen consecutive falls in funding: a 47% fall in 2024 and a 9% fall in 2025. As a result, funding has fallen to less than half its peak (at US $2.0 billion in 2025 from US $4.2 billion in 2023). This is despite the fact that the number of people in need has stayed stable at around 16.5 million people since 2024.[13]
- Ukraine was the top recipient in 2022. However, funding volumes fell significantly for the third consecutive year: by 30% in 2025 to US $2.0 billion, down from US $2.8 billion in 2024. This follows falls of 27% in 2023 and 28% in 2024. As a result, funding in 2025 is 63% below the peak in 2022.

Many countries facing protracted crises were hit very hard by humanitarian funding cuts in the past two years:

- Two countries in the top 20 faced humanitarian funding reductions of over half in 2025 compared to 2024: funding fell by 53% to Jordan (down to US $220 million), and by 52% to Lebanon (down to US $671 million).
- Six countries saw funding reduced by over 40% in 2025, all of which were protracted crisis contexts: Yemen (–49%), Nigeria (–49%), Niger (–47%), Somalia (–45%), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (–45%) and Ethiopia (–45%).
- Five of the top 20 recipient countries faced funding reductions by over half in the past two years, including Somalia (–61%), Ethiopia (–60%), Yemen (–53%), Syria (–52%) and Nigeria (–52%).

Humanitarian assistance became even more heavily concentrated amonst a few recipient countries; the top five contexts in 2025 received 51% of all humaniarian

funding allocated to specific countries, while the top 10 received 70%. This compares to 43% and 66%, respectively, in 2024. This reflects a growing trend of prioritsation in the humanitarian system, as increasingly limited resources have been allocated to a narrower pool of contexts. Unprecedented cuts in 2025 resulted in even further prioritisation (hyper-prioritisation), with funding becoming even more concentrated as a result.

HOW HAVE FUNDING CUTS IMPACTED DONOR CONCENTRATION?

As some of the largest humanitarian donors cut funding in 2025, not only did volumes of funding to recipient countries fall but the financial influence amonst top donors shifted and reduced. In many contexts, the US dominance as the top donor weakened sharply in 2025, with EU institutions and Gulf states gaining more of the donor share in some contexts. This has implications for the power of donors to drive how responses are organised and how funding is allocated.

For 19 of the 20 top recipient countries, the combined share of funding from the three historically largest donors for each country fell in 2025 compared with 2024:

- The largest reductions were seen in Colombia (a 32.5 percentage point fall, from approximately 82% to 50%), Somalia (–29.4 percentage points, from approximately 71% to 41%), Kenya (–26 percentage points, from 72% to 46%), Myanmar (–23 percentage points), Niger (–22 percentage points), and DRC (–22 percentage points).
- The largest donor changed in six out of the top 20 contexts in 2025. Given the cuts to US funding globally, the US was overtaken as top donor by EU institutions in Lebanon and Somalia, by Australia in Myanmar, by Germany in Niger, by Saudi Arabia in Syria, and by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in Palestine.
- While the US retained position as top donor in 13 contexts in 2025, its share fell in every one of these compared to 2024, a year when the US was lead donor in 19 out of 20 contexts.

Figure 2.2: Funding cuts from major donors have driven a reduction and shift in the concentration of donors in the largest recipient countries

Changes in donor concentration across top 20 contexts, 2024–2025



*UK shown as a top-3 donor to Kenya based on 2024 funding (US$44.3m).
No UK humanitarian funding to Kenya was recorded in FTS for 2025 at the time of analysis

Source: Based on UN OCHA FTS.

Notes: Data is in constant 2024 prices. For each context, the figure shows the share of country-level humanitarian funding provided by its three historically largest donors across both years, as well as any other donors who were in the top three in 2025, and an 'other' category covering all remaining donors. The top 20 countries listed do not match exactly with those in Figure 2.1. This is due to methodological differences in analyses taking a 'donor perspective' for Figure 2.2 and a 'recipient perspective' for Figure 2.1. DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo; UAE = United Arab Emirates.

Reductions in US funding meant that EU institutions replaced the US as the top donor in two contexts but also increased its share of country-level funding in 18 of the 20 contexts, including 13 contexts with a substantial increase in share (plus five percentage points). Even where increases from the EU institutions were significant, they were dwarfed by US cuts.

- For example, funding from EU institutions to DRC increased by 32% (US $33 million) from 2024 to 2025, but the collapse of US funding by 81% (–US $732 million) was the main driver of the increased EU institutions' share of total funding, which rose from 7% to 20%.
- In Ethiopia, Kenya, Lebanon, Niger, Somalia, Ukraine and Yemen, US funding cuts led to an increase in the EU institutions' share of total funding, despite a decline in EU institutions' funding volumes.

Gulf donors are increasingly visible in the top donor mix in conflict-affected Middle East and North Africa contexts, driven by both funding increases and collapsing US funding:

- In Palestine, funding from the UAE increased by 142% (from US $683 million to US $1.6 billion), making it the largest donor by far.
- Qatar's share of funding to Palestine also increased to 9% as funding rose over five-fold (US $62 million to US $376 million).
- Saudi Arabia overtook the US as lead donor in Syria, increasing funding 155% (+ US $258 million), while US funding fell 75% (–US $327 million). Saudi Arabia also retained lead donor position in Yemen with the share of funding rising from 44% to 51%. This was despite a 43% fall in its funding, because US funding concurrently declined more sharply.

The changing donor landscape also means that the position of 'blocs' of donors is changing, with the EU as a bloc (EU institutions and EU member states) having increasing power, and to a lesser extent Gulf donors:

- In 2024, the combined share of the EU bloc was larger than the US share in only five of the current top 20 contexts. However, in 2025, the EU bloc outstripped US funding and share in 18 of the top 20 contexts. This increases to 19 contexts when including Switzerland.
- On average, the EU bloc now represents 35% of funding in the top 20 contexts, compared with 23% in 2024.
- Gulf donors also give more funding than the US in four contexts in 2025 (up from two in 2024), namely: Niger, Palestine, Syria and Yemen.

Donor concentration increased in only two contexts. In Syria, the share of funding from the top three donors increased by one percentage point (46% to 47%), whilst in Palestine the funding share from the top three donors rose by 14 percentage points (47% to 61%), driven by UAE's expanded contribution.

Changes in donor concentration in different contexts affects who has power within the humanitarian architecture. This affects who gets funded, what gets funded, the

priorities of the humanitarian system, and how funding is chanelled (e.g. through the UN or national governments). However, whether donors choose to use the power implicitly (through internal decision making) or explicitly (through prompting broader conversations in the sector) likely varies from donor to donor and context to context. As the donor landscape continues to change, so will the centres of gravity within the humanitarian system.

ARE UN APPEALS SUFFICIENTLY FUNDED AND WHERE DO THEY FOCUS?

Figure 2.3: Prioritised funding requirements in 2026 are less than half of funding requirements in 2022

Funding and unmet requirements, UN-coordinated appeals, 2016–2026



Source: Based on UN OCHA FTS, Syria Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP) dashboards and UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) data.

Notes: Data is in current prices. 2026 data shows total requirements as of May 2026. Some figures changed slightly from those published in previous GHA reports, largely driven by updates to Syria 3RP data. 2025 and 2026 show two figures for requirements to reflect regular (already prioritised requirements) and hyper-prioritisation activities and resulting requirements in response to significant funding cuts in 2025. GHRP = Global Humanitarian Response Plan.

Funding to UN-coordinated appeals fell for the third year in a row in 2025, reversing a long-term trend in rising funding that peaked in 2022. Appeal funding in 2025 dropped to US $16.6 billion (–35% from 2024) – a level not seen since 2017 and 2018. The drop in funding meant that the humanitarian appeals system had the largest funding gap in history of US $30.6 billion, and the largest funding gap in percentage terms with only 35% of the funding requirement met (and only 56% of prioritised requirements met). The implication of the largest funding gap on record is that

millions of people will not have been reached with humanitarian assistance, intensifying the prioritisation of dwindling resources in a system with high needs.

At an organisational level, aid agencies have been forced to prioristise limited resources.

- **The quality of existing assistance has been cut in some contexts**: cuts to food rations in Kakuma refugee camp in Kenya have led to caloric intake falling and increases in households eating one meal or less a day.[14]
- **There has been more focused targeting of assistance**: the World Food Programme announced that around 750,000 people in Somalia would stop receiving food assistance due to cuts.[15] The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) warned last year that up to 11.6 million refugees and other people risked losing access to humanitarian assistance from UNHCR.[16]
- **The geographic focus of humanitarian assistance has narrowed**: a survey of multilateral organisations found that some had lost country presence as a result of the funding cuts.[17]

At a systems-level, the UN-coordinated appeals system has reacted to the historic increase in funding requirements and the more recent funding cuts by prioritising how many people it seeks to reach. The peak in funding requirements was reached in 2023 with US $56.1 billion needed to reach at least 245 million people.[18] Since then, there has been a growing trend to narrow the scope of the humanitarian system and increase prioritisation, with funding requirements shrinking as a consequence.

- 2024: This was the first year of prioritisation within the appeals process, and the Global Humanitarian Overview (GHO) saw funding requirements drop by 12%.
- Early 2025: The second year of the prioritisation exercise saw funding requirements drop by a further 5%.
- Mid-2025: Prioritisation accelerated through a 'hyper-prioritisation' exercise. All country and regional responses were reviewed to identify those in most urgent need, resulting in 114 million people targeted out of 300 million people in need. As a consequence, a prioritised funding requirement of US $29.5 billion was introduced – a substantial reduction on the original requirement of US $47.2 billion.
- Late 2025: A standardised formula was introduced in the Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC) guidance to calculate the numbers of people targeted and prioritised. People targeted and prioritised include all people in need at intersectoral severity phases 4 and 5, whilst those targeted could include a maximum of 50% of people in phase 3.[19]
- Early 2026: The GHO continued to have an explicit prioritised target and prioritised funding reqiurement. Prioritised funding reqiurements fell to US $23.6 billion – less than half of the funding requirement from previous years. Prioritisation was applied across response plans, with three Humanitarian Response Plans (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) and four Regional Response Plans (Afghanistan, DRC, South Sudan and Ukraine) no longer included in the GHO. The percentage of people prioritised varies widely across response plans, ranging from only 21% and 22% in Niger and Afghanistan, respectively, to 100% in Palestine and Nigeria.[20]

Whilst prioritisation has always been a reality for the humanitarian system – which has never had resources comparable to needs – the concept of prioritisation has now become embedded within the humanitarian architecture and explictly attempts to draw a boundary around what is within scope and out of scope. This has a number of implications.

Firstly, a narrower scope on what is considered 'humanitarian' risks erasing millions of people from the narrative – for example, the plans that dropped out of the GHO covered over 20 million people in need in 2025. Secondly, it is not clear if people prioritised for humanitarian assistance will actually receive it, as organisations are unlikely to be able to shift programming within and across countries easily and this will take time to implement in practice. Thirdly, interventions not considered to be life-saving – such as resilience activities that allow transition to longer term development – may fall out of scope of prioritisation and potentially fall through the cracks of humanitarian and development work. Lastly, donors may use the prioritisation framework to focus their funding on prioritised areas and people and, with decreases in general development assistance, this risks more people falling outside the scope of any assistance or services, whether by international or domestic providers.

Whilst the humanitarian system is in a time of flux regarding where to focus limited resources, its overall focus remains concentrated on the same contexts year after year.

Figure 2.4: 95% of humanitarian funding for UN-coordinated appeals goes to protracted crises contexts

Percentage of funding and overall funding requirements of UN-coordinated appeals focused on protracted crisis contexts, 2016–2026



Source: Based on UN OCHA FTS, Syria 3RP dashboards and UNHCR data.

Notes: Funding for 2026 is preliminary as of May 2026. Contexts are considered to be in protracted crisis when they have had five or more years of consecutive humanitarian appeals; regional appeals are considered to be protracted when they have existed for five or more consecutive years. Funding and requirements not considered to be protracted include UN OCHA-reported appeals that have not existed for five consecutive years. This does not include global appeals, such as the global elements of the COVID-19 Global Humanitarian Response Plan.

Nearly all humanitarian funding for interagency appeals goes to protracted crisis contexts (95% in 2025), closely aligned with the 94% of all funding needed that is for protracted crisis contexts in 2026. These percentages (upwards of 90%) have been the norm since 2024; however this was not always the case. In 2016, only 54% of funding went to protracted crisis contexts.

In absolute terms, protracted crises accounted for US $15.7 billion of the US $16.6 billion of total funding allocated to humanitarian appeals in 2025. This includes three contexts that have had appeals for 27 years (DRC, Sudan and Somalia) and two contexts that have had appeals for 24 years (Central African Republic and Palestine). Together, these contexts account for 35% of total funding for protracted crises in 2025. As of May 2026, 92% of the funding allocated so far this year has been for protracted crisis contexts.

The GHA report defines protractedness as having an interagency response plan for at least five years in a row; therefore, its growing normalisation is largely a function of the 'stickiness' of UN-coordinated appeals.

The stickiness of the system – in terms of its difficulty transitioning out of existing contexts – can be seen across a number of dimensions:

- The number of crises that were classified as protracted has risen from 19 of 43 in 2016 to 35 of 46 in 2025.
- The vast majority of the appeals in 2026 have been in place for many years. The average (median) protracted crisis had an interagency plan for 10 years in 2016, rising to 15 years in 2026.

The intersection between protractedness and the scope of humanitarian assistance relative to the other dimensions of the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus is particularly relevant in the context of funding cuts. One common critique, which prioritisation aims to address, is that the scope of humanitarian response had become too wide, meeting basic needs as opposed to responding to acute shocks, effectively substituting for basic service delivery.

This presents a tension for the humanitarian system. With funding cuts across the HDP nexus, service delivery funded by development assistance will come under increasing pressure, creating more gaps in service provision. At the same time, the humanitarian system is narrowing access to humanitarian assistance through prioritisation, hyper-prioritisation and its own funding constraints. One possible outcome is that the simultaneous retreat of humanitarian and development assistance leaves growing numbers of people falling through the cracks of internationally funded assistance, either within protracted crisis contexts with an appeal or in contexts that have dropped off the appeals list altogether. As such, it is possible that prioritisation will cut deepest where alternative provision is weakest, with protracted crisis contexts particularly vulnerable.

WHAT IS THE MIX OF HUMANITARIAN, DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE FUNDING REACHING PROTRACTED CRISES?

Figure 2.5: Development funding again became the largest share of ODA to protracted crisis contexts in 2024

Share of ODA to development, humanitarian, peace and climate from DAC donors to protracted humanitarian response plan contexts (excluding Ukraine), 2020–2024



Source: Based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Creditor Reporting System (CRS).

Notes: Excludes Ukraine as a recipient in all years. Recipients vary between years. Climate funding includes the entire activity value for funding tagged with a climate principal marker and 45% of the activity value for those tagged with climate significant marker; this is the median coefficient reported by DAC members for significant climate funding. HRP = humanitarian response plan; ODA = official development assistance.

Total official development assistance (ODA) funding from DAC members to countries experiencing protracted crisis (excluding Ukraine) increased slightly in 2024, and the distribution across systems in the nexus shifted slightly from previous trends.

In 2024 ODA to protracted crises increased by 4% to US $30 billion, up from US $29 billion in 2023 but down from a high of US $32 billion in 2021. Although Ukraine meets the GHA definition of a protracted crisis, it is excluded from this analysis to provide a clearer understanding of the underlying trends across other protracted crisis contexts, given the significant development funding and finance allocated to Ukraine by DAC members since 2022.

Prior to 2024, humanitarian funding accounted for an increasing proportion of ODA to countries experiencing protracted crisis each year. Between 2020 and 2023, humanitarian funding increased steadily from 38.4% to 47.8% of total ODA.

In 2023, humanitarian funding overtook development assistance as the largest category of funding. This stood in contrast to the OECD DAC nexus recommendation, which promotes 'prevention always, development wherever possible, humanitarian action when necessary'. The increased reliance on the humanitarian system in protracted crises means that humanitarian actors were increasingly stretched to address elements outside of the direct crisis response, including prevention and resilience.

However, 2024 saw a reversal, as development funding increased to 47.7% of ODA in protracted crisis contexts. This was driven by a reduction in humanitarian volumes and a rise in development funding across these contexts. While development funding rose overall, this hides variation between contexts and is partially driven by the inclusion of Colombia and Lebanon as newly classified protracted crises in 2024. Excluding these new contexts, absolute development funding only grew marginally (1%) in 2024. In fact, development funding fell across 12 of the protracted contexts and only increased in 10. Nevertheless, whether or not Colombia and Lebanon are included in 2024, the funding split across the nexus remains as shown: the proportional share of development and peace funding increases, while the humanitarian share falls.

Humanitarian funding fell significantly across 15 of the protracted crisis contexts in 2024. Therefore, humanitarian funding reductions and development funding increases in some contexts made development the largest sector across the nexus again in protracted settings, while humanitarian flows fell back to 42% of ODA in protracted setings. In 2024, the downward trend in the proportion of ODA allocated as peace funding also reversed. Peace funding had fallen from 11.6% of ODA in 2020 to 8.2% in 2023, before rising in both absolute and proportional terms to 10.3% of ODA in 2024.

This relative and absolute fall back in funding for the humanitarian system compared to development and peace funding in 2024 is interesting given the rhetoric around prioritisation. Prioritisation has been led by narratives around narrowing humanitarian action to address immediate and life-saving needs in response to significant and persistent funding gaps, while funding for prevention and resilience is placed more in the remit of other sectors. With significant funding cuts in 2025, changes in the distribution of funding across the nexus will be important to analyse when data is released next year. Difficult donor and system-level decisions about what to prioritise, both within the humantiarian system and across the nexus, were made in 2025; these are likely to result in further shifts in how funding is allocated between sectors.

The funding split across sectors varies significantly between protracted crisis contexts. For example, in 2024 Mozambique received the highest share of development funding (82%) and the second lowest humanitarian share (10%), while Sudan received the highest share of humanitarian funding (74%) and the lowest of development (20%). Libya received the highest share of peace funding (41%), while Yemen received the lowest (5%).

Climate funding makes up a small but growing proportion of ODA to countries in protracted crisis, reaching 11.2% of ODA (US $3.4 billion) in 2024, up from 5.6% (US $1.7 billion) in 2020. Across the period, 7.8% of ODA was reported as climate funding, compared to 11.8% of ODA for other contexts not in protracted crisis. Across protracted crisis contexts, the share of ODA reported as climate funding varies: 17% for Burkina Faso and 1% for Syria.

A lack of data for 2025 means that it isn't possible to fully understand the split in funding and finance across the HDP nexus in the largest year of cuts on record. As noted in **Chapter 1**, there is limited evidence that governments are collectively prioritising humanitarian assistance, with some cutting humanitarian budgets more, and some less, than development assistance. How this plays out in protracted crisis contexts is a key question in the context of prioritisation in the humanitarian system.

GHA REPORT 2026

CRISIS CONTEXTS

Data last updated 10 June 2026

AFGHANISTAN — 19 yrs

CONTEXT

- Crisis drivers: Conflict, pol-econ, floods, drought, earthquake
- Severity
- Access constraints
- IDPs: 6.9 m ▲ 27%
- Food insecurity: 14.8 m ▼ -7%
- Refugees abroad: 5.2 m ▼ -16%

SYSTEM

- People in need: 21.9 m
- People targeted: 80%
- People prioritised: 18%
- Top donors: USA, EU, UK

BURKINA FASO — 15 yrs

CONTEXT

- Crisis drivers: Conflict, drought, floods
- Severity: ▲ +1
- Access constraints: ▼ -1
- IDPs: 2.1 m ● 0%
- Food insecurity: 2.7 m ▼ -18%
- Refugees abroad: 294 k ▲ 5%

SYSTEM

- People in need: 4.5 m
- People targeted: 59%
- People prioritised: 26%
- Top donors: USA, EU, GER

COLOMBIA — 7 yrs

CONTEXT

- Crisis drivers: Conflict, drought, intl. displacement, floods
- Severity: ▲ +1
- Access constraints
- IDPs: 7.2 m ● -1%
- Food insecurity: 7.8 m ▲ 400%
- Refugees abroad: 461 k ● -3%

SYSTEM

- People in need: 6.9 m
- People targeted: 38%
- People prioritised: 17%
- Top donors: USA, EU, SWI

DRC — 24 yrs

CONTEXT

- Crisis drivers: Conflict, floods, pol-econ
- Severity
- Access constraints: ▲ +1
- IDPs: 4.9 m ▼ -29%
- Food insecurity: 27.7 m ▲ 19%
- Refugees abroad: 1.3 m ▲ 8%

SYSTEM

- People in need: 14.9 m
- People targeted: 49%
- People prioritised: 32%
- Top donors: USA, EU, UK

ETHIOPIA — 10 yrs

CONTEXT

- Crisis drivers: Intl. displacement, conflict, drought, floods, pol-econ
- Severity
- Access constraints: ▲ +1
- IDPs: 3.1 m ● 0%
- Food insecurity: 22.0 m ▲ 12%
- Refugees abroad: 331 k ● 3%

SYSTEM

- People in need: Information not available
- People targeted: Information not available
- People prioritised: Information not available
- Top donors: USA, UK, EU

HAITI — 17 yrs

CONTEXT

- Crisis drivers: Conflict, pol-econ, floods, drought
- Severity
- Access constraints: ▲ +1
- IDPs: 1.4 m ▲ 39%
- Food insecurity: 5.7 m ▲ 15%
- Refugees abroad: 408 k ● -4%

SYSTEM

- People in need: 6.4 m
- People targeted: 65%
- People prioritised: 52%
- Top donors: USA, EU, FRA

LEBANON — 7 yrs

CONTEXT

- Crisis drivers: Conflict, pol-econ
- Severity: ▼ -1
- Access constraints
- IDPs: 64 k ▼ -94%
- Food insecurity: 1.7 m ▲ 31%
- Refugees abroad: 21 k ● -4%

SYSTEM

- People in need: 1.3 m
- People targeted: 77%
- People prioritised: 77%
- Top donors: EU, USA, UK

MALI — 15 yrs

CONTEXT

- Crisis drivers: Conflict, drought, pol-econ
- Severity
- Access constraints
- IDPs: 415 k ● 3%
- Food insecurity: 1.5 m ▲ 11%
- Refugees abroad: 398 k ▲ 7%

SYSTEM

- People in need: 5.1 m
- People targeted: 75%
- People prioritised: 30%
- Top donors: EU, USA, GER

MYANMAR — 14 yrs

CONTEXT

- Crisis drivers: Conflict, earthquake, intl. displacement, cyclone, floods
- Severity
- Access constraints
- IDPs: 3.9 m ▲ 7%
- Food insecurity: 16.7 m ▲ 25%
- Refugees abroad: 1.5 m ▲ 11%

SYSTEM

- People in need: 16.2 m
- People targeted: 30%
- People prioritised: 16%
- Top donors: AUS, EU, UK



AUS = Australia; DRC = Democratic Republic of the Congo; FRA = France; GER = Germany; HC = host community; IDP = internally displaced person; NOR = Norway; pol-econ = political and economic; QAT = Qatar; SAU = Saudi Arabia; SWI = Switzerland; TUR = Türkiye; UAE = United Arab Emirates.

Notes: Number of years next to each country denotes the number of years of consecutive response plans. ***Sources:*** Number of years of response plans UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)'s Financial Tracking Service (FTS). Crisis drivers and severity from the Inform Severity Index. Access constraints from ACAPS humanitarian access database. IDPs from IDMC's Global Internal Displacement Database. Food insecurity from the Global Report on Food Crises datasets. Refugees abroad from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)'s Refugee Data Finder. People in need, people targeted, people prioritised, refugee populations, and host community population from Humanitarian Action and individual response plan documents. Top donors and funding trends from UN OCHA's FTS.

Thailand, 2025.

Rescuers search for survivors in the rubble of a building after earthquake in Bangkok, Thailand, April 2025.

Credit: Naron Sangnak/EPA/Shutterstock

CHAPTER 3.

HUMANITARIAN REFORM AND DELIVERY

SUMMARY

2026 marks a decade since the World Humanitarian Summit and the launch of the Grand Bargain – the humanitarian system's collective platform for reforming humanitarian assistance. Each year since, the Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) Report has monitored progress towards its main financing commitments, notably on localisation, quality funding, cash and pooled funds. Progress has been slow and data has been patchy. Accountability has long been a struggle, given the reform process is voluntary, relies on self-reporting and has no enforcement mechanisms. Gradually, over the years, some advances have been made, although far from the intended transformational shift.

Last year's collapse in humanitarian funding threatens to upend this progress. Scarce resources have led organisations to prioritise securing funding for their own underfunded responses rather than pushing for collective momentum on reform priorities. Emergency, short-term mindsets dominate over the prioritisation of quality financing, and the focus has shifted to organisational survival rather than taking risks, shifting power and localising responses. In 2025, the initial signs from the funding cuts indicated that reform priorities were on pause as the sector focused on the reset and prioritisation exercises.

This year, the most recent data on four key reform priorities suggest that this shift can no longer be considered a temporary stall but a longer term slide backwards. The proportions of funding allocated to each sector constituency remain largely the same, with multilateral agencies absorbing the majority of funding. A partial view of 2025 suggests less funding is going to local and national actors, as localised funding substantially decreased in volumes (–27%), outstripping the fall in overall humanitarian funding reductions. Modest increases in direct funding were only possible due to increased reporting of Gulf donor funding to national governments. The overall volumes of cash and voucher assistance fell in 2025, despite the consensus on the efficiency of cash in a time of restricted budgets. Funding for anticipatory action has increased but is ever more stretched across climate crises – it still accounts for such a small percentage of the overall response and the amount available per activation has halved over the past two years. The substantial US contributions to pooled funds in 2026 already appear to be re-entrenching unflexible, politicised and UN-dominated modes of financing that reform efforts have long tried to combat, further backsliding the localisation agenda.

HOW IS FUNDING ALLOCATED ACROSS THE SECTOR?

Figure 3.1: Multilateral organisations remain the largest recipient group, absorbing half of all direct donor funding in 2025

Proportion of funding by different recipient organisation types (UN, NGOs and governments)



Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), International Organization for Migration (IOM) grant awards data, UN OCHA Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPF) Data Hub, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) Transparency Portal, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) collaboration with funded partners.

Notes: Funding allocated by UN agencies with partner data (IOM, UNICEF, World Food Programme (WFP) and UNHCR) in each year are taken from their own reports where available. The total displayed for pooled funds is equal to allocations as opposed to contributions, which is lower; this has then been reconciled at the primary donors' level. Data is in constant 2024 prices.

Of the trackable funding reported by primary donors (public and private in the Financial Tracking Service (FTS), multilateral organisations were the largest recipient group in 2025, receiving almost half (47%) of primary donor funding in 2025 (US $12.5 billion).

- International NGOs received 19% of primary donor funding (US $5.1 billion).
- The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement received 7% (US $1.8 billion).
- Pooled funds received 6% (US $1.6 billion).
- Local and national actors as first-tier recipients received only 5% of funding (US $1.2 billion).[21]
- 'Other' organisations – including flows to donor development agencies and private individuals and organisations – received 16% of funding (US $4.3 billion). The majority of this (US $3.5 billion) was sourced from Gulf states.

The breakdown of funding by recipient type remained largely unchanged between 2024 and 2025, especially for international NGOs, the International Red Cross and

Red Crescent Movement, pooled funds, and local and national actors. However, the share to multilateral organisations dropped from 58% in 2024 to 47% in 2025. While they remained the largest recipient group, the volume allocated to multilaterals fell by 38% (down from US $20.1 billion in 2024).

- This was largely driven by cuts from the US, as US funding through multilaterals fell from US $9.6 billion in 2024 to US $3.4 billion in 2025 – a 65% reduction.
- German cuts also significantly impacted multilaterals, as funding from Germany to multilaterals fell from US $1.6 billion in 2024 to US $676 million in 2025 – a 58% fall.

Organisations categorised as 'other' saw an increase in their share of allocations between 2024 to 2025, rising from 7% to 16% of all first-level funding. This was primarily due to increased reporting from Gulf donors (primarily UAE, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) on funding for their own government humanitarian agencies.

First-tier direct funding is either implemented by recipient organisations or is subsequently passed onto further humanitarian organisations, sometimes through multiple intermediaries. Two thirds of funding (US $17.4 billion) is untracked beyond the first tier, obscuring the picture on how funding moves through the system before reaching target populations. This lack of transparency also challenges efforts to track the Grand Bargain commitment on increasing aggregate funding to local and national actors.

- Of the funding that can be tracked beyond the first tier, US $2 billion was allocated to international actors – including UN bodies, coordinated funds and international NGOs.
- US $1.3 billion of all tracked indirect funding was allocated to local and national actors – including local and national NGOs and government bodies.
- Multilaterals passed on US $807 million of this indirect funding to local and national actors – almost all of this came from UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). This partly reflects the fact that data from some other multilaterals was not available at the time of writing.
- Pooled funds provided the second-largest amount of funding passed on to local and national actors, with US $469 million directly from pooled funds.

IS FUNDING INCREASING FOR LOCAL AND NATIONAL ACTORS?

Figure 3.2: Total funding to local and national actors fell again, while minor increases in direct funding were driven by Gulf donor allocations to national governments

Proportion of direct and total (direct and indirect) funding to local and national actors, 2022–2025



Source: Pearson M. and Rieger N., 2026.[22] UN OCHA FTS, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Network Databank, IOM grant awards data, UN OCHA CBPF Data Hub, UNICEF Transparency Portal, UNHCR collaboration with funded partners, and WFP field-level expenditures data.

Notes: Partner data for IFRC and WFP is not yet available for 2025; IOM data for 2025 is partial. Funding allocated by UN agencies with partner data (IOM, UNICEF, WFP and UNHCR) in each year are taken from their own reports where available. Sub-grants on CBPF projects are excluded from the percentage calculation as these include more than one intermediary before funding reaches local and national actors.

In 2016, the Grand Bargain committed all signatories to collectively provide 25% of global humanitarian funding to local and national responders 'as directly as possible'. A decade on, localised funding levels have failed to meet the target and remain at inadequate levels. Trends between 2022 and 2023 showed some indications that collective efforts to increase both direct allocations and pass-through funding were culminating in progress towards the goal. However, trends over the past two years have shown that this was likely an inflated increase due to improved reporting rather than a material shift.

This reporting artefact further reinforces the importance of transparent reporting for monitoring the sector's key commitments. Despite improvements from some multilateral agencies and increased reporting from Gulf donors, there is a lack of consistent and complete data on funding passed down to local and national actors. Of reported humanitarian funding, based on data for direct flows from FTS and partial data for indirect flows (FTS, country-based pooled funds (CBPFs), UNHCR, UNICEF, International Organization for Migration (IOM)), funding to local and national actors totalled an estimated US $2.4 billion in 2025, a reduction from 2024.

- 8.7% of all reported humanitarian flows were directly and indirectly allocated to local and national actors in 2025, a fall from 9.5% in 2024.
- Localised funding decreased in volume substantially in 2025 (–27%), outstripping overall humanitarian funding reductions (–20% at the point of receipt).

As a proportion of overall funding, direct funding flows to local and national actors increased slightly from 3.9% in 2024 to 4.3% in 2025. However, the volume of direct funding fell 12% compared with the previous year, so therefore a less severe reduction than overall funding cuts (20%). However, this was down to substantial amounts provided by Gulf donors to national governments, included within the category of 'national actor'.

- In 2025, Saudi Arabia provided US $381 million to the Government of Yemen, US $182 million to the Government of Syria and US $95 million to the Government of Palestine.
- Qatar provided US $76 million to the Government of Tajikistan. The United Arab Emirates provided US $52 million to the Government of Chad.

Indirect funding to local and national actors totalled US $1.3 billion (4.4% of total funding), of which US $794 million was reported through partner agencies. Decreases in indirect localised funding occurred across partner organisations. Large decreases were reported by UNHCR and UNICEF.

- UNHCR reported a 31% decrease in humanitarian funding for local and national actors from 2024. The agency itself received a 27% decrease in total funding between 2024 and 2025.
- UNICEF reported a 45% decrease in humanitarian funding for local and national actors from 2024.
- Importantly, data for 2025 is partial, with partner data for the World Food Programme and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies not yet available. Data for these partners is instead sourced through FTS, which limits the visibility of indirect flows to local and national actors.

HOW MUCH FUNDING IS AVAILABLE FOR CASH AND VOUCHER ASSISTANCE?

Figure 3.3: While humanitarian CVA volumes fell for the third year in a row, as a proportion of total humanitarian assistance CVA held its ground

Humanitarian assistance for CVA programming, 2019–2025



Source: Data on cash and volunteer assistance (CVA) volumes was collected by the CALP Network from implementing partners and supplemented with estimates based on the UN OCHA FTS and HPC Projects Module.

Notes: CVA volumes are estimates based on provided survey responses and supplemented with estimates based on FTS data. For a few organisations that have consistently reported surveys over the past eight years but weren't able to submit in time this year, an estimate was used based on their reported volume in 2024. Double counting of CVA programmes that are sub-granted from one implementing partner to another is avoided where data on this is available. Transfer values for funding captured on FTS and HPC Projects are estimates based on the average ratio of transfer values to overall programming costs for organisations with available data. Data is not available for all included organisations across all years. Data is in current prices. CVA = cash and voucher assistance; HPC = Humanitarian Programme Cycle.

A focus on humanitarian cash and voucher assistance (CVA) is more important than ever: in a system facing severe resource constraints, cash not only extends the reach of limited funding, but also – by restoring choice to recipients and enabling locally led delivery – offers a pathway to a more dignified and accountable humanitarian response.

Funding allocated for CVA in 2025 held onto its share of shrinking humanitarian assistance, marginally increasing as a proportion of total humanitarian assistance, reaching 21.0% – up from 19.6% in 2024.

However, volumes of CVA funding fell by 11% to US $7.3 billion, down from US $8.2 billion in 2024. The fact that cash did not increase through funding cuts in 2025 represents a missed opportunity to leverage the efficiency of cash to reach more people with limited resources.[23]

2025 was the third consecutive year that humanitarian CVA volumes fell, falling 15% in 2024 and 8% in 2023. Compared with its 2022 peak of US $10.6 billion, 2025 volumes are down 31% – back down to volumes last seen in 2021.

The share CVA holds of total humanitarian assistance stayed fairly steady from 2020 to 2025, with the exception of 2022 when the increase was largely driven by a focus on multi-purpose cash in the humanitarian response to Ukraine that year. Breaking through this ceiling of around 20% of humanitarian assistance being CVA finance will require concerted political effort to operationalise existing cash policies within the Humanitarian Reset, Common Donor Approach to Humanitarian Cash Assistance, Grand Bargain and agency-level commitments.

UN agencies and their implementing partners continued to deliver the majority (56%) of CVA in 2025, with NGOs delivering 25%, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement delivering 17%, and other organisations delivering below 2%.

Further analysis of CVA volumes and trends will follow in the CALP Network's 2026 State of the World's Cash report in November 2026.[24]

WHAT PROGRESS IS BEING MADE ON ANTICIPATORY ACTION?

Figure 3.4: Funding available for anticipatory action reached 1% of total funding, a fifth of the Grand Bargain target for 2026

Total budget available for anticipatory action frameworks and disbursed through activations, and proportion of international humanitarian assistance, 2022–2025



Source: Based on Anticipation Hub data.

Notes: ALNAP adapted the Anticipation Hub dataset by including missing activations in the active frameworks data for any given year. Caps on the total amount available under UN OCHA-coordinated frameworks in specific contexts have been taken into account to avoid double counting. Additional funding for frameworks under development (but nevertheless available) have been included.

Anticipatory action is a form of pre-arranged financing that defines activities and trigger thresholds and is activated in the window between a shock warning and its impact. Given the rise in climatic shocks that are both forecastable and require a coordinated humanitarian response, the humanitarian system has made it a key priority to move towards this proactive and risk-informed mode of financing. The Grand Bargain has been one of the driving forces of efforts to increase the amount of anticipatory action financing available. In late 2024, the caucus to scale up anticipatory action culminated in a target for donors to substantially increase funding and set individual targets of 5% of humanitarian budgets for anticipatory action by 2026 or earlier, in line with the G7 commitments.[25] Progress was made over the past year as funding available grew by 10% and funding disbursed grew by 8%. As such, anticipatory action was protected from wider humanitarian system cuts but has yet to meet the 5% target despite widespread interest and support.

- The volume of funding made available for anticipatory action frameworks grew in 2025 to US $334 million, a 10% increase on the previous year (US $305 million in 2024).
- Against the backdrop of a sharply contracting overall international humanitarian assistance envelope, funding available for anticipatory action rose to 1% of total international humanitarian assistance in 2025, reaching the 1% threshold for the first time.
- Funding disbursed as a proportion of international humanitarian assistance remained stable in comparison to 2024, at 0.3%. It was 0.4% in 2023 and 0.1% in 2022.

The number of active anticipatory action frameworks, activations of frameworks and overall volumes disbursed all increased from 2024 to 2025.

- The number of active frameworks expanded sharply from 154 in 2024 to 262 in 2025, while the total budget available held broadly flat. This points to a continued shift towards establishing new frameworks rather than significantly expanding the resources channelled through each activation.
- Anticipatory action frameworks were active in 76 countries in 2025, up from 48 in 2024 – a sharp expansion in geographic coverage.
- The number of framework activations also increased to 146 activations in 2025 – up from 124 in 2024, 98 in 2023 and 47 in 2022.
- The overall volumes disbursed through these activations increased marginally from US $111 million in 2024 to US $120 million in 2025.
- Weather-related shocks (droughts, floods and tropical storms) accounted for 94% of both disbursed and available funding. Other frameworks accounted for air pollution, disease outbreaks, food insecurity and population movements.

The increase in the volume of anticipatory action equivalent to 1% of total international humanitarian assistance is encouraging, but it can be interpreted as a result of the broader contraction in humanitarian funding. Despite the overall growth in frameworks, activations and volumes of funding, resources disbursed per event have continued to decline, more than halving over the past two years, resulting in fewer per-event resources reaching more events. Furthermore, the majority of disbursed funding remained concentrated in a small number of countries.

- The average disbursement per activation has fallen dramatically from US $2 million in 2023 to US $893,000 in 2024 and US $821,000 in 2025.
- In 2025, just seven countries (Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Somalia, the Philippines, Mozambique, Nigeria and South Sudan) absorbed 66% of all funding disbursed through activations, similar to the 72% absorbed by the top seven countries in 2024.

The UN remained the largest coordinating body of anticipatory action frameworks.

- In 2025, 80% of total disbursed funding was channelled through UN-coordinated frameworks and 78% of available resources were from UN-coordinated frameworks (similar to 79% in 2024).
- This was followed by international NGOs (17% of disbursements and 10% of available resources), national governments and national NGOs (1% of disbursed funding) and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (2% of disbursed funding).

HOW HAVE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS SHAPED OCHA-MANAGED POOLED FUNDS?

Figure 3.5: The US has contributed unprecedented volumes to OCHA-managed pooled funds in 2026

Funding contributions to pooled funds, 2021–2026



Source: UN OCHA CBPFs and Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) data hubs.

Notes: Data is in current prices. Based on contributions data to UN-managed pooled funds. 2026 data is preliminary.

After the shutdown of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the major reductions in US humanitarian spending at the beginning of 2025, the US Department of State announced at the end of the year a US $2 billion contribution to UN-managed pooled funds for US-selected countries in 2026. This was followed in March 2026 by a pledge to provide an additional US $1.8 billion to be awarded in 2026.[26] This was up from zero contributions to pooled funds from the US in 2025. While the US has always been the humanitarian system's largest donor, these announcements marked a seismic shift in how it channels funding through the system, away from the traditional mix of UN agencies and NGOs to channelling a large amount of its funding through OCHA via CBPFs and the Central Emergency Response Fund. This has resulted in the US dominating the pooled funds system, with disproportionate power over the mechanisms, selected countries and priorities, despite now being a smaller donor across the sector given its significant cuts in overall finance. In some countries, US funding represents the entirety of pooled funded resources. The contribution has also shifted the role of OCHA from system coordinator to donor, fund manager and gatekeeper.

Prior to the announcement, funding to UN-managed pooled funds was in decline. Funding in 2025 fell 23% compared to 2024 (a fall of US $406 million). This was largely driven by reduced funding from four of the five largest donors to pooled funds.

- Germany reduced funding most significantly in 2025, by 63% on the previous year, a fall of US $219 million.
- The UK and Sweden both reduced funding in 2025, by 21% (US $55 million) and 39% (US $49 million), respectively.
- The Netherlands was the only major donor to significantly increase funding to pooled funds – by 25% (US $47 million) compared to 2024.

As 2026 data is preliminary, it is unclear how other donors will react to this shift in the pooled fund landscape. However, the huge increase in funding from the US – which is currently 20 times greater than the previous highest volume of funding given (US $89 million in 2023) – is already having impacts on allocations to pooled funds. While OCHA has stipulated that there are no conditions restricting how this money is spent (beyond existing pooled fund rules), the US contribution in 2026 dwarfs OCHA's own budget and enables significant US influence on spending priorities.

Historically, the UN-led country based pooled funds (CBPFs) have been among the first to increase funding allocations to local and national actors, meeting the Grand Bargain target of 25% back in 2018.[27] Furthermore, as an early proposal to respond to the sector-wide cuts in 2025, the Emergency Relief Coordinator briefly suggested an aspirational target of 70% of UN-led pooled funds specifically for local actors.[28] Recent ODI Global research on funding to local and national actors recommended that each CBPF should publish time-bound roadmaps on how to achieve the initial localisation target of 70%.[29] However, the injection of US funding and the subsequent significant allocations for UN agencies has led to a reversal in progress on funding to local and national actors.

- UN organisations have seen a huge increase in the volumes of funding allocated from pooled funds – reaching US $1.2 billion so far, up from less than US $61 million in the whole of 2025, a 19-fold increase already by May 2026.
- US funding is not being channelled via local or national actors, with only 7% allocated to national NGOs in 2026 so far, compared with almost 46% overall in 2025.
- This reverses a previously encouraging trend of increased funding from UN-coordinated pooled funds to national NGOs (35% in 2024, 46% in 2025, 7% so far in 2026).

In addition to the effects on localisation, US funding is having a huge impact on relative funding levels across crisis contexts by stipulating the crises it can be allocated to and by adding countries that did not previously have CBPFs or country windows under regional funds (e.g. Bangladesh, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Kenya and Uganda).

- Crisis contexts that have not received US funding in 2026 are: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic (CAR), Lebanon, Mali, Niger, Palestine, Somalia, Venezuela and Yemen. The next tranche of funding is said to include CAR, Lebanon and Venezuela.
- At the same time in other contexts, such as Bangladesh, Colombia, Chad and Haiti, the US accounts for 100% of funding contributed to CBPFs so far this year – and thus these contexts have received far more funding.
- While this will likely shift slightly as other donors contribute more to pooled funds, pooled funds that have received US funding this year have so far received an average of 10 times more funding than those that have not.

Figure 3.6 US-funded projects to CBPFs prioritise short-term UN-led projects with a strong focus on food



Source: ALNAP based on data from the UN OCHA CBPF Data Hub.

Notes: CBPF projects are categorised according to whether they are funded through US contributions or contributions from other donors. WASH = water, sanitation and hygiene. All projects funded by the United States are 6 months in length, hence the label in the above infographic "100% of projects, 100% of budget" for 6 months. Projects funded by other donors vary in length with many lasting longer than 6 months. To illustrate this, the above figures of "38% of projects, 73% of budget" relate to the number of projects and total budget available for projects lasting at least 12 months

While 2026 data is incomplete and should be viewed with caution, there are some preliminary trends in terms of how US funding is shaping UN-led pooled funds and creating two systems within one.

US funding reflects a preference towards funding UN agencies, which have greater capacities to absorb large funding volumes and deliver assistance in short timeframes. This is particularly relevant given that the first US funding announcement stipulated a six-month time limit for spending the money, although the second announcement has extended the deadline to 12 months. As a result, large agencies disproportionately received the funding, with local organisations missing out. There also have been reports of restrictive conditions on vetting, eligibility and information sharing, as well as early allocations for large agencies, which have all hampered smaller and local organisations from receiving funding.[30]

- US-funded projects are characterised by high budgets, a preference for UN agencies, and short implementation windows.
- US-funded projects only reached 20 local and national actors, compared with funding from all other donors, which reached 56.
- The New Humanitarian reported that a small number of international NGOs have received significant proportions of their programme budgets from pooled funds, and highlighted the disproportionate amounts allocated to Catholic Relief Services and World Vision (in comparison to their general funding levels), suggesting a tilt to US international NGOs.[31]

Thematic priorities and sectors funded by US contributions reflect a traditional focus on material and in-kind projects (e.g. Food Security and cash and voucher assistance). Humanitarian organisations are also concerned about the effect of the US's Global Gag Rule, which targets not just reproductive health and abortion care, but also gender identity, diversity, equity and inclusion. It is unclear how its enforcement will affect organisations receiving funding from the pooled fund, although UN OCHA has said that no conditions have been placed on the funds.[32,33]

- At the time of writing, funding to food security currently constitutes 36% of US-funded projects through pooled funds, compared to only 6% for non-US-funded projects.
- Multipurpose cash assistance is the second top cluster across both US- and non-US-funded pooled fund projects (15% for US, 19% for other donors), whilst shelter and non-food items allocations are broadly similar (11% for US, 14% for other donors), as are allocations to WASH (12% for US, 11% for other donors).
- Protection only accounts for 9% of funding allocated so far in 2026 for US-funded projects through pooled funds, compared to 26% for projects from other donors.

Allocations based on funding from other donors tend to reflect another approach: a stronger preference for NGOs for delivery, smaller budget allocations, and greater emphasis on channelling funding to local and national actors. The protection and health sectors are prioritised. However, current trends may shift, as significant increases are expected from other donors, which have already contributed US $167 million more in funding than has been allocated. Nevertheless, this analysis is based on a 'US-funded projects dashboard', which is in direct contradiction to the intention and spirit of pooled funds (in which separating out individual donor funding shouldn't be possible).

Commentary: What next for humanitarian reform?

Facing the conflict, displacement and climate polycrisis of 2026, slashes in official development assistance (ODA) and a reprioritised approach, humanitarian actors across the system are asking if the reform process and priorities remain fit for purpose. Furthermore, humanitarian responses are also increasingly facing a multipolar donor environment – as discussed in **Chapters 1** and **2** – with non-traditional donors taking on increased prominence. Gulf donors in particular are increasingly influential in terms of both their financial and operational presence in some humanitarian contexts such as Gaza and Syria. Given that they are less present in coordination spaces, provide less predictable funding and are less embedded in reform processes such as the Grand Bargain, the consensus on the reform agenda may no longer be taken for granted.

So what is next for humanitarian reform in a changed funding landscape? The Grand Bargain is coming to the end of its strategic cycle – having already been through two restructuring processes – and is in the process of defining its future to be agreed at the next annual meeting in October. There is broad consensus that the Grand Bargain should evolve and continue beyond 2026,[34] as many actors note that it is the only multi-actor space at a time of increasing fragmentation.[35] But in today's vastly changed funding landscape, questions remain on how the platform can remain truly relevant.

After a decade of failing to meet commitments and shift power, proposals are being put forward not only for a redesigned Grand Bargain platform but also towards a new vision of humanitarianism. The Advisory Panel on the Future of Humanitarian Action identified the crisis of legitimacy as the primary threat to the humanitarian system. It proposes centring justice and equity in humanitarian responses, countering emergency mindsets and international monopolies, and updating humanitarian norms.[36] These findings overlap with the recent recommendations from the *Lancet* Commission on health, conflict and forced displacement,[37] which calls for strengthened accountability mechanisms, a renewed look at humanity and a global – non-UN-led – pooled fund.

The fundamental barrier to progress remains the lack of political will. The high-level political intervention seen at the World Humanitarian Summit was the driving force for reform momentum but is now nowhere to be seen. Major donors cutting funding – such as the UK – are doubling down on a partnership-based model that encourages the private sector and international finance institutions to take on a bigger role in development goals (as seen at the recent UK Global Partnerships Conference[38]), but this approach fails to deliver in many humanitarian settings.[39] Without the political will and collaboration to strengthen the quality, delivery and impact of humanitarian financing, the reform process appears to be at an impasse.

GHA REPORT 2026

KEY HUMANITARIAN TRENDS

Topline numbers from the UN show decreases since 2023

Funding requirements

People in need



Targeted population

Forced displacement is increasing

Most people are displaced within their own country



Political violence has increased

Particularly in the last three years



The number of aid workers killed or injured has been remained high since 2023

National staff overwhelmingly make up the greatest proportion of those killed or injured

International staff
Wounded Killed

National staff
Wounded Killed

Food insecurity is two and a half times greater than nearly a decade ago



Floods, droughts and storms affect millions every year

No. of people affected by a natural disaster



For full notes and sources, see the Methodology and definitions chapter (online).
Sources: Forced displacement data from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) global trends. Food security data from Global Report on Food Crises dataset produced by the Food Security Information Network. Political violence and conflict data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED). Aid worker security data from the Aid Worker Security Database, Humanitarian Outcomes. UN appeals data from UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS), UNHCR's Refugee Funding Tracker, the Syria 3RP dashboard, and the Global Humanitarian Overview. Disasters data from Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT).

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER 3

21 This number does not directly align with the number reported under Figure 3.2 on funding direct to local and national actors, which is that 4.3% goes to local and national actors. This is due to methodological differences in the analysis: whereas Figure 3.1 looks at all trackable funding through public reporting systems (FTS), Figure 3.2 supplements this with data from other sources and thus uses a different denominator to align with UN budget totals. For the avoidance of doubt, 4.3% should be used as the figure for the percentage of funding going directly to local and national actors.

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