ALNAP

PRIORITISING HUMANITARIAN RESOURCES:
HOW TO THINK CLEARLY ABOUT WHAT MATTERS MOST

The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) is a global network for advancing humanitarian learning. Our goal is for all humanitarians to benefit from our sector's collective experience.

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INTRODUCTION

As humanitarian actors face seemingly impossible decisions in a context of dramatically shrinking resources, there is much talk of tough priority setting. However, there has been little clarity or common ground around the terms of these prioritisation choices or the values on which they are based. Across the humanitarian system, responses to reductions in aid have been driven by immediate cost-cutting measures, and they have unfolded in an unclear and largely uncoordinated manner.[1] This is not conducive to strategic decision-making towards a wider good.

These prioritisation challenges are an acute manifestation of a chronic dilemma at the heart of humanitarian action: how best to use limited resources to meet vast, persistent and changing needs. This is not a dilemma that can be solved definitively, but it can be navigated better. How humanitarian donors and organisations choose to prioritise their resources reflects what they value, and it sets out the course for future action.

This paper builds on a **body of work** on humanitarian prioritisation by ALNAP.[2] Here, we set out a **clear model to understand decision-making spaces and influences, and we propose constructive approaches to the inevitable dilemmas and trade-offs involved.** These approaches are applicable to all those across the sector – from global to grass-roots, from donor to do-er – who are seeking to negotiate wise choices in difficult times.

The paper is in three parts. The **first** sets out the types of prioritisation decisions that humanitarians face; the **second** examines the pragmatic and ideological challenges to making these decisions; the **third** exposes the trade-offs at play as humanitarians set out their high-level priorities in response to aid cuts, with guiding principles to navigate these constructively.

1 For example, reports from Mozambique highlight the in-country confusion caused by the reversal of plans to transition out of a humanitarian footing, and the implications of the hyper-prioritisation of the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) against the backdrop of escalating needs (Worley, 2025a). Similarly, in Cameroon, reports suggest that the 'accelerated transition' to a development footing, sped up by aid cuts, has been marked by a lack of clarity and structured attention to gap-filling and risk management (Worley, 2025b).

2 Since late 2023, ALNAP has been talking with people across the humanitarian sector about the prioritisation challenges they face, including in our podcast series 'A matter of priorities'. Building on this, in June 2025, we published a commentary piece that sets out a framework for considering prioritisation choices (Obrecht and Swithern, 2025b). This paper expands on that piece.

1. UNDERSTANDING THE TYPES OF PRIORITISATION DECISIONS

FOUR DECISION SPACES

Prioritisation involves making the best use of resources to achieve a particular goal. For humanitarian aid, this means allocating and organising resources – money, goods and staff time – to best achieve humanitarian outcomes or objectives. As we discuss in **part 2**, how these objectives are defined varies according to the organisation, context and programme.

Humanitarians must make resource prioritisation choices across four areas – what we term 'decision spaces'. These spaces are the populations, programmes, organisational structure and system – they concern the who, what and how of allocating resources.

Choices in one area have implications for choices in the others. For example, organisational choices around which specialisms to invest in will shape and will be shaped by what their programmatic offer is. Similarly, how the system is configured and what common data it uses will shape and will be shaped by which populations the system chooses to see.

Figure 1. Four 'decision spaces' for prioritisation



PRIORITISING 'WHO' AND 'WHAT': POPULATIONS AND PROGRAMMES

When donors and agencies refer to allocating humanitarian resources to those 'most in need' or prioritising 'life-saving' objectives, this connects to decisions around **populations** and **programmes**. It involves choices about the 'who' and 'what' of humanitarian action: which populations, in which crises, receive what kind of support. There is a great deal of attention on these two areas of prioritisation because they relate to frontline dilemmas about people's lives (Obrecht and Swithern, 2025). The first involves setting parameters for **geographic targeting** (the countries and locations to reach) and **population targeting** (the demographics or deprivation thresholds to focus on). The second involves decisions around which problems to address via **programmatic selection and design** (the services or goods to be prioritised and how these should be provided).

PRIORITISING 'HOW': ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND SYSTEM

Humanitarian donors and agencies must also prioritise their resources **internally**, in terms of **organisational and structural** choices. This encompasses decisions on what functions are needed to run the organisation, with how many staff, and balancing resources allocated to direct services for populations affected by crisis versus quality, compliance or fundraising roles and functions at headquarters level. These resourcing decisions have significant downstream impacts on how humanitarian aid is delivered. For example, decisions made within agencies to cut gender specialists may impact gender-sensitive programming. With regard to donors, localisation advocates have long observed how staffing limitations underly a reliance on bulk granting to international intermediaries.

Finally, there are priorities to be decided at the **system** level – the core structures and roles that are needed to enable a well-functioning humanitarian 'system'. This includes coordination, accountability and information management. Much of these prioritisation decisions are shaped by donors, through the 'system enablers' donors choose to fund (such as common risk and needs assessment tools, or coordination functions). They are also shaped by United Nations (UN) agencies, whose mandates enable them to determine the shape, size and structure of core functions (such as supply chain management, response coordination or transport logistics). A prioritisation approach to systems seeks to answer the question: Given resource constraints, what is the best architecture (functions, processes, mechanisms) to help us achieve our overall objectives/ goals?

2. FRAMING THE TYPES OF DECISION-MAKING CHALLENGES

FOUR CHALLENGES

Resource prioritisation across these four areas (populations, programmes, structures and systems) is beset by four challenges. Two are pragmatic in nature and two are ideological (see **Figure 2**).

Such pragmatic and ideological considerations are not unique to humanitarian action – they are common to the resource allocations faced around other public goods, such as national healthcare provision. But they present specific challenges in the humanitarian aid sector, which we outline below. In many ways these challenges are intertwined – ideologies shape the procedures and practicalities – but purpose-related challenges demand a new level of honest attention as the humanitarian system attempts to recalibrate or reinvent itself.

Figure 2. Four challenges shaping prioritisation decisions



PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES

What we describe as the international humanitarian 'system', in fact comprises diverse and independent moving parts. These are loosely interconnected and they lack coherent and transparent procedures for allocating resources collectively. This creates multiple challenges for the efficient allocation of scarce resources.

In theory, the fact that there is no single actor, body or process responsible for 'system design' or resource allocation allows for more distributed and democratised decision-making. Yet, in reality, decisions are made by separate but interlinked pockets of high-influence stakeholders, often with little transparency or opportunity for others to shape decisions.[3]

The Humanitarian Needs and Response Plans (HNRPs), managed by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), are the clearest collective procedure for prioritisation. They serve as a multi-agency estimation of needs in a humanitarian crisis, an articulation of what programmes and services are required, and their associated costs. These processes focus on the sub-national aspect of populations (who within a geographic area or crisis will be targeted, not which countries or crises globally should be prioritised), and on prioritising programmes (the types of responses under or spanning the humanitarian clusters that should be prioritised). However, despite efforts to clarify and standardise procedures, the calculus of prioritisation – what the most recent *Global humanitarian overview* calls the 'cruel math' of prioritisation (OCHA, 2025a) – can remain opaque and swayed by the priorities of individual organisations and donors. We discuss this in our accompanying paper (Obrecht and Swithern, 2025a).

The HNRPs are grounded in guidelines and formulae for assessing needs (see **Practical challenges**). But they also reflect the sum of the prioritisation choices of individual humanitarian agencies who participate – predominantly UN agencies and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). Agencies decide which programmes to design and offer, and where to open in-country offices, and their presence and reach directly affects the parameters of the prioritisation of populations and programmes. This presence and reach has always been shaped to some extent by financial factors and preferential pathways (Healy and Tiller, 2014). However, the recent liquidity crisis has prompted a speed and severity of organisational cuts that have outpaced strategic reprioritisation. Reduced bandwidth, capacity and presence are creating facts on the ground that shape the prioritisation of future efforts.[4]

Agencies' decisions are thus clearly shaped by donor decisions on which geographic areas to engage in and which sectors to fund. While this is also a political challenge (see **Political challenges**), procedurally here too, fragmented decision-making undermines effective prioritisation. At a global level, there is no formal coordination to support these decisions collectively and, indeed with

3 See, inter alia, Saez et al (2021).

4 For example, the Afghanistan 'reprioritised' HNRP is one of only a few of these country plans which gives an account of its methodology in any detail. It notes that clusters reduced activities and targets by factoring in response gaps analysis from the first half of 2024 and anticipated future funding shortfalls. 'Given the current context and funding climate, however, clusters were asked to further prioritize by i) focusing primarily on life-saving activities under SO1 and protection-related activities under SO2 and dropping activities with low reach in 2024; ii) reducing the proportion of people targeted in line with projected declines in resources available; iii) and considering no longer responding in provinces where partners have recalibrated or reduced their presence' (OCHA, 2025b).

donors, decisions can be split between departments, ministries and devolved country offices.[5] The Good Humanitarian Donorship group does not function as a collective decision-making body (Swithern, 2024), and although coalitions of 'like-minded' donors and UN agency donor support groups provide space for some coordination, these are exclusive to smaller and self-selecting groups of donors.

PRACTICAL CHALLENGES

Many well-documented practical challenges of humanitarian prioritisation centre on having quality data to make decisions – and having the staffing and resources to gather and make sense of this data.[6] The short and shifting timeframes around prioritisation decision-making in the wake of the 2025 aid cuts have compounded these challenges, and they have also compromised data capacities. As we explore in **part 3**, this impacts the ability to ensure meaningful consultation of people affected by crisis, at the same time as reducing assessment and analytical investments. Gaps and asymmetries in information mean humanitarian actors can be making decisions in the dark.

For the humanitarian system, the **ecosystem of risk analysis and humanitarian data collection and analysis** underpins impartial assessments of vulnerabilities and needs. These assessments include the Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework that is used to generate the people in need (PiN) metrics in the HNRPs, as detailed in our accompanying paper (Obrecht and Swithern, 2025a), as well as a wider set of food-insecurity, climate and health monitoring systems. However, these data monitoring and analysis mechanisms – particularly those funded and hosted by the United States government[7] – were among some of the first casualties of the aid cuts in 2025, stymying informed prioritisation decisions. Even when well funded, these data tools alone have limits: they are ultimately probabilistic and quantitative, and they demand investments in analytical ground-truthing if they are to inform people-centred prioritisation (see **part 3**) (Simons, 2025).

Lack of comparable information on other actors' **operational activities** in humanitarian crises makes it difficult to assess how any individual donor or agency can best add value and avoid duplication. Mapping this organisational action is at the best of times difficult, but the current context of fast-moving programmatic changes and staffing in flux makes it exceptionally hard. At a

5 For example, for some donors, core funding to UN agencies is handled by their respective ministries of foreign affairs, while programmatic funding to UN agencies and others is handled by the development ministry or department. For several donors, overall funding 'envelopes' are decided at headquarters level, while programmatic allocation decisions are devolved to country level.

6 See, for example, Darcy and Hofmann (2003); Knox-Clarke and Darcy (2014); Obrecht (2017); de Geoffroy et al (2015); Swithern (2018).

7 For example, FEWSNET – for 40 years the primary framework and mechanism for prioritising humanitarian responses to food insecurity, which is the largest humanitarian sector – was an early casualty of the US aid freeze. Dan Maxwell of the Feinstein International Center has expressed the impacts of this on prioritisation and decision-making: 'My fear is that [it] would mean that there is no evidence on which to base the choice of [how to] allocate more food assistance' (Worley, 2025c).

country level '3W' (who, what, where) coordination can help, but this rarely aggregates up to global decision-making and it is challenging to keep live. Funding uncertainties and ongoing major restructuring and down-sizing exercises within UN agencies and INGOs mean that there is a prolonged 'zone of uncertainty' about operation, in turn making it hard to factor complementarity and gap-filling into these restructuring efforts. International agencies also have collective blind-spots about the response efforts outside their ambit, with little operational understanding of local response modalities – both formal and informal.[8]

Evidence of cost-effectiveness is another practical area of weak information across the sector, making it hard to factor value into the prioritisation of scarce resources. Basic **cost-efficiency** data is hard to come by given the lack of transparent data on how much it costs different agencies to provide comparable goods and services[9] – a problem made all the harder by the volatile economic, supply chain and operational conditions in crisis contexts (Stoddard et al, 2017; ALNAP, 2018; ALNAP, 2022; Elrha, 2018; Baker and Salway, 2016). Consequently, this limits **well-evidenced cost-effectiveness analysis** (ALNAP, 2018 and 2022), which demands information about the outcomes of humanitarian interventions – information that is scarce from the perspective of implementing agencies, let alone from the perspectives of recipient communities. In the absence of real engagement with the difficulties of determining cost-effectiveness, prioritisation pathways often revert to a reductive focus on cost-savings.

POLITICAL CHALLENGES

Ideological issues feature in the more pragmatic challenges of procedures and practicalities discussed, but they are particularly pronounced in the political challenges in aid allocation. Political prioritisation often frames the window in which other prioritisation decisions can be made. Despite attempts to allocate according to humanitarian need, donors and agencies alike must grapple with influences that shape their presence and preferential pathways and that bend them towards sovereign, rather than collective, approaches (see section on **Procedural challenges**).

Politicisation of aid is not new: tensions between principled, needs-based humanitarian allocation and influences from political leaders and donor publics have long shaped the system (see Darcy and Hoffman, 2003). Domestic fiscal constraints, media coverage and popular opinion interact with donors' foreign and domestic policy interests – from 'soft power' to migration management – to shape how much humanitarian aid is prioritised, what form it takes and where it

8 For example, evidence from multiple countries shows how humanitarian agencies have bypassed national social protection systems (see Phelps and Chandaria, 2025), and localisation studies repeatedly highlight the lack of understanding about national and local informal responses and safety nets (see Barbelet et al, 2024).

9 Some attempts have been made to overcome this – most notably with the Dioptra tool, a multi-INGO initiative to create a web-based cost analysis tool to use existing financial and monitoring data to rapidly estimate cost-efficiency of programme interventions. See **https://www.dioptratool.org/**.

goes.

However, there is a new, marked shift towards an overt prioritisation of mutual interest and transactional goals as determinants for humanitarian engagement.[10] This is as compared to 20 years ago when the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative attempted to establish guardrail principles in a wave of good intention to counteract concerns.

Politics also emerges in crisis contexts, where shrinking humanitarian space determines priorities de-facto. It can manifest in multiple ways: for example, undermining the delivery of support in states that are considered priorities for humanitarian aid, such as in Palestine; precluding prioritisation of countries or populations despite recognised severity of needs, such as in Myanmar; or contesting the existence of severe needs, such as previously seen in Tigray.

PURPOSE-RELATED CHALLENGES

The procedural, practical and political challenges are distinct to prioritising humanitarian resources effectively. But they all circle back to the foundational challenge of the lack of clarity on the purpose – or objective – of humanitarian action. Whether and how a humanitarian actor articulates their aims will shape what that actor prioritises to achieve those aims.

Those who fund and implement humanitarian action do not share one central consensus on the purpose of humanitarian aid. The strategies of bilateral donors and multilateral and international agencies endorse a variety of objectives. At best, there is an overlapping consensus around the notion that humanitarian aid should be 'life saving' and protect people from the impacts of crises. OCHA's analysis of the HNRPs – which to date have set their own strategic objective at country level – reveals a common set of aims, which it proposes should form the standardised foundation for future plans. These aims are to save lives and alleviate suffering, to protect safety and rights, and to sustain lives and livelihoods (OCHA, n.d.).

At the **programme and population** levels, these broad objectives reflect a range of perspectives on the degree to which humanitarian resources should be used to promote resilience or 'improving lives' rather than merely saving them; whether they should be used to anticipate and prevent crises, rather than merely to respond; and how much humanitarians should invest in community consultation. Purpose-related challenges play out at the **system** level too: for example, between those who consider localisation as part of a priority strategic objective of pursuing justice and equity, and those who see it as being more of an

10 The US was unequivocal about its aid priorities being politically driven, noting that it would fund 'disaster relief when it fulfils the President's foreign policy aims' (Kerwin, 2025); the European Union's (EU) official development assistance (ODA) is being reprioritised away from service provision towards a greater emphasis on infrastructure – in line with principles of its global gateway programme, framed as promoting economic development for EU partners as well as ensuring EU member states' private-sector investments and competitiveness (EC, n.d.).

operational means to efficiently achieve life-saving objectives.

Six strategic objectives (purposes) are most visible and present in responses to the 2025 humanitarian financial crisis (see **Figure 3**). These objectives have been articulated in inter-agency, donor and organisational positions in re-setting and re-prioritising humanitarian action. While other objectives may exist,[11] the fact remains that there are contradictions between and within them. Within each objective, different actors in different places use different definitions – for example, it is by no means agreed what constitutes 'life saving'.[12] And between each objective, as we explore in **part 3**, all six cannot take equal priority – allocation will involve trade-offs by necessity.

Figure 3. Six core purposes stated in humanitarian prioritisation plans



11 For example, cost-effectiveness and responsible use of resources are articulated as a key aim by some, and this aim was included in previous iterations of this tool (see Obrecht and Swithern, 2025b). But we do not include it here as this objective is regarded as a means to achieving 'higher order' humanitarian purposes – such as saving lives.

12 As noted in our commentary piece (ibid.), life-saving can mean: whom we are trying to target for assistance (i.e. those in most significant life threatening circumstances); the outcomes we are trying to achieve (i.e. reducing excess mortality rates in particular populations); the services we are willing to deliver (i.e. food security versus education); or the timeframe in which we will operate (i.e. 90 days opposed to 90 months).

3. ADDRESSING PURPOSE-RELATED TRADE-OFFS AND TENSIONS

FACING THE TENSIONS

Contrary to aspirational rhetoric, it is not possible to simultaneously and equally prioritise all six humanitarian purposes illustrated in **Figure 3**. Even in a less constrained funding environment, these objectives cannot exist in equilibrium. The current acute resource constraints throw the trade-offs into stark relief. We highlight three of these.

ENSURING DIGNITY AND AGENCY VERSUS LIFE SAVING

'People first' or 'people-centred aid' is often positioned as a 'chapeau' principle in proposals for the future of humanitarian action – including in the Emergency Relief Coordinator's (ERC) Humanitarian Reset (Fletcher, 2025) and the UN 80 Initiative's Humanitarian Compact (UN, 2025) – in line with the purpose of 'ensuring dignity and agency'. Yet this principle often sits in tension with other pre-set priorities, even within the same strategic document.[13]



This diagram illustrates the concept of potential trade-offs. It does not assign fixed values and recognises that the actual shape will vary by context.

If this principle is to be fully realised as a priority, it has implications for the prioritisation of a menu of 'life-saving' interventions based on internationally agreed metrics of need severity – as we discuss in our accompanying paper (Obrecht and Swithern, 2025a). While people suffering acute crisis might identify similar priorities to humanitarian 'life-saving' support, surveys of people affected by protracted crises also often reveal a preference for support for self-reliance over emergency basics (Ground Truth Solutions, 2025; ALNAP, 2022). Ensuring that people have agency in deciding and directing the aid they receive involves investing resources in a very different operating model – potentially one that prioritises a locally led over a multilaterally led model.

13 For example, strategic documents published by some organisations offer localisation and community empowerment as a framing principle, but they go on to describe a pre-set sectoral menu.

DEFENDING MULTILATERALISM VERSUS PROMOTING LOCALISATION

The tensions between multilateralism and localisation are also well rehearsed. Most international humanitarian actors have signed up to some form of localisation commitment as a priority, yet they also retain a belief in the importance of a multilateral system. This is not necessarily a tension, but it can become so in decisions about resource prioritisation at the organisational and system levels.

Donors are highly motivated to support the work of UN agencies, both for pragmatic and ideological reasons. Ideologically, the UN system represents a collective approach to humanitarianism and a central part of the post-1945 rules-based international order – at a time when its shared norms are under threat (IARAN, 2025). Pragmatically, UN agencies are highly effective at absorbing risk, providing an easy win for donors needing to get large grants out the door. But these virtues are traded off against the rigid, top-down hierarchical systems employed by UN agencies in their 'partnerships' with local organisations, and in collective decision-making bodies that historically have featured very little power-sharing.



This diagram illustrates the concept of potential trade-offs. It does not assign fixed values and recognises that the actual shape will vary by context.

As part of the ERC's humanitarian reset, there have been some suggestions for uniting multilateralism with localisation, the most notable being calls for increased funding to UN-managed country-based pooled funds with targets for channelling those funds through local actors. While these calls may be posited as a useful reconciliation between two opposing directions, they are ultimately weighted towards prioritising the centrality of multilaterals, due to the nature of their governance and financing terms.

A more localisation-weighted alternative – endorsed by some local actors themselves – may be to explore how the multilateral system can shift from an operational to a more normative and diplomatic role for multilateral agencies, supporting and protecting the space for local actors to operate (Barter et al, 2025).

PROTECTING RIGHTS VERSUS SAVING LIVES

In many conflict settings, advocating for International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to be upheld is in line with preserving humanitarian access. In other contexts, pursuing this priority is in tension with maintaining presence to deliver support. This tension is negotiated daily at the operational level in most complex crises,[14]

14 See the **principles chapter** in ALNAP (2022).



This diagram illustrates the concept of potential trade-offs. It does not assign fixed values and recognises that the actual shape will vary by context.

and it comes to the fore at a diplomatic level in geopolitically high-profile conflicts. This may appear to be less of a resource prioritisation choice than a principles dilemma, but in fact it has implications for decision-making at the population, programme, organisational and system levels.

At a population level, it drives choices about how far reachability or severity should determine which communities are prioritised. At programmatic level, it shapes choices around investments in protection. At organisational and system levels, it points to a greater emphasis on diplomacy functions – as the UN 80 Humanitarian Compact begins to suggest.[15] But it also plays into the tensions around multilateralism and localisation too. Where the international system prioritises protecting rights – or is nonetheless denied access – it tends to rely on local actors to shoulder the risk of delivery, and so implies greater and more systematic investments in mitigating their risks and protecting their space.

APPROACHES TO DECISION-MAKING

How then, can donors and agencies navigate these tensions and dilemmas inherent in prioritisation, as they attempt to 'do better with less' in an era of aid cuts and poly-crises? It is evident that no single solution can fully reconcile them, but we propose high-level guiding points for decision-makers as they navigate choices and challenges over the coming year.

Be clear on purpose. Move beyond the headlines of strategic objectives to an honest articulation of what these entail in practice, the evidence on which both delivery and success will be judged, and which purpose(s) take priority.

Use an appropriate evidence base. Those who wish to prioritise life saving as their most fundamental objective in humanitarian action will still face questions as to which organisations, intervention designs/sectors or crises offer the highest life-saving impact. Consulting evidence across different options is key, as is acknowledging that what is considered an appropriate evidence base will differ depending on what purpose is prioritised. An approach that seeks to balance multilateral-centric life saving with locally centred dignity and agency will value evidence on needs and effectiveness from local organisations and populations affected by crisis in equal complement to international research and data.

15 The UN 80 Humanitarian Compact does not address the question of organisational configuration and resourcing for diplomacy, but it does emphasise the need to bring agencies together to speak with one voice under a new Collaborative Humanitarian Diplomacy Initiative (UN, 2025).

Make clearer, bigger, purpose-driven 'bets'. Donors and large international agencies alike have broadened their internal and external investments over the past decade to include wide-ranging functions, issues and services. This spreads funding and attention more thinly, potentially reducing impact and making it harder to monitor effectiveness. In this new era of constrained funding, individual actors may see benefit in choosing a lane and going big. For example, leaning fully into localised response through locally managed funding mechanisms and local networks as a majority share of their spending or work; or opting to focus specifically on anticipatory action and prevention designs; or investing in organisations that explicitly support the dignity and voice of people affected by crisis in response.

This then demands and enables **complementary decision-making** to be negotiated – backed up by **transparent cooperation**. The reality that different actors will set their priorities in different places could be a net gain, instead of a net loss at the system and population levels. For this to be realised takes collaboration rather than the insularity and resource competition that has characterised much recent reaction to financial scarcity. It involves finally facing the necessity of inter-donor dialogue, and of meaningfully including local organisations in multilateral decision-making fora.

The practical and political realities of the humanitarian system, in which formal decision-making is fragmented and frequently opaque, are unlikely to change for the better in the coming years. But donors and agencies should challenge one another to do better and help one another make more effective decisions – they should share information more readily and accept that no actor can go it alone in the face of present and unfolding humanitarian demands.

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