


EVALUATION: USAID/OFDA HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN ANGOLA 2000-2003

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Submitted to:

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAH	Action Against Hunger
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
CDRA	Consortium for Development and Relief Activities
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DW	Development Workshop
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
EDRC	Emergency Disaster Relief Coordinator
ERF	Emergency Relief Fund
FAA	Angolan Armed Forces
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FFP	Food for Peace
FNLA	National Liberation Front of Angola
FONGA	Forum das Organizações Não Governamentais Angolanas (Forum of Angolan Non-government Associations)
FRA	Family Reception Areas
FY	Fiscal Year
GAS	Grupos de Água e Saneamento (Water and Sanitation Group)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GRA	Government of the Republic of Angola
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IAI	Institute of Agronomic Investigations
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMC	International Medical Corp
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INAROE	Instituto Nacional de Remoção de Obstáculos e Engenheiros Explosivos (National Institute for the Removal of Obstacles and Explosive Ordnance)
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MINARS	Ministério da Assistência e Reinserção Social (Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration)
MINSA	Ministério da Saúde (Ministry of Health)
MPLA	Movement for the Liberation of the People of Angola
NFI	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non-government Organization
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
OCHA	Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
PRM	State Department's Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration
PWA	Provincial Water Authority
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Coordinator

USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USG	United States Government
UTCAH	Unidade Técnica de Coordenação da Ajudas Humanitárias (Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance)
VAM	Vulnerability Assessment Mapping
WFP	World Food Programme
WV	World Vision

FOREWORD

This report has been composed by the three-person team fielded by Development Associates to Angola in September and October of 2003 to conduct an evaluation of humanitarian assistance strategies and interventions pursued there by the United States Agency for International Development's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) from the beginning of FY 2000 through the end of FY 2003. The specific goals of the evaluation are outlined in the introductory pages of the report.

Team members brought to their assignment a combination of skills and experiences that resulted in a truly independent assessment of need and response in the humanitarian arena and contributed the benefit of a fresh approach that contained neither biases nor agendas likely to distort findings.

The team spent three weeks in the field interviewing host government officials, USAID officers, non-government organization and international donor agency representatives, former UNITA combatants, media professionals, and private citizens somewhat representative of the more vulnerable strata of Angolan society. The period of time in the field both followed and preceded consultations in Washington, D.C., with officials at the U.S. Department of State, OFDA, the World Bank and various informed individuals. The emphasis of the team's investigations in Angola was on areas beyond the capital city of Luanda, an approach necessary to obtain an understanding of the conditions faced by OFDA's implementing partners as they struggled to reach remote, hard to access, populations of affected residents—largely those displaced by war over many years. Critical players not available for interviews in Angola or Washington were contacted via the Internet.

One immediate benefit of the extensive travel to the Plan Alto region of Angola was to provide team members with a keen appreciation for the significant logistical hurdles faced by all providers of relief assistance in the region. The limitations of the transport system and the dangers imposed by mine fields are critical factors in effectively delivering humanitarian and development assistance that could be underestimated if not realized first hand. Team members traveled to Bié, Moxico, Malanje and Huambo provinces—not simply to provincial capitals but to remote villages in all cases.

Complicated itineraries followed by the team required hours of effort on the part of the OFDA representative and USAID Mission staff members in Luanda facilitating the evaluation. The evaluators are appreciative of the efforts made on their behalf and thankful for the efficiency and thoroughness of the travel and site visit arrangements across Angola. It would have been literally impossible for the team to have gained the comprehensive view of the situation it realized without such dedicated assistance.

The evaluation team notes that they were offered total cooperation and support by OFDA and USAID/Luanda in the conduct of their assignment. Questions asked were candidly answered, access to information readily provided. The team is especially appreciative of the efforts of OFDA's Emergency Disaster Relief Coordinator (EDRC) in Angola, James Conway, to facilitate its rather extensive travel across the country and the securing of every appointment or consultation sought.

The report submitted by the team encompasses a wide range of discussions and conclusions. The reader should know that in all cases findings originated with team members and that no conclusions not fully supported by them are reflected in the assessment.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The report which follows provides an independent evaluation of the humanitarian assistance operations undertaken by USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) in Angola during the four year period of FY 2000 through FY 2003. It reflects the work of a three-person team of outside professionals who examined OFDA's ability to deliver on strategic objectives, have discernable impact, demonstrate efficiency in reaching the vast number of vulnerable people in the war-torn nation, coordinate complex activities with multiple key players, and realize an element of sustainability through its interventions. The methodology followed by the evaluation team and the full scope of their examination of the program are detailed in the body of the report.

Five straight-forward conclusions are at the heart of the evaluation. They are:

- ❑ The overall legacy of OFDA's engagement in Angola is a highly positive one. There is considerable evidence that OFDA had significant impact in alleviating the horrendous suffering of the many hundreds of thousands of Angolans impacted by civil war over the past three decades. U.S. Government humanitarian assistance efforts in general and OFDA-initiated or funded activities in particular resulted in the saving of many lives otherwise likely to have been lost. Interventions undertaken by OFDA were, with only minor exceptions, valid and appropriate and displayed an intelligent deployment of resources and strategic understanding of what was possible and what was critical.
- ❑ OFDA displayed impressive skill and flexibility in meeting the ever-shifting humanitarian requirements in the country as war flared and receded, lines of control altered, access expanded or contracted. Most impressive was the way in which OFDA changed its focus in the aftermath of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi's death and the *de facto* end of the long war.
- ❑ There is reason to believe that the rapid deployment of resources and delivery of essential commodities by OFDA in the critical months following the April 2002 cease fire served to keep the fragile peace process on track and helped avert a potential plunge into general anarchy across the country. OFDA's actions signaled to UNITA combatants that they had a clear stake in making the peace process work. OFDA proved to be a major asset in the pursuit of U.S. Government foreign policy objectives in Angola in general, perhaps most importantly in these critical months.
- ❑ OFDA wisely chose its implementing partners in Angola, both NGOs and UN agencies. It worked collaboratively with partners on establishing objectives and priorities, then gave them ample operational flexibility to respond to shifting needs and opportunities.
- ❑ OFDA inputs were highly appropriate to the circumstances and opportunities present. Interventions both met immediate needs and laid a foundation for generally sustainable development. The provision of non-food items to those in displaced persons camps helped save lives, prevent disease, keep families together and give people some sense of normalcy. The benefits of the water and sanitation projects examined by the evaluation team in numerous remote villages will clearly multiply throughout the coming years. The support of

mine field identification and demarcation efforts through UNSECOORD,¹ essential for the protection of both returnees and relief workers, was a requirement for getting people out of camps and back to their areas of origin, but will also serve to open up large tracks of the country to development. Perhaps the most compelling example of a sustainable intervention is the *seed multiplication* program in Huambo province. This effort is somewhat of a textbook example of an initiative that covers the relief-to-development arc so often sought but seldom delivered. This achievement is underscored by the unprecedented support it has been given by the ChevronTexaco Corporation.

These conclusions are fleshed out in the body of the report. The seed multiplication program in Huambo is given special focus due to its potential for substantial and ongoing impact and because of the leveraging of private sector resources it has garnered.

OFDA-funded sector-specific interventions highlighted in the report are: Health and Nutrition; Water and Sanitation; Food Security; Protection of Affected Populations; and, Capacity Building.

Numerous findings stem from the evaluation team's focus on activities in those sectors. Perhaps most compelling are two conclusions asserting that:

- ❑ OFDA crafted a health program that effectively and aggressively addressed the most pressing needs of the affected population. It proactively put into place a package of health and nutrition interventions that both countered immediate threats to the displaced and the returnees and laid a foundation for future improvements in the overall system. That said, team members had a nagging suspicion that even more could have been achieved had a smaller number of discrete and strategic interventions been funded. The same amount of funding could potentially have been directed to a handful of NGOs working with the Ministry of Health on national anti-malarial or anti-polio campaigns or widespread inoculation drives aimed at vaccine-preventable epidemics.

- ❑ During the war and during the chaos of 2002, Angola faced an enormous food security crisis which threatened untold thousands of civilians. Working through UN and NGO partners, OFDA moved expeditiously to make certain that the emergency food assistance commodities were delivered and distributed where most urgently needed. In particular, its intelligent support of critical components of the World Food Programme operation substantially increased the efficiency of food deliveries across the country. OFDA has to be given considerable credit for multiple intelligent interventions to counter the imminent threat of widespread starvation and for early and increasingly effective steps to address restoration of the agricultural sector in the country. Food security is increasing in Angola and OFDA can claim a notable share of credit for that achievement.

The report discusses the impediment to both relief and recovery activities imposed by the country's infestation of landmines and the still-limited access to many vulnerable people posed by the mines and the widespread destruction of roads and bridges. It looks at how OFDA worked with its implementing partners and also examines its interactions with USAID/Angola and the American Embassy in Luanda. The report notes how OFDA skillfully exploited an

¹ UNSECOORD is the United Nations Security Coordinator.

opportunity to infuse UN/OCHA² with legitimacy and heft that well served the entire humanitarian community.

OFDA does not totally escape criticism from the evaluators, but the report is hardly ambiguous in asserting that the humanitarian assistance effort in Angola was a highly effective one that served to save innumerable lives, relieve suffering, promote foreign policy interests of the U.S. Government and plant at least a few seeds likely to sustain themselves as the country moves into a development mode. The evaluation team's analysis of the OFDA operations in Angola results in a report that underscores the many and substantial achievements realized in an environment not generally conducive to success.

² OCHA is the Office of Coordination for Humanitarian Assistance.

EVALUATION: USAID/OFDA HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN ANGOLA 2000-2003

PART ONE: THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN ANGOLA

I. COUNTRY BACKGROUND

The Portuguese first landed in what is now northern Angola in 1482, encountering the Kingdom of the Congo, which stretched from modern Gabon in the north to the Kwanza River in the south. Mbanza Congo, the capital, had a population of 50,000 people. South were various important states, of which the Kingdom of Ndongo, ruled by the Ngola (King), was most significant; it is from the king of Ndongo that modern Angola derives its name. Through a series of treaties and wars throughout the 16th century, the Portuguese gradually took control of the coastal strip. The Dutch occupied Luanda from 1641-48, but in 1648 Brazilian-based Portuguese forces re-took Luanda and initiated military conquest of the Congo and Ndongo states that ended with Portuguese victory in 1671. Full Portuguese administrative control of the country's interior, however, was not realized until the beginning of the 20th century.

Portugal's primary interest in Angola quickly turned to slavery. The slaving system began early in the 16th century when local chiefs began to sell the Portuguese laborers to work on their sugar plantations in São Tomé, Príncipe and Brazil. By the 19th century, Angola was the largest source of slaves for all of the Americas, including the United States. At the end of that century a massive forced labor system replaced formal slavery, a system which continued until finally outlawed in 1961. Forced labor provided the basis for development of a plantation economy and, by the mid-20th century, a major mining sector. Forced labor combined with British financing constructed three railroads from the coast to the interior, the most important of which was the transcontinental Benguela railroad that linked the port of Lobito with the copper zones of the Belgian Congo and what is now Zambia.

Colonial economic development did not translate into social development for native Angolans. The Portuguese regime encouraged white immigration, especially after 1950, which intensified racial antagonisms. Contrary to the accelerating decolonization witnessed elsewhere in Africa, Portugal, under the Salazar then the Caetano dictatorships, rejected the very concept of independence and officially portrayed its African colonies as overseas provinces. The fires of national liberation could not be doused, however, and three major independence movements emerged: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), with a base among Kimbundu and the mixed-race intelligentsia of Luanda, and links to communist parties in Portugal and the East Bloc; the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), with an ethnic base in the Bakongo region of the north and links to the United States and the Mobutu regime in Kinshasa; and, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi, with an ethnic and regional base in the Ovimbundu heartland in the center of the country.

From the early 1960s, elements of these movements fought against the Portuguese. A 1974 *coup d'état* in Portugal, however, established a liberal military government that promptly suspended the war and agreed to hand over power to a coalition of the three movements. Perhaps inevitably, that coalition quickly broke down and full-blown civil war erupted. By late 1975, Cuban forces had intervened on behalf of the MPLA and South African troops for UNITA, instantly internationalizing the Angolan conflict. In control of Luanda and the coastal strip (and increasingly lucrative oil fields), the MPLA declared independence on November 11, 1975, the day the Portuguese abandoned the capital. Augustinho Neto became the first president. Following Neto's somewhat mysterious death in the former Soviet Union, José Eduardo dos Santos became president in 1979 and rules the country to this day.

Civil war raged between UNITA and the MPLA through 1989 (FNLA faded as a viable force despite initial support from the U.S. Government). For much of this time, UNITA, backed by U.S. resources and South African troops, controlled vast swaths of the interior; similarly tens of thousands of Cuban troops supported the MPLA, often engaging South African soldiers on the front lines. A U.S.-brokered agreement resulted in withdrawal of foreign troops in 1989 and led to the Bicesse Accord of 1991, which spelled out an electoral process under the supervision of the United Nations for a democratic Angola. When UNITA's Savimbi failed to win the first round of the presidential election in 1992 (he won 40 percent to dos Santos' 49 percent, results which required a runoff), he called the election fraudulent and returned to war. Another peace accord was brokered in Lusaka, Zambia, and signed in 1994. This agreement, too, collapsed in 1998 when Savimbi renewed the war for a second time, claiming the MPLA was not fulfilling its obligations. The UN Security Council voted in August of 1997 to impose sanctions on UNITA and the Angolan military launched a massive offensive in 1999 which largely destroyed UNITA's conventional capacity and recaptured all major cities previously held by Savimbi's forces. Savimbi then returned to guerrilla tactics—prolonging a vicious armed struggle which continued until his death in combat in February 2002.

On April 4, 2002, the Angolan Government and UNITA signed the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, which formalized the *de facto* cease-fire that prevailed following Savimbi's

Angola in Profile:

Angola is over 1.2 million square kilometers in area, twice the size of Texas. The population is estimated at 13.5 million and GDP at \$13.3 billion. The economy has grown in recent years, but growth is highly dependent on the oil sector, which accounts for perhaps half of GDP and over 90 percent of export revenues. The oil industry however is believed to employ not more than 15,000 Angolans and revenues from the oil sector have yet to benefit the general population.

The vast majority of the Angolan population lives in deep poverty, the country's external debt is staggering, inflation is rampant. Over the past few years, allegations have arisen that large portions of Angola's oil revenues have been embezzled. In 2001, IMF studies cited some \$1.2 billion in oil revenues as being "unaccounted for."

Angola is Sub-Saharan Africa's second largest oil producer behind Nigeria; the majority of its production is located off the coast of Cabinda province. The country has abundant diamond deposits in addition to the oil. It is the agricultural potential of the Plan Alto, however, that offers the most promise for directly lifting millions of Angolans from dire poverty.

At present, Angola globally ranks at or near the bottom of nearly every available indicator for the quality of life of its inhabitants: life expectancy, child mortality rates, access to water supply, literacy. The suffering of the people of Angola is certain to continue long into the future despite the end of the devastating conflict which drove so many over the edge and into the abyss.

death. In accordance with the peace agreement, UNITA recommitted to the peace framework in the 1994 Lusaka Protocol, returned all remaining territory to Angolan Government control, quartered military personnel in predetermined locations, and relinquished its arms. In August 2002, UNITA demobilized all military personnel and in September, together with the government, reconstituted the UN-sponsored Joint Commission to resolve outstanding political issues under the Lusaka Protocol. On November 21, 2002, UNITA and the government declared all outstanding issues resolved and the Lusaka Protocol fully implemented.

Twenty-seven years of civil war in Angola ended in 2002. The horrendous suffering of the Angolan people did not.

The initial task at the end of conflict was to facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of Angolans displaced from homes and livelihoods by the fighting. The second was to secure the peace by interventions that gave people—especially former combatants—reason to believe that the fighting was genuinely over. The final challenge was to lay the groundwork for the long-delayed development of the country and structure the means of channeling the vast resources of Angola in directions that would benefit its citizens. (It is a sad irony that the Angolan people endure some of the most horrendous deprivations known on the planet, including widespread food insecurity and high incidence of preventable disease, while resident in one of the countries most generously endowed with abundant natural resources anywhere in the world and one with the ability to become a major agricultural exporter.)

II. DISRUPTION AND DISPLACEMENT

It is of course the twenty-seven years of civil war in Angola following the independence of 1975 which fueled one of the most massive and longest-lasting humanitarian crises in modern history. *The conflict in the country killed not less than a million people and uprooted at least a third of its population.* Millions of individuals fled to refugee camps in surrounding countries or became internally displaced. Tens of thousands of combatants, many forcibly recruited into armies at extremely young ages, greeted the new peace with no frames of reference beyond participation in the fighting so often inflicted upon civilians and non-aligned communities. The infestation of landmines in the country is among the worst ever recorded in any country in the world. The destruction of the physical and human infrastructure was near complete in many parts of the nation.



In reality, few places on the globe have endured the sustained violence of modern Angola. Fourteen years of anti-colonial war preceded the tortured and protracted civil war that morphed into a conflict between surrogates as a Big Power duel of the Cold War. The MPLA-UNITA struggle was a political clash vastly enlarged by ethnic and racial tensions, geography and the scramble to control natural resources. The U.S., the Soviets, the Cubans and South Africa were all active players in the war in pursuit of divergent policy objectives. National development was decisively put on hold despite the ever-increasing oil revenues.

The death of Savimbi and the relatively sudden peace agreement of 2002 afforded a new comprehension of the devastation of the country and its people. Hundreds of communities across Angola had been displaced and devastated through the deliberate strategies of both sides in the fight to depopulate the countryside and deprive combatants of food, supplies and refuge. In 70 percent of the areas not previously accessible, relief workers found people with extremely low food security if not at serious risk of starvation. Malnutrition levels and child and maternal mortality rates were critical. In these areas, barely 5 percent of the population had access to safe drinking water; hardly any children attended school.

By June 2002, two months after the effective end of the war, the caseload for emergency assistance had climbed from 1.9 million to 3 million people. The full implications of the landmine infestation and the impossibility of effectively reaching vulnerable people due to the large number of destroyed bridges and impassable roads became fully apparent.

Also apparent was the fact that Angola was going to need considerable time and massive external assistance to recover from the relentless attacks directed against civilian targets during the decades of war. One third of the population had been displaced; almost half a million refugees remained outside the national borders. The spontaneous and accelerating return of the displaced populations—while a welcome sign of people’s confidence in the peace accords—saw tens of thousands of families going back to areas infested with landmines and totally bereft of government services and inaccessible to relief agencies. Refugees and IDPs (internally displaced persons) were returning to the desperate situations to be expected in areas simply without social services, safe water or a food supply. Close to 2 million people were in the process of returning to their areas of origin in the spring and summer of 2002.

III. EVALUATION OF OFDA

Regardless of shifting political objectives in the long road to peace in Angola, the United States Government has consistently been the major bilateral provider of humanitarian assistance to the people of that troubled land. Emergency aid from the USG 1990 through 2003 totals over \$800 million, a virtually unprecedented sum—and one that does not reflect contributions to regional refugee protection and assistance efforts focused largely on Angolan refugees. The humanitarian assistance has been in the form of Food for Peace and U.S. Department of Agriculture commodities, State Department PRM³ contributions for refugee programs, and, of course through OFDA, which has served as the *de facto* disaster response coordinator for U.S. Government engagement in the crisis. It is worth noting that for FY 2003, Angola accounted for some 8 percent of OFDA’s global expenditures beyond the Iraqi operations.

³ PRM is the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration.

OFDA has actively addressed humanitarian requirements in Angola since 1990. Earlier evaluations examined initial phases of operations while this report constitutes an assessment of OFDA operations from 2000 through 2003. The basic objective of the evaluation was to focus on the effectiveness, sustainability and overall impact of OFDA's activities in the country during this period. The inclusion of *sustainability* for gauging the value and impact of a humanitarian assistance program, not always a prominent criterion, proved in this case to be an entirely appropriate topic.

The evaluation of OFDA operations in Angola during the four year period specifically addressed seven primary questions:

- What was the overall impact of OFDA interventions in Angola, 2000-2003?
- What degree of efficiency was evidenced in these operations?
- What was the geographic and social coverage realized by OFDA-funded programs?
- What degree of efficiency marked OFDA's internal program management process?
- What sustainability was realized through OFDA-supported interventions?
- How were and how well were OFDA activities coordinated with the various key relief actors involved?
- To what extent did OFDA's operations address the physical protection needs of the affected population?

A number of questions related to these broad questions shaped the evaluation team's approach. Additionally, there was throughout the process a sharp interest in the relationship between OFDA's humanitarian interventions in Angola and the U.S. Government's foreign policy objective of consolidating peace following the death of Jonas Savimbi and the end of the civil war. That is, *is there reason to assert that the strategies pursued by OFDA and the implementation of particular programs and projects complementary to those strategies helped solidify peace in Angola post-February 2002?*

The evaluation team also kept in mind the interest of OFDA officials in how their program in Angola can approach its natural phase-out while realizing maximum impact. That question proved to be one of the more interesting aspects of the evaluation. OFDA officials were transparent in articulating their interest in a large perspective approach to the evaluation. Thus, questions such as *what did OFDA affect in Angola?* and *did OFDA meet its objectives?* were central to the evaluation team's efforts and analysis as the approach taken was more qualitative than quantitative.

Information was gathered and assessed by the evaluation team to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the context in which various interventions were executed, the process by which decisions were made, the effectiveness and value of initiatives and activities supported. The evaluators looked at the relationship between OFDA and the USAID Mission in Luanda and its interaction with UN humanitarian agencies, the Government of the Republic of Angola (GRA)

and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) tasked with implementing the majority of OFDA's programs in the country.

The evaluation centered on the overall impact realized by OFDA during the four year period, with a focus on the evolution of the program inherent in the death of Savimbi and the effective end of the civil war. As overall impact largely stems from the effectiveness of various key interventions pursued, the team closely examined primary components of OFDA programming in Angola. Of particular interest were: *Health and Nutrition; Water and Sanitation; Promotion of Food Security; and, Protection of Affected and Vulnerable Populations.*

Capacity building for local NGOs was a topic of interest to the team, though the scale of OFDA's investment resulted in modest concentration of attention. Each of these programmatic areas is examined in the pages which follow and conclusions on the effectiveness of interventions offered.

IV. METHODOLOGY

To undertake the evaluation of OFDA's humanitarian assistance interventions in Angola (2000-2003), Development Associates, Inc., assembled a three-person team of independent evaluators with broad and diverse backgrounds in international development, emergency response, research and evaluation in transitional and post-conflict situations, political analysis, and information systems management. Its U.S.-based members participated in various consultations in Washington, D.C., at the outset of the evaluation; a Luanda-based team member then joined them for three weeks of in-country interviews and field research. Additional days were then spent in the analysis of data, interview notes and writing of the final report. One team member had the advantage of fluent Portuguese and life-long residency in Angola.

Team leader Jeffrey Clark has worked for USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, the House Select Committee on Hunger, the Carter Presidential Center and a variety of NGOs and international development entities in fifty countries in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America. He served as team leader for various USAID program evaluations in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Ethiopia, and most recently, East Timor and Albania. Mr. Clark has written numerous articles and contributed chapters to books on humanitarian assistance. His analysis of the humanitarian crisis of 1992 in Somalia appeared in *Foreign Affairs*. An earlier assignment in Angola resulted in the publication of "Angola: War, Politics and Famine," co-authored with J. Stephen Morrison and printed in *Africa Report*.

Nadra Garas has worked on the design and evaluation of health programs, education, community development initiatives, poverty alleviation programs and credit and enterprise development projects. Ms. Garas has a strong grounding in qualitative and quantitative research and evaluation methods and has taken leadership roles on projects centering on the development of evaluation and research design, survey and other data collection instruments, case studies and interviews. As well, she has considerable skill at analyzing quantitative, qualitative and case study data. In collaboration with representatives of local communities and international NGOs, she has conducted numerous community needs assessment and stakeholder analyses in rural and urban areas. Nadra Garas has extensive experience in the field, designing and evaluating community-driven development initiatives.

The third team member, Ana Maria de Carvalho, is a citizen of Angola with more than five years of experience in the design, planning, monitoring and evaluation of community development projects. Projects on which Ms. De Carvalho has worked include construction of schools, water and sanitation, human rights, and income generation and capacity building activities. She has carried out socio-economic research aimed at designing and implementing development projects in the areas of micro-finance, land access and management in peri-urban Angola, and forming community organizations for collective action. Ms. De Carvalho has an ongoing affiliation with the Development Workshop, an NGO long active in Angola.

Team members came to the project without pre-existing views or opinions on the OFDA operation in Angola. Looking at all aspects of the program, the team sought a diversity of inputs and independent access to information sources. Information was gathered through various means which allowed the evaluators to develop a comprehensive understanding of the context in which the program was executed, the process by which decisions were made, the effectiveness of program activities, and the value of such activities within the context of U.S. Government foreign policy interests in Angola. Included in the team's methodology were:

- ❑ *Key Informant Interviews in Angola:* Illustrative but not exclusive of the array of individuals with relevant perspectives interviewed by team members are current or former officials representing USAID, OFDA, the American Embassy, various UN entities, the Government of Angola, international NGOs and indigenous community-based organizations, the World Bank, donor governments, the media, and numerous OFDA grantees/implementing partners.
- ❑ *Key Informant Interviews beyond Angola:* The team interviewed, via e-mail, various individuals who played key roles in Angola during earlier phases of OFDA operations. State Department officials in Washington were consulted on the evaluation as were officials at the World Bank.
- ❑ *Grantee Focus Groups:* The team assembled grantee focus groups to stimulate dialogue on collective impressions of impact and importance of OFDA programming and to review preliminary assumptions reached during the field visit.
- ❑ *Comprehensive Document Review:* Team members analyzed numerous internal USAID and OFDA documents concerning the program in Angola and reviewed relevant internal and external studies and evaluations.
- ❑ *Investigating Impact beyond Luanda:* The team tested the validity of programmatic reach by conducting focused field trips that provided exposure to OFDA interventions in Bié, Moxico, Malanje and Huambo provinces.

Annex A to this report provides a (partial) listing of individuals consulted or more formally interviewed in the course of the evaluation while Annex B provides a bibliography of documents, reports and studies examined. Site visits beyond Luanda are specified in Annex C.

PART TWO: OVERVIEW OF OFDA OPERATIONS

I. FOCUS ON SURVIVAL FOR THE VULNERABLE PRIOR TO THE SHIFT OF APRIL 2002

OFDA officials irreverently refer to the “live or dead Savimbi strategies” pursued in Angola. The phrase, eloquent or not, provides an apt description of how humanitarian strategies and interventions were conceived prior to and then following the death of the UNITA leader. Before the cornering and shooting of Savimbi by the Angolan army in the eastern province of Moxico in February of 2002, the challenge was primarily one of reaching the estimated 3.7 million war-affected Angolans—both refugees and perhaps 2.6 million internally displaced who had sought security in provincial capitals, other larger cities and makeshift camps. Perhaps 2 million individuals were dependent on food aid. In October of 1999, the American ambassador in Luanda declared a continuation of the disaster situation faced in the country—thus triggering the next phase in OFDA operations underway there since 1990. The declaration acknowledged the deterioration of the humanitarian situation sparked by the return to war in 1998.

OFDA dispatched assessment teams to Angola charged with shaping strategic interventions to be carried out by UN agencies and a series of international NGOs skilled in emergency relief activities. NGOs granted OFDA resources were Africare, CRS (Catholic Relief Services), International Medical Corps, Médecins Sans Frontières/Belgium, and World Vision; additional funds were routed to UNICEF. Grants were intended to be utilized for water and sanitation projects, including construction of wells and latrines; agricultural recovery programs, including seeds and tools distribution projects; nutritional screening and feeding efforts; and, primary health care activities, which included immunization. Additionally, through Development Workshop (an international NGO that is widely perceived as an indigenous entity), OFDA supported the initial effort to restore the water supply system in Huambo, the largest city in the Plan Alto and the site of ferocious fighting at several turns during the war.

During this period, OFDA funds were also provided to OCHA—the UN’s Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance for reporting and coordination tasks. Small grants were made to UNDP⁴ to facilitate security information exchanges and larger sums went to the World Food Programme’s air service initiative, which provided safe air transport for both humanitarian assessments and the delivery of high-priority food and medical items. *In 2000, OFDA also established a permanent staff presence in Angola with the posting of an information officer, a position which evolved into that of Emergency Disaster Relief Coordinator.*

OFDA efforts in FY 2000 were additional to the provision of over 68,000 metric tons of P.L. 480 emergency food commodities through the Food for Peace program and 40,000 tons of Section 416(b) food stocks through the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Africa Bureau and other divisions of USAID contributed to the emergency response in Angola as did State/PRM. Of total U.S. Government assistance in 2000 totaling over \$94 million, OFDA contributed \$6.6 million. The focus of the humanitarian operations of OFDA and other relief entities during this period was reaching the displaced population threatened by disease and hunger. Security conditions

⁴ UNDP is the United Nations Development Programme.

largely precluded meaningful efforts to assist in the return of communities to their areas of origin or their rehabilitation.

FY 2001 saw an intensification of UNITA guerilla activities and attacks on both civilian populations and relief agencies: *there were ground-to-air missile attacks on relief flights and intentional attacks on NGO emergency feeding programs.* The lack of access sharply limited the ability to deliver relief assistance to those most in need. At times during the year, 80 percent of the land area of the country was off limits to relief operations. More than half a million people were off limits as well while several hundred thousand newly displaced civilians registered as IDPs. Of the official IDP population, perhaps 75 percent were women and children especially vulnerable to violence, theft or forced recruitment in the armed forces of the opposing parties. Their needs received decidedly minimal attention from the Angolan government.

November of 2000 saw yet another disaster declaration by the U.S. Ambassador; that move paved the way for over \$8.1 million in OFDA funding during FY 2001. Over half this sum was channeled through various international NGOs to support relief efforts similar in nature to those described above. Action Against Hunger became a major recipient of OFDA funds for implementation of emergency health and nutrition programs in Benguela province. Oxfam also received a series of grants to provide potable water to affected populations in Malanje, Caala, Huambo and Kuito. A CRS grant at this point was the first OFDA effort to address the capacity of local organizations to administer relief programs.

OFDA funds also continued to support UN activities in Angola during this period, with UNDP, OCHA and WFP being the largest recipients. And, as in FY 2000, OFDA contributions were parallel to emergency food commodity donations made by USAID/FFP (USAID/Food for Peace) and the Section 416(b) program of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. State/PRM provided several million dollars in support for Angolan refugees stranded across Southern Africa. OFDA's \$8.1 million in expenditures during FY 2001 was part of the U.S. Government's \$71 million in direct support for the embattled residents of Angola.

Separate from the complex emergency funding expended in Angola in FY 2001, OFDA also provided \$25,000 to distribute household kits provided by the European Union for flood victims.

II. NEW CHALLENGES, NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN 2002

As outlined above, the February 2002 death of UNITA's leader of three decades, Jonas Savimbi, immediately altered the dynamics of the humanitarian situation faced in Angola. Within weeks, a comprehensive cease-fire effectively ended the long war. OFDA's focus turned overnight to implementation of measures meant primarily to help the displaced return to their areas of origin, farmers to again earn their living on the land and escape the dependence of relief camps, reach those long stranded in inaccessible areas, and, perhaps less obvious but equally essential, to underpin the fragile peace accords which had ushered in such shifts in strategies. OFDA thus quickly funded partner agencies to secure and deliver humanitarian assistance to the family reception areas (FRAs) where former UNITA combatants and their families had gathered. Assistance focused on immediate improvements to food security and public health. During the month of June alone, OFDA programmed over \$2 million in non-food assistance aid to the vulnerable residents of the FRAs. Air and sealifts delivered water containers, blankets, plastic

sheeting, kitchen sets and soap. Additionally, emergency health kits meant to provide support to some 360,000 individuals were secured and distributed.

In essence, the strategy pursued by OFDA prior to the demise of Jonas Savimbi had been to concentrate on providing basic life-saving assistance to the massive IDP population. With the turn of events in the spring of 2002, however, a greater scope of operation became possible due to the instantly expanded zone of access made available.

“When peace came in April of 2002, we could suddenly reach 300 rather than thirteen sites!”
OFDA Representative

With the soon realized prospect of people returning to their areas of origin, the requirement became one of facilitating that process. OFDA thus shifted part of the focus to agricultural rehabilitation with an emphasis on the seeds and tools interventions implemented by World Vision and others (discussed below). NGO partners were given shorter time frames for implementing projects and encouraged to expand operations into new geographic areas. Overcoming the obstacles to access presented by the extensive seeding of landmines during the war became a priority, as did water supply and sanitation programming. In general, livelihood support became the new imperative.

The speed at which OFDA delivered emergency assistance to the FRAs was without parallel in the donor community. During the early weeks of altered operations launched after the cease fire, with the exception of the provision of tents by the Namibian government, OFDA alone provided commodities that were on the ground and in place for use by the intended beneficiaries. Other players did step up to the plate, however, with OFDA’s lead perhaps most resoundingly followed by ECHO, the European Union’s disaster assistance unit. ECHO too sensed the importance of getting visible support to the former combatants sooner rather than later in an effort to cement the peace accords. Through the coordination role played by OCHA and the generally good communication apparent within the donor community, a number of players soon joined the effort.

Implementing partners of OFDA during this phase included the NGOs referenced above as well as Concern and Goal, both tasked to deliver emergency health programs and support emergency nutrition activities (meaning supplementary and therapeutic feeding centers). UN agencies continued to receive significant funding from OFDA; OCHA received a grant for its Emergency Response Fund, and funds went to the UNDP, WFP and UNICEF.

As in earlier phases of operations, OFDA funding was additional to the provision of food commodities through the USDA and refugee assistance through State/PRM. During FY 2002, the U.S. Government’s direct allocation of funds for emergency operations in Angola totaled over \$122 million, with OFDA contributing \$20.5 million. Additional sums were channeled through regional refugee assistance programs for Angolans resident in surrounding countries.

Beyond the total of OFDA’s contribution cited here, it is important to underscore the speed and flexibility of OFDA’s response to the altered circumstances made possible by the April 2002 peace accords. Within three months from that turning point, OFDA had programmed some \$8 million for essential non-food items, such as the medical kits, and for OCHA operations. OFDA’s mobilization proved to be a shot in the arm for an over-stretched donor community and led the way for other humanitarian agencies by seizing the new opportunities. The OFDA Emergency Disaster Relief Coordinator moved immediately to persuade the NGO implementing

partners to compress funding already granted and expand operations into newly accessible areas with highly vulnerable populations.

OFDA representatives assert—and their view is sustained by senior diplomatic officials—that absent such mobilization in these critical months, the entire process of demobilizing combatants could have collapsed and with it, the peace accords. Diplomats and relief agency representatives are unanimous in stating that OFDA operations in the spring and summer of 2002 saved the lives of untold thousands of individuals scrambling for survival in the chaos and uncertainty that were collateral to the end of the fighting.


OFDA field operations during this period were highly coordinated with and supported by the USAID Mission, the American Embassy officials in Luanda and OFDA staff in Washington. The current U.S. ambassador in Luanda states without ambiguity that OFDA operations in the critical period in 2002 contributed directly to “keeping the peace process on track.”

III. OFDA RESPONSE TO NEED/IMPLEMENTATION OF PRIORITY INTERVENTIONS

It is clear from the record that OFDA consciously strived throughout the 2000-2003 period to support critical interventions key to the survival of those most adversely affected by the Angolan civil war. It labored collaboratively alongside OCHA, ECHO and other prominent international players to fund activities in multiple sectors most likely to achieve and leverage significant impact—a task made immeasurably more difficult by endless disruption and dislocation stemming from the relentless fighting and by limited access to those in need due to the fighting, the infestation of landmines and widespread destruction of roads, bridges and airstrips. The burden imposed on the donor community was clearly multiplied by the minimal investment, capacity and political will manifested by the GRA.

“There is no doubt on United States humanitarian assistance helping cement the peace accords. The food aid, the access, the tools to the farmers, yes indeed this played a vital role in maintaining the peace. NGOs were an instrument for holding things together.” Angolan Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development

The increase in OFDA funding seen in FY 2001 underscores the growing needs of the population due to the escalation of guerrilla warfare and general deterioration in their condition. In 2002, funding increased to over \$20 million—ironically in response to *the end of war* and the imperatives of assisting the returnee population and former combatants (primarily UNITA soldiers) to better guarantee their adherence to the peace process. Maintaining OFDA funding at virtually the same level in 2003 proved critical to providing adequate response in the altered environment.



OFDA largely concentrated its funding for activities in health and nutrition, water and sanitation and food security, and, to a lesser extent, protection of vulnerable families and local capacity building. Also emphasized were efforts to facilitate coordination of the international response to the emergency in Angola and meet the challenge of the landmines.

Several cross-cutting interventions merit discussion prior to focusing on sector-specific activities. OFDA support of the emergency air service provided by WFP serves as an example of a pivotal investment made during this period that affected impact in all sectors. Due to the security situation and the dilapidated state of roads and infrastructure, air transport was, for many critical destinations, the only means of access in the early days after the peace agreement. WFP air service was then and remains now critical to the ability of NGOs to reach newly opened areas and deliver both relief commodities and personnel to manage operations. NGO staffers interviewed during the team's field visits underscored the centrality of the WFP air service. "We simply could not have operated without the WFP air transport system," assessed one interviewee. NGOs today express willingness to contribute financially to keep the air service functional in light of budgetary pressures on WFP to curtail the program. This dependence on air service reflects the security situation faced in the country and the endless logistical complications of implementing relief and development activities in a country twice the size of Texas largely without dependable road connections.

The Vulnerability Assessment Mapping (VAM) activity—also undertaken by WFP and supported by OFDA—facilitated the work of all OFDA implementing partners as well as that of UN and other relief agencies. The information and analyses provided through VAM were critical to targeting and coordinating food aid deliveries. Members of the relief community speak of an improvement in effectiveness "once VAM kicked in." Data provided through this activity clearly allowed for a more considered allocation of resources by decision-makers.

OFDA's considerable if indirect support of demining activities proved crucial to the survival and recovery of the returnees. Landmines were a critical obstacle to reaching the most vulnerable during and after the war and remain a major obstacle that limits the free movement of people and goods around the country and rejuvenation of the agricultural sector. Landmines directly hinder resettlement activities and general recovery from the horrors of war. Thousands of Angolans continue to risk their lives in attempts to return to their homes and reclaim land for agriculture despite the deadly hazard presented by the mines—as gruesomely documented by the inordinate number of maimed and crippled individuals found across large areas of the country. While OFDA has not funded demining NGOs, its grants to OCHA, UNSECOORD and UNDP have been central to the effort to overcome this horrible scourge.

The School Yard is the Mine Field


A few kilometers outside of Luena, the team came to the front line in the battle for Luena: a bridge, no more than twenty feet wide and 100 feet long. The area around the bridge was heavily mined during the war by both sides as they gained and lost control of this strategic location. At the foot of the bridge sits a small hamlet, just a few houses and a school house. The school yard is actually a mine field, however. The demining NGO seen working in this area needed several days to clear mines from the area. The young children knew only too well the risk of venturing out into the yard.

the international community were committed to ongoing engagement in that process. Addressing the needs of the former UNITA soldiers coming out of the bush proved to be indispensable to keeping both parties at the negotiating table. As stated, OFDA was the only donor to provide serious inputs at the critical juncture in the early spring of 2002, though it was soon joined by ECHO.

OFDA’s interventions reached an enormous zone of territory across the country over the four year period despite the limitations of coverage imposed by the fighting, landmines and general lack of accessibility. Projects were implemented in all provinces of the Plan Alto, the large central portion of the country where the suffering and the dislocation were most intense. The assistance provided reached across a large arc socially as well, with people from all ethnical groups assisted regardless of presumed political alliances. OFDA interventions were consciously targeted at former UNITA soldiers and their extended families in the spring of 2002 and beyond in an attempt to facilitate their reintegration.

“Their work enabled demobilization to proceed. They were innovative and creative and helped keep UNITA in the political process by delivering resources. They completely melded their operations to our political agenda.”
Senior US Government Official, referring to OFDA

The evaluation team concluded that OFDA repeatedly and virtually without exception funded critical activities—those mentioned here as well as the focused sector-specific interventions discussed below—that centrally and substantially contributed to the considerable success of the humanitarian relief operations during the danger-fraught period following the death of Jonas Savimbi.



A. OFDA and Health and Nutrition

Background

Building a health system infrastructure and launching a multitude of public health interventions is one of the most urgent needs in Angola. With the end of the war and opening of borders, large numbers of refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants are returning to homes areas depleted and devastated by the struggle, putting acute pressure on the almost non-existent public health care system.

Currently, the delivery of preventative and curative health services in Angola is severely constrained due to:

- ❑ Lack of physical infrastructure. During the war, health facilities in affected areas were gutted by armies and militia or abandoned to the elements by fleeing staff. The need to replace previously existing or build new facilities is critical.
- ❑ Lack of human infrastructure. Over the last year, an expanding number of initiatives have been launched to train health care providers and upgrade the skills of health sector personnel. These imperatives had been totally abandoned during the war, leading to such a dearth of qualified Angolan health care professionals that World Bank estimates peg the number of ratio of physicians at 0.04 per 1,000 people in Angola.

Theatre Skit on Mosquito Nets

In Mussiringingi, the evaluation team came across a theatre group performing a skit on the proper use of mosquito nets—critical in a country where malaria ranks as the leading contributor to the high mortality rate. Villagers were participating with performers in short plays on the merits of using the netting prior to net distributions to households in the village. The skits are part of a health awareness and education program carried out by Goal, an Irish NGO funded by OFDA.

The health care management infrastructure is seriously lacking in capacity and personnel at all levels.

- ❑ Lack of medical supplies. The limited availability of essential medical supplies has impeded the ability of health care providers to deliver appropriate service to patients.
- ❑ Limited access. Access in many parts of the country remains limited and sporadic. Perhaps 15 percent of the main roads connecting major provincial capitals are reliably open. Mines and unexploded ordnance continue to pose a great hazard to relief and development workers and thousands of civilians as they make their way back home.
- ❑ Limited capacity of local partners. Currently, Angolan public and private sector health care providers do not have the capacity to implement the required health initiatives to address needs.

These are the realities today. During the war and initial period following the cease fire, conditions were even more deplorable. It was in that context that OFDA funded a number of critical health sector interventions examined by the evaluators.

Analysis and Conclusions

In response to the dire situation faced in the health sector, OFDA invested considerable resources to counter the high toll claimed by preventable diseases as people began to return to their areas of origin. Since 2000, OFDA has funded implementation of projects undertaken by Goal, Concern, International Medical Corp, UNICEF, Action Against Hunger (AAH), Catholic Relief Services, Africare and the Christian Children's Fund. The range of activities implemented by these organizations evolved as the needs on the ground shifted with the establishment of quartering areas and IDP camps, and more recently, resettlement activities and access to new

areas. By FY 2003, OFDA's partners were Goal, Concern, International Medical Corp, AAH, the Christian Children's Fund and Africare. UNICEF funding had been discontinued due to disappointment with implementation of activities.

Activities OFDA supported addressed critical health issues of vital importance to the survival of IDPs, ex-combatants and returnees. Nutrition centers (therapeutic and supplemental) were opened to counter malnutrition among the most vulnerable. In 2001, CRS, with OFDA support, reached some 45,000 beneficiaries through its nutrition services in Benguela province alone.

Support for public health programs has been a central component of sector activities. The rehabilitation of health posts and the delivery of health kits were essential in view of the near total lack of any health care infrastructure in rural Angola. Immediately after the cease fire, IMC was able to distribute health kits in FRAs⁵ in Bié, Huambo, Uíge, Cuando Cubango, Kwanza Sul and Benguela. Also critical was the maternal and child health component of OFDA's emergency health care interventions. Through its support to Africare, AAH and CRS, in FY 2002 OFDA reached almost 250,000 children under the age of five and 224,000 women of child bearing age, providing medicines, vaccinations and nutrition.

Immunization at São Pedro

The evaluation team visited the São Pedro commune in Huambo where IMC was conducting a mother and child immunization program. Using an otherwise vacant government health post, IMC staff were registering and vaccinating babies and women of child bearing age against tetanus and other children's diseases. In addition to maintaining a central record, the nurses provided mothers with immunization cards for each child in case of family relocation.

OFDA's support for immunization programs was critical both as a response to the emergency situation and the long term health of children and mothers. Measles, for example, contribute significantly to the high infant mortality rates seen in Angola. In FY 2003, OFDA provided IMC almost \$2 million for emergency health initiatives, including vaccinations and basic health training in Bié, Malange and Huambo. In Bié OFDA funded Africare's work with the Ministry of Health to extend the cold chain coverage.

OFDA supported emergency health initiatives aimed at improving public health conditions through the provision of curative and preventative health care services to the population. For example, in FY 2002, OFDA's funding of AAH's program enabled it to reach over 143,000 people in Benguela province, up from the 71,000 IDPs served in FY 2001.

During the past year and a half, agencies active in the health and nutrition sector have shifted gears to meet changing need and new opportunity. While the need for therapeutic and supplemental feeding declined, public health issues became more urgent as people returned to home areas long devoid of health system infrastructure or services. Many implementing partners launched public health awareness campaigns to promote better health practices and combat the spread of malaria—the leading cause of mortality. Some partners also started to tackle HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention issues. The return of refugees from camps in Namibia, Zambia and Congo, the relocation of IDPs and the resettlement of ex-combatants are factors that will almost certainly contribute to a worsening prevalence of HIV/AIDS.

⁵ FRA s are Family Reception Areas.

OFDA's implementing partners in the health sector invested considerable energy and effort into developing working relations with relevant Government of Angola agencies at the central and provincial levels with varying degrees of success. One major obstacle is the stark absence of government commitment, personnel or resources. While leaders at all levels acknowledge the role and responsibility of the government in this sector, the commitment of resources remains vastly disproportionate to need.

Improving the capacity of the Ministry of Health to fulfill its role in post-war Angola is an objective articulated by several OFDA partners. They have consciously engaged local health agency staff in public health activities and facilitated their participation in training sessions. To some extent, the presence of the NGO health sector is used by government officials as a proxy for their own activities. One immunization professional employed by an international NGO noted that "most of the time people from the government do not come with us on the immunization campaigns; they say they do, but they don't. They ask us for the reports we prepare after we finish the work. They're our partners so we give them the reports even though they did not participate."

Mussiringingi Health Post

The new health post building in Mussiringingi commune was rehabilitated with help from non-governmental and church organizations and is now staffed by health workers trained by Goal. People from other villages walk several kilometers to reach this health post, the only facility for basic health services available in a wide radius. Mothers from neighboring villages trek several kilometers seeking help for sick children, as seen by the evaluation team on a visit.

Engaging health care providers from the public sector is critical to the sustainability of the activities launched under OFDA and those to be potentially supported through longer term development programs of USAID/Angola. Realizing that goal, however, will continue to be a major challenge.

OFDA's implementing partners have built on indigenous knowledge and wisely engaged local health care providers. They have, for example, actively promoted and enhanced the role and skills of traditional birth attendants through training and the provision of medical supplies, demonstrating awareness of the importance of community involvement in health programs. And they have supported village health committees charged with promoting personal hygiene and maintenance of clean water supplies.

Rehabilitation of the physical infrastructure is central to the sustaining a public health system across the country. While this rehabilitation is carried out by government and other donors for the most part, OFDA's implementing partners have contributed to the effort, as demonstrated by Goal's work in rebuilding and equipping health posts. In addition, implementing partners have promoted the use of these facilities. IMC, for example, uses a government health post to conduct immunization campaigns—putting the post to use rather than leaving it as just another empty facility.



Health awareness campaign in Clemente, Malange.

The evaluation team's assessment is that OFDA crafted a health program that effectively and aggressively addressed the most pressing needs of the affected population. It proactively put into place a package of health and nutrition interventions that both countered immediate threats to the displaced and the returnees and laid a foundation for future improvements in the overall system. Due to an intelligent combination of activities and partners, OFDA's response to health and nutrition sector needs was well targeted and effectively implemented.

That said, team members had a nagging suspicion that even more could have been achieved had a smaller number of more discrete and strategic interventions been funded. The same amount of funding could potentially have been directed to a handful of NGOs working with the Ministry of Health on national anti-malarial or anti-polio campaigns or widespread inoculation drives aimed at vaccine-preventable epidemics. Such efforts might have had more lasting impact and possibly could have infused the Ministry with a sense of mission and engagement not notable at present.

In any event, challenges in the health sector remain vast. In the short term, meeting people's health needs is vital to their ability to resettle as new areas become accessible. In the long term, organizations currently working in the health sector have to address critical issues of transitioning from an emergency stance to the development of sustainable health care networks. This transition places demands on the implementing partners with respect to staffing, resources, and the nature of their relationship with the Government of Angola.

"Health is not yet a reality for the Angolan people."
Provincial Governor

B. OFDA and Water and Sanitation

Background

Over long three decades, Angola's public resources were, not surprisingly, overwhelmingly devoted to the prosecution of war while national development stagnated. The already limited capacity of public sector institutions to maintain adequate social services foundered and all prospects of providing potable water and minimal sanitation practices evaporated. The paltry investment in the infrastructure of towns, villages and communes and massive displacement of hundreds of thousands of people exacerbated problems associated with a lack of access to potable water, rendering dire consequences in the general health of the population. In the year 2000, only 38 percent of the rural population was estimated to have reasonable access to water from an



Community-based Water and Sanitation Programs.

A community-based integrated program implemented by Oxfam in Malanje Province with OFDA funding is aimed at the heart of deep-seated poverty. The province's population is estimated at 450,000 people, half of whom are vulnerable returnees, IDPs and asset-poor residents. The majority of the IDP and returnee population lives in remote areas where access to a safe water supply is severely limited. The Oxfam initiative strives to reduce vulnerability through construction of hand dug cement lined wells, boreholes and family dry pit latrines. More than 100 boreholes and five hand-dug wells have been constructed, while over 80 boreholes constructed by UNICEF in the 1980s have been rehabilitated.

These programs are complemented with a public health education component which forges village water and sanitation committees, known as Grupos de Água e Saneamento (GAS). Communities are organized by small committees whose members are elected with the input of the traditional leaders—the sobas. Each committee consists of six women and men responsible for the maintenance of the village well and water pump.

improved source such as public standpipes, boreholes, protected wells, springs or rainwater collection sites.⁶ As resettlement of the displaced persons accelerated in 2002, provision of potable water became ever more critical for prevention of the spread of water borne diseases.

The provision of drinking water to vulnerable communities was an immediate priority for relief agencies and the construction of boreholes with manual pumps or hand dug wells tapping underground water sources were the most efficient means of obtaining safe sources. OFDA focused its efforts to provide potable water in the resettlement areas of the Plan Alto. Its partners, Oxfam and Development Workshop (DW), implemented integrated water and sanitation programs in widespread areas there, benefiting vulnerable people in IDP camps and resettlement areas. In FY 2003, OFDA funding allowed Oxfam to provide potable water sources for over 115,000 people in Huambo, Malange and Kuito.

⁶ Development Indicators, United Nations Development Programme, 2003.

Analysis and Conclusions

The strategy adopted by OFDA's implementing partners incorporated critical elements of community management of resources and services. Based on field trips, observations and conversations with beneficiaries and community representatives, the evaluation team concluded that such strategies were clearly suitable for the circumstances faced in Angola. The community organization and management models developed by both Oxfam and DW were well conceived and executed. Strong participation of communities in the planning and construction of water and sanitation activities deepened local ownership and increased the sustainability of the interventions.

Community participation was evident in different steps in the project implementation process. Community residents provided labor to build water wells and latrines while program staff contributed technical assistance. The NGOs provided latrine slabs and the community members dug the pits and constructed the latrines' surrounding structure. The health and hygiene education campaigns were central to efforts to mobilize the community. In an attempt to address current practices of waste disposal and create clean environments in villages, the implementing partners worked with volunteer groups of *social mobilizers* in both peri-urban and rural areas where sanitation programs were being implemented. The social mobilizers engage the community in educational activities to deal with such issues as waste disposal, using visual demonstration techniques to create awareness of problems arising from poor hygiene.

Gender was taken into account as a vital element of community participation, recognizing that women and girls are perhaps the primary direct beneficiaries of water and sanitation programs, given that the chore of finding and transporting water for every day use traditionally falls on their shoulders. In rural Angola, women and girls walk miles every day to fetch water, often from a polluted source.

Water and sanitation committee groups have equal numbers of women and men. Village health and water committee members participate in borehole maintenance meetings and identify basic health needs for their communities. The availability of an improved and sustained source of water within their communities via the Oxfam and DW projects has lessened those needs.

Oxfam and DW both incorporated elements into program strategy to deepen long-term sustainability. Strengthening the capacity of provincial water authorities to maintain water and sanitation systems is one critical component. At least in Huambo province, the implementing partners' technical team works closely with the Provincial Water Authority (PWA), providing training and supplies for water testing and chlorination as needed. OFDA's implementing partners in the water sector was acknowledged by the provincial governor in Malange who indicated to the evaluation team that they have made significant contributions to both the water supply and overall hygienic conditions in the areas of intervention.

GAS in Landa

The village water committee in Landa is composed of three women and three men selected by peers in a village meeting attended by all residents and facilitated by a traditional leader, the soba, and a representative of Oxfam. They are in charge of maintenance of the water pump and installation of latrines in the village. As newcomers resettle in the community, GAS members help them build latrines and introduce rules for using the pump.

OFDA's implementing partners in the water and sanitation sector worked proactively with local government agencies and forged strong partnerships in design and implementation of their programs. In Humabo, DW worked collaboratively with the Provincial Water Authority to increase the quantity and the quality of the piped water supply to residents of Humabo City and outskirts. The PWA was directly involved in conceptualization, design and implementation *and the provincial government provided \$51,590 for the purchase of equipment for the water system.* Improvements by DW and the PWA to the supply network in the peri-urban areas of Huambo have led to substantial increase in water availability. It is estimated that some 130,000 people have benefited, including 30,000 resident in IDP camps.

An important program aim is to promote hygiene awareness in villages and communes. During site visits, the evaluation team observed that the latrine projects had a relatively high adoption rate, as reflected by usage, cleanliness and maintenance. Hygiene Committee Groups, created for promoting health education awareness in the communities, were key. Despite operational constraints, the evaluation team recognized that overall, the support and the training provided by Oxfam staff to the water and sanitation committee members has been impressive, reflecting their general positive performance on human capacity building.

The evaluation team also noted that as a response to the emergency situation, the water and sanitation activities were highly participatory, involving regular negotiation of responsibilities between implementing partners' technical teams, local authorities, and community representatives. These activities provide a foundation for launching long term community development initiatives. The evaluation team concluded that the DW and Oxfam water and sanitation programs were highly appropriate investments of OFDA resources and directly relevant to the current needs of the returnee population and the eventual development of targeted rural communities.

The evaluation team was convinced that water and sanitation programs implemented by DW and Oxfam were effective in achieving their main objectives, *i.e.* providing water and improving the sanitary conditions of the vulnerable communities in an emergency situation. There has been increased supply of water in many areas leading to substantial improvement in general health for a large number of people. This could not have been achieved in the absence of a well planned, implemented and coordinated effort. Also noted is that this was achieved in a highly uncertain environment where the rules and procedures for importation of necessary equipment were subject to constant change, with good prospects for an unpredictable levying of tariffs and port and storage fees upon arrival in the country.

NGO-Local Government Collaboration. *In Humabo, the partnership between DW and the PWA is illustrative of the potential for addressing community needs in an effective and sustainable manner. This is the only case in which the provincial government made cash contributions (in addition to other labor and in-kind buy-ins) to the rehabilitation of the water pumping station and treatment plant. With OFDA's investment it was possible for this NGO-public sector collaboration to successfully rehabilitate the hydro-electrical system to meet the communities' pressing water consumption needs. DW involved its government counterpart in all stages of the project implementation. This has contributed to a greater sense of ownership as demonstrated by the PWA officials during the site visit. A formal operational memorandum of understanding that outlined the contributions and responsibilities of the different partners frames cooperation between them. The work and the collaboration with PWA illustrate the advantages that NGO partnerships with public institutions can bring.*

Evaluators witnessed the positive impact that the water and sanitation programs supported by OFDA had on the lives of the population living in the more remote areas of the country. This can be attributed to the skills, commitment and determination of the staff of the partner NGOs involved and their emphasis on working closely and collaboratively with local agencies wherever possible.

C. OFDA and Food Security

Background

The central and most threatening consequence of the massive displacement of the rural population of Angola was the severe erosion of basic food security for hundreds of thousands of families—and indeed for entire sections of the country. Rural families not driven from their land directly by the conflict were routed by UNITA and GRA units determined to deprive their opponents of material support from the civilian population. The disruption was exacerbated by the landmine infestation and destruction of roads and bridges linking villages to market centers.

Not only were farmers unable to farm, but the systems and structures that underpinned the agricultural sector in the country were largely destroyed: the entire food production and distribution system was effectively ruptured. Farmers could not buy seeds, tools or fertilizers. Marketing structures were rendered dysfunctional; there was no predictability to prices paid farmers for crops. Agricultural research stations were stripped of materials and manpower and left to wither away. The destruction was so complete that not only were nearly 4 million Angolans dependent on food aid at the time of the 2002 peace agreements, but the entire food production and distribution system was in dire need of immediate resuscitation if people were going to be able to return to their areas of origin and their livelihoods.

Countering the fragile food security of displaced and returning families has been at the core of OFDA's operations in Angola over the four years pertinent to this evaluation. In FY 2000, OFDA supplied over \$6.6 million in emergency relief assistance to Angola, with a large portion of the funding going to agricultural recovery programs including—even in the deteriorated situation faced at that time—money for seeds and tools distribution and agricultural technical assistance as well as nutritional screening and feeding programs directed at children less than five years old. By FY 2002, funding had increased to over \$20.5 million, with food security still being the dominant intervention; the statistics for FY 2003 are very similar though the situation had altered dramatically in the spring of 2002 when the imperative had become getting the displaced back to their home areas and keeping the peace accords on track.

OFDA had several implementing partners directly engaged in addressing food security, primarily international NGOs and UN agencies, with WFP being the most critical UN partner. The World Food Programme operation was largely one of food distribution while the FAO was the initial partner of OFDA in the distribution of seeds and tools.

The OFDA evaluation team gained understanding of the critical importance of the agricultural research station system in the revitalization of the Angolan agricultural sector during a trip to the field. A stop at Estação Experimental da Chianga, a station affiliated with the Institute for Agronomic Investigations outside the provincial capital of Huambo, revealed a facility struggling to right itself from the destruction of war. The station had at one point been seized and occupied by Jonas Savimbi himself—his former bunker a highlight of the tour of the facility—and had suffered considerable collateral damage. Staff members had been scattered, seed supplies and equipment lost or destroyed, operations largely suspended. Now the facility is recovering and is a key component of the promising World Vision seed multiplication program supported with OFDA funding. It is the vital work being done at Estação Experimental da Chianga and similar stations that will identify the optimally desirable seed varieties needed to produce the crops and thus the incomes that will position Angola's farmers to become the engine to pull this potentially rich agricultural country away from food insecurity and dependence on external assistance.

The OFDA seeds and tools program expanded to include a set of NGO implementing partners—as individual institutions, then through the consortium for development and relief known as CDRA, which was established in 2002. World Vision (WV), Africare, Care International, Save the Children, and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) are the CDRA partners. The program targeted IDPs, newly resettled returnees, and resident farm families with an emphasis on demobilized soldiers and other ex-combatants. The program covers several provinces of the country where the risk to food security has been most intense—Malange, Kwanza Norte, and Bié—and in newly accessible areas in diverse locations.

Food Distribution. During the period 2000-2003, the WFP operation in Angola was able to reach an average of 1 million individuals each month through emergency food distribution operations. The beneficiaries were largely the IDP and returnee populations. As the coordinating agency for food distribution, the WFP supplied partner NGOs with food for general food distributions, nutritional feeding centers, community kitchens and food-for-work programs. WFP efforts were targeted to reach accessible communities considered highly food insecure.

Food aid distribution in Angola never evolved into a reliably smooth process due to the incredibly bad road network, which provides even more daunting during the rainy season, and the ever-shifting accessibility of the food insecure areas. As a result, supplies often reached distribution areas late or in damaged condition, which led in some cases to friction between WFP and government institutions. There was an extraordinary—and extraordinarily expensive—reliance on air transport.

During much of the last four years, as much as 80 percent Angola's territory was inaccessible to the humanitarian community due to insecure or impassable roads. Major roads connecting the provincial capitals, in incredibly poor condition and simply impassible during the rainy season, were heavily mined by both UNITA and MPLA armies. Also, bridges were demolished and scores await rebuilding today. Dramatic flare-ups of violence during the war, which included deliberate attacks on the humanitarian convoys, impeded the ability of NGOs to operate.

The delapidated state of the transportation infrastructure made road transportation of food difficult if not impossible. With vast swaths of the country inaccessible due not only to impassable roads but to military road blocks, air transport was the only option to reach the majority of the most vulnerable. WFP consequently set up an air transport service for the

distribution of relief commodities to locations otherwise inaccessible. WFP cargo flights were a vital life line for hundreds of thousands Angolans; more than 60 percent of food and humanitarian assistance had to be delivered by air in some years.

Almost two years after the end of hostilities, land access remains one of the most daunting challenges in developing an effective delivery system for humanitarian and rehabilitative assistance. Although various airstrips have severely deteriorated, WFP air cargo and passenger service remains the lynchpin of the food and general relief distribution system. While land transportation to provincial capitals has improved, many secondary and tertiary roads remain impassable, isolating communities where large number of IDPs and refugees are congregating. WFP transport of food and non-food items (such as seeds and tools) has been critical in restoring food security. OFDA support for WFP's air transport operation over the last four years has directly allowed both personnel and emergency relief supplies to reach millions of Angolans dependent on relief operations for survival.

Barriers imposed by logistics and security frustrated food security monitoring. There was no effective system in place that could adequately capture information on the same set of indicators across the country. A consequence of the jagged imperfections in the food security information flow was that both the donor community and the government were confronted with difficult decisions as to how limited resources could best be allocated.

Consequently, development of an information system became a priority and a somewhat sophisticated food security and vulnerability information mechanism was established within the Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping (VAM) unit of the WFP. The system captured qualitative and some degree of quantitative information related to agricultural performance, income sources and price trends to make informed decisions regarding commodity allocations. OFDA provided funds for this initiative.

VAM did not provide analysis of climatic, socio-economic and demographic factors, however, and as a result the FEWS-NET was established, also with OFDA funds, to provide information to ensure a better framework for food security analysis and consequent food policies. FEWS-NET, operational since mid-2003, has offices and staff, but draws on the resources made available through other partners such as data collected by WFP field staff. Currently, FEWS-NET, OFDA and the Ministry of Agriculture are considering modalities for locating FEWS-NET within the Ministry. If the transfer is successful, FEWS-NET would contribute to the longer-term capacity building aspect of OFDA's presence in the country.

Seed Distribution. Through CDRA, member NGOs have distributed crop seeds to numerous rural communities across the country; the World Vision program in Huambo serves as an example. This program has already benefited more than 100,000 families over the past three agricultural seasons through seeds and tools distributions while its potential for wider impact is seen through collaborations with farmer associations and social



Seed Distribution at Chipipa, Huambo

networks to improve comprehension of the project's design and intent and greatly expand its reach.

The evaluation team observed a WV seeds and tools distribution activity geared to a returnee population. During a field visit to the Chipipa commune in Huambo province beneficiaries there spoke of a dependable delivery of inputs and were visibly preparing the land for the upcoming planting season. The WV kit consisted of pre-tested seed varieties of maize and beans (with each farmer receiving a three kilogram bag of bean and an eighteen kilogram bag of maize seeds) as well as a hoe and a machete. The seeds were treated with colorful additives to discourage consumption. Complementing the distribution of seed stocks, WV has struck a partnership with the Institute of Agronomic Investigations (IAI) to support field tests of selected seed varieties and their subsequent multiplication. The provision of credit, and extension services were also important components of the program. Beyond the basic WV kit distributed during the land preparation phase, participating communities receive vegetable seeds in the dry season plus additional commodities from the WFP.

The seed distribution program has demonstrably enabled IDP and other communities to begin to meet part of their basic food needs and re-stimulate non-functional markets. However, the ongoing arrival of returnee populations to areas of origins—most without adequate food stocks, especially those in the newly accessible areas—has overwhelmed the supply of seeds appropriate for distribution and NGOs are left scrambling for funding to expand seed and tool initiatives. A further complicating factor—linked to the existence of landmines—is that the size of plots available and suitable for farming in some areas is inadequate to enable returning populations to rapidly become food self-sufficient in the near term.

Despite ongoing shortfalls, available data offers encouragement. According to the latest FAO/WFP survey,⁷ the abundance of rain and the return of IDP and refugee farmers to their land in combination with the distribution of agricultural inputs have led to a 14 percent increase in land under cultivation and overall cereal production was estimated at 670,000 tons, some 23 percent higher than the previous year.

Conclusions

It was somewhat inescapable that addressing the food insecurity threatening untold thousands of Angolan civilians would be at the core of OFDA interventions over the past four years. People were hungry and had to be fed. Working through the UN and NGO partners, OFDA moved expeditiously to make sure that the emergency food assistance commodities coming from FFP and WFP were delivered and distributed where most urgently needed. WFP air serve operations supported by OFDA were critical in this regard, as were the overall OCHA operations. When the information system underpinning food distribution decisions proved inadequate, OFDA supported WFP in the establishment of the VAM mechanism. Given the enormous barriers presented by the fighting and the inaccessibility of vast regions of the country, the emergency food distribution system was notably efficient and OFDA has to be given considerable credit for this achievement.

⁷ FAO/WFP analysis of July 2003.

Evaluation team members were impressed at the emphasis on restoring food production and returning people to productive work in the agricultural sector taken at an early juncture by OFDA. Most impressive was the seed multiplication initiative witnessed in Huamo province, a key component of the larger seed and tool distribution efforts funded by OFDA.

The team does note that the initial investments made by OFDA in the seed and tools distribution effort implemented by the FAO provided relatively little return. OFDA funded FAO's purchase of seeds and tools although the UN agency displayed inadequate regard for the transportation of the commodities or for the technical assistance inputs required for them to have maximum impact. The FAO effort pales in comparison to the later WV program and OFDA could have been more exacting in demanding a comprehensive approach in the earlier initiative.

During the war itself and during the chaos of 2002, Angola faced an enormous food security crisis. OFDA made multiple intelligent interventions to counter the imminent threat of widespread starvation and to address the restoration of the agricultural sector in the country. Food security is increasing in Angola and OFDA interventions contributed to that breakthrough.

D. OFDA and Protection Issues

Background

In 2001, over 1.2 million internally displaced persons were registered in Angola, the majority women and children. By the end of the war, almost 4 million Angolans had been internally displaced, forced to flee their homes by the fighting and destruction. Many had been subjected to gross violations of their human rights—looting, physical and sexual assaults and often forced recruitment into armed forces. Violation of human rights stemming from lack of social protection was a particularly critical issue in new resettlement areas and locations receiving large numbers of returnees. Problems associated with sexual abuse/harassment of women in IDP camps or transit centers, lack of civil registration, and the socio-economic difficulties faced by children separated from their families became a significant concern for both the international community and local authorities.

Seed Multiplication. A component of OFDA's food security enhancement strategy of particular interest to the evaluation team members proved to be the seed multiplication initiative pursued in Angola's Plan Alto by World Vision. Seed multiplication is a core element in the larger approach to sustainable rural development in the Plan Alto described in a WV document found in Annex E of this report. The seed multiplication initiative has several thrusts:

- ❑ An improvement in agricultural production and productivity through increased crop yields realized via the use of fertilizer, improved crop varieties and production technologies. This improvement is directly linked to restoration of the functionality of the agricultural research station system in the Plan Alto left in tatters by the war.
- ❑ Diversification of farming systems for high value production, largely through a rapid multiplication of improved and adapted crop varieties such as potatoes, fruits and non-perishable vegetables.
- ❑ Stronger linkages between producers and markets through a strengthening of farmer associations, training programs, market information systems and improved storage techniques.
- ❑ Decentralized community-based credit schemes, input-supplier credit mechanisms and linkages to formal banks.
- ❑ Rehabilitation of roadways linking farmers to markets.

The multiplication of crop seeds and the infusion of the private sector purveyors of the improved varieties are at the core of the initiative. Essential to the effort is the reinvigoration of the agricultural research facilities including the Estação Experimental da Chianga station outside Huambo visited by the evaluation team. Restoring these field stations is required for achieving ongoing improvements in production and productivity via research and extension services and lessening dependence on research done in Zambia or Zimbabwe.

The approach of WV in the effort is to enhance the capacity and legitimacy of farmer associations by increasing their human capacity. This focuses on building extension networks, training centers, radio programs centering on extension and marketing messages, and mobile video shows featuring training curriculum. Participation of women and young people will be encouraged.

The initiative will be centered along the major transport corridors of Huambo province and adjacent areas in Hula, Bié, Benguela and Kwanza Sul. A key to sustainability will be development of private sector linkages for the ongoing introduction of hybrid varieties of maize and vegetable seeds as well as to private sector fertilizer suppliers. On-farm trials will help codify biological and economic response to various fertilizers used on major crops on a range of soil types in various seasons.

Credit guarantees provided by WV will facilitate access to credit by smallholder farmers and training programs will incorporate provision of micro-finance to encourage entrepreneurial initiatives and agricultural trading connections.

OFDA, in collaboration with OCHA and other UN agencies, worked with the government to adopt into Angolan law the *Norms for the Resettlement of Displaced Persons* legislation establishing minimal standards for the treatment of returnees and IDPs aimed to protect former combatants and other individuals against abuses of their rights as citizens. This move was seen as a first step in ensuring basic rights for the displaced families. While the GRA adopted these standards, there continued to be considerable difficulty in implementation, as remains the case today.



Evaluation team meets with UNITA ex-combatant in Lunda Village, Malange.

OFDA grants through the ERF mechanism at OCHA were used to fund activities that attempted to mitigate the violation of human rights and to promote social protection throughout the country. In partnership with the Ministry of Justice, UNICEF, UNDP, the UN Office for Human Rights and various international NGOs over the past four years, OCHA played an ongoing role in coordinating activities related to protection of both IDPs and returnees. ERF grants supported several activities for registration of returnees and IDPs, facilitating their access to government services and recognition as Angolan citizens. ERF also provided funds to demining organizations—such as Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and Halo Trust—working in different provinces across the country. In addition, ERF supported mine awareness campaigns to reduce the threat of landmines to people returning to newly accessible areas.

OFDA’s support for UNSECOORD (the UN Security Coordinator) security and liaison officers funds one of the more critical components of the demining operation in Angola, with UNSECOORD being the most critical link in the overall effort. These officers have taken on responsibility for coordinating demining operations, not only with demining NGOs but with the GRA, UNITA and the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA).

The GRA civilian demining agency, National Institute for the Removal of Obstacles and Explosive Ordnance (INAROE), does not interact with either UNITA or FAA. UNSECOORD bridges the gap, collecting vital information from all parties on the location of mines, then disseminating guidance on mapping, demarcating and demining priorities and coordinating field activities with UN agencies and demining NGOs.

Without an addressing of the landmine infestation, the provision of humanitarian assistance and ability to reach literally hundreds of communities would have been significantly reduced. The issue will hinder development efforts in Angola for years to come.

Analysis and Conclusions

The evaluation team saw that while OFDA’s role in the protection sector is relatively limited, its interventions have been well targeted, funding principal and essential activities. The adoption of the *Norms for the Resettlement of Displaced Persons* law and activities to expand access to the vulnerable directly benefit both the weary population making its way back home and those struggling to open up agricultural land. Facilitating demining obviously allows the humanitarian community to reach more areas by minimizing risk for relief workers.

While the evaluation team recognized that some minimal progress in addressing human rights and protection issues has been achieved in Angola, the GRA, national and international organizations face considerable challenges in protecting the rights of IDPs and refugees as they return to areas of origin. Much remains to be done to improve the human rights situation and boost social protection of the most vulnerable groups, especially the UNITA ex-combatants and returnees.

E. OFDA and Capacity Building

Background

Humanitarian relief and recovery projects in Angola have essentially been implemented by international NGOs and UN agencies. A small number of local NGOs have worked in collaboration with international counterparts and the government has played a marginal role in some sectors, but the core effort has been orchestrated by external players. The reality is that indigenous NGOs have extremely limited capacity and resources as would be expected in a country where civil society is only now beginning to evolve as a potential counter to authoritarian governance. Governmental agencies are similarly bereft of capacity given historical factors, the three decade focus on the war and the limited sense of responsibility in this area demonstrated by the political leadership. A goal of OFDA has been to begin to develop the capacity of local entities to respond to humanitarian requirements. Funding has been modest and expectations limited, but there has been an effort to nudge local players into more substantive roles.

“Local NGOs could not get involved due to political and logistical limitations. Now they want to participate but need support to develop strategy and capacity.”

Forum of Angolan Non-government Associations Representative

Analysis and Conclusions

From the beginning, OFDA sought ways to engage indigenous NGOs and government agencies as players in the humanitarian assistance arena. The dearth of NGOs and the lack of capacity found in both the non-governmental sector and government effectively thwarted that goal and at least potentially undermined the sustainability of many of the efforts being made. The lack of managerial and fiscal accountability prevalent in local NGOs served to exclude them as serious partners of the international relief agencies. Support for the development of the NGO sector in Angola came into focus as a goal if not priority for OFDA which supported at least one initiative aimed at positioning local NGOs to become implementing partners with international NGOs counterparts.

OFDA engaged Catholic Relief Services to implement a capacity building program for local NGOs and government counterparts such as MINARS and UTACH.⁸ Through this effort, private and public sector organization personnel participate in training sessions carried out in several vulnerable provinces. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Training program has a practicum component that allows local NGOs to undertake development activities under the tutelage of an implementing international entity—a step vital for creating local partners who will have the ability to liaise and cooperate with the international community and achieve credibility with government officials.

International NGO observers are optimistic over the potential of local NGOs to eventually design and manage their own activities. One OFDA implementing partner staff member maintains that

⁸ MINARS is the Ministério da Assistência e Reinserção Social (Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration) while UTACH is the Unidade Técnica de Coordenação da Ajudas Humanitárias (Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance)

“we have the ability and think we can build and train such partners, but it is very difficult and it is taking much longer and we will continue to need donor support.”

This nascent effort is in its second stage and has the potential for further development during the transition from an emergency to a development focus. OFDA’s forward thinking on this issue could be used strategically by the USAID Mission’s program to enhance and vitalize the just emerging civil society in Angola. The potential anchoring the FEWS-NET operation within the Ministry of Agriculture is a parallel effort at capacity building at the governmental level that also provides precedent.



PART THREE: OFDA COORDINATION WITH KEY PLAYERS

I. OFDA COORDINATION WITH OCHA

Background

OCHA is the acronym for Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations. In Angola, OCHA played a decidedly unique leadership role that kept its profile high, its staff in the center of critical humanitarian operations over the past four years. As coordinator of the UN agencies engaged in relief operations in the country and frequent negotiator with the Government of Angola on operational strategies, prioritization and modalities, OCHA by necessity became a major entity with which OFDA interacted and coordinated humanitarian assistance strategies and interventions. Given the central role OCHA assumed, the outcome of that coordination was vital to the ability of OFDA to achieve its own goals in the country.

OFDA’s support of the Emergency Relief Fund (ERF) was a key factor in allowing OCHA to function as a rapid funding mechanism for humanitarian relief activities. OFDA provided a total of \$3.5 million during 2001 and 2002 to the ERF. By 2002, OFDA’s share of total donor contributions to the ERF budget had grown to 41 percent—up from 17 percent in 2001. This increase reflected both ongoing need and strategic opportunities and requirements afforded by the peace agreements of 2002.



Through the ERF, OCHA was able to disburse funds to various NGOs addressing diverse needs. OCHA’s project approval process had shortened to an impressive six weeks during this period—a critical factor in light of rapidly shifting needs. “The quick release of funds minimized response time,” one NGO official remarked. ERF’s approach also reflected program flexibility which enabled NGOs to address altered circumstances and move to new areas and sectors as required. “The flexibility of the funding helped responsiveness,” continued the same official,

noting the ability of NGOs to quickly reach newly accessible areas. During 2001, the ERF funded fifty-five projects implemented by thirty-one organizations; in 2002, some sixty-six projects undertaken by thirty-six organizations were supported.

The staff assembled by OCHA in Angola is among the largest it has ever fielded. The need to maintain such an expanded staff was reflective of both the vast territory in play and the multiplicity of functions at both the Luanda and the provincial levels which rested with the UN given the dearth of governmental capacity and engagement. OCHA staff played a central role in collecting, analyzing and distributing information to donor and NGO decision-makers. The use of international staff was one of the factors that enabled OCHA to assume a strong position when negotiating with the government as their expatriate status largely shielded the staff from the pressures and duress that national employees periodically faced.

For the bulk of the period in question, the OCHA operations in Angola were under the leadership of Lise Grande—an individual of apparently notable skill and fortitude. One of the contributions made by Ms. Grande was providing shared, time sensitive analyses of needs assessments that facilitated the marshalling of resources and a consensus on priorities for relief activities.

“The role of OCHA was critical to the coordination and our ability to work quickly in the field.”

NGO Representative

In Angola, OCHA facilitated the process that allowed NGOs to launch relief operations in formerly restricted zones through negotiations with the government that allowed access to the transient areas and eventually resettlement zones. The coordinating role played by OCHA was respected by implementing NGOs and agreements reached on the geographic divisions and assignments among them across the country were sustained. Representatives of OFDA’s partnering NGOs in Angola recognized OCHA’s capabilities in identifying essential relief interventions. “OCHA provided good guidance about prioritization,” a senior NGO official offered.

According to one OCHA representative, implementation of the humanitarian relief effort and its coordination were buoyed by their approach to dealing with the NGO community. OCHA worked with NGOs “as *strategic partners*, not just implementing partners.” Working in this mode, OCHA was able to mobilize funding and implementing capacity around common objectives. “By following OCHA guidelines but adapting the guidelines to the context, our focused and dedicated staff all worked to support the success of this mission in becoming one of the most effective OCHA operations around the world,” a senior OCHA official offered.

Analysis and Conclusions

It is the evaluation’s team finding that OFDA’s ongoing and smooth coordination of effort and resources with OCHA was a significant factor in its own overall highly successful record in Angola. OCHA clearly benefited from two critical factors in the country—the skills and determination of Lise Grande and the practicalities offered by the ERF—and OFDA skillfully exploited both. Through the steadily increasing funding routed through the ERF, OFDA allowed OCHA to not merely be a coordinating agency, but a relevant implementer of key projects. Through the ERF, OCHA was able to guide and coordinate the multitude of NGOs critical to the

relief operations as well as the activities of UN agencies. OFDA helped enabled OCHA become an effective coordinator of the overall effort by:

- ❑ Making it a strong voice in consultations with the government.
- ❑ Providing the organization heft in dealing with the disparate grouping of UN agencies active in the operations.
- ❑ Underscoring its credibility with NGOs by making it a relevant and efficient funder of key projects in diverse areas.

OFDA helped give OCHA the legitimacy required for it to be an effective coordinator of operations. By providing shared analyses of the needs assessment and priorities for humanitarian relief, OCHA was able to facilitate the process of leveraging the resources of the donor community. As a key participant in this process, OFDA, in turn, was better able to allocate its resources among key sectors and programs. The role of OCHA was central to the success of humanitarian relief efforts in Angola over the last four years. It played an effective role as overall coordinator and liaison between the government, UN agencies, international NGOs and bilateral donors.

II. OFDA COORDINATION WITH IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

Background

OFDA selected implementing partners that demonstrated advanced organizational capacity to work in their respective sectors, Oxfam for water and sanitation projects, Concern for therapeutic feeding and CRS for capacity building, for example. According to the USAID Mission Director, “OFDA’s capacity to select implementing partners with strong positive track record is key to the success of the program.” The implementing partners predominantly adopted a community-directed and oriented approach. They worked in collaboration with local government agencies when possible as well as with local traditional leadership at the community level.

“OFDA is a strategic partner and not just a funding agency.”
OFDA implementing partner

Over the four year period from 2000 to 2003, OFDA worked with over fourteen international NGOs and five UN agencies. During the critical period of peace negotiations, OFDA worked with and coordinated the delivery of vital non-food items with at least eight organizations. Over a four year period, OFDA coordinated over fifty-three activities in twelve sectors.⁹

“OFDA gave us the flexibility to change our work in the field to meet new needs, especially at the time when things were changing quickly after the peace.”
OFDA implementing partner

⁹ OFDA was involved in health, nutrition, food security and agriculture, water and sanitation, capacity building, non-food item distribution, coordination, security, protection, information management, logistics and transportation.

Analysis and Conclusions

OFDA repeatedly demonstrated willingness to work on behalf of its partners, running interference with UN agencies and the government to facilitate their work. This effort is recognized by the implementing partners, whose officials also praise OFDA staff members for “being supportive and open to discussion and dialogue to develop strategies and plans to most effectively meet needs.”

Flexibility on the part of OFDA in reallocating funds within project agreements to respond immediately to fast changing needs during the emergency maximized the impact of operations. This stance meant that OFDA was engaged on a continual basis with its implementing partners during critical times over the last four years, its staff thus well informed and prepared to make quick decisions and adjustments.

OFDA worked strategically with its partners to deliver the goods and services needed to respond to the complex emergency. OFDA’s EDRC refers to partners as “strategic and thinking partner” who were also responsive to the dire needs on the ground as they “voluntarily suspended activities when they deemed them no longer necessary.”

Establishing effective two way communication between the EDRC and representatives of the implementing partners enabled OFDA to quickly respond to NGO requests and accelerate the funding process as necessary. More critically, this dynamic interactive partnership between OFDA and the implementing agencies allowed OFDA to take various measures that would ensure appropriate funding levels and implementation plans to be carried out in direct response to the changing circumstances. OFDA could extend or shorten the period of funding to allow the partners to more adequately respond to the needs of those most adversely affected by war and others who were commencing the resettlement process. In collaboration with the EDRC, OFDA partners such as CRS, Goal, Oxfam and IMC, developed a plan to compress funding allocated over a twelve month period and expend resources over a nine month period so that they could more adequately respond to the new pressing needs of the most vulnerable.

In an effort to avoid duplication within a complex range of activities, OFDA encouraged and supported its partners to cooperate with OCHA. OFDA provided resources that enabled all parties involved to most effectively and efficiently meet rapidly changing needs. OFDA and its partners actively participated in OCHA’s strategy sessions and contributed to the *consolidated appeal* process. By participating in the OCHA’s weekly meeting, OFDA and its implementing partners were able to discern program priorities and coordinate efforts to avoid duplication and build on comparative strengths and expertise in the field.

The evaluation team noted the rapport and solid communication between OFDA and its implementing partners and the high degree of common articulation of need, strategy and approach. It seems clear that OFDA’s skilled coordination of activities undertaken by its many implementing partners contributed to the achievements realized throughout the last four years in responding to the complex emergency faced in Angola.

The evaluation team concluded that OFDA was demonstrably successful at selecting the appropriate implementing partners, matching funding to the partners’ comparative advantage and

areas of strength, avoiding duplication and ensuring adequate geographic and sectoral coverage through its strong partnerships and coordination with NGOs and UN agencies.

III. OFDA MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION WITH USAID/ANGOLA

Background

In Angola, as elsewhere, OFDA operations were managed and controlled from USAID/Washington; they were seen as and were in fact distinct from the USAID Mission's portfolio of development assistance projects. There was nothing unusual about this separation, given the presumed temporary requirement for emergency relief assistance. (The disaster in Angola was of course hardly short-term in nature.) Nonetheless, an ongoing humanitarian effort that required an expenditure of well over \$800 million from FY 1990 through FY 2003, including more than \$54 million provided through OFDA grants and contracts from FY 2000 through FY 2003 alone, clearly had management and coordination implications involving the Mission and the U.S. Embassy in Luanda.

During the initial phase of operations in the FY 2000-FY 2003 period, OFDA relied on the deployment of assessment teams to Angola whose tasks included structuring grant agreements with various UN agencies and NGOs to implement relief activities. In late 2000, the first in-country OFDA information officer was posted; that position evolved into the Emergency Disaster Relief Coordinator position relied upon by OFDA during the elevated level of operations following the cease fire agreements of early 2002 through the present. The EDRC reported to and worked directly with an Angolan desk officer based in the Washington offices of OFDA. Approval for all interventions rested with OFDA/Washington.

The initial posting of an OFDA officer in the field did not equate with any perceptible integration of approaches with the USAID Mission. The Mission Director in the 2000-2001 era reportedly did not regard OFDA programming as directly relevant to the Mission's portfolio and correspondingly did not facilitate the disaster information officer's direct contact with other donors, the embassy, the United Nations. The American Ambassador then (and later, as witnessed by the evaluation team) did however evidence commitment to the humanitarian assistance operations and sought out the OFDA representative's information, analysis and guidance.

The dynamics of the relationship altered considerably in October 2001 when a new Mission Director arrived in Luanda and immediately asked, "Why isn't nearly \$9 million in emergency funding included in the Mission Strategy Statement?" With that, the OFDA EDRC incumbent became more closely involved in Mission decision-making processes, representing the humanitarian assistance perspective with ongoing support from the Mission leadership.

One element that may have contributed to the appreciation in status of the OFDA representative was the informal undertaking of tasks by the then incumbent staff member to assist in the targeting and delivery of emergency food commodities. Given the lack of an in-country FFP officer, the OFDA representative essentially covered FFP and WFP programming matters on a day-to-day basis—with support via FFP/Washington and periodic visits to the field by FFP officers. The quasi-official role played by the OFDA representative both widened access to WFP officials and absorbed management duties otherwise left to Mission staff.

As relief operations intensified and broadened with the events of 2002, the connections between OFDA in Luanda and the USAID Mission and the embassy strengthened. Today, the Mission Director and the Ambassador speak clearly and persuasively on the central importance of OFDA programming to their own agendas. The Mission Director stated to the evaluation team: “OFDA is the Mission here.” His words implied not that the Mission had a singular focus, but that he perceived no strategic separation of relief and development activities.

Analysis and Conclusions

The evaluation team could of course obtain only a limited perspective on the dynamics that surrounded the interactions between OFDA and the USAID Mission in Angola over the past four years. The impression gained is that the relationship altered over time as different individuals filled the relevant key positions and as circumstances on the ground changed. What was clear was the strong rapport existing today between the EDRC and the Mission Director, the Ambassador and other senior officials at USAID and the embassy. Consultations with the Ambassador and political officers both in Luanda and Washington paint a highly positive view and appreciation of the ongoing role played by OFDA in Angola. That OFDA substantially contributed to the central goal of keeping the peace accords of 2002 on track was the undiluted message delivered by all interviewed. Respect for and reliance on the current and previous EDRC was obvious in those consultations. The efficient and timely delivery of critical inputs by OFDA and its sound judgment in selecting and skills in coordinating multiple program implementing partners were consistently praised.

The evaluators note that the internal management of the operations in Angola did not follow a readily apparent strategy. Given the size and complexity and long time frame of operations, it seems that responsibility for the Angolan portfolio shifted somewhat frequently between different desk officers in Washington¹⁰ and that the establishment of permanent in-country presence was somewhat late in coming. A case could be made that OFDA/Washington should have encouraged more direct support for operations in-country on the part of FFP.

That said, the program worked and worked quite well in the view of the evaluation team. During the tumultuous months in the spring of 2002, OFDA was the most effective player in the humanitarian sphere. People were reached with vital assistance, adherence to the peace accords was consolidated through OFDA’s quick actions, the worst scenarios for massive starvation and chaos were avoided. A contributing element to this was OFDA’s skill in putting effective people in the field—via temporary missions and permanent placements—and in choosing and well-coordinating implementing partners.

The increased harmony between OFDA and USAID/Angola strategies over the past two years has yielded at least the potential of some capturing of the foundations laid by OFDA projects to boost the impact of Mission-funded development activities. This is especially the case in the agricultural sector.

The evaluation team is cognizant of the natural tension between OFDA representatives in the field and host USAID Missions. The OFDA representative has to avoid the danger of *mission*

¹⁰ The turnover of desk officers during 2002 and 2003 reflects the demands placed on OFDA by operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and is not unique to the Angolan program.

creep—allowing an emergency program to become a mere extension of the Mission’s portfolio and submitting to micro-management by Mission or embassy officials—while still striving to craft a well coordinated effort and contributing to sustainable development in the affected country. In Angola, that balance was well struck. OFDA’s focus on the immediate dangers and needs presented by the emergency situation was maintained while its operations complemented the political and developmental goals of the U.S. Government in Angola.

OFDA maintained its focus on priority requirements in Angola throughout the four year period. Through a lean and efficient deployment of staff members from Washington and the establishment of a permanent on-the-ground presence, OFDA was able to coordinate a large and complex portfolio of activities with a multitude of players. Relations with the USAID Mission and the U.S. Embassy grew in strength and mutual support. Ongoing communication and consultations with implementing partners in the field and with UN and donor government officials in Luanda allowed OFDA to be consistently abreast with key developments affecting the vulnerable population. OFDA delivered well conceived and efficiently implemented interventions. The high element of sustainability found in many of those interventions is somewhat surprising.

The evaluation team is unanimous in concluding that whatever shortfalls in the management and coordination of the OFDA program might be cited, the overall record is one of impressive achievement. High impact interventions stemming from coherent strategies were delivered with notable efficiency.

PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONS

The evaluation resulted in several conclusions specific to particular components of OFDA initiated or supported interventions in Angola over the past four years; these conclusions with supporting analysis are offered in the two sections of the report immediately preceding this concluding chapter and need not be repeated here. Following are a number of fundamental conclusions reached by the team that speak somewhat more broadly of the OFDA humanitarian assistance program in the country and conform to a *big picture* approach to the evaluation. Major findings include:

- ❑ The overall legacy of OFDA’s engagement in Angola is a highly positive one. There is considerable evidence that OFDA had significant impact in alleviating the horrendous suffering of the many hundreds of thousands of Angolans impacted by civil war over the past three decades. U.S. Government humanitarian assistance efforts in general and OFDA-initiated or funded activities in particular resulted in the saving of many lives otherwise likely to have been lost. Interventions undertaken by OFDA were, with only minor exceptions, valid and appropriate and displayed an intelligent deployment of resources and strategic understanding of what was possible and what was critical.
- ❑ OFDA displayed impressive skill and flexibility in meeting the ever-shifting humanitarian requirements in the country as war flared and receded, lines of control altered, access expanded or contracted. Most impressive was the way in which OFDA changed its focus in the aftermath of the Savimbi death and the *de facto* end of the long war.

- ❑ There is reason to believe that the rapid deployment of resources and delivery of essential commodities by OFDA in the critical months following the April 2002 cease fire served to keep the fragile peace process on track and helped avert a potential plunge into general anarchy across the country. OFDA's actions clearly signaled to UNITA combatants that they had a stake in making the peace process work. OFDA proved to be a major asset in the pursuit of U.S. Government foreign policy objectives in Angola in general, but perhaps most importantly in these critical months.
- ❑ OFDA wisely chose its implementing partners in Angola, both NGOs and UN agencies. It worked collaboratively with partners on establishing objectives and priorities and then gave them ample operational flexibility to respond to shifting needs and opportunities. When partners proved less than impressive in implementing programs—UNICEF is a prime example—OFDA moved on to more productive options. It kept a relatively large number of implementing partners well informed and well coordinated. There was little unnecessary duplication of effort between the partners that distracted from the delivery of essential services to those in need.
- ❑ OFDA and the USAID Mission in Angola overcame earlier diversions of purpose and orientation to form a more cohesive joint approach that has served the humanitarian agenda well over the past two years and that is working well now as OFDA's exit from Angola nears. OFDA officials were clearly seen as strong and important collaborators by the American Embassy in Luanda as it scrambled to secure the peace accords of 2002.
- ❑ The coherence realized in the latter phase of operations could likely have been achieved at an earlier point if OFDA had posted an EDRC in the country when circumstances outlined such a need—at least one year earlier than the late 2000 posting of the first EDRC. Even after the position was established, the incumbent initially worked quite separately from the USAID Mission with disaster relief funding not regarded as directly relevant to the Mission's portfolio. That separation was effectively bridged with the appointment of a new Mission Director in October 2001.
- ❑ OFDA was well-served by the personnel choices it made in fielding staff to Angola. The significant results realized in the country were clearly facilitated by the facile work of skilled individuals able to respond to altering circumstances, deliver resources in an impressively short time frame and coordinate a wide portfolio of both programs and program managers. Equally important, the EDRCs assigned to Angola by OFDA have comprehended the advantages of enabling other actors to achieve priority goals; the support channeled to OCHA and WFP at the right junctures are prime examples of leveraging OFDA investments to expand the reach of the overall humanitarian assistance operation. OCHA's leadership during this period was key to its credibility and effectiveness. Reinforcing the credibility of OCHA in particular proved to be a move with multiple positive benefits—benefits perhaps not readily predictable given the success of OCHA operations in other locations. OFDA's enabling role and the leadership it exerted have earned it the seemingly genuine gratitude of the donor community in the country.
- ❑ The skills, commitment and determination of the OFDA EDRCs posted to Angola are subtly evident in the way they were effectively (though never officially) tasked to serve as liaison officers with the WFP and Angolan government on food commodity deliveries given the

lack of a permanent FFP representative in the country. OFDA's representatives accepted the challenge and in the process effectively forged beneficial working relationships with WFP staff.

- ❑ The evaluation team notes the good fortune of OFDA in having skilled and motivated staff members engaged in their Angola operations both in the field and in Washington in light of the fact there seems to have been scant structure or philosophy guiding the internal management of its operations there. The slowness in dispatching an EDRC to the field, the initial disconnect between the OFDA program and the USAID Mission portfolio, and the lack of dependable liaison with FFP do not collectively paint a picture of a strong managerial structure. Yet, things worked. This has to be largely attributed to having the right people in place at the right time.
- ❑ With some minor though legitimate exceptions, there is little evidence that OFDA operations in Angola have served to strengthen the capacity of central or regional governmental entities to design or implement emergency response efforts of any sort. This shortfall, however, is more a reflection of the overall lack of engagement on this front (and related ones) by the GRA. The government has proven to be a most reluctant partner on the entire response to the humanitarian crisis faced by the people of the country. There is little political will apparent on the part of government to become engaged and the capacity within relevant ministries is so nominal as to leave them marginal players. If affiliating the FEWS-NET operation with the Ministry of Agriculture is successful, OFDA at least will have one solid accomplishment in this area.
- ❑ OFDA has implementing partners such as CRS and OCHA that are engaging regional and local government officials and indigenous NGO representatives in basic capacity building activities. Despite the somewhat universal goal of building local capacity to deal with humanitarian assistance operations, the situation in Angola has hardly been conducive for such activities and the evaluation team finds little fault with OFDA's modest record of achievement in this area.
- ❑ Overall the evaluation team considers OFDA's inputs to have been highly appropriate to the needs of the populations. Interventions both met immediate needs and laid a foundation for attacking endemic poverty and food insecurity and generally sustainable development. The provision of non-food items to those in IDP camps helped save lives, prevent disease, keep families together and give people some sense of normalcy. The evaluation team is notably impressed with the strong element of sustainability evident in a number of OFDA interventions in Angola. To a degree not frequently witnessed, there has been an emphasis on getting people back to their livelihoods in OFDA's relief programs in Angola. The benefits of the water and sanitation projects examined by the evaluation team in numerous remote villages will clearly multiply throughout the coming years. The support of mine field identification and demarcation efforts through UNSECOORD, essential for the protection of both returnees and relief workers, is of course a requirement for getting people out of camps and back to their areas of origin, but will also serve to open up large tracks of the country to development. Perhaps the most compelling example is the *seed multiplication* program in Huambo province funded by OFDA. This effort, profiled elsewhere in this report, is somewhat of a textbook example of an initiative that covers the relief-to-development arc so often sought but seldom delivered. This achievement is

underscored by the unprecedented support given the program by the ChevronTexaco Corporation. OFDA can be proud of the foundations for the future development of the country they have afforded in Angola.

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ANNEX A: CONTACT LIST

The following names form a partial listing of interviews undertaken by the evaluation team. Several additional contacts are impossible due to translation and logistical complications. The team made numerous visits to villages and camps, to observe living conditions for IDPs, returnees and ex-combatants; the identity of those individuals is not certain in all cases.

The list is organized by alphabetical order.

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ANNEX C: SITES VISITED BY THE EVALUATION TEAM

Moxico Province

- Camanongue
- Luena
- Mussiringiugi
- Dom Bosco Transit Center
- Vietnam Veteran's of America Foundation Rehabilitation Center

Bie Province

- Kuito
- Camacupa

Malange Province

- Campo de Aviação Bairro
- Caculama Municipality
- Clemente Village
- Lunda Village
- Malange City

Huambo Province

- Chipipa
- Chianga
- São Pedro-Kalikoque
- Xavier Samacau Commune
- Katchiungo Municipality
- Bailundo Municipality
- Kulimahala Water Distribution Center
- Cuando Hydroelectric Station
- Huambo City

**ANNEX E: PRO-PLANALTO: A STRATEGY FOR A
PROSPEROUS RURAL SECTOR IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS
OF ANGOLA, 2004 – 2008 WORLD VISION INTERNATIONAL**



**PRO-PLANALTO
A STRATEGY FOR A PROSPEROUS RURAL SECTOR IN THE CENTRAL
HIGHLANDS OF ANGOLA**

2004 - 2008

**A Broad Based Approach for Sustainable Rural Development
with Strategic Focus on the Province of Huambo**

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Context

Angola is at a critical moment in the country's history and the process of rural resettlement represents an unprecedented opportunity for peace and progress. Two thirds of the rural population are located in the central highlands and have access to a productive resource base. Despite the high potential for agricultural production, the agricultural recovery of the central highlands is constrained by little evaluation of improved crop technologies over the past 30 years. To compete in the global economy and to achieve rural prosperity, there must be a strong commitment to quality agricultural research and development with the support of international cooperation. With its rich but under-exploited agricultural resource base, the Angolan agricultural sector is poised for recovery.

Goal

The vision for agricultural recovery in the central highlands of Angola is to rapidly develop a highly prosperous rural sector. The overall program goal for the next five years is:

Improved food security, incomes and quality of life for smallholder farmers in the central highlands of Angola by increasing their agricultural productivity and competitiveness in domestic, regional and international markets.

This goal will be achieved through four major objectives:

- 1: Increased agricultural production and improved productivity.
- 2: Improved efficiency of marketing of agricultural produce.
- 3: Effective Systems for Rural Credit
- 4: Rehabilitation of "Market/Farm/Market" secondary and tertiary feeder roads

It will be essential to integrate these interventions with education, health and water/sanitation to ensure multi-sectoral complementarity.

Geographical Focus and Clientele

The geographical focus of the program will be along major corridors in the province of Huambo and the adjacent provinces of Huila, Bié, Benguela and Kwanza Sul with linkages to input supply and market outlets:

- Rail corridor Benguela/Huambo/Quito;
- Lobito/Londuimbali/Alto Hama/Huambo/Quito = West/East axis;
- Huambo/Caala/Lubango Southern axis,
- Huambo/Alto Hama/Waku Kungo/Luanda Northern axis,
- Alto Hama/Bailundo/Katchiungo loop.

and through cluster development with focus on but not limited to the municipalities of greatest potential for maize, beans and potato production in Huambo to include Bailundo, Londuimbale, Huambo, Caala, Ekunha, Katchiungo and Tchikala Tcholonga

Clients will be smallholder farmers with average holding size of 5-10 hectares (or 2-3 hectares with the potential to expand) and will be organized into farmer associations. There will be a major focus on women and young people as prime movers in the development process.

The focus in and around Huambo is justified on the following rationale:

- population density is high justifying investment in productive infrastructure;
- the need for poverty alleviation is great and there is a high potential for agricultural production and rural economic development;
- Huambo represents a center for agricultural investigation and training through the IIA Field Station, Faculty of Agrarian Sciences and Agricultural College;
- Availability of basic grain storage facilities;
- Huambo city represents the second largest urban market in Angola.

Program Description

1: Increased agricultural production and improved productivity.

1.1: Increased crop yields through the use of fertilizer, improved crop varieties and production technology (maize, wheat, potatoes and vegetables).

- Five year commitment to crop improvement and local seed/plant multiplication in collaboration with CIP, CIMMYT, IIA using a participative methodology with on-farm trials and Farmer Field Schools;
- Establish low cost rural extension support for new technology packages (optimum plant population, timely weeding and integrated pest management);
- Development of seed systems and private sector linkages for the introduction of hybrid varieties of maize and vegetable seeds;
- Promote linkages to private sector fertilizer supply systems;
- On-farm trials to establish biological and economic response to fertilizer over the major crops over a range of soil types/conditions/seasons;
- Development of Apex Farmers Associations for input supply.

1.2: Diversification of farming systems for high value production

- rapid multiplication of improved and adapted crop varieties of high value crops (potatoes, fruit and non-perishable vegetables);
- restocking with a range of small livestock;
- technical assistance for animal health;
- improved production and processing technology for farmers;
- develop organic farming systems using legumes and in-country certification schemes for export markets in Europe (eg organic beans/soya/wheat).

1.3: Increase in the amount of land under cultivation through improved access to animal traction, mechanical cultivation and agricultural inputs.

2: Improved efficiency of marketing of agricultural produce.

In recognition of the fact that rural economies are demand driven, WV will seek to create linkages between producers and markets through the following activities:

- strengthening and capacity building of farmer associations to improve the efficiency of access to distant markets;
- training in various aspects of agricultural marketing and micro-enterprise management;
- establish systems for market information;
- promote improved storage techniques and value added processing of agricultural produce.

The focus in the short term (2 years) will be on the urban centers of Luanda and Huambo as the major internal markets to substitute imports. In the longer term the objective will be to develop export opportunities in the southern Africa region and Europe.

3: Effective Systems for Rural Credit

Decentralized community based credit schemes with Farmers Associations, input supplier credit and linkages to formal bank credit will be developed:

- provision of rural micro-finance to support entrepreneurial initiatives and agricultural trading;
- Promote access to rural credit for animals, traction equipment supply, work stock and other inputs.

Linkages will be facilitated with suppliers of agricultural inputs and the identification of economically sound technical recommendations will serve to develop the market for input supply. A credit guarantee fund (5%) will be established to facilitate access to rural credit by smallholder farmers through financial institutions. Decentralized community based credit schemes with Farmers Associations, input supplier credit and linkages to formal bank credit will be developed. Training schemes will cover the provision of rural micro-finance to support entrepreneurial initiatives and agricultural trading. Pro-Planalto will also promote solidarity marketing by farmers associations and facilitate access to distant markets.

4: Rehabilitation of "Market/Farm/Market" secondary and tertiary feeder roads

All-weather roads are vital for providing access to distant markets and for the provision of inputs and services to farming communities. The strategy is to develop local construction capacity as a simultaneous effort to road rehabilitation, using non-capital intensive, labor-based construction techniques. The program will operate in close partnership with the provincial department of public works. This year Huambo has a budget of about US\$1.5 m for road and bridge rehabilitation. By combining resources there could be considerable synergy (government machines, technicians and USAID/WV food and cash resources) in developing community-based, rural road rehabilitation and maintenance contractors in selected target areas, who can be contracted directly, on an on-going basis, by provincial road authorities.

Approach

Land, water and labor are all in abundant supply and farmers are organized in associations but small scale rural enterprises are de-capitalized and any agricultural extension networks have been seriously disrupted.

Apex Unions of Farmers Associations

The essential element in any strategy for agricultural development revolves around the capacity building of farmers associations and their members (with gender sensitivity) to increase their development capabilities. There has been a serious disruption of human capacity to promote agricultural development activities. Investment in social capital and farmers associations will potentialize and synergize initiatives in other areas such as micro-finance, rural enterprise development and solidarity trading.

Extension Network

- IDA/WV extensionists with modified Training and Visit methodology including PRAs;
- Farmer Field Schools and Farmer field days;
- Evaluation/demonstration/multiplication areas;

Training Centres

- Week long courses to train MINADER/NGO extensionists;
- Practical lessons for students at the Faculty of Agronomy and Agricultural College;
- Video and technical library (publications in Portuguese from Brazil and Portugal);
- Integration with Chianga Experimental Station, Agricultural college and the Faculty of Agrarian Sciences, University Agostinho Neto.

Radio Programs

- Radio Huambo daily transmission of extension messages via “Conversa na Lavra” in Umbundu and Portuguese;
- Preparation of messages coordinated by WV with complete participation of MINADER, Teaching Institutions and PVOs.

Mobile Video Show

- Projection of video taken from training sessions and farmers field days and developed with the provincial communication department and Radio Huambo

Performance Measurement

World Vision will ensure that a suitable monitoring and evaluation system is in place to measure broad based impact at the provincial level. Expected impact will include:

- *Development of a vibrant rural economy with replication of the approach in other areas;*
- *Double to quadruple smallholder farmer incomes over program life for one million farming families;*
- *At least an additional 2 million hectares of land under agricultural cultivation;*

- *100,000 smallholder farmers (>60% women) trained in improved agricultural production technology in response to defined market opportunities;*
- *Fully functional practical training centres for 1,000 agricultural technicians;*
- *Radio Huambo and video show transmission of extension messages to over 1 million people;*
- *Fully functioning Chianga Experimental Station, participative evaluation network and Faculty of Agricultural Sciences.*

Budget

A total budget of US\$ 50 million over five years. World Vision will also invest in the development of the health and education sectors in the program area.

ANNEX F: SCOPE OF WORK; EVALUATION OF USAID/OFDA HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE IN ANGOLA, 2000 – 2003

Purpose

The U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) seeks to evaluate its relief and rehabilitation program in Angola between 2000 and 2003. This evaluation will focus on the effectiveness, sustainability, and overall impact of OFDA's activities. OFDA seeks a team of three experienced professionals to conduct research in the field and Washington over an estimated period of 45 days.

Background

On April 4, 2002, representatives of the Government of the Republic of Angola (GRA) and the National Union for the Independence of Angola (UNITA) signed a Memorandum of Understanding that ended the 27-year civil war and reinstated the 1994 Lusaka Protocol. The agreement resulted in a new set of opportunities and challenges for the humanitarian community. Access to populations in need of humanitarian assistance and the availability of more cost-effective road transport of humanitarian supplies have increased. However, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, return and resettlement of displaced populations, and increased landmine threats have resulted in a rise in the need for humanitarian resources in the short term.

The GRA estimates that the civil conflict affected more than four million Angolans. To date, the United States Government has provided more than \$122 million in emergency assistance to those affected by the conflict in Angola in 2002, channeled through USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance and Office of Food for Peace, the State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, & Migration and the Bureau of Political Military Affairs, and the United States Department of Agriculture. Since 1990, the U.S. Government has contributed nearly \$774 million in emergency assistance to affected populations in Angola.

Following the initial implementation of the peace agreement, OFDA nearly tripled its planned FY 2002 budget for Angola to address the needs, challenges, and opportunities presented by increased access. OFDA also re-designed its response strategy in Angola to expand activities beyond the Planalto region in order to provide greater flexibility, geographically and programmatically, to its partners—enabling them to rapidly respond to the fluid humanitarian situation. In addition to the Demobilization and Reintegration Planning Liaison Officer deployed to Angola in May, USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance deployed an assessment team to Angola from June 11 through July 9, 2002. The team assessed the humanitarian situation in newly accessible areas and FRAs, as well as the return and resettlement needs of IDPs. OFDA also maintains a permanent field presence in Angola through an Emergency Disaster Response Coordinator to monitor OFDA's programs, coordinate with USAID/Angola, and report on humanitarian issues in the country.

OFDA supports a variety of humanitarian assistance programs directly targeting millions of vulnerable people throughout Angola, addressing needs in health, nutrition, water & sanitation,

and food security. In response to the urgent need for resettlement support, OFDA provided the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) with \$3.1 million to distribute seeds and tools to IDP and resettling populations throughout the country. OFDA has provided several million dollars in support to UN OCHA's Emergency Response Fund (ERF). The ERF provides rapid disbursement of funds through humanitarian partners to serve as a short-term, emergency mechanism to assist communities until emergency response programs can be established. The ERF addresses the need for the international humanitarian community to have flexibility to rapidly changing humanitarian requirements.

In response to security and access concerns, OFDA has provided funding to UN OCHA to enhance coordination efforts among the humanitarian community. Coordination activities include reporting; information sharing initiatives among the UN, GRA, NGOs, and donors; and field advisors working across Angola to provide information to the humanitarian community on security and access. OFDA supports UNDP's efforts to maintain civil/military security liaison officers in selected provinces. OFDA has also addressed coordination issues through its support of the WFP Vulnerability Assessment Mapping (VAM/Angola) project. VAM/Angola improves the targeting of food assistance to the most vulnerable populations through collection, analysis, and dissemination of food security data for the humanitarian community.

Evaluation Questions

The evaluation will address the following series of questions.

Overall Impact: Assess the overall impact of OFDA's relief intervention in Angola, 2000-2003.

- What were the stated strategic objectives of OFDA's intervention in Angola? To what extent were these objectives achieved? What were the major issues influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?
- What are the most significant impacts that OFDA's relief activities have had on beneficiaries over the past three years?
- Have OFDA programs been sufficiently flexible? Have they been implemented with sufficient speed?
- How did OFDA's strategy and relief activities respond to the change in the political situation following the death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi? Did OFDA programs help consolidate peace in Angola post-Savimbi?
- How have improvements in access and security affected OFDA activities in Angola?
- What has been the role of OFDA activities and staff in facilitating the transition from relief to longer-term development in Angola? Does Angola provide lessons in how OFDA or USAID can help ease this transition?

Efficiency: Address the efficiency of OFDA's intervention.

- Taking into account the high transport costs inherent to working in Angola, were the range of activities undertaken by OFDA in Angola generally cost-efficient? Were they timely?
- Were OFDA activities complimentary and well coordinated with each other, avoiding duplication of effort?
- Were OFDA activities well coordinated with other donors (DFID, ECHO, etc.), avoiding duplication of effort?

Coverage: Consider geographical and social differences in coverage among OFDA programs.

- Did the sectors targeted represent the sectors with greatest needs?
- Did the geographical areas targeted represent the areas with greatest needs?
- Were the demographic groups with greatest needs targeted? (e.g., women, elderly, etc.)
- What were the causes of any sectoral, geographic, or demographic differences in coverage? Were they external or a product of program design and implementation?
- How did OFDA's priorities and activities affect strategies developed by other donors and implementers? Did other actors meet needs that were unmet by OFDA?

Management: Evaluate the efficiency of OFDA's internal program management process.

- How effective was OFDA's Angola portfolio management from the Washington side? How did the OFDA/Washington Angola team's organization, administrative practices, grant management procedures, and reporting structures affect strategy and outcomes?
- How well did the OFDA/Washington Angola team process incoming information? How were NGO and IO field reports reviewed and used? What other information sources were used by the team?

Sustainability: Assess the sustainability of OFDA's Angola intervention.

- Will the impacts of OFDA's relief activities be sustainable without continued external financial input? What factors will contribute to this possible sustainability?
- What is the prospective long-term impact of OFDA's programs on sustainable livelihoods? During the various stages of conflict in Angola, have OFDA programs placed a greater emphasis on saving lives or sustaining livelihoods?
- In what ways did OFDA's relief programs reinforce or hinder USAID/Angola's development-oriented activities and strategic objectives over the past 3 years? Looking forward, what are the prospects for increased relief-development program integration and possible handoff of OFDA-sponsored programs to USAID/Angola?
- Does OFDA's current approach reflect the fact that in peacetime the Government of Angola can now access more domestic financial resources and should be better equipped to carry out its own relief and reconstruction programs?

Coordination: Discuss OFDA's coordination function in Angola.

- What role have OFDA personnel played in coordinating various relief actors? In coordinating with USAID actors (including the Office of Food for Peace, and Missions)?
- Were there opportunities for OFDA, beyond its own direct response efforts, to trigger responses from other DCHA or USAID offices that could have benefited the U.S. Government effort to save lives, foster stability and encourage development in Angola? Did OFDA take advantage of any such opportunities?
- In which forums, in both Washington and Angola, did OFDA participate for coordination and information-sharing purposes?
- Did the significant authority and scope of OCHA's operations in Angola assist or hinder OFDA's program? Are there any general lessons that can be drawn from OCHA's coordination role in Angola?
- Was OFDA a constructive and reliable partner to those organizations responsible for coordination and implementation? Did OFDA provide adequate levels of reporting to other donors, implementers, and outside partners?
- How has the need in Angola for external coordination of humanitarian activities changed as domestic political circumstances have evolved?

- Have OFDA's interventions contributed to enhancing the Government of Angola's own coordination capacity?

Protection: Address the role of protection in OFDA's Angola interventions.

- To what extent did OFDA's relief portfolio attempt to address the physical protection needs of affected populations in Angola? To what extent were these protection needs actually met?
- What additional steps might OFDA undertake/have undertaken to improve protection for affected populations?

Evaluation Team & Estimated Level of Effort

The three-person evaluation team will consist of a team leader and two project specialists. To provide a broader perspective and better facilitate data collection, prospective evaluation teams are strongly encouraged to include at least one Angolan national as a team member, and also to include a mix of genders. OFDA staff will assist as necessary with the facilitation of meetings and procurement of documents. The team should collectively possess the following set of skills:

- Extensive experience implementing humanitarian relief programs in complex emergencies in various geographic regions around the world, preferably from several perspectives (UN/IO, NGO, donor)
- Experience carrying out two or more major humanitarian evaluations for a major donor, international NGO, or international organization.
- General familiarity with the political and humanitarian context in Angola, particularly over the past 3 years
- Basic understanding of USAID/OFDA grant management procedures
- Specific training and/or extensive practical experience in developing or implementing protection activities
- Specific training and/or extensive practical experience in developing or implementing activities aimed at sustaining local livelihoods

The team leader will be a Senior Level Humanitarian and Crisis Analyst. The second team member will be a Mid-Level Institutional Analyst. The third team member will be either a Junior Level Operations Research Analyst or a Cooperating Country National / Third Country National. All three members will participate for the entire duration of the evaluation.

Methodology and Estimated Timeline

The notional start date for the evaluation is mid September. The evaluation team will conduct the evaluation and complete the report in approximately 45 days.

Key informant interviews and document review in Washington, DC (8 days). The team should meet with staff from USAID, the State Department, international NGOs, donors, and other knowledgeable parties. It may review strategic assessments, grant documents, situation reports, and other relevant documents. The OFDA Evaluation Coordinator will assist with facilitation of meetings and procurement of documents as necessary.

Field work and data collection in Angola (22 days). The team may meet with representatives of the U.S. Government, other donors, international NGOs, local NGOs, UN organizations, and other relevant agencies in Luanda and potentially in outlying areas. The OFDA Emergency

Disaster Relief Coordinator and the OFDA Evaluation Coordinator will assist with facilitation as necessary, but the evaluation team is expected to be as independent as possible.

Writing report (10 days). The team will draft the report over 10 days at its organizational headquarters location.

Briefing OFDA staff (2 days). The team will return to Washington to brief OFDA managers and staff on findings, and to obtain feedback.

Final report revisions and printing (3 days). Following the final oral briefings and taking into account any new information obtained, the evaluation team will prepare and publish a final version of the evaluation report.

Deliverables

The evaluation team will produce the following deliverables:

Work Plan: Prior to departure to the field, the evaluation team will provide to OFDA a 2-3 page written strategy detailing how the evaluation will be completed, for OFDA review and approval. The work plan will include a list of potential interviewees, a draft list of interview questions, and a description of any other data collection instruments (e.g., surveys) to be used. The questions and instruments should be tailored to individual categories of respondents such as implementing partners, beneficiaries, government officials, and other donors.

Field Debrief: Upon completion of research in Angola, the evaluation team will provide a verbal debrief of preliminary findings to USAID staff in Luanda, and will request preliminary feedback which may be incorporated into the final report.

Written Report: The team shall write and present for review a first draft of the evaluation report at least one week prior to the final oral briefings (below). The report will include an executive summary, brief overview of the humanitarian context in Angola over the focus period, description of methodology, and a detailed description of the evaluation's findings and recommendations. Additional information including team itinerary, interviewee lists, questionnaires, surveys, and bibliography should be included in annexes. The report should be no more than 40 pages, excluding annexes. Following the final oral briefings and taking into account any new information obtained, the evaluation team will prepare and print a final version of the evaluation report, with the number of printed copies to be determined.

Final Oral Briefings: At least one week after distribution of the written report to OFDA, the full evaluation team will conduct two oral debriefs to present findings, one with OFDA senior management and the other to a broader audience from both inside and outside USAID, to present study findings and obtain feedback.