

# **CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND**

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## **TWO YEAR EVALUATION**

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## **FOREWORD**

During the 1990s and early 2000s, funding for appeals was often inconsistent, at times slow and sometimes linked more to political considerations rather than need. Some appeals were funded over 100% (e.g. for crises such as the former Yugoslavia), while others received less than 20% of needed funds. In order to address this shortcoming, member states sought to create predictable, timely and equitable means to fund humanitarian crises. In December 2005, the United Nations passed a resolution, adding to the existing \$50 million loan facility of the Central Emergency Revolving Fund a grant facility of up to US \$450 million to become the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).

Resolution 60/124, which created this new Fund, required that a 2-year independent evaluation would be conducted that would report back to the General Assembly on the progress of the new CERF.

Since its launch on 9 March 2006, the CERF has grown rapidly, receiving over a billion dollars in contributions and disbursing over 1,000 grants in 62 countries. During this time, implementing agencies, OCHA, the CERF Secretariat and the UN Secretariat worked together to establish procedures, clarify roles and find innovative solutions while simultaneously responding to an increasing number of disasters. Managing the expanding CERF allowed little time for comprehensive reflection, so OCHA and its partners have eagerly anticipated this evaluation. We look to this external evaluation as not just an accountability report to member states, but as a valuable opportunity to provide strategic recommendations that we can use to sharpen and improve the functioning of the CERF.

I would like to thank team leader Mr. Martin Barber and the experienced and capable evaluation team, Ms. Roberta Lossio, Mr. Abhijit Bhattacharjee and Mr. Lewis Sida, for their tremendous efforts in successfully taking up this challenging and complex assignment. I would also like to thank all of those that contributed to the evaluation by participating in consultations and providing comments and feedback on the evaluation reports.

The report offers valuable recommendations addressing the need to increase the consistency in quality of CERF funded programmes, strengthen capacities at headquarters and in the field to improve efficiency and timeliness and rationalize accountabilities. The CERF is a unique mechanism that has a broad variety of stakeholders, therefore implementing these recommendations will require a concerted and coordinated effort by all actors. We look forward to your support in seizing this opportunity to increase the effectiveness of the CERF as a critical tool for improving the quality of aid brought to people in need.

John Holmes  
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs  
And Emergency Relief Coordinator

## **THE EVALUATION TEAM**

The team comprised four individual independent consultants.

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## **THE STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT**

After the Executive Summary and Matrix of Conclusions and Recommendations, the report is divided into eight sections. The first two contain the Introduction, Objectives and methodology for the evaluation, and the Background to the CERF. Sections 3-6 present the findings of the evaluation based on the four key issues outlined in the GA resolution and provide answers to the questions posed in the Terms of Reference.

In section 7, the findings are analysed using the OECD/DAC criteria for humanitarian evaluation. In these five sections (3-7), at the end of each sub-section, findings have been summarized into 'Conclusions', and wherever, relevant, corresponding 'Recommendations' have been made. Finally, in Section 8, some brief Concluding Remarks are offered.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The evaluation team wishes to express its appreciation to all those from governments, the UN and other international organisations and non-governmental organisations, as well as individual beneficiaries of the CERF, who have given their time, energy and expertise to contribute to this evaluation, either in interviews or by sending in written materials. Everywhere it went, the team encountered intense interest in the CERF, its achievements and its potential.

The team would like to express its particular appreciation to the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators and their staff in the countries visited, who facilitated their travel and arranged their schedules.

This evaluation could not have been completed without the enthusiastic support and cooperation of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, John Holmes, his staff in OCHA, in New York, Geneva and the field, and particularly the staff of the CERF Secretariat in New York. Rudi Muller and his team responded quickly and fully to every request.

The team is grateful to ALNAP and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), and the War Studies Department of Kings College, London, which made available meeting space and other facilities for the team's meetings.

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

|        |  |
|--------|--|
| ACE    | Assessment and Classification of Emergencies                   |
| CAG    | CERF Advisory Group  |
| CAP    | Consolidated Appeals Process                                   |
| CERF   | Central Emergency Response Fund                                |
| CHAP   | Common Humanitarian Action Plan                                |
| CHF    | Common Humanitarian Fund                                       |
| CRD    | Coordination and Response Division (OCHA)                      |
| CIDA   | Canadian International Development Agency                      |
| DFID   | Department for International Development (United Kingdom)      |
| DPKO   | Department of Peacekeeping Operations                          |
| DPRK   | Democratic Republic of Korea                                   |
| DRC    | Democratic Republic of Congo                                   |
| DSRSG  | Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General         |
| ECHO   | European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office                  |
| ECOSOC | Economic and Social Council                                    |
| ERC    | Emergency Relief Coordinator                                   |
| ESS    | Evaluation Studies Section (OCHA)                              |
| ERF    | Emergency Response Fund  |
| FAO    | Food and Agriculture Organization                              |
| FSAU   | Food Security Analysis Unit                                    |
| FTS    | Financial Tracking Service                                     |
| GA     | General Assembly   |
| GHA    | Global Humanitarian Assistance                                 |
| GHD    | Good Humanitarian Donorship                                    |
| HAP    | Humanitarian Action Plan                                       |
| HC     | Humanitarian Coordinator                                       |
| HCT    | Humanitarian Country Team                                      |
| HQ     | Headquarters   |
| HRF    | Humanitarian Response Fund                                     |
| IA     | CERF Inter-Agency Group  |
| IASC   | Inter-Agency Standing Committee                                |
| ICRC   | International Committee of the Red Cross                       |
| ICVA   | International Council of Voluntary Agencies                    |
| IDP    | Internally Displaced Persons                                   |
| IFRC   | International Federation of the Red Cross                      |
| ILO    | International Labour Organization                              |
| INGO   | International Non-Governmental Organization                    |
| IOM    | International Organisation for Migration                       |
| IPC    | Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification |
| IRA    | Immediate Response Account (WFP)                               |
| LoU    | Letter of Understanding  |
| M or m | Million  |
| MDTF   | Multi-Donor Trust Fund   |

|          |   |
|----------|---|
| MONUC    | United Nation Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo              |
| MSF      | Médecins Sans Frontières  |
| NGO      | Non Governmental Organization   |
| OCHA     | Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs                                     |
| OECD/DAC | Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee |
| OIOS     | Office of Internal Oversight Services   |
| PAHO     | Pan American Health Organization  |
| PF       | Pooled Fund   |
| PSC      | Programme Support Costs   |
| RAG      | Review Advisory Group   |
| RC       | Resident Coordinator  |
| RR       | Rapid Response  |
| RRM      | Rapid Response Mechanism  |
| RVF      | Rift Valley Fever   |
| SCHR     | Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response  |
| SG       | Secretary-General   |
| SGB      | Secretary-General’s Bulletin  |
| SGBV     | Sexual and gender-based violence  |
| TOR      | Terms of Reference  |
| TYP      | Three year programme  |
| UFE      | Underfunded Emergencies   |
| UK       | United Kingdom  |
| UN       | United Nations  |
| UNCT     | United Nations Country Team   |
| UNDAC    | United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination                                     |
| UNDP     | United Nations Development Program  |
| UNDSS    | United Nations Department for Safety and Security                                       |
| UNFPA    | United Nations Populations Fund   |
| UNHCR    | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees   |
| UNICEF   | United Nations Children’s Fund  |
| USAID    | United States Agency for International Development                                      |
| WASH     | Water, sanitation and hygiene (cluster)   |
| Watsan   | Water and Sanitation  |
| WFP      | World Food Programme  |
| WHO      | World Health Organization   |

**Terms used:**

1. Unless otherwise specified, ‘agencies’ or ‘operational agencies’ mean UN agencies/IOM, the organisations eligible to receive CERF funds.
2. UNCT (UN Country Team) is used in the report, since the term is still widely used. In the context of humanitarian reform, the more partnership-friendly terms HCT (Humanitarian Country Team), IASC CT or simply “country team” are being promoted.

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

In its resolution 60/124 of December 2005, the General Assembly of the United Nations sought to remedy two problems that had bedevilled UN efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance in a timely and effective manner. First, the Emergency Relief Coordinator, mandated by the Assembly to coordinate the international response to humanitarian emergencies, had no resources at his disposal with which to address the immediate needs in a rapid-onset crisis; and secondly, the international response to protracted emergencies seemed often to be dictated more by political considerations than an objective assessment of the needs of the people, and therefore lacked equity and fairness.

Resolution 60/124 sought to address these problems by transforming the Central Emergency Revolving Fund, created in 1991, into the Central Emergency Response Fund, adding to the existing loan facility of US\$ 50 million a grant element with an annual target of \$450 million.

Detailed arrangements for the management and administration of the CERF, including the provision that two-thirds would be for rapid response and one-third for underfunded emergencies, were described in the Secretary-General's Bulletin of 10 October 2006 (SGB/2006/10.)

In its resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to commission an external independent evaluation of the CERF after the first two years of operation. This study has been produced in fulfilment of that obligation.

### **Introduction and Background to the CERF**

The CERF is managed by the Emergency Relief Coordinator who decides on the allocation of the Fund. He has established a small team of staff as the CERF Secretariat, within the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The UN Controller is the financial administrator of the Fund, responsible for receiving and processing contributions, disbursing allocations and producing financial accounts on the use of the Fund. The fund is open to agencies, funds and programmes of the UN system and the IOM. OCHA is not eligible to apply for grants.

As of 22 May 2008, the CERF grant element had received a total of US\$ 1.06 billion in contributions, as well as US\$ 52 million in unpaid pledges. The total receipts and disbursements, by year and funding window, are shown in the table below.

Funds allocated for rapid response provide an initial injection of resources to kick-start the response to a rapid-onset emergency. Applications are sent in to the ERC through the CERF Secretariat by the Resident/ Humanitarian Coordinator in the affected country, after consultations in the humanitarian country team. Funds for underfunded emergencies are allocated according to a process, which identifies countries, or programmes within countries, which are considered to be 'underfunded' and eligible for

funding. The loan element of the CERF continues to be used at approximately the same level as previously.

|               | <b>Total receipts<br/>(US\$) 22/05/08</b> | <b>Disbursements RR<br/>(US\$) 27/05/08</b> | <b>Disbursements UFE<br/>(US\$) 27/05/08</b> |
|---------------|---|---|--|
| <b>2006</b>   | 298,712,453                               | 182,425,720                                 | 76,881,765                                   |
| <b>2007</b>   | 385,137,101                               | 227,780,577                                 | 123,114,422                                  |
| <b>2008</b>   | 376,731,568                               | 132,333,703                                 | 97,073,110 <sup>1</sup>                      |
| <b>Totals</b> | 1,060,581,122                             | 542,540,000                                 | 297,069,297                                  |

### Objectives and methodology of the evaluation

The overall purpose of the evaluation was defined as to “provide strategic guidance to member states and the UN system on the future of the CERF”. The terms of reference identified two core objectives:

- To assess the CERF in a comprehensive manner, based on project data and frameworks, covering the benefits and disadvantages of the CERF as an approach to humanitarian financing;
- To provide recommendations to donors and the UN system at strategic and operational levels as to whether the CERF should be continued in its current form and if so, how it should be improved.

The evaluation used a range of methods: initial briefings at UN Headquarters; desk research of key documents, reports and studies; field visits to seven countries that had benefited from CERF grants; telephone interviews with relevant personnel in seven other countries; an electronic and on-line survey; key informant interviews with a very wide range of stakeholders including members of the CERF Advisory Group; representatives of donor governments and of governments that have benefited from the CERF, UN agencies and other international organisations at their Headquarters and in the field, international and national NGOs, beneficiary groups, and knowledgeable independent experts.

### **Key Findings**

#### **1. The grant and revolving elements of the fund**

1.1 CERF’s effect on overall humanitarian funding: Although CERF, by some estimates, constitutes no more than 4 % of global annual humanitarian funding<sup>2</sup>, it makes up a much

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<sup>1</sup> Most grants from the underfunded window are made early in the year. OCHA expects that in 2008 as a whole, more than 2/3rds of CERF funding will be for rapid response.

<sup>2</sup> Estimate taken from Global Humanitarian Assistance (2007), Development Initiatives, UK.

more significant proportion of humanitarian funding requested by UN agencies and their partners in consolidated and flash appeals. In 2007, 72% of the funding requested in CAPs and Flash Appeals was covered, the highest proportion in the past 10 years, which suggests that the CERF is having a positive impact on the predictability of funding.

The CERF has attracted contributions from an unprecedented coalition of 86 donor governments. Nevertheless, 85% of the funds received as of May 2008 came from seven top donors<sup>3</sup>, whose contributions for humanitarian aid have risen steadily over the past seven years. Their overall funding of humanitarian assistance has increased in 2006 and 2007 by more than the level of their contributions to the CERF. Their contributions to the fund did not therefore come at the expense of other organisations, and may be considered ‘additional’.

On the question as to whether the size of the CERF needs to be bigger than its current 4% share of overall humanitarian financing, the evaluation concluded that while the Fund could be allowed to increase in response to demands, such increases need to be accompanied by improvements in the capacity to deliver and by the implementation of other recommendations in this report.

The ‘rapid response’ window of the CERF is widely recognized as being a valuable and successful addition to the humanitarian financing architecture. It works best when used in combination with UN agencies’ own emergency funds or with other humanitarian pooled funding mechanisms. It enables the ERC to kick-start the international response to an emergency, to meet time-critical requirements and to intervene quickly in deteriorating situations, by funding essential enabling activities and key sectors. It has allowed Resident/ Humanitarian Coordinators (RC/HCs) and UN country teams to become reliable partners of affected governments confronted by sudden-onset disasters.

In relation to questions of predictability and equity in funding of ‘underfunded’ emergencies (UFE), the findings suggest that the CERF has established itself as an impartial humanitarian financing mechanism, something strongly welcomed by both donor governments and governments suffering disasters.

1.2. CERF’s links to other humanitarian pooled funding mechanisms: The CERF was launched at the same time as two ‘Common Humanitarian Funds’ in DRC and Sudan. In both cases, these funds have been managed alongside the CERF, resulting in useful synergies and complementarity. Furthermore, Humanitarian Coordinators in a number of countries, assisted by OCHA, UNDP or UNICEF, have continued to set up country-specific Emergency Relief Funds (ERFs). These enable HCs to intervene rapidly when the need or opportunity arises, releasing funds to UN agencies or international and local NGOs that have the presence and capacity to intervene rapidly and effectively. The evaluation found that, where these different funding mechanisms were used intelligently

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<sup>3</sup> Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and UK

and transparently together, funding decisions were moved ‘closer to the point of delivery’, improving their relevance and appropriateness.

While the UFE has helped several HCs dealing with badly neglected crises to stimulate the interest and support of bilateral donors, the definition of ‘underfundedness’ has proved problematic. If an appeal is inflated, it will easily appear underfunded. A modest appeal, which appears relatively well funded, may contain sectors of activity of higher priority. The evaluation found that a number of projects had been supported by the UFE window that were a response to many years of failed development.

1.3. Impact on other elements of humanitarian reform: The evaluation finds that where clusters have been introduced appropriately as a form of enhanced sectoral coordination, under the leadership of an experienced HC, the interaction with the CERF has been positive, leading to improved decision-making, coordination and gap-filling. Where clusters have been introduced without proper training and preparation, they have either been rejected by governments or UN country teams, or poorly implemented. In these cases, CERF did not usually have a positive impact on decision-making and coordination of the humanitarian response. The evaluation agrees with the widely-held view that the key to effective coordination of humanitarian response is the humanitarian coordinator system, and the support provided to it by OCHA.

The CERF has dramatically strengthened the capacity of RCs and HCs in their interactions with host governments. In several situations the team observed effective coordination, facilitated by the advent of the CERF, between government, UN system and other humanitarian organisations.

In contrast, the CERF has not yet led to an improvement in the relations between the UN agencies and the community of NGOs and civil society, except in a small number of cases, where exceptional partnership arrangements have been put in place, and in some situations where CERF has provided timely funding to NGOs through ERFs.

**Key Recommendation 1.** The CERF should continue under its current mandate. The size of the Fund should be allowed to increase progressively, in line with demands, and in parallel to improvements in the implementation capacity of the UN agencies and the management capacity of the CERF Secretariat. [Specific recommendations 1-6 in Section 3]

## **2. Actions and responses supported by the CERF to improve humanitarian performance**

2.1. Life-saving criteria: In order to assist in clearly defining what activities may be funded from the CERF, the ERC endorsed the ‘life-saving criteria’ in August 2007, which had been developed in consultation with members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).

The evaluation reviewed the application of the ‘life-saving criteria’ in both rapid response and underfunded emergencies. While the agreement on the criteria has helped to define

which activities can be funded by the CERF, the decision-making process nevertheless proved contentious in several cases. The problem is that the criteria define acceptable activities, but pay insufficient attention to the context in which the activities take place. Activities that may be a legitimate component of a core emergency humanitarian response in one context, may not be so in another. The team found several examples of activities which were not relevant or appropriate to a humanitarian response, either because of delays in implementation or because of poor targeting of beneficiaries, or because the activity sought to address a long-standing failure of development, which could not be addressed appropriately by an emergency programme.

2.2 Pre-existing capacity of agencies is critical for timely response: When the operational agency receiving the CERF grant had good emergency capacity, the response to the emergency was generally timely. When the agency did not have the required capacity, the response was often delayed, in some cases, so much so that the assistance constituted a timely response to the following year's disaster! This finding demonstrates the importance for the operational agencies of being able to give evidence to the ERC of the capacity required to implement rapid response programmes. It also highlights the necessity for agencies to maintain their own emergency funding reserves.

2.3 Needs-based Response: The quality of needs assessments has been a long-term problem for humanitarian agencies. There is evidence from the country studies that the CERF is indirectly supporting efforts to address this problem. Alongside several efforts to develop global frameworks for improved assessment, the CERF and other pooled funds have encouraged HCs and humanitarian country teams to conduct coordinated needs assessments and to elaborate innovative indicators as a more objective measure of relative need. While this finding was positive, there was also evidence of some UN country teams 'dividing the cake' in ways that were not transparent and did not reflect a genuine effort to identify key priorities.

2.4. Outcomes: The sheer volume of projects supported by the CERF, their diversity, the number of agencies involved, and the inter-related nature of much funding make it very difficult to provide a statistically rigorous judgment on whether outcomes have been materially affected by the existence of CERF. Nevertheless, it can be broadly asserted that the volume of humanitarian activity has increased as a result of the CERF and that projects are likely to be more relevant as a result of decentralized decision-making. The evaluation, however, did not find that the CERF had yet had a noticeable impact on the quality of agency performance. While the team saw some excellent work, as well as some that was not, it was not possible to ascribe the one or the other to the CERF.

**Key Recommendation 2:** The quality of CERF-funded programmes needs to become more consistent. To that end, the criteria for project approval and their application need to be further refined, including the application of the 'life saving criteria', assessments of agencies' capacity, the timeframe for implementation and the use of needs assessments.

[Specific recommendations: 7-12 in section 4.]

### **3. The administration of the CERF and criteria for resource allocation**

3.1 Resource Mobilization: The ERCs have been outstandingly successful in mobilizing resources for the CERF. It seems likely that the fund will reach its long-term target of US\$ 450 million in 2008, much sooner than anticipated. The number of contributing states is also a great vote of confidence. The opportunity to take a part, however small, in the international response to every major humanitarian emergency on the planet seems to have struck a chord, as it should, with nearly half the UN's member states.

3.2 CERF Secretariat capacity: The CERF Secretariat was initially established with just five staff. While the work of this small group has been universally acknowledged as exemplary under very difficult circumstances, and the numbers have now increased, the evaluation has identified a number of areas where improvements are required. If its advice to the ERC is to be of high quality and timely, the Secretariat needs sufficient staff with the requisite seniority and experience to interact effectively with RC/HCs and operational agencies. The ERC and OCHA's responsibilities, not only for the CERF, but also in different ways for the oversight of other pooled funds, also need to be recognized in appropriate structural adjustments within OCHA.

3.3 OCHA deployment capacity: Key to the timely and appropriate development of project proposals, particularly in sudden-onset emergencies, is the availability of trained OCHA and UN agency staff to assist the RCs and HCs confronted with a new disaster. OCHA's programme to develop surge capacity in its growing network of regional offices and among its UN agency partners, together with the CERF Secretariat's training programmes, are important elements in improving the quality and relevance of proposals.

3.4 Approval of CERF Proposals: A number of factors influence the quality of the decision-making processes for CERF grants. These include: an early agreement between the ERC and the RC/HC on the 'envelope' of funding to be made available, initially at least, from the CERF; a clear link between the early publication of a Flash Appeal and the allocation of funds from the CERF; the availability of trained OCHA and agency support staff during the process of preparing the flash appeal and CERF proposals; and the transparent use of sectoral coordination mechanisms, or clusters, to identify priority needs. In the UFE, where more time is available, the last element – a transparent sectoral or cluster process – is key.

3.5 Disbursement of CERF Funds: A number of administrative steps impact on the speed with which funds are disbursed by the UN Controller's Office to operational agencies and onward to implementing partners. While the timeliness of these transactions has improved in 2007, there is room for further improvement. Agreement on an umbrella Letter of Understanding between the Controller and each operational agency, outstanding

for many months, is urgently needed<sup>4</sup>. NGOs implementing CERF projects have complained of frequent delays in the disbursement of funds by the agencies. It is incumbent on the ERC, as programme manager, to ensure that funds are disbursed by the agencies to the NGOs in a timely way.

**3.6 Projects or programmes:** Several operational agencies expressed concern at the level of ‘projectization’ in CERF allocations. The evaluation considered that on the rapid response side a relatively high degree of earmarking may be required to target the CERF funds at the key priorities identified by the HC and the humanitarian country team, although streamlining of reporting requirements should help to reduce agencies’ transaction costs. On the underfunded side, opportunities clearly exist for a more programmatic approach.

**3.7 Overhead Charges:** Three separate issues relating to overhead charges or programme support costs (PSC) were brought to the attention of the evaluators. First is the charge of 3% levied on all expenditures for programme support services on the part of the United Nations Secretariat. Secondly, the operational agencies charge an overhead of up to 7%, as agreed in discussions with the Controller. Finally, UN agencies routinely expect NGOs to implement their programmes without allowing them to charge a reasonable overhead. With many NGOs seeing major increases in the proportion of their funding coming from the UN, following the advent of CERF, CHFs and ERFs, this situation is not sustainable.

**3.8 The CERF Advisory Group (CAG)** has provided valuable advice and support to the ERC and the CERF Secretariat. It identified several of the key issues studied in this evaluation. While the CAG has also provided some donor government representatives with a regular engagement with the evolution of CERF, there is need for a wider forum for engagement with all member states contributing to the Fund.

**Key Recommendation 3:** The capacity of the CERF secretariat and OCHA field teams need to be strengthened, to ensure timely review of applications and high-quality decisions, and onward disbursement of funds from UN agencies/IOM to implementing partners needs to be speeded up, thereby guaranteeing faster response and better value for money. In addition, overhead charges need to be reviewed and the mandate of the CERF Advisory Group should be extended for a further period. [Specific recommendations 13-24 in section 5].

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<sup>4</sup> The evaluation was informed that a draft of the Umbrella LOU, approved by the Office of Legal Affairs, was cleared by the Controller on 18 June 2008. The text still needed to be agreed by the operational agencies.

#### **4. Factors affecting the ability of the CERF to meet its objectives**

4.1. Accountability and transparency: As manager of the CERF funds, the ERC needs to have in place systems that allow him to be confident that funds are being managed as effectively and efficiently as possible. In order to help achieve this, the evaluation makes a number of recommendations. These seek to address the dual lines of accountability from the operational agencies' country offices through the RC/HC to the ERC, and through their own Headquarters to the UN Controller, and the complexity that these relationships introduce in relation to monitoring and evaluation of projects. They also seek to address difficulties arising from the use of incompatible financial reporting systems by the UN and the operational agencies, and onerous financial reporting requirements on the agencies resulting from the decentralized and project-level nature of CERF project decision-making.

4.2. Communications: Inevitably, with a Fund that has been in existence for just two years, there is a need for the ERC to communicate widely about its purpose, its achievements and even its limitations, in order not to create expectations that cannot be fulfilled. A communications strategy, developed with the participation of the agencies and other key stakeholders would design systems for the dissemination of appropriate information to those who need it.

4.3 Access of NGOs to the CERF: A major topic of discussion throughout the evaluation has been the fact that NGOs do not have direct access to the CERF. The evaluation recognizes that the addition of NGOs to the list of eligible organisations is not feasible at the present time<sup>5</sup>. However, the team believes that there are a number of ways in which NGOs can be more directly associated with this important new financing mechanism, both by taking an active part in its decision-making processes, and by being able to access CERF funds more quickly, more predictably and with lower transaction costs than has been the case so far.

**Key Recommendation 4: The multiple lines of accountability for CERF need to be clarified, in consultation with the UN Controller and the operational agencies, to specify the roles of each actor; the ERC needs to ensure that the operational agencies have in place appropriate monitoring and reporting systems, and to make use of quality assurance mechanisms for evaluation of CERF projects, without increasing the bureaucratic burdens in implementing humanitarian programmes. [Specific recommendations 25-33 in Section 6]**

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<sup>5</sup> The CERF was established under GA resolution 60/124. Funds are disbursed by the Office of the Controller in accordance with UN financial regulations and rules. It is understood that, in order to disburse funds to NGOs, the Controller's Office would require contracts based on competitive tendering, a route which would not allow CERF to provide time-critical response in emergencies.

## **OECD/DAC Criteria for Humanitarian Evaluation**

Section 7 of the evaluation report reviews the team's findings in relation to the OECD/DAC criteria of coverage, relevance and appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency, coordination, impact, and connectedness and coherence.

CERF grants have generally been allocated for activities that are highly relevant in relation to the needs of disaster-affected communities, especially in rapid response. CERF has been an effective mechanism to enhance UN agencies' ability to undertake early action to save lives and to provide time-critical response in rapid-onset emergencies. In this, the CERF has succeeded in reinforcing the principles of impartiality and needs-based response. Individual agencies' pre-existing capacity has been critical to the effectiveness of CERF. The effectiveness of the CERF has improved steadily over the two years, as those involved have become familiar with the systems. There are still issues, however, over the timeliness of disbursements, particularly from the operational agencies to their NGO implementing partners. In this context, the ability of OCHA and the agencies to engage with NGOs over the CERF, in ways that reflect the diversity and capacities of NGOs, will be an important contributing factor to CERF's overall effectiveness in future.

CERF has contributed positively to coordination among the UN agencies, and between the UN and governments, in several places. Where CERF has worked in tandem with other pillars of humanitarian reform, the process has often been mutually beneficial. In many cases, however, this has not been the case. While the CERF has had a significant effect on the funding for the five major UN humanitarian agencies, it is still too early to say with assurance to what extent the victims of disasters are better off with CERF.

## **Conclusions**

First and foremost, the report concludes that the CERF has made considerable progress towards meeting its principal objectives of improving the timeliness of initial response to sudden-onset emergencies and correcting the inequities of humanitarian financing of 'neglected' emergencies. This is a remarkable achievement.

The CERF has also attracted an unprecedented coalition of donors and should reach its annual target of US\$ 450 million in 2008.

Nevertheless, the ERC is confronted with many challenges, if the promise of the first two years is to be converted into a consistent track record of high quality projects, with a demonstrable benefit to the victims of war and natural disasters. The generally positive tone of this report should not allow readers to underestimate the severity of those challenges.

The General Assembly will wish to keep the progress of the CERF under review. This evaluation recommends that a similar study should be initiated in early 2011, so that the conclusions can be presented at the Assembly's 66<sup>th</sup> session.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TABLES

### SECTION 3 – THE GRANT AND REVOLVING ELEMENTS OF THE FUND

| <b>CONCLUSIONS</b>   | <b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b>  |
|--|---|
| <b>Impact on funding</b>   |   |
| <p>1. The CERF has not had any significant impact on overall levels of humanitarian funding, although early trends indicate that CERF is making humanitarian funding more predictable for UN agencies/IOM and their partners by increasing the coverage of CAP and flash appeals.</p> <p>2. CERF has become a major source of funding for UN agencies, whilst not appearing to have impacted negatively on NGO funding.</p> <p>3. CERF is an important, impartial humanitarian financing mechanism and has made a difference to forgotten and neglected crises.</p> <p>4. CERF works well with other humanitarian pooled funds. It seems most effective when it is complemented by other forms of financing, whether CHFs, ERFs or agencies' own emergency funding. Combined with ERF it can also allow previously excluded agencies such as local NGOs to access significant resources.</p> | <p>1. OCHA and the UN agencies should explore setting up in-country rapid response mechanisms, or ERFs, part-funded by CERF, in countries in protracted crises or subject to disasters, as a way of funding reputable and principled civil society organisations with recognised programme capacity. Where appropriate, UN agencies may be encouraged to 'pre-qualify' competent national and international NGO partners, and to agree consistent arrangements for payment of overheads</p>   |
| <b>The CERF Windows</b>  |   |
| <p>5. While CERF works well for large-scale rapid onset disasters, it has been less certain in its handling of smaller scale disasters.</p> <p>6. Although it is generally acknowledged that CERF has strengthened humanitarian response in under-funded/neglected crises, communication around the selection of under-funded countries has been unclear and the process has not inspired widespread confidence.</p> <p>7. Potential uses of the loan window have not been sufficiently explored.</p>  | <p>2. The 'underfunded' window should be renamed the 'underfunded protracted crisis' window, or similar. A clearer more widely supported process for this window is required. A transparent set of data should be used to determine eligible countries and the process reviewed by the IASC Working Group, for submission to the ERC.</p> <p>3. In situations when agencies are awaiting funds from donors, or where they are required to set up common services on behalf of the UN system, the CERF loan window can be used creatively to strengthen time-critical response, provided that loan approval processes can be simplified, by removing the requirement for a pledge letter for smaller loans, and by allowing larger short-term loans against pledges. The loan window should be promoted among country teams as another tool available for humanitarian work.</p> |
| <b>CERF Impact on humanitarian reform</b>  |   |
| <p>8. CERF has strengthened collaboration among the UN agencies, but has not yet made a significant difference in coordinated planning and action involving other non-UN actors.</p> <p>9. There is a perceived conflict of interest in UN agencies' cluster lead role as well as lead/chairing role in discussions on CERF funding allocations.</p>   | <p>4. The ERC and RC/HCs should re-emphasize the importance of impartial and objective chairing of cluster meetings, particularly when CERF funding allocations are being discussed. Ideally, clusters should be chaired by officials without agency management responsibilities. Where this is not possible, cluster leads should consider inviting their co-leads or other members to chair funding discussions.</p> <p>5. The ERC should work with UNDGO to ensure that, when RCs receive CERF funds, lines of accountability to the ERC are fully adhered to, and that the RCs make full use of the humanitarian coordination mechanisms available.</p> <p>6. The UN agencies/IOM should work to promote the Principles of Partnership with NGOs throughout their organisations.</p>  |

**Key Recommendation 1 (for Section 3)**

The CERF should continue under its current mandate. The size of the Fund should be allowed to increase progressively, in line with demands, and in parallel to improvements in the implementation capacity of the UN agencies/IOM and the management capacity of the CERF Secretariat.

**SECTION 4 – ACTIONS SUPPORTED BY THE CERF TO IMPROVE HUMANITARIAN PERFORMANCE**

| CONCLUSIONS   | RECOMMENDATIONS  |
|---|--|
| <b>Life-saving criteria</b>   |  |
| <p>10. The life-saving criteria have been defined without sufficient reference to context, which has made prioritisation of needs difficult. As a result, CERF funds have sometimes been used to address recovery needs and long-term issues of under-development, rather than core emergency humanitarian needs.</p> <p>11. Use of CERF funds to address issues that require long-term interventions, and are not situated in a humanitarian emergency context, diverts resources that could be used for meeting core emergency humanitarian needs.</p>  | <p>7. In order to ensure that CERF only funds activities arising out of humanitarian emergencies (both rapid and chronic), place the existing ‘life-saving criteria’ for CERF grants in the context of core emergency humanitarian needs to emphasise the principles articulated in the SG’s bulletin, and target the CERF more precisely so that prioritisation of needs becomes clearer.</p>   |
| <b>Timely Response</b>  |  |
| <p>12. While timelines in the CERF approval and LOU process are a factor in rapid response, other factors contribute to serious delays in delivery of assistance: (a) delayed proposal development in country; (b) an agency’s lack of capacity to pre-finance implementation; (c) time-consuming negotiations with potential implementing partners; and (d) cumbersome internal procurement systems.</p> <p>13. CERF has generally enabled time-critical response to rapid onset humanitarian crises and played a complementary role to in-country and agency-specific rapid response mechanisms wherever these exist.</p> <p>14. Agencies own preparedness and response capacities remain critical and they must continue to strive to improve these both globally and nationally. This includes the maintenance of their own emergency response funds.</p> | <p>8. Appraisals of proposals by the CERF secretariat for the rapid response window need to factor in the applicant agencies’ preparedness to launch a response immediately on approval of funds by the ERC (without waiting for LOUs and disbursement from the Controller’s office), and the RC/HC’s assessment of the agencies’ capacity to deliver timely response.</p> <p>9. In exceptional cases, particularly involving activities in the agricultural sector, the ERC needs to allow, from the outset, an extension of the project duration for RR grants.</p> <p>10. Donors must continue to support agencies’ individual emergency response funds in addition to mechanisms such as CERF to ensure timely response.</p> |
| <b>Needs Assessment and Prioritization</b>  |  |
| <p>15. CERF has fostered multi-lateral and consultative processes of prioritisation. These have helped reinforce the importance of ensuring that humanitarian response is based on needs assessments, although the tools and methods for systematic needs assessment are not yet in place.</p>  | <p>11. Where feasible, CERF funds should be allocated on the basis of coordinated needs assessments.</p>   |
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| <b>Gender</b>  |  |
| 16. Gender equity in humanitarian programming is a principle that is widely subscribed to in both the CERF application guidance and in agencies' internal policies. The degree to which this commitment is acted upon is unclear, partly because CERF application and reporting formats do not require issues such as gender equity to be mentioned. | 12. The CERF application template should include a section on important issues of principle such as gender equity. |
| <b>Outcomes</b>  |  |
| 17. CERF has led to an increased volume of humanitarian activity.<br>18. Projects funded by CERF are more likely to be appropriate and relevant, owing to the decentralised nature of the decision-making.   |  |

**Key Recommendation 2 (for Section 4)**

The quality of CERF-funded programmes needs to become more consistent. To that end, and without affecting the timeliness of decision-making, the criteria for project approval and their application need to be further refined, including the application of the 'life saving criteria', assessments of agencies' capacity, the timeframe for implementation and the use of needs assessments.

**SECTION 5 – THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CERF AND CRITERIA FOR RESPONSE ALLOCATION**

| CONCLUSIONS   | RECOMMENDATIONS   |
|---|---|
| <b>Administration of CERF Secretariat</b>   |   |
| <p>19. In spite of a shortage of staff of an appropriately senior level, the CERF secretariat has played a pivotal role in establishing CERF as a credible rapid response mechanism in less than two years.</p> <p>20. OCHA staff's support to the RC/HC is critical in the process of needs prioritisation and proposal development for CERF allocations. Wherever OCHA offices do not exist, rapid deployment of OCHA staff and UNDAC teams is critical to shaping the rapid response and supporting the RC/HC in coordination.</p> <p>21. OCHA's capacity to deploy staff for a reasonable length of time following sudden onset disasters, particularly in countries where it has no existing presence, has been limited. This capacity needs to be considered an essential investment for facilitating effective allocation and utilisation of CERF grants.</p> <p>22. The links between different humanitarian pooled funds, including CERF, CHFs and ERFs have not yet received sufficient attention in the IASC. Responsibility for this issue is also dispersed within OCHA.</p> | <p>13. CERF Secretariat officers should have discretion to seek the advice of CRD during the appraisal of projects, when they feel it would be useful. While the CERF Secretariat should continue to copy all correspondence to CRD, formal reference of projects to CRD for review should no longer be a requirement.</p> <p>14. When significant CERF funding is envisaged for countries without an OCHA presence, the ERC should ensure that a core team of OCHA or UN agency surge staff is deployed for a sufficient length of time to support the RC/HC in prioritisation, the CERF application process and coordination of the immediate response. Staff selected for deployment as part of OCHA and UN agency surge teams should be adequately trained and, where possible, include specialists in cross cutting issues, such as gender. Where such staff are required to assist RCs with the development of CERF proposals and with subsequent reporting, it is the view of the evaluation team that such costs should be considered a reasonable charge against the 3% overhead fee levied by the UN Secretariat.</p> |

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|  | <p>15. The staffing of the CERF Secretariat should be strengthened to reflect levels of responsibility, and the consequence of error, and to ensure credibility with agency counterparts. Specifically, the Chief of the CERF Secretariat should be at the D1 level. In addition, the CERF Secretariat should be moved into proper office space as soon as possible.</p> <p>16. The UN Controller should delegate to the ERC the authority to approve adjustments to the CERF Secretariat budget, within agreed limits.</p> <p>17. The evaluation recommends that OCHA should initiate a discussion in the IASC on the harmonization of various humanitarian pooled funds, including the CERF. In order to improve consistency and coherence, the ERC should consider the appointment of a Director of Humanitarian Financing, through whom the Chief of the CERF Secretariat would report, to advise him on issues relating to all humanitarian pooled funds.</p> |
| <p><b>Decision-making Processes</b></p>  |  |
| <p>23. Early agreement on a funding ‘envelope’ for rapid response between the ERC and RC/HC, and regular communication from the outset between OCHA staff in the field and the CERF Secretariat have facilitated the rapid approval of appropriate proposals.</p>                      | <p>18. Negotiations with the RC/HC on the initial envelope for a CERF contribution should be handled on the telephone in the first days following a disaster by the ERC personally or by his Deputy or by the Director overseeing the CERF Secretariat. As a rule of thumb, an initial contribution to a medium-scale disaster could be between 10 and 20% of the initial Flash Appeal, with a special focus on those components of the Appeal required to get operations underway.</p> <p>19. The ERC should continue to routinely remind RC/HCs that the CERF funds emergency humanitarian needs, was never intended to fund everything, nor was it meant to fund all agencies. Requests must focus on the most urgent enabling activities and on those sectors where government or civil society capacity is weakest, or where donor support is least likely to be available.</p>   |
| <p><b>Projects or Programmes</b></p>   |  |
| <p>24. The main reason for the difficulties UN agencies face in managing CERF funds is the inflexibility of the financial reporting system. Proposed changes to the allocation of UFE funds would enable agencies to access such funds on a programme rather than a project basis.</p> |  |
| <p><b>Timeliness in CERF Administration</b></p>  |  |
| <p>25. A number of factors continue to cause delays in the disbursement of CERF funds from the UN Controller, through the operational agencies to the implementing partner.</p>  | <p>20. Through its field-based staff OCHA should continue to articulate clearly the CERF allocation criteria and funds availability, and through better communication, including greater use of telephone and satellite links, the CERF Secretariat should ensure that initial CERF proposals for RR are received within a maximum of 10 days after the disaster.</p> <p>21. Given that the ERC is accountable to donors for the use of the funds, he should request a commitment from the UN agencies to forward project funds to implementing partners within a target number of days and to publish tables of performance in the same way as the CERF secretariat.</p>  |

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| <b>Overheads</b>  |  |
| 26. The system of overheads/PSC charges for CERF grants is widely perceived as being unrelated to the value added provided by different departments and agencies in the humanitarian response delivery chain. | <p>22. The evaluation recommends that the ERC should seek to negotiate with the UN Controller an understanding that two-thirds of the UN Secretariat’s 3% PSC charge will be made available to OCHA to meet all legitimate costs associated with the management and oversight of the CERF.</p> <p>23. OCHA should seek agreements with the five main humanitarian agencies and UNDP on ways of categorizing projects depending on the level of administrative support and oversight required from the UN agency, and on the indirect support cost structure of the agency concerned. PSC rates up to 7% could then be applied accordingly. An agreement should also be sought in the context of the IASC to standardize the provision of fair overhead charges for NGOs implementing projects funded by the CERF</p> |
| <b>CERF Advisory Group</b>  |  |
| 27. The CERF Advisory Group has played a valuable role in debating important issues relevant to the CERF and has provided useful advice to the ERC.   | 24. The evaluation recommends that the mandate of the CERF Advisory Group be extended for a further period of two years, and that its membership should rotate regularly, in keeping with its status as a group of members serving in their individual capacities. Members should continue to be drawn from a range of backgrounds and geographical origins. The practice of designating alternate members of the AG is no longer required. The Group should consist of 16 members. In addition, a wider platform involving all member states contributing to the CERF needs to be created, which would be convened every six months by the ERC, where he could report on CERF progress, challenges and funding needs, and provide a forum for open discussions.   |

**Key Recommendation 3 (for Section 5)**

The capacity of the CERF secretariat and OCHA field teams need to be strengthened, to ensure timely review of applications and high-quality decisions, and onward disbursement of funds to implementing partners needs to be speeded up, thereby guaranteeing faster response and better value for money. In addition, overhead charges need to be reviewed and the mandate of the CERF Advisory Group should be extended for a further period.

**SECTION 6 – FACTORS AFFECTING ABILITY OF THE CERF TO MEET ITS OBJECTIVES**

| <b>CONCLUSIONS</b>  | <b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b>  |
|---|---|
| <b>Additionality</b>  |   |
| <p>28. It is hard to prove empirically to what extent CERF funding has been additional. In the long run, the value added by CERF will have to come, not so much from additional funding, but additional value generated for every dollar of humanitarian funding.</p>   |   |
| <b>CERF Reporting</b>   |   |
| <p>29. The quality of narrative reporting on CERF grants leaves a lot to be desired, although with a new reporting format, the quality should show significant improvement in 2008.</p> <p>30. The multiple financial reports required from the operational agencies have entailed heavy transaction costs, without necessarily improving accountability.</p>         | <p>25. The ERC should ask the Controller to work with the UN agencies/IOM to rationalize the CERF financial reporting system.</p> <p>26. When agencies receive more than one grant for the same emergency at the same time (through different sectoral/cluster proposals), the LOU ought to allow agencies flexibility to amend budgets, with the agreement of the HC, to reflect changing imperatives or priorities, and to prepare one comprehensive financial report.</p>  |
| <b>Monitoring and Evaluation</b>  |   |
| <p>31. In a large number of proposals, substantial (between 3-10% of total) funds have been provided by CERF, in addition to staff and operating costs, for M &amp; E, for which there was very little demonstrated outcome.</p>  | <p>27. Clear parameters for Monitoring and Evaluation, with detailed statements of specific interventions to be carried out, need to be included in all proposals and LOUs and the outputs made available to all through the in-country humanitarian country teams.</p>   |
| <b>Accountability and transparency</b>  |   |
| <p>32. Transparency and accountability to primary stakeholders (donors, NGOs, governments) in CERF allocations is not yet sufficiently demonstrated.</p>  | <p>28. The ERC could make use of independent assessors to conduct rapid appraisals of proposals (for large and complex operations) – these assessors will have been selected through a vetting process involving IASC, and trained in CERF-related requirements</p> <p>29. In order to fulfil his responsibility for quality assurance, the ERC should from time to time commission independent programme audits, real-time evaluations and end-of-project evaluations, where appropriate using the roster of assessors. The evaluations/RTEs should include a mix of country studies, evaluations of randomly selected individual CERF-funded projects and sector grants, as well as overall evaluations like the current one. All reports should be made available to all stakeholders.</p> |
| <b>Engagement with Government</b>   |   |
| <p>33. In countries where the UN enjoyed better pre-existing relationships with governments, the UNCTs have worked closely and productively with federal and regional authorities<sup>1</sup>, although, in some instances, where governments have had limited capacity, excessive reliance on government systems for implementation has been counter-productive.</p> |   |

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| <b>Communications</b>  |  |
| 34. While the CERF website has developed into a valuable source of information about the CERF, stakeholders need to receive key communications directly from the ERC or the CERF Secretariat.  | 30. The CERF secretariat should produce an annual report on activities for a wide audience, and ensure a wide distribution for its monthly update on activities  |
| <b>Access for NGOs to CERF funding</b>   |  |
| 35. Where RC/HCs and UN agencies/IOM have engaged NGOs inclusively on issues surrounding the CERF, there have been benefits to the management of humanitarian response. Such situations remain, however, the exception rather than the rule. | 31. OCHA and the UN agencies need to acknowledge that NGOs have unique strengths to contribute to the objectives of the CERF, and hence the NGOs need to play a more important role in CERF processes than they have been playing so far.<br>32. Within the limitations of CERF, OCHA and UN agencies should explore various options for enabling NGOs to have meaningful access to CERF funds rapidly, and at low cost. |
| <b>Maintaining support in the GA</b>   |  |
| 36. The future success of the CERF is dependent on the continued support of member states in the General Assembly and as contributors to the Fund.   | 33. The General Assembly should consider inviting all member states to contribute to the CERF, and requesting the Secretary-General to commission a further independent evaluation in early 2011.  |

**Key Recommendation 4 (for Section 6)**

The multiple lines of accountability for CERF need to be clarified, in consultation with the UN Controller and the operational agencies, to specify the roles of each actor; the ERC needs to ensure that the operational agencies have in place appropriate monitoring and reporting systems, and to make use of quality assurance mechanisms for evaluation of CERF projects, without increasing the bureaucratic burdens of implementation.

## **INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

## **1. INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE REPORT**

This report presents the results of the independent evaluation of the first two years of operations of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). The evaluation was commissioned by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), in consultation with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)<sup>6</sup>, pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 60/124. The work was carried out by four international consultants between March and July 2008.

### **1.1. THE INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF CERF - BACKGROUND**

The objectives and scope of the evaluation are set out in GA resolution 60/124. The overall purpose is to **provide strategic guidance to member states and the UN system on the future of the CERF.**

In 2007, OCHA commissioned an independent CERF Review, to provide performance (effectiveness) and management (efficiency) feedback to CERF stakeholders, with the aim of contributing to strengthening the effectiveness of the mechanism and its potential impact on overall humanitarian response. The information and main conclusions from the review were intended to provide a baseline for this “two-year” evaluation of the CERF, required by the General Assembly.

The 2007 review concluded that significant progress had been made in the implementation of the CERF in its first year of operations. However, there were a number of issues which needed to be clarified, including ensuring a common understanding of the scope of the CERF, providing more effective management of the CERF within OCHA, strengthening working relationships with UN agencies and the NGO community at both the global and field levels, and finally, providing more effective and transparent information on CERF as a mechanism and on its performance.

This evaluation is distinct from the first CERF Review completed in September 2007 in three ways:

1. Greater depth of analysis on CERF’s efficiency and effectiveness;
2. Use of an increased range of methodologies, with a reliance on newly-available quantitative data and reporting, as well as extensive interviews with key stakeholders in the field;
3. A focus on the provision of strategic guidance to member states and the UN system on the future of the CERF.

### **1.2. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE EVALUATION**

In its resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to commission an independent evaluation of the Fund at the end of the second year of operation to assess:

- Both the grant and revolving elements of the Fund,

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<sup>6</sup> ToR External Evaluation of the CERF

- Its administration, criteria for resource allocation,
- Actions and responses supported by it, and
- Its ability to meet its objectives

The findings of this evaluation are to be presented at the General Assembly's sixty-third session in a report summarizing key strategic recommendations.

The Terms of Reference<sup>7</sup> for the evaluation outline two core objectives and four key areas:

### **Objectives**

- To assess the CERF in a comprehensive manner, based on project data and frameworks, covering the benefits and disadvantages of the CERF as an approach to humanitarian financing, and
- To provide recommendations to donors and the UN system at strategic and operational levels as to whether the CERF should be continued in its current form and if so, how it should be improved.

### **Key areas to be examined**

The following four key areas are to be examined during this evaluation:

1. The “value added” of the CERF grant and revolving fund in the context of the overall humanitarian financing architecture;
2. The strategic, managerial and operational aspects of the CERF, covering high level leadership, advocacy, as well as administrative issues such as efficiency and effectiveness, fundraising issues such as promotion and take-up, and distributive issues such as the criteria for allocation of funds;
3. The contribution of the CERF to improved humanitarian performance;
4. Internal (e.g. capacities) and external (e.g. political) factors, which influence the ability of the CERF to deliver on its objectives.

Detailed questions in relation to the above areas can be found in the Terms of Reference attached as Annex 1.

### **1.3. ORGANISATION OF THE EVALUATION**

The evaluation was managed by the Evaluation and Studies Section (ESS), situated within the Policy Development and Studies Branch of the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The evaluation was overseen by a review advisory group (RAG) made up of evaluation experts from key stakeholders, including governments, UN agencies and NGOs. The RAG acted as a Steering Committee, the function of which was to ensure the independence of the evaluation and transparency in the decision-making process. It also provided quality control and standards for the evaluation, and commented on the ToR, the selection of the consultants and the inception report. That report was produced to guide the evaluation after the evaluation team received preliminary briefings from key stakeholders at UN headquarters.

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<sup>7</sup> See Annex 1.

Apart from the General Assembly of the United Nations, the intended users of this evaluation are member states contributing to the CERF, the ERC, the Controller, the IASC and its member agencies, the CERF Advisory Group, the CERF Secretariat, OCHA and other key decision makers. In order to ensure that the results of the evaluation are taken up and ultimately incorporated into strategic planning following the evaluation, the process was designed to build ownership among stakeholders.

#### **1.4. METHODOLOGY**

The evaluation focused on the four areas set out in the General Assembly resolution and used the internationally accepted OECD/DAC criteria for humanitarian evaluations, (Coverage, Relevance, Appropriateness, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Coordination, Impact, Connectedness and Coherence) for its analysis.

##### **Methodological approach**

The methods employed by the consultants in gathering and assessing information were the following:

a) Detailed briefing from OCHA, CERF Secretariat, individual UN agencies in New York, briefing from group of key donor representatives and NGOs at the UN to understand the ongoing debates and issues around the CERF. An inception report (Annex 2) was produced in the early stages of the consultancy following the briefings and initial desk research, which provided the overall structure for the field work and interviews.

b) Desk research: study of all key documents related to CERF including Secretary-General's reports and GA resolutions setting up the Fund, the Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Fund, progress reports by OCHA and Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs), the CERF and Financial Tracking Service (FTS) websites, CERF project proposals from HCs and UN agencies, the 2007 interim review report, the draft audit report on the CERF by OIOS, reports and comments on the CERF by non-UN agencies, including Oxfam, CARE, Save the Children, and CIDA, reports of various evaluations on different aspects of humanitarian reform and various documents made available by OCHA, UN agencies, donors and NGOs. A list of all key documents studied is provided in Annex 8.

c) Key informant interviews with seven members of the CERF Advisory Group; 17 donor government representatives, either in their capitals or at their Permanent Missions in Geneva (namely, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, ECHO, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States of America); a representative of the Group of 77 in New York; senior staff of the United Nations Secretariat and at UN Agency HQs (FAO, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO); senior staff of IOM, IFRC and the ICRC; and 12 international NGOs and NGO coalitions, (CARE International, Coordination Sud (France), DARA (Spain), Disasters Emergency Committee, Oxfam GB, ICVA, Interaction, Médecins sans Frontières, Norwegian Refugee Council, Save the Children UK, SCHR, World Vision International). Key informant interviews were also undertaken with knowledgeable individuals. These included: Dr. Rony Brauman, Mr. Jan Egeland, Ms. Tasneem Mowjee and Ms. Abby Stoddard.

d) A survey of perceptions on key aspects of the CERF administered to RC/HCs, OCHA staff in the field, UN agency/IOM HQ staff, country offices of UN agencies/IOM and INGOs headquarters and country offices. The survey was available in electronic format and on-line from 10/04 to 22/05. Over 200 potential respondents were invited to take part in the online survey, and 123 returns were fully completed, 92% by UN staff and 8% by INGO staff. Hence the survey findings need to be treated with caution, as they largely reflect the views of UN/IOM staff. The questionnaire used and the results of the survey are in Annex 7. A breakdown of the category of respondents is given below:

**Table 1: CERF Evaluation Survey - category of respondents**

| Category of respondent                          | N° of Respondents | % of Respondents |
|---|-------------------|------------------|
| RC/HC/OCHA                                      | 41                | 33.33%           |
| UN Agencies/IOM Headquarters (HQ) Desk Officers | 15                | 12.20%           |
| Country Offices (CO) of UN Agencies/IOM         | 57                | 46.34%           |
| INGOs HQ Desk Officers                          | 4                 | 3.25%            |
| Country Offices of INGOs                        | 6                 | 4.88%            |
| <b>Total</b>                                    | 123               | 100.00%          |

e) Country visits were undertaken in 7 countries which were selected on the basis of the factors below, and another 7 countries were telephone-interviewed and desk-reviewed, namely Bolivia, Chad, DPRK, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Pakistan and Somalia.

In each of the selected countries, the evaluation team conducted interviews with government officials, UN Agencies/IOM and NGOs.

Country selection was based on:

- Size of CERF funding
- A good mix of funding from the rapid response and underfunded windows
- Countries in different regions (Asia, Africa and Latin America/Caribbean)
- A mix of natural disasters and complex emergencies.

Over 300 interviews were conducted in the countries visited by the team, and also on the telephone with countries selected for study. A detailed list of interviewees is given in Annex 3.

**Table 2: Countries visited**

| Country            | Rationale for selection                       | Evaluation team members who visited |
|--------------------|---|-------------------------------------|
| DRC                | Largest funds disbursement; protracted crisis | Entire evaluation team              |
| Sudan              | Second-largest funds; protracted crisis       | Abhijit Bhattacharjee (AB)          |
| Afghanistan        | Large CERF funding; protracted crisis         | Lewis Sida (LS)                     |
| Bangladesh         | Rapid onset and underfunded refugee crisis    | LS                                  |
| Peru               | Rapid onset                                   | Roberta Lossio & AB                 |
| Haiti              | Underfunded and rapid response                | AB                                  |
| Dominican Republic | Rapid onset                                   | AB                                  |

The itineraries for the country visits are attached as Annex 4.

**Data collection tools:**

The review employed the normal range of social science research methods in standard humanitarian evaluations:

- A comprehensive document review using both internal and external documents, correspondence, reports and data.
- Field visits and observations: During field visits, the team attempted to conduct site visits to ongoing projects funded by CERF as well as interviewed key informants to gather information about work which may have been already completed. The projects were selected on the basis of the need to balance the work of different agencies seen by the evaluators, different types of interventions/sectoral work carried out and to ensure that a substantial number of CERF approved projects were seen. Most<sup>8</sup> projects seen were approved during 2007 and 2008.
- Statistical analysis of data: simple averages and percentages were worked out for funding data available from various sources (OCHA's Financial Tracking System, OECD DAC figures, GHA data on global humanitarian funding trends) to derive trends; review of CERF financial spreadsheets on funds pledged and contributed in 2006 and 2007; analyses of timelines on sums requested, allocated, funds disbursed from data maintained by the CERF secretariat and partial data maintained in countries, etc., were used. Data on beneficiaries or needs assessments which could be used as benchmarks were not available in any country and hence no statistical analyses were carried out.
- Questionnaire/ online survey.
- Semi-structured and structured interviews, individual and focus groups both in person and by telephone with a range of stakeholders including beneficiaries, host and donor governments, UN and other international organisations, and national and international NGOs.

**Triangulation of information:**

A combination of three different approaches was used to triangulate information gathered by the evaluation team in various stages:

- i) Information gathered from the field visits was compared against the findings from telephone interviews and desk research, and statements made by interviewees compared with reports and published information.
- ii) Following each country visit, a joint debriefing session was conducted for the UN Country Team or country humanitarian teams, which helped to validate some of the findings from each country.
- iii) The members of the evaluation team met for three days at the end of all country visits and on completion of most of the desk research and interviews, where they debated, discussed and checked

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<sup>8</sup> Except a community health project in DRC which was approved in 2006.

their individual findings, derived from the range of different data sources, for consistency and coherence.

iv) Before preparation of the first draft of the report, the team leader met with a number of key stakeholders in UN Headquarters, including the Controller, the Deputy ERC, senior staff of OCHA and the CERF secretariat and members of the CERF inter-agency group, which includes members of the IASC, to test some of the key findings and check their validity.

## **1.5. CONSTRAINTS**

i) CERF funding is only a proportion, often small, of funds applied for a particular programme by an agency, and hence attribution of outcomes and results directly to CERF funding was difficult. However, since CERF is part of the humanitarian reform package, examination of inter-linkages between different aspects of the reform (humanitarian financing, clusters, coordination, partnerships) enabled the evaluation to assess the contribution the CERF was making to enable rapid life-saving and time-critical response, and to the overall reform agenda.

ii) Given the short time-frame in which the evaluation was carried out and the fact that the CERF has been in existence for only two years, assessment of impact in relation to OECD/DAC criteria was not attempted; during the field visits and interactions with beneficiary communities attempt was made to assess whether or not the activities supported through CERF reached the communities and provided any immediate benefit.

## **2. CERF BACKGROUND**

In December 2005, through General Assembly (GA) resolution 60/124, the Central Emergency Revolving Fund was upgraded to become the Central Emergency Response Fund, through the addition of a grant component. The expanded CERF was designed to provide a “source of predictable humanitarian funding, to ensure a timely, life-saving response capacity and to provide a minimum level of equity in the geographical distribution of assistance”<sup>9</sup>.

After the launch of the new CERF in March 2006, the loan element continued to provide a cash-flow mechanism of US\$50 million, to ensure rapid response to humanitarian emergencies ahead of the transfer of donor pledges. The grant element, split into Rapid Response (RR) and Underfunded Emergency (UFE) windows, was established with an annual target of US\$ 450 million – two thirds of which would be allocated to the RR and one third to UFE. The organizations eligible to apply for funds from the CERF are the United Nations funds, programmes and specialized agencies, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). OCHA is eligible to apply only for funds from the loan component.

### **2.1. ORGANIZATION OF THE CERF**

The Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) is the programme manager of the Fund and decides on its use in coordination with recommendations from RC/HCs and consultation with UN Country Teams. He reports annually to the General Assembly on the use of the Fund.

At the policy level, the ERC receives advice on the implementation of the Fund from the GA, the IASC and the CERF Advisory Group.

The CERF Advisory Group’s members are appointed by the Secretary-General and serve in their individual capacities. The Group’s main objective is to provide retroactive policy guidance and expert advice to the ERC on the use and impact of the Fund. Its key functions are<sup>10</sup>:

- Review the timeliness and appropriateness of Fund allocations.
- Review the management of the Fund, including reporting and the results achieved against Fund use.
- Review Fund performance against the objectives set by the General Assembly.
- Assess Fund levels and recommend Fund replenishment.
- Examine the two- year independent review of the function and performance of the Fund.
- Consider the effectiveness of, and provide recommendations on, the CERF website.

The Advisory Group meets twice a year and is comprised of 12 members and four alternates.

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<sup>9</sup> Report of the Secretary General A/60/432, paragraph 13

<sup>10</sup> Terms of Reference – CERF Advisory Group.

The ERC consults, when appropriate, with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators (RC/HC) and representatives of UN agencies, funds and programmes in order to obtain guidance and support when determining priorities for the use of the Fund. In this context the Director of OCHA New York has established a CERF Inter-Agency (IA) Group, composed of representatives of IASC member organizations, which meets at least once a month. The CERF IA Group meets at the working level to provide a consultation forum on the development of CERF procedures and on the management and use of the Fund, in addition to sharing information on recent allocations, upcoming CERF training sessions, and lessons learned from the use of the Fund.

In March 2007, the IASC Working Group formally recommended that the CERF IA Group be used to discuss day-to-day issues, while policy questions would regularly feature on the agendas of the IASC Working Group.

The UN Controller is the administrator of the Fund, responsible for receiving and processing contributions, disbursing allocations to eligible organisations and accounting for the use of the funds. Individual recipients of the Fund are in turn obliged to submit financial reports on the use of CERF funds to the UN Controller.

The CERF Secretariat<sup>11</sup> was established within OCHA, under the supervision of the OCHA Director in New York, to support the ERC in assessing proposals for funding from the CERF<sup>12</sup> and in reporting to donors. The CERF Secretariat serves as the focal point for the submission of funding requests. It reviews proposals, advises on criteria and financial adjustments, consolidates recommendations and prepares the folders for submission to the ERC. Other functions of the Secretariat include supporting policy making, managing submissions to UFE and RR windows, coordinating Inter Agency and government consultations, keeping track of the financial records, administering the budget of the Secretariat, overseeing CERF database, formulating templates and training materials, reviewing reports, and maintaining updated information in the website.

As indicated in its organizational chart (see Figure 1), the Chief of the CERF Secretariat supervises three units (Programme, Reporting and Finance), the administration support staff and the CAP liaison officer. Other OCHA Sections provide support to the Secretariat: OCHA's Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) Section contributes to the analysis of funding needs to guide requests to the UFE window; the Coordination and Response Division (CRD) provides advice on country-specific proposals in relation to context (consistency with needs and humanitarian plans etc.) and provides feedback on country level reports; the Policy Development and Studies Branch (PDSB) provides capacity for evaluation and leads efforts to improve the assessment framework; the Donor and External Relations Section (DERS) leads a resource mobilization and replenishment strategy. The field offices of OCHA<sup>13</sup> support the RC/HCs in the preparation of CERF submissions, provide guidance and support to UNDAC teams for Rapid Response submissions.


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<sup>11</sup> It started with 5 staff members in April 2006. In October 2007 the number had increased to 12.

<sup>12</sup> See Section 2.3 on the Grant Facility for description of the decision making process for UFE and RR.

<sup>13</sup> When OCHA does not have a field office, OCHA Regional offices take this role.

**Figure 1: CERF Organizational Chart** <sup>14</sup>



## 2.2 CERF LOAN ELEMENT

The loan element of the Fund is intended to act as a “cash flow mechanism to ensure rapid and coordinated response to humanitarian emergencies”<sup>15</sup>. Loans are normally requested for humanitarian response activities, where a pledge has been made but funds have not yet been received. Loans are to be reimbursed within 12 months. Advances from the loan element are to be encouraged and, where possible, prioritized over grants, where the loan element is a feasible option.

**Table 3: CERF loans disbursed 2006 - 2007**

| Year         | Countries   | Amount Disbursed (US\$) |
|--------------|-------------|-------------------------|
| 2006         | Sudan       | 51,622,337              |
|              | Afghanistan | 1,650,000               |
| 2007         | Sudan       | 41,340,435              |
| <b>Total</b> |             | <b>94,612,772</b>       |

In 2006 and 2007 the loan facility was used only in Sudan and Afghanistan, with a total disbursement of US\$ 94,612,772<sup>16</sup>. UNICEF and WFP were the main borrowers, with 36% and 30% respectively, of the total funds disbursed in the two years.

Source: CERF Secretariat. May 2008


<sup>14</sup> According to the CERF Secretariat's cost plan, there are twelve posts. In addition to these, the CERF Secretariat has a Junior Professional Officer as well as staff on loan from UN agencies (WFP, FAO and UNHCR).

<sup>15</sup> Secretary General's Bulletin ST/SGB/2006/10, paragraph 3.1

<sup>16</sup> 97% of the loans asked in 2006 and 2007 were repaid, and the outstanding balance is due in July 2008.

Figure 2 shows the use of the loan element since 1992<sup>17</sup>. Nearly US \$450 million was disbursed in loans over 15 years.

**Figure 2: CERF loans.**



Source: CERF Secretariat, July 2008.

### 2.3 CERF GRANT ELEMENT

The grant element was created “to ensure a more predictable and timely response to humanitarian emergencies, based on demonstrable needs and on priorities identified in consultation with the affected State, as appropriate.”<sup>18</sup> The specific objectives of the grant element are:

- Promote early action and response to reduce loss of life;
- Enhance response to time-critical requirements;
- Strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises.”

Two-thirds of the grant element are to be used for “rapid response” (RR), defined as “core emergency humanitarian needs in sudden onset disasters (or rapid deterioration within existing crises)”, while one-third is to be used for “underfunded emergencies” (UFE), defined as “core emergency humanitarian needs in chronically underfunded emergencies”.<sup>19</sup>

Projects for CERF funding are prioritized in accordance with **key criteria**, which, as of April 2008, included the following provisions<sup>20</sup>:

- Projects funded under the Rapid Response (RR) window must clearly respond to the needs of a sudden onset emergency, rapid deterioration of an existing emergency, or time-critical intervention. In the Underfunded Emergencies (UFE) window, grants are given to chronically underfunded core humanitarian programmes, based on recent needs assessments, and essential for the humanitarian response/strategy.

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<sup>17</sup> The Central Emergency Revolving Fund was established in 1991.

<sup>18</sup> GAR 60/124 para 15

<sup>19</sup> All quotations in this section are from SGB/2006/10.

<sup>20</sup> CERF Application Guidelines. Draft 28<sup>th</sup> April 2008. Some of these provisions were not included in earlier versions of these Guidelines.

- Projects must be developed at the country level, prioritized by the country team through a consultative process led by the RC/HC, with relevant humanitarian actors, and endorsed by the RC/HC, who submits the grant request.
- Activities must comply with the Guidance on CERF Life-saving Criteria and any sector guidelines set by the ERC at the time of allocation.
- Applications to the CERF must be based on recent needs assessments, and be essential for the humanitarian response/strategy.
- CERF is not intended to substitute for existing humanitarian appeal mechanisms. If an affected/selected country has a Flash Appeal (RR Window) or a CAP (UFE Window), CERF submissions should be based on the strategic planning framework and these instruments should be used as a catalogue from which to select projects. The issuance of a Flash Appeal is not a pre-condition for CERF funds to be allocated under the rapid-response window.
- CERF rapid response funds should “kick-start” or act as a catalyst rather than fully fund projects.

The Guidelines also highlight that CERF supported interventions should be consistent with basic humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. The document draws attention to the consideration of vulnerability of particular groups (women and children), environmental impacts, partnerships with governments and national and international non-government organizations (NGOs), empowerment of affected populations, as well as support for the principles of “Good Humanitarian Donorship” and “Do No Harm”.

## **2.4 RAPID RESPONSE (RR)**

The funds disbursed for Rapid Response purposes provide an initial injection of resources to kick-start the response. Grants for rapid response are provided to projects where implementation<sup>21</sup> takes place within three months following the disbursement of funds from the UN Secretariat. A maximum of US\$30 million may be provided to any one disaster or emergency<sup>22</sup>. The RC/HC endorses and submits a package of proposals for CERF, based on life-saving priority needs identified through consultation with Country Teams and humanitarian actors. The CERF Secretariat and OCHA review the proposals, which are approved by the ERC.

In 2006, 3.26% of the total funds disbursed to projects were refunded to the CERF by the agencies which had received them. In 2007, this percentage was reduced to 0.19%. In almost all cases, except one<sup>23</sup>, the funds were allocated from the RR window (please see table 4). Respondents informed the evaluation team that the main reasons for refunding CERF grants were related to the short time frame (funds must be committed within 3 months in RR window) for the implementation of projects, which sometimes agencies found unrealistic. This issue is discussed in the Timelines Section.

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<sup>21</sup> For CERF grants, implementation is defined as the period within which all funds are committed. RR projects must be completed within 6 months.

<sup>22</sup> SGB/2006/10 para 4.7

<sup>23</sup> UNDP’s project in Myanmar in 2007 to increase access to essential medical care for HIV-related illness, including anti-retroviral therapy, in Dawei district (Project ID: 07-UDP-003)

**Table 4: Refunds to the CERF in 2006 and 2007**

|                               | 2006           | 2007           | Total          |
|-------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Total funds disbursed (US\$)  | 259,307,485.00 | 350,894,999.00 | 610,202,484.00 |
| Refunds as of May 2008 (US\$) | 8,452,154.11   | 651,260.38     | 9,103,414.49   |
| % of total allocation         | 3.26%          | 0.19%          | 1.49%          |

Source: CERF Secretariat, May 2008

## 2.5 THE UNDERFUNDED EMERGENCIES WINDOW (UFE)

The allocation process for UFE currently has two rounds each year, in January and July<sup>24</sup>. The allocation procedure consists of two main tiers. First is the selection of appeals/countries and the division of the available amount of funding among these eligible appeals/countries. Second, specific life-saving proposals are prioritized by the RC/HC, with support from the country team, for the amount provided by the ERC.

With respect to the criteria used for selection of countries, as a first step, funding data is reviewed. For CAP countries, funding shortfalls and requirements captured by the Financial Tracking Service are taken into account, with special emphasis placed on countries that fall into the bottom third of this list<sup>25</sup>. For countries without CAPs, operational agencies provide recommendations (based on a template) for those countries with low levels of funding for core humanitarian activities, based on their assessment of the situation.

As a second step, information on the humanitarian needs and funding requirements/shortfalls for both CAP and non-CAP countries is then supplemented with data gained from consultations with a wide-range of stakeholders, including participants of the inter-agency meetings on CERF, OCHA staff, and Humanitarian/Resident Coordinators (RC/HCs). Other data, including ECHO Global Needs Assessment scores, humanitarian aid per affected beneficiary, and IASC early warning analysis are also taken into account.

The process is managed by the Director of OCHA’s New York Office, with support from the CERF Secretariat and inputs from the CAP Section and CRD.

Based on the information available, the ERC decides on a list of countries to benefit from the underfunded window. The available amount of funding is then apportioned to each country selected by the ERC, using a mathematical formula. The funding ‘envelope’ is communicated to the RC/HC in writing. RC/HCs are invited to present a package of proposals for the amount designated.


<sup>24</sup> Five rounds were organized as of May 2008.

<sup>25</sup> The CERF *Procedures for Grant Allocations to Underfunded Emergencies* dated 1 January 2008, changed this proportion to countries that fall in the **bottom half** of this list. Procedures were first established in February 2006

At the country level, the RC/HC leads the CERF grant application process with support from the humanitarian country team<sup>26</sup> Based on assessed needs and capacity and access to implement, operational partners provide recommendations on the priority projects to the RC/HC for endorsement. Projects submitted by the RC/HC to the ERC are reviewed by the CERF Secretariat and the Coordination and Response Division (CRD) of OCHA to ensure that they comply with CERF guidelines, including the ‘Life-saving criteria’, endorsed by the ERC in August 2007, and are relevant to the recipient country. A final recommendation on the list of projects is prepared by the CERF Secretariat for review and approval of the ERC. Project approvals are communicated to the respective agencies’ headquarters and the RC/HC in writing.

Since its inception, CERF UFE window has increasingly provided support to countries without a CAP, as can be seen in Figure 3. Ethiopia, Kenya and Eritrea received 52% of the funds disbursed to non CAP countries since 2006.

**Figure 3: Percentage of funding to Non CAP countries**



Source: CERF Secretariat April 2008

## 2.6 REPLENISHMENT OF CERF

As at 22th May 2008, the CERF had received US\$ 1.060 billion in paid contributions since its inception in 2006 – in addition to US\$ 52 m in unpaid pledges, from 86 countries and 6 other donors, including private sector, NGOs and one local government entity.

**Table 5: Contributions to the CERF (2006 to 22 May 2008)**

|              | Paid contributions   | Unpaid Pledges    |
|--------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| 2006         | 298,712,453          |                   |
| 2007         | 385,137,101          | 10,000            |
| 2008         | 376,731,568          | 52,955,258        |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>1,060,581,122</b> | <b>52,965,258</b> |

<sup>26</sup> This study follows the SGB/2006/10 in using the term “operational agencies” to identify those UN agencies, funds and programmes, as well as IOM, that are eligible to apply for CERF grants.

Source: CERF Web Site and CERF Secretariat Statistics. May 2008. The advocacy and fund raising strategy implemented by OCHA’s Donor and External Relations Section includes the organization of a high level conference on CERF for Member States, meetings for contributing states in New York and Geneva, and a monthly newsletter<sup>27</sup> to 128 member States and 40 entities, including private sector and international organizations. The funds raised have been achieving the targets set for each year. In 2007, the funds raised were higher than the target set by OCHA for the year of US\$ 300 million, and in 2008 the intention is to achieve the objective of raising US\$450 million (the target set by the GA resolution).

The CERF has benefited from a very large number of contributions from “non-traditional” (non OECD/DAC) state donors. As of May 2008, contributions from non-traditional donors constituted around 1% of the total funds mobilized.

## 2.7 CERF ALLOCATIONS

As of 27<sup>th</sup> May 2008, the CERF had disbursed US\$ 839,609,297 to humanitarian projects in 62 countries<sup>28</sup>. Of this, 65% went to Rapid Response and 35% to Underfunded Emergencies, as shown in the table below.

**Table 6: CERF Disbursements**

|              | Disbursements (RR) | Disbursements (UFE) | Total              |
|--------------|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| <b>2006</b>  | 182,425,720        | 76,881,765          | 259,307,485        |
| <b>2007</b>  | 227,780,577        | 123,114,422         | 350,894,999        |
| <b>2008</b>  | 132,333,703        | 97,073,110          | 229,406,813        |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>542,540,000</b> | <b>297,069,297</b>  | <b>839,609,297</b> |
| <b>%</b>     | <b>65%</b>         | <b>35%</b>          | <b>100%</b>        |

Source: CERF Web Site and CERF Secretariat Statistics. 27 May 2008.

On the list of recipient countries since 2006, there are five countries that have consistently been present every year amongst the 15 top funded: DRC, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia and Cote d'Ivoire. This group of countries has received 33% of the funds disbursed by the CERF grant element since its inception. DRC, Sudan and Ethiopia are also amongst the countries receiving most funds from the bilateral humanitarian assistance of OECD/DAC countries<sup>29</sup>.

Table 7 shows the top 15 countries that received 65% of total CERF funding in the period.

**Table 7: CERF Funding of the top 15 Countries (March 2006 to 27 May 2008)<sup>30</sup>**

<sup>27</sup> The “CERF news” started to be sent in January 2007. It gives information on contributions to the CERF and activities supported by it.

<sup>28</sup> <http://ochaonline.un.org/cerf>. May 2008.

<sup>29</sup> Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2007-2008

<sup>30</sup> More detailed information about 2006 and 2007 projects is provided as Annex 8.

| Countries                        | Funds Allocated US\$ | % of Total    |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|---------------|
| DRC                              | 123,913,577          | 14.76%        |
| Sudan                            | 70,955,530           | 8.45%         |
| Afghanistan                      | 51,360,756           | 6.12%         |
| Kenya                            | 45,562,679           | 5.43%         |
| Somalia                          | 32,273,830           | 3.84%         |
| Ethiopia                         | 31,989,798           | 3.81%         |
| Myanmar                          | 30,044,396           | 3.58%         |
| Sri Lanka                        | 27,802,966           | 3.31%         |
| Bangladesh                       | 27,747,096           | 3.30%         |
| Chad                             | 22,034,497           | 2.62%         |
| Cote d'Ivoire                    | 21,250,101           | 2.53%         |
| Zimbabwe                         | 18,492,697           | 2.20%         |
| Mozambique                       | 17,072,155           | 2.03%         |
| Occupied Palestinian Territories | 16,003,225           | 1.91%         |
| Central African Republic         | 15,417,796           | 1.84%         |
| <b>Total</b>                     | <b>551,921,099</b>   | <b>65.73%</b> |

Source: CERF Web Site. 27 May 2008.

The graph below shows CERF funding divided by sectors. Food and health have been the most important sectors, together representing 50% of the total funding allocated<sup>31</sup>.


This proportion of funding coincides with the sectors that are best funded by the totality of donors worldwide<sup>32</sup>, while there are still sectors such as agriculture, education and water and sanitation that have been consistently underfunded over the last eight years, according to the 2007 Global Humanitarian Assistance report<sup>33</sup>. The same document states that shelter and non-food items faced even larger shortfalls of funding, with only 29% of identified needs met within the appeal process.

<sup>31</sup> CERF Review September 2007

<sup>32</sup> FTS, May 2008.

<sup>33</sup> Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2007-2008


**Figure 4: Total CERF Funding by Sector (March 2006 to 27 May 2008)**



Source: CERF Web Site. 27May 2008.

WFP and UNICEF have together received 61% of the CERF funding since its inception. Another 28% of the total funding has gone to UNHCR, WHO and FAO. The other recipient agencies received less than 11% of the funds disbursed. This division of the funds has remained relatively constant since the establishment of the CERF.

**Figure 5: Total CERF Funding by recipient Agency (March 2006 to 27 May 2008)**



Source: CERF Secretariat. May 2008.

## **FINDINGS**


### 3. THE GRANT AND REVOLVING ELEMENTS OF THE FUND

*i) What are the various types of pooled funds for humanitarian programmes available now and how do they relate to/complement/overlap with each other? ii) How has CERF funding affected the overall funding for humanitarian programmes? iii) What impact has the CERF had on the funding of UN agencies and NGOs for time-critical response, and has it strengthened or weakened their response capacity? iv) How has CERF contributed to strengthening the HCs, Cluster approach, Coordination and partnership with NGOs, host governments? To what extent are CERF priorities decided in consultation with host governments and the latter enabled to lead coordination? v) To what extent has the CERF strengthened humanitarian response in forgotten/underfunded crises? How is the revolving fund used? How does CERF's time-frame (6 months) affect response in protracted crises? vi) What role should CERF play in the overall global humanitarian response?*

#### 3.1 OVERALL IMPACT ON FUNDING

The establishment of CERF has made a significant difference to the funding of global humanitarian appeals (flash appeals and CAPs). As the graph 6 shows, the percentage funding achieved for all appeals (CAP and Flash) has risen steadily since 2001, culminating in a figure of 72% coverage for 2007, the highest this decade. In this respect financing mechanisms such as CERF appear to be having a positive effect on the predictability of funding.

**Figure 6: CAP and Flash Appeal Funding**




CERF has not had a discernable impact on overall humanitarian funding trends, however. The Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) report<sup>34</sup> for 2007 estimates the overall humanitarian assistance in 2006 at US\$14.2bn. A \$450m fund represents just 3% of this total, and 5% of the \$9.2bn OECD figure for humanitarian funding for 2007. To put it in perspective, the amount of CERF funding represents only a small annual fluctuation in OECD humanitarian assistance: the US alone reduced its humanitarian funding by US\$458m in 2006 (more than the entire CERF).

When compared to global CAPs and flash appeals (6.5% of the \$3.7bn total in 2007), CERF is a highly significant resource in terms of what UN agencies request for humanitarian programming (as defined by CAP and flash appeals).

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<sup>34</sup> Global Humanitarian Assistance. Development Initiatives. Wells, 2007.

**Figure 7: Total humanitarian expenditure, 1990–2006**



Source: GHA 2006-2007 Report

## **Conclusion**

1. The CERF has not had any significant impact on overall levels of humanitarian funding<sup>35</sup>, although early trends indicate that CERF is making humanitarian funding more predictable for UN agencies/IOM and their partners by increasing the coverage of CAP and flash appeals.

### **3.2. IMPACT ON FUNDING OF UN AGENCIES AND NGOS**

As global humanitarian assistance fluctuates from year to year, it is extremely difficult to see the impact of the CERF on the funding of UN agencies and NGOs generally. In particular, the data for NGOs' consolidated humanitarian expenditure is not easily available and the UN financial tracking system (FTS), managed by OCHA, may well not tell the whole story for donors and UN agencies, as the reporting of data to FTS is voluntary.


Although FTS does not tell the whole story, it is certainly indicative, if not fully accurate. One major discrepancy may be that donors have got better at reporting over the time period (especially NGO data), thus making the upward trend this decade appear more significant than it actually is. With these caveats in place, it is possible to see from the data that the humanitarian funding of the top five CERF recipient UN agencies has increased steadily over the decade. If the Iraq (2003) and Indian Ocean Tsunami crises are controlled for, the spikes for WFP and UNICEF virtually disappear.

For UN agencies CERF is definitely significant. For the top five UN agencies in humanitarian action, CERF was the top source of humanitarian funding for UNICEF and WHO, the third biggest source for FAO and WFP and the ninth for UNHCR in 2007.

<sup>35</sup> This is further explored in sub-section 6.1 on 'Additionality' on page 89.

This evaluation also looked at the funding flows of the top seven donors to CERF<sup>36</sup>, which together contributed 85% of the funding in 2007, to understand the implications of their giving to the CERF, and how it had impacted on their overall funding flows.


**Figure 8: Humanitarian Funding by the top seven donors to CERF**



Source: FTS, May 2008

As can be seen from the graph in Figure 8, humanitarian funding has increased from these seven donors throughout the decade. This has also been true of their funding to UN agencies (controlling for the tsunami in 2005), although the direct funding to UN agencies has fallen slightly below the trend line in 2007. If however, the CERF funding is combined with UN agency funding (Figure 9), then the trend has seen a constant increase over the years.

**Figure 9: Trends in Funding to UN (direct + CERF)**




Source: FTS, May 2008

<sup>36</sup> Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and UK. Source GHA 2007 from FTS and OECD.

The pattern for NGOs is actually similar to the upward trend overall (Figure 10). All of the seven major CERF donors bar the UK have systematically increased their NGO funding year on year (excluding the tsunami). The UK has fluctuated over this period, with 2007 neither the highest NGO allocation for the decade, nor the lowest.

**Figure 10: NGO funding by top seven donors to CERF**



Source: FTS, May 2008

The following table gives an indication of the proportion of CERF funds forwarded by UN agencies/IOM to NGOs and civil society implementing partners in specific countries over a 6 month period from January – July 2007. The information was obtained from available country reports. This information has not been systematically maintained by UN agencies/IOM in all countries where CERF has operated.

**Table 8: Funding through implementing partners**

|                          | Total Amount of CERF Funding provided for UN agencies/IOM | Total Amount of CERF Funding forwarded to implementing partners | Percentage of funding implemented by NGOs |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|
| Sudan                    | 7,382,869   | 1,617,131   | 22%                                       |
| Somalia                  | 12,039,448  | 1,449,353   | 12%                                       |
| Mozambique               | 7,126,666   | 3,803,525   | 53%                                       |
| Cote d'Ivoire            | 4,157,215   | 2,019,538   | 49%                                       |
| Central African Republic | 4,478,703   | 2,760,615   | 62%                                       |
| Liberia                  | 4,000,000   | 3,184,223   | 80%                                       |
| Philippines              | 2,600,000   | 2,022,476   | 78%                                       |
| Zimbabwe                 | 2,264,214   | 1,235,786   | 55%                                       |
| <b>Totals</b>            | <b>44,049,114</b>   | <b>18,092,647</b>   | <b>41%</b>                                |

Source: Country Reports Jan-June 2007.

## **Conclusion**


**2.** CERF has become a major source of funding for UN agencies, whilst not appearing to have impacted negatively on NGO funding.

### 3.3 IMPACT ON FORGOTTEN CRISES

There is a general perception that CERF has increased funding for neglected/ forgotten crises. This evaluation has found this to be a widespread consensus in country case studies, in the survey carried out by the team (see graph below), and is borne out by the evidence that 72% of CAP requirements were funded in 2007, the highest percentage this decade.

Furthermore, when compared with a list compiled by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (Table 9) of the top ten ‘unreported’ crises in 2007, CERF is a major source of funds for all those that have appeals. There are five MSF ‘unreported crises’ that have appeals (two crises are generic and three are not covered by either CAP or Flash). Of those five, CERF ranges between the third and seventh largest source, with contributions ranging from \$7m to \$52m. The country case studies provide further illustrations of how CERF, both UFE and RR windows, has become a useful tool for providing humanitarian assistance where it is needed, when donors are unable or unwilling to give.

**Figure 11: CERF has strengthened humanitarian response in underfunded/neglected/ forgotten crises**  
(CERF Evaluation Survey, May 2008)



- In Afghanistan, where humanitarian needs have been considerable, in an environment where major donors are focused on reconstruction and development, and where some major humanitarian donors have channelled assistance through their military forces, rather than through traditional humanitarian agencies, the CERF has been able to fill a significant gap.
- Bangladesh and Pakistan provide two examples of where the preparation of flash appeals was held up for various reasons, and CERF was able to respond in a timely fashion whilst the problems were being resolved.
- In Central African Republic, a crisis described as “unknown”, and not simply “forgotten”, CERF funding allowed the HC and the Humanitarian Partnerships Team to demonstrate to donors the severity of the humanitarian crisis, as well as their capacity to respond, thereby attracting significant additional donor resources.
- In DPRK, despite chronic humanitarian crises, the government declared that it would accept no more humanitarian funding after 2005, and donors said that they would provide no development assistance. As a result, there were severe funding gaps in 2006, which CERF helped fill, through its underfunded (UFE) window.
- Following tropical storm Noel in Dominican Republic in 2007, the government was reluctant to declare a national emergency and make an international appeal for funds, for fear of losing tourist trade. However, with the CERF funding made rapidly available, the UN was able not only to respond to the urgent humanitarian needs of affected communities but also to engage with the government, which subsequently issued an appeal.

- The case of the Burmese refugees in Bangladesh was one of a ‘forgotten’ crisis. With a change of official policy towards the refugees, UNHCR seized the opportunity to improve their living conditions. CERF funds facilitated this response.
- During 2007, there was an allocation to Eritrea for UFE; Eritrea had received little bi-lateral funding, as donors had stopped or reduced their support for work in the country. However, the UN Country Team clearly identified specific needs, and CERF was able to step in and fund specific humanitarian work within the limitations of the UN system’s capacity in the country.
- According to UNFPA, CERF local decision-making has resulted in attention to the diversity of needs among specific affected populations, including women and girls, young people, the elderly and those specifically affected by patterns of violence.

All these examples suggest that that CERF has contributed to increased levels of funding for neglected/ forgotten crises. This evidence also suggests that CERF has been able to establish itself as an impartial humanitarian financing mechanism, something strongly welcomed by both donor governments and governments suffering disaster.

**Table 9: MSF list and CERF UFE**

| <b>MSF top ten unreported crises 2007</b> | <b>CERF top ten UFE grant recipients 2007</b> |
|---|---|
| Somalia                                   | DRC   |
| Zimbabwe                                  | Ethiopia                                      |
| Child malnutrition                        | Burundi                                       |
| Tuberculosis                              | CAR   |
| Sri Lankan conflict                       | Cote d'Ivoire                                 |
| DRC                                       | Sudan   |
| Colombian conflict                        | DPRK  |
| Myanmar                                   | Angola  |
| CAR                                       | Zimbabwe                                      |
| Chechnya                                  | Occupied Palestinian Territories              |

### **Conclusion**

3. CERF is an important, impartial humanitarian financing mechanism and has made a difference to forgotten and neglected crises.

### **3.4. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER NEW FINANCING MECHANISMS (CHF, ERF)**

The relationships between CERF and the various other humanitarian pooled funds are complex. They are the more difficult to understand, given that many of these funding mechanisms started or significantly expanded at the same time as the CERF. Nevertheless, there are some observations that can be made.

Firstly, where these pooled fund mechanisms exist alongside the CERF, the two get mixed up together. In DRC, the prioritisation process for CERF UFE and the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) started life as being exactly the same, and although they have subsequently changed, remain similar. In Sudan the same decentralised process of planning that exists for the CHF also services the CERF. In Ethiopia, the board of the HRF also reviews CERF applications (although this is relatively new). In Somalia, CERF funding contributes to the ERF. This is only natural – trying to have two distinct processes would be a practical impossibility and would not contribute to coherence and coordination.

Common to all the examples above is that CERF is an exclusively UN/ IOM mechanism. As per the GA resolution governing the CERF, it has been constructed as a UN fund, and is seen as belonging to the UN agencies. In countries where there are other pooled funds available, they can be complementary.

This ‘package’ of humanitarian pooled funds appears to be changing an important feature of humanitarian financing significantly, by putting the funding decisions ‘closer to the point of delivery. This has been a trend for some years now, with donors like ECHO setting up country offices and making funding decisions based on presence and capacity in the country affected<sup>37</sup>. CHFs are taking this a step further in places like Sudan and DRC where decisions are made on a provincial level about which agency is best placed to carry out a particular piece of work. Whilst agencies understandably complain about an increased workload, the competition inherent in this system forces all actors to be competent in the eyes of their peers, rather than just clever at fund raising.

Another dynamic, highlighted by recent developments in the Somalia humanitarian response fund (HRF), is the inclusion of local NGOs, which were previously excluded from the normal funding relationships between donors and agencies. The local NGO SAACID has received several tranches of ERF funding at the maximum level of \$250,000, totalling over one million US dollars. Such resources were previously unobtainable for them – they described a funding environment where only UN agencies and large international NGOs could access donor funding directly. As a result they have been able to serve 80,000 meals a day to the poorest residents of Mogadishu.

If ERFs were routinely set up in protracted crises, and CERF was to regularly contribute to such mechanisms, this would allow NGOs with programme capacity to access appropriate funding. Furthermore, a governance mechanism such as that used for the HRF in Ethiopia (which was highly rated by all those interviewed) could ensure rapid and transparent funding. Given that OCHA is not eligible to receive CERF funding, an alternative administrative arrangement would need to be developed in some situations.

As indicated below (Section 5.6), one of the factors inhibiting the development of effective partnerships between UN agencies/IOM and NGOs is the lack of consistent arrangements for the provision of overhead costs to the NGOs. With the rapid growth in the number of project

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<sup>37</sup> See for instance *Uncertain Power: the changing role of official donors in humanitarian action*. Macrae, J et al. HPG Report 12, December 2002. ODI, London.

agreements between UN agencies/IOM and NGOs in the context of CERF, CHF and ERF, predictable arrangements for the payment of overheads are urgently required.

The CERF also has an important relationship with the emergency funding mechanisms of the UN humanitarian agencies. This is explored in detail in Section 4.2, under the heading “Timely Response”.

### **Conclusion**

4. CERF works well with other humanitarian pooled funds. It seems most effective when it is complemented by other forms of financing, whether CHFs, ERFs or agencies’ own emergency funding. Combined with ERF it can also allow previously excluded agencies such as local NGOs to access significant resources.

### **Recommendation**

1. OCHA and the UN agencies should explore setting up in-country rapid response mechanisms, or ERFs, part-funded by CERF, in countries in protracted crises or subject to disasters, as a way of funding reputable and principled civil society organisations with recognised programme capacity. Where appropriate, UN agencies may be encouraged to ‘pre-qualify’ competent national and international NGO partners, and to agree consistent arrangements for payment of overheads.

## **3.5. RAPID RESPONSE AND UNDERFUNDED WINDOWS, AND THE LOAN FACILITY**

### **3.5.1 Rapid response**

The rapid response ‘window’ of the CERF is viewed by most observers as the most successful of the three components. It constitutes two-thirds of the grant element and is simpler to administer than the underfunded window. If there is an emergency, the humanitarian country team, applies through the RC/HC to the ERC for funds. If approved, the funds are disbursed quite rapidly and grant recipients have a three-month period to commit funds. The concept that CERF funds are to ‘kick start’ a programme is reasonably well embedded, although the analysis shows that CERF can often be the entirety of the funding for an agency’s response in a particular sector.

Whilst the success and value of the rapid response window is widely acknowledged, there are still issues to be addressed. The first is timeliness, and this is discussed in detail in other sections of this report (see sections 4.2 and 5.5). Two other features should be noted. Firstly, whilst RR is an excellent mechanism for responding to large scale, obvious disasters, it is less clear to what extent it should respond to small-scale events<sup>38</sup>. Bangladesh is a good example of this problem – the

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<sup>38</sup> Whilst it is difficult to be precise about this term, such events are typically those that do not receive global media coverage. This in turn means numbers of deaths in the hundreds rather than thousands. Another way to make this distinction might be financial, although this rapidly runs across similar issues to those exposed by the UFE experience.

response to cyclone Sidr was rapid (CERF was approved within 24 hours of submission of proposal), but for the flooding earlier in the year it took longer to persuade the ERC of the necessity to respond. The role of CERF in responding to small-scale emergencies still needs to be clearly defined, and such events are increasing globally<sup>39</sup>. Links between the CERF Secretariat and the IFRC's Disasters Response and Emergency Fund (DREF) could usefully be expanded.<sup>40</sup>

Secondly, the evaluation demonstrated that the speed with which proposals are approved and funds disbursed constitutes only part of the picture. The capacity of the agencies to react quickly is arguably more important. This is picked up in several parts of this report. Where agencies can use CERF in combination with their own emergency funds, and where complementary rapid funding and response mechanisms exist, such as the RRM in DRC and the common pipeline in Sudan<sup>41</sup>, the speed and effectiveness of agency rapid response is greatly enhanced.


### 3.5.2 Underfunded

The 'underfunded' window (UFE) is more complex. The process for the selection of countries or situations for CERF funding is described in the Introduction to this report.

Most of those interviewed in the course of this evaluation were unclear on the basis for allocation of UFE funds. DRC illustrates this most clearly.

In 2007, DRC received almost 40% of the global 'underfunded' allocation (\$47.5m of \$123.8m). Yet as the graph in Figure 12 shows, humanitarian funding to DRC has been steadily increasing since the millennium.

**Figure 12: Overall humanitarian Funding to DRC**



Source: FTS. May 2008

What the DRC graphs show (see also Figure 13) is that Consolidated Appeals are not a reliable indicator of humanitarian need, and the level of their funding is certainly not. This was also the conclusion of the first CERF review<sup>42</sup>.

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
<sup>39</sup> Disaster Risk Reduction: 2007 Global Review. ISDR, Geneva, 2007.

<sup>40</sup> In 2007, the IFRC's DREF mechanism responded to over 100 natural disasters.

<sup>41</sup> See respective country report annexes for a full explanation of these mechanisms.

<sup>42</sup> CERF review citation.

**Figure 13: CAP requirement and funding DRC**



Source: FTS, May 2008

The difficulty is – as has been acknowledged for many years<sup>43</sup> - that CAPs vary in quality and ambition. Humanitarian needs did not explode in DRC in 2005, although stability improved with the elections and access to vulnerable populations became easier.<sup>44</sup> What did change in 2005/6 was that the CAP target tripled. This new, much more ambitious CAP, received twice the funding of the previous year, but because of the scale of its ambition, it had a lower percentage of funding - 50% rather than the 70% of the previous year.

Donors also point out that the criteria for determining ‘underfundedness’ do not take into account situations in which they may have deliberately chosen not to fund certain CAPs or sectors within CAPs, because of a perception that they are of poor quality or not a valid part of a humanitarian response.

‘Non-CAP’ countries are proposed for funding by the UN agencies; this information is then cross-referenced, including with the ECHO ‘Global Needs Analysis’ (and records kept to demonstrate such). On this basis the ERC decides on allocations. The guidelines for underfunded allocations are posted on the CERF website.

There is concern over the transparency in this decision-making process<sup>45</sup>. The country studies and interviews noted a lack of understanding of the criteria used and of how the allocations are made from this window.

Central to this issue may be the concept of ‘underfundedness’ itself. While the concept was surely intended to address the underfundedness of an overall humanitarian operation, or specific sectors of it, decisions have rather been based on the underfundedness of UN agencies’ humanitarian programmes. The evaluation team believes that this funding window was intended to help in ‘protracted crises’ receiving inadequate attention from donors. Framed this way – or similarly – the ERC could make judgments across a range of factors about which crises require additional funding. This would also reduce the possibility of CERF becoming perceived as easy money for projects that failed to attract donor funding.

<sup>43</sup> See for instance An External review of the CAP. Porter, T. OCHA, Geneva, 2002..

<sup>44</sup> The IRC reported in 2000 that 1.7 million people had died in excess of ‘normal’ sub-Saharan African mortality rates due to the conflict. In all, the IRC has conducted five such studies - in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2007. The analysis has not changed dramatically over that period.

<sup>45</sup> CIDA (June 2007): Central Emergency Response Fund – Review of First Year of Operations (Final Report)

### **3.5.3 The loan window**

Although the overall level of use of the loan window has not been greatly affected by the introduction of the grant elements, demand for loans has come almost exclusively from Sudan and Afghanistan, which have used the CERF loan facility extensively, and in 2006 and 2007 drew down almost the \$50m limit annually. Whilst it is good that this facility has remained useful, and well used, its limited country usage suggests that with the advent of the grant facility the loan facility has become less attractive.

The limited use of the loan window is due in part to administrative factors that are still found to be cumbersome for a short-term loan window. In early 2008, UNICEF made a request for a loan of US\$17 million, whilst awaiting the arrival of CHF funds. However, before negotiations with the CERF secretariat could be completed, the CHF funds were received and the request withdrawn.

One area in which the loan window could be valuable is when UN agencies carry out logistics or security-related tasks on behalf of the UN system, for which they later recover the costs from agencies using the service, on a pro rata basis. Since these activities often require up-front financing, the loan window could be a valuable source of such financing.

Since the original revolving fund was set up in 1991, it has been OCHA's practice to require agencies to produce a pledge letter when asking for a loan, although the GA Resolution does not require that. To maximise the usage of the available resources, the ERC and the CERF secretariat should review the use of the loan window and explore more creative uses for it.

### **Conclusions**

5. While CERF works well for large-scale rapid onset disasters, it has been less certain in its handling of smaller scale disasters.
6. Although it is generally acknowledged that CERF has strengthened humanitarian response in underfunded/ neglected crises, communication around the selection of underfunded countries has been unclear and the process has not inspired widespread confidence.
7. Potential uses of the loan window have not been sufficiently explored.

### **Recommendations**

2. The 'underfunded' window should be renamed the 'underfunded protracted crisis' window, or similar. A clearer more widely supported process for this window is required. A transparent set of data should be used to determine eligible countries and the process reviewed by the IASC Working Group, for submission to the ERC.
3. In situations when agencies are awaiting funds from donors, or where they are required to set up common services on behalf of the UN system, the CERF loan window can be used creatively to strengthen time-critical response, provided that loan approval processes can be simplified, by removing the requirement for a pledge letter for smaller loans, and by allowing larger short-term loans against pledges. The loan window should be promoted among country teams as another tool available for humanitarian work.

### **3.6. IMPACT ON HUMANITARIAN REFORM AND THE ROLE OF CERF MORE WIDELY**

Humanitarian reform aims to “enhance humanitarian response capacity, predictability, accountability and partnership”<sup>46</sup>. The reform has four main components:

- Clusters.
- Humanitarian financing (including CERF).
- Strengthening the HC system.
- Better partnerships between UN and non-UN humanitarian actors.

The first review of the CERF found that it had not yet led to improved coordination as envisaged by humanitarian reform<sup>47</sup>. It found that where coordination had worked well before, it continued to do so and vice versa. Elements of this analysis remain accurate. However, this evaluation has found a subtler picture emerging. CERF can empower humanitarian coordination where it is used well.

Firstly, the fact that humanitarian country teams have to come together under the stewardship of the RC/HC to discuss CERF proposals has made a difference. At the very least it means that obviously duplicate proposals are challenged by peers and compromises achieved. This said, the quality of these interactions is still extremely variable. In many places there is still the attitude that ‘everyone gets some of the pie’ (DPRK was an example quoted to the evaluation team). While these examples exist, the availability of CERF has also led to several innovative processes for resource allocation, prioritisation and complementary working (a good example of this latter is the CERF funded ‘joint pipeline’ between UNICEF, UNJLC and CARE in Sudan<sup>48</sup>).

CERF has certainly led to a greater predictability of funding for CAPs and flash appeals (see above), although it may not have led to greater predictability for individual agencies. This paradox can be explained by the fact that overall CERF increases funding flows, especially to crises and activities that struggle to find funding, but individual agencies now have to bid for this funding in smaller tranches, country by country rather than in larger chunks as they prefer. WFP and FAO told the evaluation team that CERF had made planning harder, as accessing the fund was less predictable than a relationship with a reliable donor.

#### **3.6.1. The role of the clusters in CERF allocations**

The cluster approach was the focus of an evaluation in 2007 that found that clusters had improved efforts to identify and address gaps in response, although overall accountability had not improved<sup>49</sup>. This evaluation has found that CERF has not particularly aided the implementation of the cluster

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<sup>46</sup> Taken from <http://www.humanitarianreform.org>

<sup>47</sup> Reference first CERF review.

<sup>48</sup> In December 2007, a RR grant for \$5.5 m was made to UNICEF and UNJLC for setting up in partnership with CARE International a common pipeline for NFI and shelter materials. UNICEF was responsible for procurement and transportation of NFIs to CARE warehouses, CARE was responsible for warehousing and transport to the distribution sites, and UNJLC ensured effective supply chain management and coordination of the NFI pipeline. OCHA assists with needs verification, coordination of assessments and information sharing. The INGOs and NGOs play the main role in distribution of the items to targeted beneficiaries.

<sup>49</sup> Cluster evaluation.

system. In many of the responses studied, clusters were the source of some controversy and in Bangladesh, Bolivia and Peru were either partially or not activated. CERF funding was made independently of the use of clusters, although the ERC has issued specific policy and operational guidance at the IASC level to encourage Humanitarian Country Teams (HCT) to adopt clusters.

Nevertheless, where clusters and CERF did work to enhance each other, the outcome seemed greater. Clusters working properly allow all agencies working in a particular sector to develop a strategy and ensure the greatest coverage. CERF can then fund this strategy and coverage. A good example of this is the WASH cluster in DRC, which has targeted the containment of cholera successfully, using an evidence-based approach, maximising coverage and using CERF strategically to fund necessary projects. In several countries, the principles of the cluster approach, rather than the formal activation of clusters, have enabled UN agencies to develop joint strategies, plans and funding proposals for CERF rapid response, as in the case of a Rift Valley Fever (RVF) outbreak in Tanzania and Sudan, in collaboration with the government agencies. Clusters have been used in this way in Mozambique and Somalia, but this is extremely dependent on the context. The acceptance or otherwise of the ‘cluster’ approach is intimately connected with the experience and approach of the RC/HC.

Despite the obvious advantages and transforming role clusters can play in humanitarian response in general, and in facilitating transparency of CERF grant processes, clusters remain contentious. There can be a perception within the HCT, UN agencies and among governments that the cluster approach undermines the government’s control and leadership over emergency response and creates a bureaucratic superstructure, which the HCT and the government will not be able to handle. Poor communication on the modalities of cluster implementation has contributed to a general perception among the UN agencies in the field that the cluster approach is something new and complicated, and generated scepticism among the governments and NGOs that this ‘UN-imposed’ process would undermine existing processes of coordination where they existed, with the UN agencies taking control of all humanitarian operations. The fact that there is ambiguity on whether or not government personnel should be part of clusters, and if so, in what role, makes the entire concept difficult to roll out in situations where sectoral coordination with government participation already exists.

Clusters need not be seen as rigid mechanisms requiring a one-size-fits-all approach. In Peru, while the government had some capacity and resources to manage several aspects of the response on its own, with advisory support from UNCT (and OCHA/UNDAC), this was not the case in the shelter/housing sector (for which CERF funds were made available), where there was little capacity to provide adequate leadership, either within the government or the UN agencies. Shelter is one of the most complex operations in any emergency, and there are not many agencies which have developed expertise in dealing with temporary shelter, transition shelter, and least of all permanent housing. The evaluation team believes that activating the shelter cluster would have enabled the agencies to work together, led by the IFRC. This would have also enabled the UN system to play a more effective role in shaping the reconstruction plan of the government, which has only recently been produced (early April 2008).

It needs to be acknowledged however, that, even when deployed, the cluster approach has confronted three major issues, and these will need to be resolved in order to get stakeholders to fully commit to the approach, if the potential synergies between clusters and the CERF mechanism are to be fully realised:

- Untimely and inadequate deployment – the slow speed of deployment and organisation of the clusters.<sup>50</sup>
- Clusters are seen as too “UN-centric”, and when the UN agency’s programme functions and cluster lead role are not separated, this may create a conflict of interest, especially if the cluster lead is also involved in funding decisions<sup>51</sup> (Sudan and DRC CHF/CERF funds for example). To overcome this, in some countries (DRC, Somalia, and some sectors in Sudan) have designated NGOs as co-leads of clusters.
- A complication that arises with regard to participation of NGOs in sector/cluster meetings is the question of representation, especially when access to meetings is restricted. As NGOs constitute a large number of individual organisations and interests, the selection process for NGO participation in sectors/clusters is difficult. It is recognised that NGOs that participate in these forums do not represent the entire group of NGOs, however most NGOs do not have the resources to attend all of the cluster meetings individually. NGOs, especially local ones, which are not part of cluster/sectoral meetings are concerned that they have limited access to humanitarian pooled funds, as donors may use participation in these forums as a filter for funding decisions. This, combined with the fact that CERF can only be accessed by UN agencies/IOM, has made many NGOs suspicious of the cluster approach, as it is feared that it will undermine their access to funding. Many non-UN interlocutors argued that UN agencies’ cluster lead role undermines their commitment to building partnerships, when funding interests (CERF, CHFs etc) are thrown in into the relationship.

### **3.6.2. Strengthening of the Humanitarian Coordinator system**

The strengthening of the Humanitarian Coordinator system is perhaps the key to making all of the other components of humanitarian reform (HR) work effectively. To paraphrase the first CERF review, where the HC system worked well, so did all of the components of HR; where it didn’t, they were not as successful. Despite this, CERF has had some universally positive impacts on the HC position and role. Firstly, the fact that the UN could deploy “its own resources” gave the UN system (and therefore the office of the RC/HC) greater credibility in the eyes of the host government in all of the cases studied for this evaluation. Good examples of this include Bangladesh and Peru, but it is certainly also the case in Ethiopia and elsewhere. This is particularly important in countries where the HC has a role in humanitarian negotiations with government on behalf of all humanitarian agencies.

Secondly, in several cases the RC/HCs saw the CERF as a mechanism that enhanced coordination and their own position in facilitating agency discussions around prioritisation and joint action. This was the case in Mozambique and Ethiopia. In countries where other such ‘humanitarian pooled funds’ exist, the HC position sits on top of a machine of fund allocation, and has become a powerful figure. In DRC this has led to the cluster system being implemented as envisaged (although CERF allocations are not discussed outside the UN agencies in any depth). In Sudan, clusters have not been fully implemented. Nevertheless, there is strong strategic leadership from the HC and a well-grounded, decentralised prioritisation process.

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<sup>50</sup> Commentary on the Implementation and Effectiveness of the Cluster Approach, Mercy Corps - September 2006

<sup>51</sup> IASC (2006) Interim Self-Assessment of the Cluster Approach in the Field, November 2006.

There have also been many cases where CERF allocations did not affect the strategic leadership role at all. In Bangladesh, the RC was not made into an HC, despite a major cyclone and a substantial CERF allocation. This meant the line of accountability to the ERC, which is clearly spelled out in the HC's job description, was not as clear as it could have been, and few of the elements of 'humanitarian reform' were put into practice. In Afghanistan CERF allocations have been made in a context where the word 'humanitarian' can hardly be used and the HC role is subsidiary to the DSRSG and RC roles.

The ability of an RC to perform an HC function, especially in situations where the humanitarian needs are new, is enhanced by the deployment of OCHA and UN agencies/ CERF surge capacity. Wherever OCHA offices exist, these take the primary responsibility to support the RC/HC in preparing CERF allocations, and act as a bridge between the CERF secretariat and UN country offices. In DRC and Sudan, OCHA also plays a similar role with regard to common humanitarian funds.

In many countries where OCHA had limited or no capacity on the ground, surge was deployed. This took two forms – specific CERF surge support (e.g. Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti, OPT and Pakistan) and support provided more broadly from OCHA HQ and regional offices (including Peru, Dominican Republic, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Bolivia and so on). In all these examples, the early deployment of UNDAC, OCHA and agency surge staff was critical in enabling the country team to prepare the flash appeal and CERF proposals reasonably rapidly.

The evaluation team considered the idea that the allocation of CERF funds should routinely trigger the appointment of a Humanitarian Coordinator. It was pointed out, however, that in some cases the appointment of HCs has proved controversial, while in others, single-agency emergency programmes supported by the CERF may not require the appointment of an HC.

While these arguments have validity, the UN should not be responding to major emergencies in situations where lines of accountability are not as clear as they could be, and the resources of the humanitarian coordination system are not deployed, or only partially so.

### **3.6.3. Partnerships**

The last aspect of humanitarian reform is partnership with governments, non-UN agencies, and in particular non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Some aspects of these relationships will be covered in other sections of this report. While CERF has helped RC/HCs to build more credible partnerships with governments in several countries, CERF has not yet enhanced the relationship with NGOs, and may even have reinforced the mutual suspicion between big UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs. In this respect, this evaluation concurs with the findings of the CERF Interim review<sup>52</sup> that while CERF has strengthened collaboration among the UN agencies, it has not yet made a significant difference in forging partnerships between UN and non-UN agencies.

A number of continuing initiatives are seeking to strengthen partnerships between UN agencies/IOM and NGOs. At its meeting on 18-20 June 2008, the IASC Working Group considered a paper entitled "CERF Partnerships", prepared by the CERF Secretariat, which discussed several issues also identified in this evaluation. The paper recommended that

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<sup>52</sup> Central Emergency Response Fund: Interim Review (Final Report)

organisations should adhere to the Principles of Partnership elaborated in the context of the Global Humanitarian Platform, recognising that much work is needed to turn these principles into practice in most countries. The paper also encouraged IASC organisations to report on “efforts undertaken to improve sub-agreement arrangements and the timelines of disbursements from UN agencies/IOM to NGOs”.<sup>53</sup>

### **Conclusions**

8. CERF has strengthened collaboration among the UN agencies, but has not yet made a significant difference in coordinated planning and action involving other non-UN actors.

9. There is a perceived conflict of interest in UN agencies’ cluster lead role as well as lead/chairing role in discussions on CERF funding allocations.

### **Recommendations**

4. The ERC and RC/HCs should re-emphasize the importance of impartial and objective chairing of cluster meetings, particularly when CERF funding allocations are being discussed. Ideally, clusters should be chaired by officials without agency management responsibilities. Where this is not possible, cluster leads should consider inviting their co-leads or other members to chair funding discussions.

5. The ERC should work with UNDG<sup>54</sup> to ensure that, when RCs receive CERF funds, lines of accountability to the ERC are fully adhered to, and that the RCs make full use of the humanitarian coordination mechanisms available.

6. The UN agencies/IOM should work to promote the Principles of Partnership with NGOs throughout their organisations.

### **Key recommendation for Section 3**

The CERF should continue under its current mandate. The size of the Fund should be allowed to increase progressively, in line with demands, and in parallel to improvements in the implementation capacity of the UN agencies/IOM and the management capacity of the CERF Secretariat.

## **4. ACTIONS SUPPORTED BY THE CERF TO IMPROVE HUMANITARIAN PERFORMANCE**

*What types of response have been supported by CERF, both Rapid Response and Underfunded, and how relevant are the types of response supported by the CERF, to the objectives of the fund? ii) How has CERF impacted the capacity for timely and predictable responses, and has it enabled time-critical responses in rapid-onset and underfunded crises? iii) To what extent has the CERF helped people affected by chronic crises traditionally viewed as ‘neglected’? iv) What has been the quality of needs assessments that underpin proposals to CERF and*

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<sup>53</sup> IASC Working Group, *CERF Partnerships*, 18-20 June 2008, p.7.

<sup>54</sup> UN Development Group Office.

*to what extent have the identified needs been met by CERF allocations? v) How effective have CERF supported projects been?*

#### **4.1. LIFE SAVING**

The Secretary General’s Bulletin<sup>55</sup> setting up the CERF stipulated that the grant element of CERF should be used primarily to provide for *rapid response to core emergency humanitarian needs* due to sudden onset emergencies and urgent requirements due to rapid deterioration of an existing crisis, as well as to provide support for *core emergency humanitarian needs* in chronically underfunded emergencies. The document lays repeated emphasis on demonstrable *core emergency humanitarian needs*.

In order to translate these principles into practical guidelines, the CERF secretariat, with the help of IASC, developed a set of “life-saving criteria”, which were endorsed by the ERC in August 2007. Allocations from the CERF would be used for life-saving activities, defined as activities that within a short time-span remedy, mitigate or avert direct physical harm or imminent threats (whether violence, disease or deprivation) to a population or major portion thereof<sup>56</sup>. Also permissible for CERF funding under these criteria are common humanitarian services necessary to enable life-saving activities to take place. Activities that are not immediately life-saving, such as disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness, economic recovery, disarmament, etc., are not eligible for CERF funding.

A broad definition of life-saving allows flexibility to UN agencies to respond to needs on the ground. These work reasonably well in rapid response situations following rapid onset disasters or sudden deterioration of the humanitarian situation in chronic crises. However, such broad interpretation makes prioritisation difficult, especially in the situation of chronic underfunded crises.

The CERF Advisory Group (Minutes of meeting 23-24 May 2007) expressed concern that too broad a definition of life-saving criteria could dilute the overall effectiveness of the fund, and specifically cautioned against using the UFE window to fund crises that are a result of long-standing structural problems of a developmental nature (CERF Advisory Meeting, October 2007). The evidence from this evaluation reinforces this concern.

##### **4.1.1 Life-saving Criteria in Chronic /Protracted Crisis Situations**

In many countries, the persistence of a crisis means that people are constantly living below or close to emergency threshold levels of malnutrition, with lack of access to health care, water and sanitation. In such a situation, the life-saving criteria, as defined currently, are difficult to interpret. In a number of instances, the life-saving criteria have been used to justify what, in the view of the evaluation team, are situations of chronic *under-development* or *underfunded development*, rather than what can be classified as core emergency humanitarian needs, as the following examples show:

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<sup>55</sup> UN Secretariat (2006) Secretary General’s Bulletin, ST/SGB/2006/10.

<sup>56</sup> CERF, Third Allocation of CERF Funds to Underfunded Emergencies: Criteria and Procedures, February-March 2007.

- In DRC, ongoing core programmes of agencies have been funded through the UFE such as UNHCR's work with returnee women including sensitisation on human and civil rights, training on leadership and access to capital and markets, community-led assistance to victims of violence and abuse.
- In Haiti, a programme for immunization was funded in 2007 through the UFE window. This was part of a regular programme of immunization of the government, which had approached WHO/PAHO with a request to fill a funding gap.
- Also in Haiti, a programme to address child trafficking was launched with CERF funding. Child trafficking in Port-au-Prince is a decades-old problem, and a serious one. Children of families from remote areas are brought into the capital on the promise of educating them, but more often than not, these children end up as unpaid domestic workers, or end up on the streets as sex workers or drug traffickers. Under this project, IOM, through its partner NGO, identified about 150 such children and facilitated their return to their homes.

While it is true that decades of conflict and lack of development in many situations have meant that the most basic needs of people remain unmet, this does not necessarily make such situations appropriate for the use of CERF funds. A short-term humanitarian approach, such as the CERF, cannot adequately address issues that require long-term and structural responses. It can sometimes temporarily alleviate the situation, and may mask the symptoms of chronic under-development for a time, but HCs and UN agencies need to consider whether such activities are an appropriate use of an emergency response mechanism with ultimately finite resources.

This issue touches on the nature of 'international humanitarian action'. Many experts point out that the lack of basic services has the same effect on people, whatever the cause. For these experts, an intervention meets the standard of legitimate international humanitarian action, if the level of need experienced by beneficiaries meets a certain threshold. Others point out, however, that such need exists, in pockets, in almost every country. For them, legitimate international humanitarian action requires a 'trigger', either a natural disaster or a conflict, which overwhelms the normal coping mechanisms of the country. On the borderline of this debate lie those provinces in a chronically conflict-affected country like DRC, which have not been directly affected by the conflict, but which have suffered 40 years of failed or absent government. Should programmes targeting needy people in such situations be considered legitimate beneficiaries of the CERF underfunded window?

The evaluation cannot offer a definitive answer to such a question. The team's own view is that, while such programmes in DRC may have been legitimate recipients of CERF funding in the period immediately after the elections, when access for international organisations to many parts of the DRC became possible for the first time for several years, there is an urgent need to change the nature of the international community's interventions in such areas, to wean the communities off emergency aid and to work with local partners in recovery and development mode.

#### **4.1.2. Life-saving Criteria in Rapid Response**

Apart from the complexity of defining life-saving interventions in protracted crises, the application of life-saving criteria in two critical sectors, livelihoods and education, have been a matter of debate in relation to CERF grants in rapid response as well. The definition of what is a life-saving component of a core emergency humanitarian response is not easy. In many situations, families want to begin a semblance of normal life as soon as they can, and for this they require basic support

in activities like debris clearing, temporary employment and income for survival etc., and these certainly constitute life-saving interventions, enabling people to begin their own recovery processes. And this is where work on livelihoods recovery (for example FAO's work in Dominican Republic following tropical storm Noel in 2007 on debris clearing, restoration of irrigation channels etc., for small farmers) are also life-saving in the sense that without these interventions, farmers would be left with no means of reclaiming their land or gaining access to any temporary employment in the aftermath of the storm's destruction.

However, whenever the provision of emergency livelihoods assistance has been slow in coming, as has been the case in several instances (provision of fishing gear to Peruvian fishermen affected by 2007 earthquake, supply of fodder for animals in Afghanistan, land reclamation in Dominican Republic, etc), taking 6-9 months, the life-saving nature of these interventions have been questionable.

As with livelihoods, emergency education can have a life-saving impact, and constitutes an appropriate part of a core emergency humanitarian response, if it enables children and the community to regain a sense of normalcy and helps them to get out of shock and trauma immediately following a disaster. UNESCO's work on temporary schools in Peru following the earthquake in 2007 using CERF funds is an example of a critical contribution that CERF can appropriately make in the context of an emergency humanitarian response, but which also helps to build an outcome that can be long lasting and serve as a basis for early recovery and development.

However, the evaluation team also came across several instances, where work on temporary schools improvement or provision of water and sanitation, was being carried out 6-8 months after the disaster. As with the delayed livelihoods interventions, these examples raise questions about the appropriateness of such projects for CERF funding.

It can be argued that work on health, whether water-borne diseases following a disaster or regular health interventions in a situation of chronic under-development, will ultimately help save lives, and hence qualify for CERF support. Health infrastructure in most parts of the world being what it is, the unmet needs are endless, and all investments in this area can be life-saving.

CERF-funded public health interventions following tropical storm Noel, in Dominican republic, helped to contain an outbreak of Leptospirosis in flooded areas, and enabled the health authorities to create region-wide monitoring and testing facilities for Leptospirosis, which facilitated surveillance and early detection, preventing an outbreak of the disease, which takes a serious toll of human lives in the country.

After the earthquake destroyed the hospital in Pisco (Peru), CERF funded construction of a temporary hospital and boundary wall, the work on which was to be completed by May 2008, although the government had already built three temporary blocks, which opened in January 2008.

The evaluation team believes the first example was a good use of CERF funds, while the second example was not.

## **Conclusions**

10. The life-saving criteria have been defined without sufficient reference to context, which has made prioritisation of needs difficult. As a result, CERF funds have sometimes been used to address recovery needs and long-term issues of under-development, rather than core emergency humanitarian needs.

11. Use of CERF funds to address issues that require long-term interventions, and are not situated in a humanitarian emergency context, diverts resources that could be used for meeting core emergency humanitarian needs.

## **Recommendation**

7. In order to ensure that CERF only funds activities arising out of humanitarian emergencies (both rapid and chronic), place the existing 'life-saving criteria' for CERF grants in the context of core emergency humanitarian needs to emphasise the principles articulated in the SG's bulletin, and target the CERF more precisely so that prioritisation of needs becomes clearer.

## **4.2. TIMELY RESPONSE**

There are broadly two aspects to the issue of timely response, firstly whether the CERF secretariat approves, and the UN Controller disburses funds quickly against requests, and secondly whether CERF funded projects help communities affected by disasters in a timely fashion. The first of these questions is addressed in the section on the administration of the CERF.

On the question whether CERF funded projects reach their beneficiaries in a timely fashion, the evidence is mixed. Broadly the conclusion is that where an individual UN agency has good emergency response capacity, CERF helps the agency to respond in a timely manner. Where the agency does not have response capacity then CERF is powerless to ensure a timely response. In the aftermath of cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh the UN agencies mostly responded quickly. Within a couple of days they were transporting relief items to the affected areas and were able to distribute essential supplies in some areas within a week. This is a fast response and was entirely due to prepositioning of supplies and having agreements with partners that could be rapidly activated. CERF did not provide funds until the end of the first week, meaning the initial response was not set in motion by CERF funding, but augmented by it. The same was true in Mozambique where a number of agencies had prepositioned supplies and were able to respond rapidly to the flooding with the government. Also in Mozambique, UNICEF used its own resources to kick-start its response at a high level, knowing that CERF funds would become available within two weeks.

However, even when the ERC approves a proposal in the fastest possible time, implementation does not necessarily start that quickly. As the country studies show, weak capacity on the ground, inability to find implementing partners, delayed procurement due to cumbersome internal systems are some of the factors that have often seriously delayed response. In Peru, although a CERF grant for temporary shelters was approved on day 8 after the disaster, IOM initiated its procurement only after receiving the signed LoU and this delayed the supplies. In Bangladesh, a RR grant for WFP

was approved by ERC within five days of the cyclone Sidr. The agency, however, took some time to negotiate the details of the operation with its implementing partner and get the food supply arranged which meant that emergency operation did not start until 3 weeks after the disaster had struck. FAO's supply of fishing gear only arrived in Peru eight months after the disaster, due to its cumbersome procurement systems. In the Rift Valley Fever (RVF) outbreak in Sudan, it took FAO and WHO about two weeks<sup>57</sup> to prepare a proposal and submit it to the CERF Secretariat on 27 November 2007. Following one revision of the proposal, it was approved on 14 December, and funds were disbursed to FAO and WHO on 27 December. The first suspected cases had been reported from early October, and by 20 November 2007, the Federal Ministry of Health had reported at least 164 deaths due to the RVF.

The conclusion here is that CERF, however fast, can never create rapid response capacity on its own. When an agency does not have response capacity, either in a country, regionally or globally, it is not able to respond quickly, however rapidly the CERF funding arrives. This suggests that any assessment of proposals must include not only the needs in a particular region or sector, but also the capacity of the agency asking for funds to respond in a timely fashion. It also suggests that agencies' own preparedness and response capacities remain critical, including the maintenance of their own emergency response funds.

An important example of the inability of CERF to simply create capacity relates to the lead time WFP needs to purchase new food. In many contexts it is possible to simply redirect food from nearby programmes, but in genuinely new, poorly funded or difficult to reach places, sometimes this is not possible. This was the case in Chad in 2007 when new displacement created the need for food not available in the country. CERF and WFP need to work together to resolve this issue, either through the innovative use of cash or through strategic pre-positioning.

Another aspect of timelines in project implementation (CERF grants) relates to the CERF grants duration. For RR grants, funds must be committed within three months and activities completed within 6 months. UFE grants usually have to be completed within a maximum of nine months, depending on the timing of grant approval. UFE grants made in February/March have up to December to complete implementation; since 2007, projects approved in August/September are being allowed to continue up to the following June. The three months requirement for the commitment of funds for RR projects is considered by several agencies as being unrealistic in some situations. In cases such as agricultural projects, implementation is linked to the planting season and usually requires upwards of six months. If agencies are to monitor and report on the results of their support, the entire duration of the production cycle needs to be included in the plan for implementation. While the principle of 3 months project duration ensures that the focus is on time-critical emergency interventions, it is usually in relation to the livelihoods or food procurement sectors that the project duration of 3 months may be seen as too short.

## **Conclusions**

12. While timelines in the CERF approval and LOU process are a factor in rapid response, other factors contribute to serious delays in delivery of assistance: (a) delayed proposal development in country; (b) an agency's lack of capacity to pre-finance implementation; (c) time-consuming

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<sup>57</sup> 2007 Annual Report of the Humanitarian Coordinator on the Use of CERF grants to Sudan

negotiations with potential implementing partners; and (d) cumbersome internal procurement systems.

13. CERF has generally enabled time-critical response to rapid onset humanitarian crises<sup>1</sup> and played a complementary role to in-country and agency-specific rapid response mechanisms wherever these exist.

14. Agencies' own preparedness and response capacities remain critical and they must continue to strive to improve these both globally and nationally. This includes the maintenance of their own emergency response funds.

### **Recommendation**

8. Appraisals of proposals by the CERF secretariat for the rapid response window need to factor in the applicant agencies' preparedness to launch a response immediately on approval of funds by the ERC (without waiting for LOUs and disbursement from the Controller's office), and the RC/HC's assessment of the agencies' capacity to deliver timely response.

9. In exceptional cases, particularly involving activities in the agricultural sector, the ERC needs to allow, from the outset, an extension of the project duration for RR grants

10. Donors must continue to support agencies' individual emergency response funds in addition to mechanisms such as CERF to ensure timely response.

### **4.3. NEEDS ASSESSMENT AND PRIORITISATION**

The 2007 evaluations of the Cluster Approach and CERF highlighted continued problems in needs assessment practice<sup>58</sup>. The inability to consistently measure needs was identified as a constraint to equitably allocating humanitarian resources through the CERF<sup>59</sup>.

Nevertheless, the CERF, and other such humanitarian pooled funds, have had a significant impact on the needs assessment and prioritisation process. This is not universal, but the evidence from the country case studies for this evaluation is that practice is changing as a result of these mechanisms.

CERF has clearly contributed to encouraging UN agencies to conduct joint or coordinated needs assessments. In Bangladesh, the UN system (WFP, UNICEF, UNDP and WHO, with OCHA's

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<sup>58</sup> Several major initiatives are underway to develop tools for systematic needs assessments. Starting with the 2005 IASC Needs Analysis Framework and the work on Initial Rapid Assessment tool, there are various attempts at developing more systematic frameworks and joint assessment methods. In 2007 OCHA launched the Assessment and Classification of Emergencies (ACE) Project with funding from ECHO. Progress on classifying emergencies includes the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC) system developed by the FAO Food Security Analysis Unit (FSAU) in Somalia. The IPC, which is being tested in other countries under the auspices of a multi-partner group, combines information from a range of sources to analyse and monitor the food security and livelihood situation in different regions of a country.

<sup>59</sup> OCHA (2007). *Central Emergency Response Fund: Interim Review (Final Report)*. New York.

help) mounted a joint assessment two days after Cyclone Sidr hit the country, publishing the results five days later. Similar joint assessments were carried out in Peru after the earthquake in 2007, and the assessment outcome was fed back into the planning process and CERF proposals. In Sudan, on at least two occasions involving CERF grants, joint assessments were carried out to inform CERF proposals: an assessment of the LRA-affected areas in south Sudan, facilitated by OCHA with the involvement of other agencies and NGOs, and a joint assessment and proposal on Rift Valley Fever (RVF) outbreak developed by WHO and FAO.

In protracted crises, operational agencies now not only have to decide what their priorities are, but also to justify them in a ‘court of peers’. Not only that, but the prioritisation is being carried out consistently closer to where the projects are being implemented. The best current example of this is the ‘prioritisation table’ from the CAP (HAP) for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which takes a range of indicators such as displacement, malnutrition and morbidity of selected diseases and prioritises geographical areas for intervention based on a total score. Evidence is collected on these indicators by a variety of agencies and this is then fed into the prioritisation process.


Whilst there is still room for improvement, this process has started a conversation amongst all those involved in humanitarian action in DRC about what needs to be tackled urgently, where, how and who is best placed. Furthermore, it has introduced evidence into this process.

Whilst the use of needs assessment evidence as the basis for their joint decision-making is still being developed, the prioritisation process is joint, competitive and ultimately consensual. This is different to multiple agencies petitioning multiple donors to fund their projects in isolation from each other.

One area in which needs assessments are still weak is in the incorporation of gender-sensitive analysis. The UNDAC team deployed in response to the 2008 disaster in Bolivia included an expert in vulnerable groups. As a result, specific attention was paid to cross-cutting issues, including gender. One of the elements taken into account was the disaggregation of data in the Disaster Assessment, which consequently led to a better approach in relation to vulnerable groups, thus improving the overall quality of the response. Apart from a few specific projects in some countries, the evaluation

found that gender-sensitive programming did not appear to be routine (see section below on gender).

**Figure 14: CERF funding is based on demonstrated needs which are central to saving lives now or in the immediate future** (CERF Evaluation Survey, May 2008)



The above discussion relates in the main to protracted crises, where it is possible to develop over time a sophisticated prioritisation process. Much of CERF funding is allocated for rapid onset events, where there is always a tension between rapid response and needs assessment. In Bangladesh the CERF allocation was made within five days – before the needs assessment was completed. Nevertheless, CERF proposals were informed

by the assessment and were not much different to how they would have been after a month of extensive research. Overall the evaluation found that, by emphasising the role of the RC/HC in the vetting process for CERF proposals, the proposal development process does help in bringing in a shared understanding of the critical needs at least among the UN agencies, and that the needs get picked up early when agencies sit around the table to develop joint proposals. It is worth noting here

that 83% of the survey respondents felt that the CERF funding has been based on demonstrated needs, and only 12% holding a contrary view. This view echoes the results of research by DARA<sup>60</sup>.

### **Conclusions**

15. CERF has fostered multi-lateral and consultative processes of prioritisation. These have helped reinforce the importance of ensuring that humanitarian response is based on needs assessments, although the tools and methods for systematic needs assessment are not yet in place.

### **Recommendations**

11. Where feasible, CERF funds should be allocated on the basis of coordinated needs assessments

## **4.4. GENDER**

The CERF guidelines on applying to the fund emphasise the ‘application of gender equity principles’, referencing in particular “the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,<sup>61</sup> the Convention on the Rights of the Child,<sup>62</sup> the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography,<sup>63</sup> the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict,<sup>64</sup> and other relevant resolutions such as SC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.<sup>65”</sup>

All UN agencies have gender policies that require them to actively promote gender equity in their programme work. The degree to which this commitment is followed through on with any consistency is beyond the scope of this evaluation, and indeed was not highlighted as part of the terms of reference. Nevertheless, the country case studies did not find a general highlighting of gender equity issues in CERF projects. There are certainly examples in CERF proposals where gender issues are specifically highlighted such as UNDP in Bangladesh following cyclone Sidr “Gender sensitivities will be addressed to ensure equitable distribution and recognition of women’s role in emergency activities for families and communities”.

One of the issues that may have hindered the evaluation team from drawing any specific conclusions is that whilst gender equity is mentioned as a principle in the pre-ambule to the CERF application template, it is not specifically required in the template itself. This is also true of other principles; a revision to require agencies to mention what they plan to do in these areas would allow for more systematic evaluation of this work, whilst at the same time ensuring that this does not make the application process too cumbersome.

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<sup>60</sup> Humanitarian response index 2007, DARA international.

<sup>61</sup> Adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly.

<sup>62</sup> Adopted in 1989 by the UN General Assembly.

<sup>63</sup> Adopted in 2000 by the UN General Assembly.

<sup>64</sup> Adopted in 2000 by the UN General Assembly.

<sup>65</sup> Adopted in 2000 by the UN General Assembly.

### **Conclusion**

16. Gender equity in humanitarian programming is a principle that is widely subscribed to in both the CERF application guidance and in agencies' internal policies. The degree to which this commitment is acted upon is unclear, partly because CERF application and reporting formats do not require issues such as gender equity to be mentioned.

### **Recommendation**

12. The CERF application template should include a section on important issues of principle such as gender equity.

## **4.5 OUTCOMES**

The sheer volume of projects supported by the CERF, their diversity, the number of agencies involved, the inter-related nature of much funding, the lack of reliable data in many emergencies all combine to make a statistically rigorous judgement on whether outcomes are changed by the existence of the CERF practically impossible.

This said, the evidence from the country case studies does appear to be very similar, indicating that conclusions can be drawn, even if they are not necessarily of the highest standard of rigour. Broadly, these are that there is a higher volume of humanitarian activity as a result of the CERF, and that projects are potentially more relevant and appropriate as a result of decentralised decision making. On the other hand, CERF has not affected the quality of project implementation, as this lies purely in the domain of the individual agency carrying out the work.

There are some good examples to support these conclusions. First – on the volume front – all interviewed, including those contacted by telephone, indicated that CERF had increased their capacity to carry out humanitarian work. The one single exception to this was WFP in Sudan, which reported that they had lost funding from some donors that were also contributors to the CHF and CERF<sup>66</sup>. In their case CERF had definitely not increased humanitarian project availability, and in Sudan generally the CERF forms a very small part of overall funding. In all of the other countries studied, however, the impact was significant. It is also clear that in Afghanistan that does not have a humanitarian appeal, and Bangladesh and Pakistan, which were both unwilling to have a flash appeal, the UN was able to access funding from the CERF, when it might otherwise have been much more problematic.

That the CERF has not materially affected the quality of programming cannot be a surprise. The evaluation team came across some examples of excellent, effective programmes. Most of the agencies eligible for the CERF had examples of these, which are described in the country case studies. Two examples from the 'new' humanitarian agencies are the WHO programme in Sudan,

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<sup>66</sup> Although this was the case, WFP was funded 64% of its CAP requirements in 2005, 82% in 2006 and 90% in 2007 indicating that although individual donors have changed funding channels, or have given way to others overall they have gained rather than lost.

which has a good reputation for swift response and technical excellence; and a remarkable case from FAO: experts told the evaluation team that in 2007 they had prevented an outbreak of locusts from spreading from its starting point in Yemen thanks to a CERF grant. This was the first time in FAO's history that they had been able to stop an outbreak before it started to spread. Previously, funding had never arrived in time.

Nevertheless the evaluation team also saw examples of poor programme quality. Supplies that were yet to arrive nine months after the emergency had finished, buildings not completed 18 months after the project commencement date, projects that aimed to improve sanitation but in the absence of a proper maintenance system had failed within three months of completion: these are all examples of insufficient agency internal oversight. Agencies rightly have pointed out through the course of this evaluation that the responsibility for ensuring project and programme quality rests with them – this is certainly the case. The variability in quality suggests however, that those accountable for CERF funds need a minimum guarantee of quality from the agencies and that the current monitoring and reporting regime does not provide this.

### **Conclusions**

17. CERF has led to an increased volume of humanitarian activity.

18. Projects funded by CERF are more likely to be appropriate and relevant, owing to the decentralised nature of the decision-making.

### **Key recommendation for Section 4**

The quality of CERF-funded programmes needs to become more consistent. To that end, and without affecting the timeliness of decision-making, the criteria for project approval and their application need to be further refined, including the application of the 'life saving criteria', assessments of agencies' capacity, the timeframe for implementation and the use of needs assessments.

## **5. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CERF AND CRITERIA FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION**

*How effective has the ERC been in promoting CERF as a tool for global humanitarian response, and to what extent has he been able to mobilise additional resources and ensure that humanitarian funding is in proportion to needs? How consistently are the criteria for assessing life-saving needs applied across different countries and 'projects'? How effective are the processes, systems, and criteria applied in the development, appraisal and allocation of CERF fund? How quickly are funds disbursed for time-critical response?*

### **5.1. PROMOTING THE CERF AND MOBILIZING RESOURCES**

By any measure, the two ERCs who have held office during the first three years of the CERF's life have been outstandingly successful in mobilizing resources for the CERF. In 2008, its third year, the fund will almost certainly reach its long-term target of US\$ 450 million in the year. On top of that, the CERF has succeeded in attracting a very large number of governments to donate to the Fund that are not regular contributors to UN humanitarian operations. This 'global engagement' in the CERF is possibly unique for a voluntary funding mechanism.

The size of the contributions made by the largest donors is due in part to a situation in which these governments' funds available for humanitarian work are increasing year on year, while their administrative budgets for disbursing the money are shrinking. That this conjuncture has arisen at a time when they have embraced humanitarian reform, of which CERF is a key component, is fortuitous. But these donors also explain that the CERF has domestic political and practical advantages. It enables them to tell their Ministers and public that their country is engaged from the outset in responding to a crisis, while allowing them a little extra time to consider where their bilateral resources can be used to best advantage. It allows them to take part in the response to every major humanitarian emergency, through the CERF, while continuing to select the countries for their bilateral aid.

This opportunity to take a part in the response to every major humanitarian disaster may also help to explain the enthusiasm of non-traditional donors for the CERF.

GA Resolution 60/124 encouraged the ERC also to seek resources from the private sector. In this endeavour, they have been less successful. While the CERF has achieved remarkable buy-in from governments, civil society and the general public are far less engaged. This may be explained in part by the fact that NGOs do not have direct access to the Fund. Some major NGOs still worry that the CERF may be taking resources that might otherwise have come directly to them. While this report does not advocate direct access to the CERF for NGOs, it makes several recommendations, which, if implemented, would engage both international and national NGOs much more closely in the operations of the Fund. In addition, a comprehensive communications strategy for extending the reach of the CERF into civil society generally, could not only raise more funds, but also promote knowledge and appreciation for this unique international instrument.

### **5.2 ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT OF CERF/OCHA SECRETARIAT**

The CERF Secretariat initially comprised five staff headed by a P5 manager. While the number of staff had increased to 12 at the time of the evaluation - supported by the secondment of experts from UN agencies - for over two years the Secretariat was provided with no proper office and was still, at

the time of the evaluation, functioning from a small cubicle adjoining the security and reception desks at the UN Secretariat in New York. That CERF has been able to establish itself as a credible humanitarian tool and is now widely accepted for its role in rapid response owes a great deal to this small team.

The Chief of the CERF Secretariat, who remains at the P5 level, in spite of his responsibility for advising the ERC on the distribution of a sum equivalent to one fifth of the UN Secretariat's annual budget, is the most senior official with full-time responsibility for the CERF. He reports to the Director of OCHA's New York office and, through him, to the ERC.

The ERC, on the advice of the CERF Secretariat, took over 700 separate decisions to allocate CERF funds in 2006 and 2007, a rate of more than one decision for every working day. That these decisions have generally been well founded and have resulted in valuable humanitarian work is a tribute to the extraordinary commitment and integrity of the Chief of the Secretariat and his small team. Nevertheless, they would be the first to admit that they could have done an even better job, if they had been provided, from the outset, with an appropriate number of suitably experienced staff for a task of this importance and complexity.

The evaluation found that the small CERF Secretariat has done a remarkable job in launching the CERF as an important element of humanitarian financing. Nevertheless, it is widely recognised that the structure and grading of the Secretariat has not allowed OCHA to recruit staff with the level of seniority and experience commensurate with the task of managing such an important and sizeable fund in a way that will ensure the continued confidence and support of donors and partner agencies.

The activities of the CERF Secretariat are funded from an annual budget approved by the UN Controller. At present, no authority has been delegated to the ERC to adjust the allotment of funds under the different budget lines, so that newly emerging requirements could be financed from savings under other budget headings. In view of the rapidly changing environment in which the CERF Secretariat has to function, it would seem appropriate to allow a degree of flexibility in this area.

Support from OCHA, both in New York and at country level, has been critical to the success of CERF so far. The Coordination and Response Division (CRD), as the field coordination branch of OCHA, has played an important role in ensuring the quality of submissions made to the ERC. The CRD desks support the field in the production of submissions, proper application of the CERF criteria, and the preparation of inputs for recommendations prepared by the CERF Secretariat for approval by the ERC.

In its draft audit report on the CERF, the OIOS questions the value of the involvement of the CRD, pointing out that the review of projects by desk officers takes up valuable time, while the qualifications of these desk officers to pass judgement on technical projects developed by agencies in the field are not obvious. The evaluation team considered this question and found that CRD has played a useful role in facilitating dialogue between RC/HCs, OCHA and UN agency country offices and the CERF Secretariat, especially during the period when staff in the field had little knowledge of the criteria to be applied in submitting proposals. Staff are now better trained, the CERF Secretariat better resourced to review proposals, and consequently the reference to CRD would seem to be no longer essential. CRD desk officers felt that they had been most useful when

project ideas were initially sent in from the field, and before a detailed proposal was formulated. They recognised that their role had diminished as the country offices gained experience with CERF.

In the countries that received CERF funding, OCHA staff's support has been critical in assisting the RC/HC and the UNCT in developing submissions to the ERC. RC/HCs acknowledged that having an OCHA person in daily contact with the CERF secretariat facilitates the process and leads to proposals that meet the criteria for the Fund, and are likely to be funded more quickly. The ability of an RC to perform an HC function, especially in situations where the humanitarian needs are new, is enhanced by the deployment of OCHA surge capacity. Wherever OCHA offices exist, these take the primary responsibility to support the RC/HC in assessing CERF proposals, and act as a bridge between the CERF secretariat and UN country offices. Rapid response in Mozambique, Bolivia, Chad, Peru, and Dominican Republic were all facilitated by deployment of OCHA staff. The HC in Mozambique found the role of OCHA so critical in enabling the country team's rapid response that he has requested a permanent OCHA presence. Apart from coordination and facilitating CERF funding, OCHA's role in ERFs and CHFs are also seen as critical to the success of these funds.

In many countries where OCHA had limited or no capacity on the ground, surge was deployed – including CERF trained staff from other operational agencies – either specifically for CERF, as in Chad, Haiti and Pakistan, or more generally (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Mozambique, Peru). In all these examples, the early deployment of UNDAC, OCHA and agency surge staff was critical in enabling the UNCT to prepare the flash appeal and CERF proposals reasonably rapidly. Unfortunately however, OCHA's ability to deploy staff in countries with no OCHA presence has been limited. As was demonstrated in Peru following the 2007 earthquake, OCHA's inability to deploy staff for longer than the first 2-3 weeks delayed the implementation of emergency response activities by most UN agencies, and caused problems of coordination and inter-sector collaboration. Coordination of the UN system in Bangladesh for humanitarian affairs fell on the office of the Resident Coordinator during both the flood response and the cyclone. OCHA did provide support at the very beginning of the cyclone to draw together the CERF proposal and the rapid needs assessment. This was a timely and much appreciated intervention. However, the RC did not accept the need for continued OCHA support, and consequently coordination was under-resourced within the UN system. The RC did not have an expert knowledge of the humanitarian system and the various tools and initiatives that exist. Some of the information management tools that OCHA has developed over the years, if deployed, might have helped in gaining a comprehensive overview. As a result, there was inadequate understanding of where the gaps in the response were, and agencies and donors lacked knowledge of where to act.

OCHA is expanding its network of regional offices capable of providing surge support where required and has trained staff of other UN agencies to take part in surge teams.

The evaluation noted that OCHA is now required to deal with a number of funding mechanisms, in addition to the CERF. CHF and ERF are managed by HCs, with the assistance of OCHA staff. Although HCs may be accountable to a specific group of donors for their management of CHF and ERF funds, they remain accountable for all their work as HCs to the ERC. There are obvious synergies to be achieved at the policy level, as well as in specific operations, by establishing closer links between these various funds. Currently, responsibility for OCHA's work in relation to these different mechanisms is dispersed within the Office.

At the time of the evaluation, the Chief of the CERF Secretariat reported to the ERC through the Director of OCHA's New York Office. Responsibility for the development of ERFs and CHFs lay with individual HCs, supported by OCHA's resource mobilisation staff and administrative unit in Geneva, and at a policy level by PDSB in New York. In recognition of the fact that increasing numbers of OCHA staff at Headquarters and in the field are involved in the allocation of funds for emergency response, these arrangements need to be rationalized, so that the ERC can receive consistent advice, prepared under the supervision of a Director dedicated full-time to this task.

### **Conclusions**

19. In spite of a shortage of staff of an appropriately senior level, the CERF secretariat has played a pivotal role in establishing CERF as a credible rapid response mechanism in less than two years.

20. OCHA staff's support to the RC/HC is critical in the process of needs prioritisation and proposal development for CERF allocations. Wherever OCHA offices do not exist, rapid deployment of OCHA staff and UNDAC teams is critical to shaping the rapid response and supporting the RC/HC in coordination.

21. OCHA's capacity to deploy staff for a reasonable length of time following sudden onset disasters, particularly in countries where it has no existing presence, has been limited. This capacity needs to be considered an essential investment for facilitating effective allocation and utilisation of CERF grants.

22. The links between different humanitarian pooled funds, including CERF, CHFs and ERFs have not yet received sufficient attention in the IASC. Responsibility for this issue is also dispersed within OCHA.

### **Recommendations**

13. CERF Secretariat officers should have discretion to seek the advice of CRD during the appraisal of projects, when they feel it would be useful. While the CERF Secretariat should continue to copy all correspondence to CRD, formal reference of projects to CRD for review should no longer be a requirement.

14. When significant CERF funding is envisaged for countries without an OCHA presence, the ERC should ensure that a core team of OCHA or UN agency surge staff is deployed for a sufficient length of time to support the UNCT in prioritisation, the CERF application process and coordination of the immediate response. Staff selected for deployment as part of OCHA and UN agency surge teams should be adequately trained and, where possible, include specialists in cross cutting issues, such as gender. Where such staff are required to assist RCs with the development of CERF proposals and with subsequent reporting, it is the view of the evaluation team that such costs should be considered a reasonable charge against the 3% overhead fee levied by the UN Secretariat.

15. The staffing of the CERF Secretariat should be strengthened to reflect levels of responsibility, and the consequence of error, and to ensure credibility with agency counterparts. Specifically, the Chief of the CERF Secretariat should be at the D1 level. In addition, the CERF Secretariat should be moved into proper office space as soon as possible.

16. The UN Controller should delegate to the ERC the authority to approve adjustments to the CERF Secretariat budget, within agreed limits.

17. The evaluation recommends that OCHA should initiate a discussion in the IASC on the harmonization of various humanitarian pooled funds, including the CERF. In order to improve consistency and coherence, the ERC should consider the appointment of a Director of Humanitarian Financing, through whom the Chief of the CERF Secretariat would report, to advise him on issues relating to all humanitarian pooled funds.

### **5.3. DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES FOR CERF ALLOCATIONS**

Earlier sections of this report contain details about the role played by HCs and clusters or other sectoral coordination mechanisms in the development of proposals and the choice of projects for funding. In the section immediately above, the role of the CRD in OCHA has been discussed. This section will look specifically at the role played by the ERC, his Deputy, the Directors of the New York and Geneva Offices of OCHA and the CERF Secretariat.

When the CERF was initiated in 2006, the then ERC took a highly proactive role in deciding on the distribution of the first grants under the rapid response window. He frequently reached a decision in a matter of hours about the level at which the CERF would intervene initially. As the system has matured in 2007 and 2008, the present ERC has taken a more reactive approach, relying primarily on the RC or the HC for an indication of the level at which an initial contribution should be set.

In several situations, including the Bangladesh floods, Chad, Mozambique and Somalia, initial proposals submitted to the CERF Secretariat had to be revised, when it became clear that the level of funding requested could not be released. Earlier agreement on an acceptable ‘envelope’ would have saved time and unnecessary work. When an envelope has been agreed early, detailed discussions about appropriate projects between RC/HCs, OCHA field staff and the CERF Secretariat are facilitated.

As soon as the envelope has been agreed, HCs and Humanitarian Country Teams facing emergencies need the support of the CERF Secretariat in New York, and of OCHA and UN agency surge staff in the field, to put in place transparent processes for the development and review of funding ideas. In cases where there has been regular contact between OCHA staff in the field and the CERF Secretariat, proposals have usually been approved much more quickly.

The principles applied above to the decision-making over rapid response grants apply equally to underfunded window grants, where there is of course more time to ensure that the process is fully transparent. This process has been reviewed in detail in other sections.

#### **Conclusion**

23. Early agreement on a funding ‘envelope’ for rapid response between the ERC and RC/HC, and regular communication from the outset between OCHA staff in the field and the CERF Secretariat have facilitated the rapid approval of appropriate proposals.

## **Recommendations**

18 Negotiations with the RC/HC on the initial envelope for a CERF contribution should be handled on the telephone in the first days following a disaster by the ERC personally or by his Deputy or by the Director overseeing the CERF Secretariat. As a rule of thumb, an initial contribution to a medium-scale disaster could be between 10 and 20% of the initial Flash Appeal, with a special focus on those components of the Appeal required to get operations underway.

19. The ERC should continue to routinely remind RC/HCs that the CERF funds emergency humanitarian needs, was never intended to fund everything, nor was it meant to fund all agencies. Requests must focus on the most urgent enabling activities and on those sectors where government or civil society capacity is weakest, or where donor support is least likely to be available.

## **5.4 PROJECTS OR PROGRAMMES**

A number of UN agencies told the evaluation team that the CERF had led to ‘over-projectization’, with a serious increase in administrative or ‘transaction’ costs. They pointed out that member states contribute funds to the CERF completely unearmarked, but that the ERC then earmarks the money down to the project level in specific countries. Although narrative reporting requirements have recently been simplified, financial reporting requirements mean that agencies need to keep separate records of project expenditure, often using systems not compatible with their normal formats, thereby incurring extra transaction costs (see Section 6.2. below). The agencies also pointed out that the main donors contributing to the CERF had agreed on the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship, which promote a programme, rather than a project approach and encourage reductions in earmarking, while asking for greater accountability.

The evaluation weighed the argument for a more ‘programmatic’ approach by the CERF against the ERC’s responsibility for ensuring that the funds ‘make a difference’ in terms of rapid response or filling serious gaps in funding. The issue is further complicated by the relatively poor quality of management information in the form of monitoring reports and programme evaluations, available from the agencies at country level.

On the rapid response side, the CERF is intended primarily to ‘kick-start’ the humanitarian response. It seems inevitable that RC/HCs will request a relatively high degree of earmarking in such cases. They need to know that agencies will undertake key specific actions in a given time-frame. Frequently, recommendations will have come from cluster or sector leads at local or provincial level. CERF allocations in such situations will normally be at the project level.

Once the allocation has been made, however, the HC and the UN agency need as much flexibility as possible to respond to changing priorities and to react to changing security conditions. CERF already broadly accommodates such flexibility on the narrative reporting side, but not yet in relation to accounting and financial reporting.

In relation to the UFE, the evaluation recommends in other sections of this report a review of the way in which UFE funds are allocated. If implemented, these recommendations would allow this window to move away from a project approach to a programme one. HCs and humanitarian country teams in selected countries in protracted crisis would identify underfunded agency

programmes for support. Provided that the financial reporting issues can be resolved, and provided that the agencies maintain and make available appropriate management information at country level, it should be possible for CERF to contribute funds at programme level, in full conformity with the principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship.

## **Conclusion**


24. The main reason for the difficulties UN agencies face in managing CERF funds is the inflexibility of the financial reporting system. Proposed changes to the allocation of UFE funds would enable agencies to access such funds on a programme rather than a project basis.

## **5.5 TIMELINESS IN ADMINISTRATION OF CERF**

Timeliness is critical for all humanitarian response, and more so for the CERF RR which is meant to enable life-saving response in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. It is recognised by all agencies and interlocutors interviewed during the evaluation that the CERF secretariat and UN Controller's office have dramatically improved the speed with which they handle grants at various stages, namely appraisal and approval of proposals, counter-signing of LOUs and disbursement of funds from the UN Secretariat to recipient agency HQs.

Figure 15 indicates that CERF has contributed to improving the timely response to funding Flash Appeals in the first weeks after the disaster<sup>67</sup>. In 2004 the median funding received for a Flash Appeal before the launch of the Appeal and during the first two weeks after the launch, was 21% (in 2005 it was 33%). In 2006 the median raised to 51% and in 2007, to 55%.

**Figure 15: Timeliness of Total Funding to Appeals as % of funding received.** (Source: CERF Secretariat, March 2008).



The results of the evaluation survey corroborate these findings (see Figure 16).

Records maintained at the Secretariat for RR grants during 2007 reveal that the average number of working days between receipt of final proposal to approval is 3, and between receipt of signed LOU to disbursement to agency HQs is about 6. During 2007, 86% of the RR grants requests were approved by the ERC within 3 business days following receipt of final proposal.


However, sometimes preparation of the proposals in the field takes considerable time - in Sudan it took about three weeks to get to the final proposal<sup>68</sup>, and following the Mozambique floods, the

<sup>67</sup> CERF Secretariat studied the timeliness of funding received to Flash Appeals and other appeals in the period 2004 - 2007.

<sup>68</sup> See Sudan Country Study

final proposal was submitted after three weeks<sup>69</sup>. Additionally, after the approval, the LOU between the ERC and Agency HQ often takes an average 7-10 days. Currently individual LOUs need to be signed for each grant received from CERF and this increases the paperwork as well as delays disbursement of funds. For over a year now, there has been a proposal on the table to switch to a system of one umbrella LOU that will be signed with each recipient agency, avoiding the need for individual LOUs for each grant. As of June 2008, agreement on the umbrella LOU had still not been achieved.

**Figure 16: Funding provided by CERF for specific response is timely**  
(CERF Evaluation Survey, May 2008)



The timeline for disbursement of funds from the Controller's office to the agency HQs has also improved in the past two years; however, the Controller's office was not established to handle emergency operations, and staff in the Controller's office have, on occasion, not taken prompt action on a project approval by the ERC, and in such cases, disbursement can be seriously delayed, as the following case shows: the ERC authorised a rapid response grant of US\$ 3.1 million for UNICEF in DPRK. The request for disbursement was sent to the Controller's Office on 5 March

2007. Officials were reportedly concerned by recent allegations of impropriety by the UN in DPRK, and that the payment might contravene UN sanctions, although humanitarian assistance is specifically exempt. The disbursement was finally made on 20 April 2007, nearly 7 weeks later. While it is understood that the Office of the Controller needs to exercise due diligence, the programme manager, in this case the ERC, needs to be kept informed and any such delays minimized.

NGOs have raised the issue of slow forward disbursement from UN agencies to NGOs when they are acting as implementing partners<sup>70</sup>.

While the Secretariat has streamlined systems at its end to be able to release funds as soon as signed LOUs are received, the transfer of funds from UN agencies/IOM to NGOs still takes a long time; up to 3 months in some cases.

## **Conclusion**

25. A number of factors continue to cause delays in the disbursement of CERF funds from the UN Controller, through the operational agencies to the implementing partner.

## **Recommendations**

20. Through its field-based staff OCHA should continue to articulate clearly the CERF allocation criteria and funds availability, and through better communication, including greater use of telephone and satellite links, the CERF Secretariat should ensure that initial CERF proposals for RR are received within a maximum of 10 days after the disaster.

<sup>69</sup> Real Time Evaluation of Mozambique Floods Response (2007)

<sup>70</sup> Save the Children (June 2007). Save the Children Experiences with CERF in 2007.

21. Given that the ERC is accountable to donors for the use of the funds, he should request a commitment from the UN agencies to forward project funds to implementing partners within a target number of days and to publish tables of performance in the same way as the CERF secretariat.

## **5.6 OVERHEADS, PROGRAMME SUPPORT COSTS (PSC)**

One of the topics most frequently raised with the evaluation team by all categories of stakeholders was the question of overheads or programme support costs. There are three separate, but linked issues.

### **5.6.1 PSC of 3% charged for services on the part of the UN Secretariat**

In accordance with the rules for the management of UN Trust Funds, the United Nations Secretariat levies a charge of 3% for programme support services on payments made from the CERF. Many interlocutors pointed out that on a year's expenditure of US\$ 450 million (the Fund's annual target), this charge would raise \$13.5 million for the UN Secretariat. They expressed concern that the process of allocating programme support funds was not 'transparent' and that it was not clear what this payment was used for. In response, the Controller's Office pointed out that guidelines on the use of programme support funds are contained in ST/AI/286 on Programme Support Accounts, and that currently 40% of the programme support income may be used by the implementing offices, while 60% is used for central administrative functions. This formula was established to ensure that resources from the regular budget are not used to cover expenses related to Trust Funds.

During the course of the evaluation, the Controller informed OCHA that he had authorized the release of funds from CERF PSC receipts to meet the costs of the CERF Secretariat, and that this arrangement would continue, so long as the expenditure of the CERF remained above a specified level. The funds released in this way were equivalent to approximately 1% of overall expenditure, or one-third of the amount collected as PSC.

In discussions with the evaluation team, the Controller recognised the importance for OCHA to put in place adequate support and oversight mechanisms, to ensure effective use of the CERF, and accepted that such mechanisms were a reasonable charge on funds generated by the PSC on Trust Funds.

The evaluation team recognises that the UN Secretariat incurs substantial legitimate costs in administering the CERF. By rationalizing the financial reporting system, these costs can be reduced, both for the UN Secretariat and for the operational agencies. In view of the size of the CERF, it would seem reasonable to expect that the costs incurred by the Departments of the UN Secretariat, excluding OCHA, in administering the Fund could be covered by retaining 1% of expenditures, without imposing any burden on the Regular Budget.

Some interlocutors pointed out that several trust funds of similar size to the CERF, including the recently established Peace-building Fund, are now administered by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) unit established by UNDP, and that this unit charges a fee of only 1% for its services.

While the MDTF unit, as its name implies, has been established solely for the purpose of administering trust funds, and has already gained considerable experience in doing so, moving the CERF to the MDTF does not appear to be a realistic option in the short term. First, funds required for the administration of the CERF Secretariat would need to be charged to the income of the CERF. For this to happen, OCHA would need to identify a Trust Fund into which these funds could be paid. Secondly, the question of fiduciary responsibility would need to be decided. In the case of the Peace-building Fund, this has remained with the Secretary-General. Thirdly, this option was not favoured by most representatives of member states contributing to the CERF, interviewed by the evaluation team. Since the CERF has such an unusually large base of contributors, OCHA would need to assure itself that contributors would not be put off by the need to pay the funds to UNDP. Fourthly, representatives of some UN agencies also informed the team that they did not favour this option.

In these circumstances, the evaluation team has focused on the need to get ‘value for money’ from the 3% charged for support services on the part of the UN Secretariat.

### **5.6.2 PSC levied by UN agencies**

The UN agencies charge different rates of PSC and calculate the amounts differently. Within the framework of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative (GHD), a study is currently underway, which looks in detail at this issue. Among the main findings of the draft report is that a percentage rate does not provide a true picture of indirect costs. The corresponding recommendation invites donors to acquire a much more thorough understanding of the cost structures of humanitarian organisations, so that they can assess their cost-effectiveness more accurately. It also states that humanitarian organisations have a reciprocal responsibility to make it clear what costs they are including as indirect costs, so that donors can make a more informed judgement.<sup>71</sup>

For the purposes of the CERF, the ERC and the Controller obtained a commitment that operational agencies receiving CERF funds would charge no more than 7% PSC. As a result, most agencies now charge that amount on all CERF projects, irrespective of the work required from them and of the way in which individual organisations calculate indirect support costs.<sup>72</sup>

CERF funds are now being used in a wide range of ways. In some cases, UN agencies are executing the projects themselves. In others, they are transferring parts of a CERF grant to a relatively large number of national implementing partners, requiring quite intensive monitoring. In other cases, however, UN agencies are transferring funds to well-established international NGOs, with which they have long-standing partnerships, in situations where requirements for oversight are minimal.

While recognising that this is a highly complex and difficult issue, it is nevertheless worth pointing out that PSC charges of 7% on expenditure of \$450 million annually would raise \$31.5 million for the agencies. If that figure could be reduced by even one seventh, an additional \$4.5 million would be available to the ERC for distribution to emergencies.

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<sup>71</sup> Study by Development Initiatives for Good Humanitarian Donorship, entitled “Indirect Support Cost Study: Draft Final Report of June 2008, p. 23.

<sup>72</sup> It should be noted that 7% is less than the PSC charged by some agencies on bilateral contributions.

### 5.6.3 Overhead costs of NGOs implementing CERF-funded projects

The administrative arrangements of the UN agencies for disbursing funds to NGOs vary from agency to agency, and within each agency from country to country. UNICEF, for example, provides up to 25% of in-country project administration costs, as well as an overhead, normally between 3 and 5%, but these amounts need to be negotiated for each grant on a case-by-case basis. WFP usually provides a mutually agreed rate per tonne of food distributed by NGOs to cover their operating costs, and the rate varies from project to project and from country to country. UNHCR reports that they recently increased their overhead payment to international NGOs to 7% in certain circumstances. In all countries, NGOs complained that most UN agencies did not provide them overhead costs, and sometimes not even adequate administrative costs for implementing CERF-funded projects passed through UN agencies. They also expressed frustration at the inordinate amount of time their staff had to spend negotiating with UN agencies on this issue, to the detriment of their regular work.

Across all the countries visited during the evaluation, the stories are consistently similar. Being aware of this, the CERF Advisory Group asked the Secretary General to explore options to direct the appropriate proportion of the overhead charge to the final implementing partners<sup>73</sup>.

In Sudan, UNDP has been used as a vehicle to pass through CERF funds to NGOs. For a southern Sudan grant made by CERF last year, UNDP was the managing agent for which it eventually agreed an overhead of 5%. UNDP's role in this was managing the contract and dealing with the funds; as UNDP does not have expertise on emergency response, its role in programmatic monitoring and oversight was limited. Support for project oversight was also provided by OCHA and the Inter Agency Management Group. For a similar project in Iraq, UNDP charged 3%.

#### **Conclusion**

26. The system of overheads/PSC charges for CERF grants is widely perceived as being unrelated to the value added provided by different departments and agencies in the humanitarian response delivery chain.

#### **Recommendations**

22. The evaluation recommends that the ERC should seek to negotiate with the UN Controller an understanding that two-thirds of the UN Secretariat's 3% PSC charge will be made available to OCHA to meet all legitimate costs associated with the management and oversight of the CERF.

23. OCHA should seek agreements with the five main humanitarian agencies and UNDP on ways of categorizing projects depending on the level of administrative support and oversight required from the UN agency, and on the indirect support cost structure of the agency concerned. PSC rates up to 7% could then be applied accordingly. An agreement should also be sought in the context of the IASC to standardize the provision of fair overhead charges for NGOs implementing projects funded by the CERF.

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<sup>73</sup> CERF. Meeting of Advisory Group, 23-24 May 2007 – Note by the Secretary General

## **5.7. THE CERF ADVISORY GROUP**

The establishment of the CERF AG was endorsed by the General Assembly under resolution 60/124 of 15 December 2005. The Secretary-General selected 12 members, and four alternates, for the CAG, on the basis of nominations put forward by member states. Members serve in their individual capacities. The AG met twice in 2006, twice in 2007, and so far once in 2008. In 2006, the meetings lasted one day. In 2007 and 2008, the meetings have taken place over two days.

Of the eleven current members<sup>74</sup>, four are serving officials in the governments of traditional donor countries, three are officials of governments belonging to the G77, three are representatives of NGOs and one is an academic expert. Of the four alternates, two are government officials, one is from an NGO and one is an academic expert.

On the basis of a review of the minutes of AG meetings and interviews with some AG members, the ERC and other senior OCHA and UN agency staff, the evaluation team considers that the AG has played a valuable role in identifying and debating important issues relating to the management of the CERF. Questions have arisen, however, over the way the AG is serviced, as well as over its composition.

Some members stressed that the AG would be more effective if papers were circulated sufficiently in advance of the meetings to allow members to study the issues and prepare themselves properly. In addition, they suggested that the ERC should include among the papers for each meeting a note describing the follow-up action taken by OCHA on recommendations made by the AG at its previous meeting, together with an indication of the reasons why any specific recommendation could not be implemented.<sup>75</sup>

Several members told the team that the diversity of the membership of the AG helped to stimulate interesting and informed discussions. However, some members expressed the view that those members nominated by donor governments, who occupy posts with responsibility for decisions on the allocation of humanitarian funds, could not serve on the AG in a strictly personal capacity. They also pointed out that donor governments could discuss the CERF with OCHA in a number of other forums, including the OCHA Donor Support Group (ODSG).

In response to these arguments, representatives of donor governments pointed out that the advice given by the AG relates to a review of decisions already taken. The group does not advise the ERC on how to respond to new situations. In these circumstances, these members believed that they were able to serve in their individual capacities. They also believed that a total absence of such members would deprive the AG of a significant source of expertise. While the AG has provided a limited number of representatives of major donor countries with a regular engagement with the evolution of CERF, the AG cannot substitute for a broad forum for engagement by the ERC and OCHA with all member states contributing to the Fund.

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<sup>74</sup> One seat on the AG was vacant at the time of the evaluation, following the appointment of Catherine Bragg as Deputy ERC.

<sup>75</sup> It should be noted that this proposal was largely implemented for the AG meeting in June 2008, attended by the evaluation team leader.

Nevertheless, the evaluation believes that the donor government representatives have played a valuable role in AG meetings and should continue to have a place in the Group, subject to regular rotation, as with all members.

UN agencies welcomed the interaction they have had with the AG at the conclusion of AG meetings, and would be happy to expand the level of interaction in the future.

### **Conclusion**

27. The CERF Advisory Group has played a valuable role in debating important issues relevant to the CERF and has provided useful advice to the ERC.

### **Recommendation**

24. The evaluation recommends that the mandate of the CERF Advisory Group be extended for a further period of two years, and that its membership should rotate regularly, in keeping with its status as a group of members serving in their individual capacities. Members should continue to be drawn from a range of backgrounds and geographical origins. The practice of designating alternate members of the AG is no longer required. The Group should consist of 16 members. In addition, a wider platform involving all member states contributing to the CERF needs to be created, which would be convened every six months by the ERC, where he could report on CERF progress, challenges and funding needs, and provide a forum for open discussions.

### **Key recommendation for Section 5.**

The capacity of the CERF secretariat and OCHA field teams need to be strengthened, to ensure timely review of applications and high-quality decisions, and onward disbursement of funds to implementing partners needs to be speeded up, thereby guaranteeing faster response and better value for money. In addition, overhead charges need to be reviewed and the mandate of the CERF Advisory Group should be extended for a further period.

## 6. FACTORS AFFECTING THE ABILITY OF THE CERF TO MEET ITS OBJECTIVES

*Are the funds in the CERF additional to other donor funding? To what degree has the administrative and management capacity of CERF Sectt enabled CERF to play the critical role it was designed for? Have donors and CERF Sectt complied with GHDI principles in the overall fundraising and its allocations? How are the capacity and skills/competence of the institutions receiving CERF funding assessed and do they have the procedures necessary to implement the projects effectively and efficiently? What reporting and accountability mechanisms are in place to advise on, monitor and evaluate and report on CERF funding, and how efficient and effective/useful are these reporting and accountability mechanism? To what extent are host governments involved in decision-making, implementation and monitoring of projects funded by the CERF? How does the CERF communicate with wider stakeholders, including governments, civil society, media and academic institutions? To what extent does the fact that only UN agencies can access the fund limit the potential for rapid humanitarian action? Could NGOs be given direct access?*

### 6.1. ADDITIONALITY IN CERF FUNDING

The jury is still out as to what extent CERF money is ‘additional’. For several donors that are the largest contributors to the CERF, their CERF funding is certainly additional and has not come at the expense of reducing their bi-lateral/direct funding of humanitarian work. As discussed elsewhere, this evaluation found that the funding flows of the top seven donors (Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and UK) to CERF, which together contributed 85% of the funding in 2007, increased their total funding available to the UN agencies throughout the decade.

Despite this sustained overall increase by this group of major donors, in particular countries or for specific agencies the same donors may have sometimes reduced their funding, leading some agencies to conclude that CERF has had a negative effect on availability of funds.

NGOs reported similar reductions in funding in different countries as some donors now often direct them to pooled funds and CERF whenever approached with a funding request. Although precise figures were not available, NGOs met during the evaluation argued that since they cannot apply for CERF funds and are relatively minor players in the CHF allocations in DRC and Sudan, their direct access to funds in those countries, and in some countries where CERF has been a major source of funding, has therefore declined.<sup>76</sup>

Globally however, in absolute terms, all these seven major CERF donors, bar the UK, have also systematically increased their NGO funding year on year (corrected for the tsunami-effect, as the following figures reveal<sup>77</sup> .

**Table 10: NGO Humanitarian Funding by the top-7 donors to CERF (US\$ millions)**

| 2001  | 2002  | 2003  | 2004  | 2005  | 2006  | 2007  |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 103.7 | 190.2 | 125.6 | 202.2 | 357.2 | 325.5 | 389.2 |

Source: FTS


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<sup>76</sup> While NGOs in CHF countries may be receiving less funding directly from donors, the increase in their funding through the UN there may have increased overall levels of funding of some NGOs.

<sup>77</sup> All data are in current prices

However, if one compares the total funding to NGOs in relation to the growth in the overall humanitarian funding by these donors (using the same FTS data), the NGOs’ share in the additional funding has slightly declined, as can be seen from the widening gap between the two trend lines in the following figure. This decline in proportion of funding to NGOs however can by no means be attributed to CERF as it predates CERF by several years.

**Figure 17: Trend Humanitarian Funding and Funding to NGOs by top-7 Donors**



In brief, as the above discussion shows, the question whether or not CERF funds are ‘additional’ is a complex one. While for some donors, their funding of CERF came from additional budgets, this is not the case for all donors. What can be said for sure is that the overall levels of humanitarian funds available for UN agencies have increased with the introduction of CHF and CERF in particular.<sup>78</sup>

It can be argued that whether or not CERF funds are additional is a moot point. As long as the overall humanitarian funding continues to increase, and is able to keep pace with the needs, whether or not it comes from CERF, bi-lateral donors or any other mechanism is immaterial. In any case, CERF as it currently stands is no more than 4 per cent<sup>79</sup> of total global humanitarian funding. The Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, initiated in 2003, while stressing the need to increase overall volume of aid, also laid emphasis on *improving the humanitarian outcomes and getting better value for money from each humanitarian dollar given by donors*. This is where CERF’s distinctive value needs to come from – in terms of playing a catalytic role in gearing the entire humanitarian system towards providing better value for money in time-critical response - and hence CERF has to be seen in the context of the synergy it is able to generate, working in tandem with other pillars of humanitarian reform.

The country case studies for this evaluation provide illustrations of how CERF has become a useful tool for providing humanitarian assistance where it is needed when donors are unable or unwilling to give. Afghanistan is a good example of this, where successive humanitarian appeals have been well funded by CERF against a backdrop of donor absence from humanitarian issues in the country (or rather where some of the major humanitarian donors have channelled their assistance through

<sup>78</sup> In 2007, the proportion of CHF funds going directly to NGOs increased over 2006 figures, and the amount going to UN agencies decreased accordingly.

<sup>79</sup> This figure is based on the ‘guesstimates’ contained in the Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) report produced by Development Initiatives.

their military rather than traditional humanitarian agencies). Pakistan and Bangladesh provide two further example of where the traditional funding mechanisms – in this case the flash appeal – became controversial and CERF was able to respond in a timely fashion whilst this was being resolved. Mozambique received more funding as a result of CERF than it would have otherwise, measured by donor response to the IFRC appeal<sup>80</sup>.

### **Conclusion**

28. It is hard to prove empirically to what extent CERF funding has been additional. In the long run, the value added by CERF will have to come, not so much from additional funding, but additional value generated for every dollar of humanitarian funding.

## **6.2 CERF REPORTING**

The narrative reporting format for CERF grants was revised early in 2008 and reporting requirements have been reduced to one annual report during a calendar year to be submitted by 30 March. The RC/HC, with support from OCHA field offices wherever these exist, is required to collect inputs from UN agencies and IOM and consolidate these into one coherent report which provides an analysis of the challenges faced when prioritising needs, describes project implementation arrangements, and identifies results achieved and lessons learned. The report is required to aggregate information by sector/cluster.

The quality of reports to date, however, has been generally weak and uneven. Of the thirty odd country reports on CERF funds seen by the evaluators, only one or two can be said to provide an acceptable quality of information, account of progress and analysis. In Sudan, the evaluators found that the UNCT had developed a systematic reporting system on CERF grants, with inputs coming from individual agencies that are then pulled together by OCHA on behalf of the RC/HC. OCHA's Policy and Planning Unit in Khartoum is well resourced and is primarily responsible for the planning process, as well as for maintaining a comprehensive reporting system on CHF and CERF grants. The quality of reports is some of the best the evaluators have seen, and the reports provide clear data on the following aspects:

- Names of Agency partners and details of activities carried out by the partners;
- Amount of funds provided to each partner;
- Results/outcomes achieved in each sector
- Breakdown of number of beneficiaries by age group (adult, children), gender and type (IDP, newly displaced, refugees etc).

An example of details provided in the report on a CERF grant made to deal with water-borne Diseases in Sudan:

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<sup>80</sup> Mozambique real time review. Cosgrave et al. OCHA, Geneva, 2007.

**Table 11: Grants to water-borne diseases in Sudan**

| Agency         | CERF grant (\$) | Implementing Partners      | Primary Activities  | CERF Funds received (\$) |
|----------------|-----------------|----------------------------|---|--------------------------|
| WHO/<br>UNICEF | 1,024,699       | IFRC                       | Rehabilitation of boreholes   | 40,000                   |
|                |                 | Rural Water Department     | Chlorination  | 1,937                    |
|                |                 | WFP                        | Travel & freight costs  | 153,337                  |
|                |                 | MEDAIR                     | Water treatment, latrines & hygiene promotion   | 85,812                   |
|                |                 | Swedish Free Mission       | Disinfection of 100 boreholes, installation of 100 latrines & hygiene promotion in Juba | 65,328                   |
|                |                 | International Aid Services | Management of emergency water services in Yei   | 8,763                    |
|                |                 | Public Health Department   | Re-assembling of 100 wheel barrows for garbage collection in Juba                       | 300                      |
| Total          | 1,024,699       |                            |   | 335,477                  |

Agencies complain that CERF has increased their workload on reporting, both financial and narrative, as they have to submit separate reports on each sector of their work. Some of them work in several sectors, which require them to submit separate proposals in the first place. This is a particular problem in countries which have strong sectoral /cluster mechanisms in place for developing and vetting of proposals. As discussed in section 5.4 above, some agencies think that CERF has led to “over-projectisation” of their humanitarian work, with substantial transaction costs involved in meeting the reporting obligations.

When UN agencies transmit funds to NGOs, most UN agencies demand quarterly reports for grants made. Often, the grants made to NGOs are very small (in the range of \$10,000-\$100,000) and fragmented (several grants for several sectors) requiring them to submit a large number of reports, which are costly for the organisations.

The CERF financial reporting follows the Financial Regulations and Rules of the UN, and is managed, by the office of the Controller. Until January 2008, CERF disbursements were considered to be advances and were not reported as expenditures until financial income statements for the funds were received from the agencies. Since January 2008, grants to agencies have been recognised as expenditure. The Office of the Controller requires expenditures to be reported in the same format used by the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts when reporting UN trust fund monies to the legislative bodies. This format is not compatible with the agencies’ reporting formats. The financial reporting requirements have reportedly imposed a significant burden on the agencies. The required financial reports have included interim financial statements on completion of project duration and interim and final annual financial statements. The number of reports to be submitted has varied depending on the time of the grant: a CERF grant received in October might have involved submission of up to eight financial reports to the Controller’s office, as per the Agreements.

The Office of the Controller has informed the evaluation team that under the draft Umbrella LOU cleared by the Controller in June 2008, the financial reporting requirements have been streamlined, with two interim financial reports required at 15 February and 15 August, and a final report at 30

June. It was not possible, in the time available to assess the impact of these changes on the operational agencies.

### **Conclusions**

29. The quality of narrative reporting on CERF grants leaves a lot to be desired, although with a new reporting format, the quality should show significant improvement in 2008.

30. The multiple financial reports required from the operational agencies have entailed heavy transaction costs, without necessarily improving accountability.

### **Recommendations**

25. The ERC should ask the Controller to work with the UN agencies/IOM to rationalize the CERF financial reporting system.

26. When agencies receive more than one grant for the same emergency at the same time (through different sectoral/cluster proposals), the LOU ought to allow agencies flexibility to amend budgets, with the agreement of the HC, to reflect changing imperatives or priorities, and to prepare one comprehensive financial report.

## **6.3. MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M & E)**

The grant of CERF funds is predicated on the principle that the recipient UN agencies and IOM follow their own system of M & E and ensure delivery of results. The evaluation saw a large number of proposals (66 project proposal from 14 countries selected for the evaluation) for both UFE and RR. A few examples are given in the table below of the ones that had included in the budgets a substantial amount of funds for monitoring and evaluation activities<sup>81</sup>. However during the field visits or discussions with the recipient organisations, the evaluators found little evidence of any systematic M & E being undertaken for CERF-funded projects. The evaluators were shown only one evaluation report relating to work supported through CERF funds. CERF secretariat also had no record of systematic monitoring and evaluations conducted by individual agencies, indicating that both conducting and tracking of M & E were weak.

**Table 12: Examples of CERF Projects which had components of M & E budgets**

| <b>Project &amp; country</b>  | <b>Total Approved</b> | <b>M&amp;E</b> |
|---|-----------------------|----------------|
| Bangladesh: Emergency agricultural response to cyclone affected farmers and fishing communities     | 1,000,000             | 8,000          |
| Bolivia: Food security assistance to small producers in affected areas (*)                          | 288,600               | 12,600         |
| Bolivia: Emergency Operation 10616.0: Humanitarian assistance to households affected by floods (**) | 1,023,320             | 15,000         |

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<sup>81</sup> This was also an issue raised by the CERF Interim Review.

|  |           |        |
|--|-----------|--------|
| DRC: Treatment of severe malnutrition          | 3,000,000 | 50,000 |
| DRC: Strengthening health cluster activities   | 154,615   | 9,500  |
| DRC: Measles vaccination campaign in the       | 500,000   | 50,000 |
| DRC: Immunization of children, pregnant women  | 773,870   | 65,749 |
| DRC: Support accelerated immunization campaign | 1,498,000 | 30,000 |
| DRC: SGBV strengthening and prevention         | 741,011   | 35,000 |
| Haiti: Potable water for Martissant            | 222,500   | 18,903 |
| Sudan: Emergency Nutrition response in Darfur  | 88,863    | 3,775  |

Source: Project Documents

(\*) mentioned under budget line “Other” for “monitoring, assessment and dissemination”

(\*\*) mentioned under the Budget Category “operation” for “National Consultants for assessments and M&E”

The CERF secretariat has not consistently enforced compliance with the budgetary format required in the application template. Furthermore, the review of financial reports by OIOS indicated that for some projects the expenditures reported by the operating agencies were substantially different from the budgeted expenditures. Financial reports are currently not systematically reviewed in the context of their budgeted proposals. This has been in part because of confusion regarding whether this work should be carried out by the Office of the Controller or the CERF Secretariat. However, during the evaluation the Controller indicated that he was ready to accept the recommendation of OIOS that this work should be done by the CERF Secretariat, which should take on the appropriate staff for this purpose.<sup>82</sup>

## **Conclusion**

31.. In a large number of proposals, substantial (between 3-10% of total) funds have been provided by CERF, in addition to staff and operating costs, for M & E, for which there was very little demonstrated outcome.

## **Recommendation**

27. Clear parameters for Monitoring and Evaluation, with detailed statements of specific interventions to be carried out, need to be included in all proposals and LOUs and the outputs made available to all through the in-country humanitarian country teams.

## **6.4 ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY**

Accountability is one of the biggest challenges currently facing the CERF and opinion is divided on how accountability lines should work, amongst donors, operational agencies and RC/HCs. In the current system several officials have a measure of responsibility for the proper use of CERF funds.

<sup>82</sup> OIOS draft Report on the CERF.

The head of the UN agency country office has responsibility as the person overseeing the project. The RC/HC has recommended the agency and project for funding, so has some responsibility for assessing that the agency office was fit for purpose and that the proposed activities were priorities. The ERC, supported by the CERF Secretariat and OCHA more widely, has approved the agency for use of the funds, and as CERF Fund Manager is considered by donors and the GA as the person accountable for its use. The UN Controller has advanced the funds and then accepted a report of their proper use and therefore also has responsibility. Finally, the finance director of the agency concerned has responsibility for signing off on proper use of the funds.

In interviews, in the course of this evaluation, at least one RC/HC suggested that he considered himself responsible to the ERC for the proper use of the funds. Heads of agencies in the countries studied routinely told the evaluation team that the lines of accountability are the standard ones they have for their agency – they are accountable to their HQ for the proper use of funds and ensuring quality programme work.

The CERF Advisory Group has already considered this question and recommended the development of a “Performance and Accountability Framework”. The CERF Secretariat has sent an outline to the firm KPMG, which has offered pro bono consultancy services to assist with the development of such a framework.

The key to the development of such a framework will be to establish who is accountable for what. In practice, accountability for CERF funds can be envisaged on two parallel tracks.

### **1. Financial**



### **2. Outcomes**



While the CERF Secretariat does not have a formal role in the accountability framework, it is responsible for advising the ERC on the quality of narrative reporting received. The Controller has also indicated that he expects the CERF Secretariat to assist with the review of financial reports. By advising both officials ultimately accountable for the use of the funds, the CERF Secretariat can help to bring coherence to the review of project outcomes and financial reports.

For this system of parallel accountability to work effectively, two pre-conditions need to be fulfilled. First, the UN agencies’ standard internal monitoring and reporting systems need to be formally integrated into the project proposals, with the outcomes routinely shared with the RC/HC. Secondly, the ERC, with the agreement of the UN agencies, could make use of a range of ‘quality assurance’ instruments, such as Real-Time Evaluations, impact assessments, or deployment of independent assessors, to satisfy himself that projects were being implemented to an appropriate standard.

As with programme quality, the CERF did not particularly influence agency practice with regard to accountability to beneficiaries. Where agencies were pursuing good practice in this area, there were strong accountability lines; where this was not considered a priority, or did not feature in programme design, there was less direct accountability to beneficiaries. Moreover the evaluation found that where UN agencies were being strongly accountable to beneficiaries, this tended to be informal rather than formal. Examples include:

- In Afghanistan, WFP work directly with communities with many of their projects, through the village Shura groups. Communities are involved in the design and oversight of projects and have multiple routes for highlighting and resolving issues with WFP.
- In DRC, the camp managers of IDP camps have the mobile phone numbers of UNICEF cluster coordination staff and will call them if there are issues with water supply.

As the majority of UN agencies work in partnership with government or non-governmental organisations, direct accountability to beneficiaries is often the responsibility of those agencies. Again, CERF does not appear to impact on practice greatly. Where practice is well developed and sophisticated in terms of participation of communities, transparency of project budgets and so on, then CERF-funded projects conform to this standard. Where such practice is not well developed, it is not the case.

Transparency is traditionally seen as a key part of being accountable, and in nearly all of the country case studies carried out for this evaluation the CERF processes at field level were perceived by observers outside the UN as being insufficiently transparent. Ethiopia was one notable exception, where the HRF board, comprising government, UN agencies and NGOs reviews CERF applications as well as HRF ones. In most of the countries studied, only UN agencies participated in discussions around CERF allocation (in DRC NGOs were invited but did not attend CERF meetings), and in one country it was felt that CERF applications were in fact agreed amongst the ‘big three’ humanitarian UN agencies. NGOs that received CERF funding sometimes knew the source of the funding, but more often did not. This depended on the agency, and the country office. It also depended to an extent on the cluster.

Transparency in the identification of projects for CERF funding remains an issue<sup>83</sup>. Prioritisation of CERF proposals is not systematic, and often depends on the sector lead agency. Most CERF grant discussions are reportedly held at short notice involving a limited group of agencies. Even some UN humanitarian agencies complained that sometimes they were not involved in the discussions and found out about CERF proposals when they received the meeting minutes. In countries with CHF, most interlocutors held the view that the CHF funding allocation process, though more time-consuming, was more transparent than the CERF allocation process.

In IASC meetings, SCHR pointed to examples of NGOs not being welcomed into the clusters at the field level and noted the tendency to minimise the role of NGOs, especially when it came to grants allocations. However, the situation on the ground in almost all the countries continues to be the same. NGOs are usually excluded from any discussion on CERF grants; several UN agency interlocutors argued during the evaluation that since NGOs cannot be direct recipients of CERF

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<sup>83</sup> Although only 27% of the survey respondents found the CERF process non-transparent, this reflects the high proportion of respondents from UN agencies. The proportion of interviewees who held this view was far higher.

grants, there was no point in involving them in decisions. NGOs, when they receive funds from UN agencies, often are not told if the funds came from CERF grants or other sources. INGOs in Bangladesh reported that they were not even aware that CERF funds were allocated for cyclone Sidr response, and neither were local NGOs or INGOs involved at any stage in discussion with UN agencies/IOM of CERF prioritisation process<sup>84</sup>. The evaluation team was informed of one instance where a UN agency put forward a project proposal for CERF funding, including reference to an NGO implementing partner, without prior consultation with the NGO.

The representatives of one international NGO suggested to the evaluation team that the ERC and the UN agencies might establish a feedback/complaints mechanism, to which NGOs could refer issues, which they felt needed attention. While the ERC might consider designating an official to receive complaints regarding OCHA itself, the team believes that complaints regarding individual UN agencies/IOM should be addressed to the agencies themselves. In addition, NGOs have access to three NGO coordinating bodies in the context of the IASC.

Where clusters worked well, allowing for joint sector management, CERF was often included in discussions. Again, when there was a joint UN and NGO management approach to a particular sector, a discussion of how available resources could be brought to bear on a particular problem was obviously relevant. Where clusters worked at this more serious level, UN agencies and NGOs often co-chaired meetings, especially where the allocation of resources was being debated.

It is the view of the evaluation team that RCs, HCs and humanitarian country teams should aim for this level of transparency. The key to a transparent allocation of CERF resources lies in a functioning cluster or sectoral coordination mechanism, in which priorities and available capacity can be considered in a collegial way among key actors.

## **Conclusion**

32. Transparency and accountability to primary stakeholders (donors, NGOs, governments) in CERF allocations is not yet sufficiently demonstrated.

## **Recommendations**

28. The ERC could make use of independent assessors to conduct rapid appraisals of proposals (for large and complex operations) – these assessors will have been selected through a vetting process involving IASC, and trained in CERF-related requirements

29. In order to fulfil his responsibility for quality assurance, the ERC should from time to time commission independent programme audits, real-time evaluations and end-of-project evaluations, where appropriate using the roster of assessors. The evaluations/RTEs should include a mix of country studies, evaluations of randomly selected individual CERF-funded projects and sector grants, as well as overall evaluations like the current one. All reports should be made available to all stakeholders.

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<sup>84</sup> CERF (2008). *Lessons Learned: CERF Rapid Response Window – 2007*.

## **6.5 AGENCY CAPACITY FOR RAPID RESPONSE**

Of the 13 agencies which have received CERF funding to date, the top five recipients are WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WHO and FAO.<sup>85</sup> The participation of FAO and WHO in humanitarian action has grown dramatically during the past ten years, and this growth has been accelerated by the arrival of the CERF. Both agencies have taken steps to improve their capacity to cope with the increased demand.

FAO has invested significantly in improving their work in humanitarian action, which now represents something like half of their annual turnover (and is 30 times what it was a decade ago).

WHO has had a three year programme (TYP) to improve its performance in humanitarian response in place since 2005. A recent evaluation<sup>86</sup> found that humanitarian reform (including CERF) had magnified the effect of the TYP, leading to a change ‘visible at all levels of WHO organisational and cultural approach to humanitarian action’. The evaluation also noted that there remained much to be done including updating ‘inefficient and antiquated rules and regulations’ and the improvement of human resources management, which was ‘particularly below standards’.

In the section on Action and Responses supported by the CERF, it was argued that pre-existing capacity of agencies, in the countries where projects are to be carried out, is critical to providing timely response. Currently, the appraisals of CERF proposals do not pay adequate attention to an agency’s available capacity to provide reliable and fast response, especially in time-critical situations. CERF Secretariat needs to put in place a reliable mechanism to assess the capacity and track the record of implementing agencies in specific countries. Although this is primarily an issue for the rapid response window, agencies also need to demonstrate capacity to implement UFE projects. Indeed, there is little point in designating a project as ‘underfunded’, if the agency does not have the capacity to implement it when funding becomes available.

Examples identified by the evaluation where agency capacity proved inadequate included a health clinic in Goma funded in 2006 through the UFE window, which had not been completed in March 2008; ambulances to provide urgent assistance to deportees crossing borders in Afghanistan which had not arrived nine months after the RR grant approval; and temporary shelters in Peru provided through CERF RR funds, which fell below SPHERE standards. Conclusions and recommendations relating to agency capacity for timely response are in Section 4.2 above.

## **6.6. ENGAGEMENT WITH GOVERNMENT**

In many countries, the governments have played a key role in disaster response, and UNCTs have engaged very actively with governments. In a number of countries where CERF grants were made (Peru, Dominican Republic, Sudan, Pakistan, Afghanistan etc) during 2007, the governments were involved in prioritising the needs in close cooperation with the UNCTs, and in these countries the

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<sup>85</sup> For these five agencies, CERF represents the smallest percentage of funding for WFP (5%) and the largest for WHO (23% in 2007).

<sup>86</sup> Evaluation of the three-year programme to improve the performance of the World Health Organisation (TYP). De Ville de Goyet, C et al. WHO. Geneva. 2007.

level of awareness about CERF and related UN processes was significantly high. The Afghanistan government has played a strong role in the great majority of CERF allocations, both as instigator and implementer. The 2006/7 drought appeal was launched at the government's request. The UN agencies provided assistance to deportees from Iran, as a result of a request from government. In Peru, the UNDAC deployed staff were located in government offices, supporting the latter in communication and coordination.

Apart from these exceptions, generally the level of engagement of the government in CERF allocations was weak. It was only where flash appeals were launched, that governments were likely to be more aware of the CERF as a financing instrument. Moreover, the level of engagement also depended on pre-existing relationship of individual agencies with government authorities. Some agencies which routinely work through government departments, made sure that their government focal points were well informed of any CERF grants received by the agency.

Nevertheless, there are some issues with the role of the government, especially when a government with inadequate capacity is closely involved in distribution of aid made available through CERF funding. For example, in countries like Afghanistan, government does not have implementation capacity in the remotest or most difficult places where humanitarian action is most likely to be needed. In parts of DRC, supplies left with local mayors reportedly never reached the people they were intended for.

### **Conclusion**

33. In countries where the UN enjoyed better pre-existing relationships with governments, the UNCTs have worked closely and productively with federal and regional authorities, although, in some instances, where governments have had limited capacity, excessive reliance on government systems for implementation has been counter-productive.

## **6.7 COMMUNICATION ON CERF**

The criteria and processes for CERF allocations appear still to be unclear to a large number of senior country staff, including heads of agencies. Countries that have been successful in attracting large CERF funds are sometimes perceived as being favoured countries because of the personal influence of the RC/HC on the decision-making process in New York. Several countries submitted proposals to CERF rapid response window after spending considerable time in planning and prioritisation, even on the advice of in-country OCHA staff, only to be told that CERF could only fund a small part of the proposal. Countries apply for a certain amount, to be told that it is too much, and asked to revise and resubmit another proposal; this can go on for two or three iterations. It would be more effective if, as proposed above, the ERC would give the countries an indication of the maximum size of envelope within which the country needs to plan; this would avoid giving false expectations and wasting time. In considering the size of an envelope, the ERC will need to consider the size of the disaster and extent of the humanitarian needs, the capacity of the national government to respond, the readiness of other donors to provide funding quickly, the capacity of the operational agencies to implement, and the availability of funds in the CERF at the time. As indicated elsewhere in this report, where a flash appeal is to be issued, the CERF envelope is likely to constitute between 10 and 20 percent of the amount sought.

While there is a clear conviction at the level of CERF management in the HQ, that the CERF processes in country must foster partnership with NGOs, in the countries receiving CERF funds the general consensus appears still to be that involvement of NGOs may be useful, but not essential, since NGOs are not eligible for direct funding. This divergence exists in spite of efforts by the CERF Secretariat to close this communications gap.

The CERF Secretariat organises training courses for field staff in different regions to explain the CERF processes and criteria. Other units of OCHA (namely, Humanitarian Reform Support Unit, Humanitarian Coordination Strengthening Project) also organise training courses periodically on specific aspects of the humanitarian reform. However, sometimes not enough joint planning of these training courses takes place, giving a disjointed perspective to the participants. 44% of the survey respondents said that the CERF training currently is not reaching the people who need it, and is not always appropriate (only 39% of respondents said the training was appropriate – this was the lowest positive feedback on any of the 25 questions).

Given the lack of clarity that still exists in the field about CERF criteria and size of funds, it is apparent that more needs to be done to communicate various aspects of CERF effectively to the country teams, especially to the senior management in country. Among survey respondents, 44% also held the view that communication on CERF is not adequate.

Member states also expressed the desire to receive more regular information regarding the progress of the CERF. While the CERF website is appreciated, many stakeholders would welcome a regular monthly message highlighting significant developments. Although a monthly newsletter is being issued, it is clearly not reaching some key stakeholders. Officials with direct responsibility for CERF allocations in the capitals of some key member states informed the evaluation that they did not receive reports on the progress of the CERF. They made it clear that they did not consider they had ‘received’ a document, if it had only been posted on the CERF website.

CERF has not yet published an annual report on activities. The evaluation was informed that such a publication is in preparation for 2007. For 2006, no report could be published, since the capacity of the CERF Secretariat was limited.

### **Conclusion**

27. While the CERF website has developed into a valuable source of information about the CERF, stakeholders need to receive key communications directly from the ERC or the CERF Secretariat.

### **Recommendation**

30. The CERF secretariat should produce an annual report on activities for a wide audience, and ensure a wide distribution for its monthly update on activities.

## **6.8 ACCESS FOR NGOS TO CERF FUNDING**

As discussed in previous sections, engagement with NGOs has been patchy and the evaluation does not indicate that CERF has brought about any change in UN agencies' partnership with NGOs. NGOs have usually been excluded from discussion on CERF funding. This is also confirmed by the survey where to the question whether CERF has enabled stronger relationship with NGO partners, the response received one of the lowest positive scores (48%) from amongst the scores on 25 questions.

Direct access for NGOs is a thorny issue in any discussion on CERF. On the one hand, there are technical and political reasons why a GA-mandated mechanism like the CERF cannot directly fund the NGOs, which constitute a heterogeneous group with different ideology, affiliation, capacity and accountability systems. On the other hand, NGOs, at least those with proven capacity, resources and expertise – and there are many of them – often are able to provide high quality response and often are the first to reach the poorest and most vulnerable. The fact that NGOs can often deliver at a lower cost than the UN makes it all the more important, at least from the humanitarian imperative perspective, that NGOs ought to be key players if CERF is to become a truly effective global rapid response tool.

In a few countries (Sudan, DRC and other ERF countries), the CERF has found creative mechanisms to ensure that NGOs can access CERF funds quickly and are able to provide rapid response. The lessons from these initiatives have been extremely positive, and proven to be the first line of response following sudden emergencies.

### **Conclusion**

35. Where RC/HCs and UN agencies/IOM have engaged NGOs inclusively on issues surrounding the CERF, there have been benefits to the management of humanitarian response. Such situations remain, however, the exception rather than the rule.

### **Recommendations**

31. OCHA and the UN agencies need to acknowledge that NGOs have unique strengths to contribute to the objectives of the CERF, and hence the NGOs need to play a more important role in CERF processes than they have been playing so far.

32. Within the limitations of CERF, OCHA and UN agencies should explore various options for enabling NGOs to have meaningful access to CERF funds rapidly, and at low cost.

## **6.9 MAINTAINING SUPPORT IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY**

The intent behind General Assembly Resolution 60/124 was to fill two important gaps in the international humanitarian response architecture: the lack of resources available to the Emergency Relief Coordinator to kick-start the international humanitarian response to sudden-onset disasters

and to meet time-critical needs; and, the need for a mechanism to bring equity and impartiality to the allocation of resources for core emergency humanitarian response in underfunded or neglected emergencies.

In the two years since the resolution was adopted, the CERF has demonstrated that it can fill those gaps. It is unlikely that those who drafted and adopted the resolution could have foreseen the speed with which the new CERF has become an essential feature of international humanitarian action.

The CERF has attracted an unprecedented number of member states to contribute to the Fund. Indeed, the Assembly may consider inviting all member states to contribute as a gesture of solidarity with the victims of disasters in all corners of the globe.

In order for this success to continue and grow, it will be incumbent on the Secretary-General to maintain the support of member states in the General Assembly and as contributors to the Fund. This will require regular reporting on the operations of the CERF, as well as progress reports on the implementation of the recommendations contained in this evaluation. Indeed, member states should consider requesting the Secretary-General to commission a further independent evaluation at an appropriate time.

### **Conclusion**

36. The future success of the CERF is dependent on the continued support of member states in the General Assembly and as contributors to the Fund.

### **Recommendation**

33. The General Assembly should consider inviting all member states to contribute to the CERF, and requesting the Secretary-General to commission a further independent evaluation in early 2011.

### **Key recommendation for Section 6**

The multiple lines of accountability for CERF need to be clarified, in consultation with the UN Controller and the operational agencies, to specify the roles of each actor; the ERC needs to ensure that the operational agencies have in place appropriate monitoring and reporting systems, and to make use of quality assurance mechanisms for evaluation of CERF projects, without increasing the bureaucratic burdens of implementation.

## 7. OECD/DAC CRITERIA FOR HUMANITARIAN EVALUATIONS

### COVERAGE:

*Coverage is about the need "to reach major population groups facing life-threatening suffering wherever they are, providing them with assistance and protection proportionate to their need and devoid of extraneous political agendas".*

As discussed in previous sections, the CERF succeeded in reinforcing to a large extent the principles of impartiality and needs-based response in humanitarian response worldwide. A good example of this, amongst the many mentioned in this report, is the response to cyclone Nargis in Myanmar for which the CERF grant was one of the largest so far at US\$ 22 million. Despite grave political difficulties, CERF was able to approve its first grant by 12 May 2008, 10 days after the disaster, which meant UN agencies were able to put in place essential measures to provide assistance to the victims and negotiate humanitarian access to the affected areas.

In protracted crises, some of which have been relegated to the status of what are called the ‘forgotten crises’ due to lack of funding, CERF funds have played a key role in not only providing vital assistance and protection support (Afghanistan, Eritrea, DPRK, Sudan, Somalia and so on) to communities, but also enabled UN agencies to draw attention of other humanitarian agencies and donors to these ongoing crises needing attention - the case of the forgotten Burmese refugees in Bangladesh mentioned earlier is a good example. In Central African Republic (CAR), another forgotten crisis, CERF grants enabled UN agencies to kick-start humanitarian response and subsequently bring on board other donors who were not even fully aware of the humanitarian needs in the country.

The role of CERF in meeting unmet life-saving humanitarian needs becomes clear in cases like Afghanistan. The ICRC recently stated that they had less access to people displaced by conflict than at any time in the last 20 years, and said that the “humanitarian situation is worsening as hostilities spread”<sup>87</sup>. A country that is being provided tens of billions of dollars in aid for security and reconstruction by the international community receives only about US\$160 million in humanitarian aid every year. This situation is extraordinary in the country where conflict has raged for the past 30 years and still continues to put millions of people in a life-threatening situation. The fact that there is no common appeal, or humanitarian strategy arguably diminishes the power of both UN agencies and other humanitarian actors to mobilise resources for humanitarian action. The UN agencies account for nearly half of the current humanitarian aid, of which a third comes from the CERF alone.

Working in tandem with other pillars of humanitarian reform, CERF has contributed to a significant increase in CAP funding – in 2007, the coverage was 72%, the highest achieved in the decade. Clusters that have enabled inter-sector and inter-agency collaboration have also ensured that unmet needs are identified by humanitarian agencies quickly and appropriate response launched, thus increasing the coverage.

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<sup>87</sup> “Humanitarian situation worsens as Afghan hostilities spread”. International Committee of the Red Cross. 18 February, 2008. <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/Afghanistan-interview-180208>

## RELEVANCE AND APPROPRIATENESS

*Relevance* is concerned with assessing whether projects are in line with local needs and priorities and refers to the overall goal and purpose of a programme. *Appropriateness* is about the need to tailor humanitarian activities and inputs to local needs, and examines the correspondence between input/resources and the intended result).

CERF grants have been generally allocated for needs that are highly relevant to disaster-affected communities, especially in rapid responses. In the seven country studies and through the telephone interviews, the evaluation has not found a case in CERF's portfolio of rapid response grants that raises questions about relevance. The same cannot be said about the underfunded grants. In a number of cases involving the 'underfunded' window, the relevance of CERF grants, which are supposed to be meant only for meeting the core emergency humanitarian needs, remains unclear, where it appears these have been used either to support regular ongoing programmes of agencies or to provide non life-saving interventions.

There have been many excellent and appropriate projects supported by CERF, for instance:

- Residents of areas affected by cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh cite rapid provision of clean drinking water as one of the most effective and rapid responses to their needs.
- The CERF-supported humanitarian cargo service into Somalia was cited by all of the UN agencies and others as an essential service that allowed for assistance to be delivered at a critical time.

These two cases are merely illustrative and there are projects from every case study for this evaluation that fall into this category. There were also a number of projects supported by CERF that were not so appropriate:

- Poor quality tents provided in Peru did not take into consideration the fact that people would need to live in these tents for 3-6 months before they would be moved to transition shelters;
- Dredging and cleaning operations were conducted on a stretch of drainage canal in Haiti without looking into the overall drainage system connecting the canal. This meant that 2-3 months after the cleaning, the canal was clogged up again;

These weaknesses in some of the cases apart, overall this evaluation found that CERF has been funding highly relevant and appropriate interventions through the RR window in line with the purpose of this fund. An important fact that came out from evidence gathered through the country studies was that since the RR window of CERF is meant for rapid and time-critical interventions, relevance and appropriateness are also linked to agencies' ability to deliver timely response. In cases where response has been delayed, the relevance and appropriateness have been poor. In case of UFE grants however, as the discussion in section 3.5 demonstrates, there were a significant number of cases where the relevance and appropriateness of the activities undertaken through CERF grants was questionable.

## EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY:

*Effectiveness* measures the extent to which the activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. *Timeliness* is generally implicit within the criteria of effectiveness. *Efficiency* measures the outputs – qualitative and quantitative – in relation to the inputs. In case of CERF as a mechanism, some of the issues around efficiency and effectiveness are intertwined, and hence both are dealt with here.

The question of effectiveness here is discussed in relation to CERF as a humanitarian financing mechanism as a whole, rather than the effectiveness of all the projects CERF has funded. In this context, it is to be noted that there are three key elements to assessing CERF's effectiveness:

- i) Its ability to promote early action and response;
- ii) Its role in enhancing response to time-critical needs; and
- iii) Strengthening the core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises.

As discussed in section 3, the rapid response window of CERF has enabled agencies to launch or scale up rapid response in the fastest time when the CERF worked in tandem with already existing agency resources or in-country mechanisms for fast delivery of response (like ERFs, RRM, CHFs etc). Even where such mechanisms did not exist, CERF funds have enabled rapid response directly by UN agencies and NGOs, and often indirectly, by enabling other donors (bi-lateral) to take rapid decisions. The very fact that the CERF funds have been allocated for a rapid response is taken by many donors as an indication of the severity and gravity of needs, and has enabled them to justify to their political constituents the need for response in particular situations.

Allocations from CERF also helped greater inter-agency collaboration and coordination with governments (Peru, Dominican Republic, Pakistan for example) which enabled better prioritisation and targeting of the response.

In case of underfunded crises, although the evaluation found that CERF has strengthened humanitarian response, on occasions when CERF funds were used to fund non life-saving activities, these made little or no contribution to fulfilling CERF's objectives, thus raising questions about the effectiveness of such grants, and this is an area which CERF needs to improve upon to enhance its effectiveness in underfunded emergencies.

The timeliness of CERF funding has progressively improved over the past two years, as the CERF secretariat and country teams have become more proficient at rolling out and using this new financing tool. However, the time taken in disbursement of funds, especially from the UN agencies/IOM to the field and then in forward disbursements to implementing partners when required have been slow. Although such delays have been offset to a large extent by the fact that major implementing partners have their own sources of funds which they can draw upon to launch a response whilst waiting for the CERF funds to reach their accounts, this is far from ideal. Apart from the funds disbursement, another delaying factor in many agencies has been their limited institutional capacity to deliver rapid response – cumbersome procurement and decision-making systems in a few UN agencies have often delayed implementation on the ground, reducing the effectiveness of the response.

To a large extent, apart from improving the disbursement timelines and implementation capacity of some of the UN agencies which are only now beginning to get involved in major humanitarian response, another important contributing factor to CERF overall effectiveness will be its ability to engage the NGOs and ensure that they have a major role to play in CERF-funded humanitarian response. The fact is that NGOs, at least those of them who have proven capacity, resources and expertise – and there are many of them – often are able to provide high quality response and are often the first to reach the poorest and most vulnerable. UN agencies, barring in a few exceptional situations, cannot match the agility and efficiency of such NGOs. The fact that NGOs can also generally deliver at a lower cost than the UN agencies, as their overheads costs are lower, makes it

all the more important, at least from the humanitarian imperative perspective, that NGOs should be key players if CERF is to become as effective as possible as a global rapid response tool.

The capacity of the CERF secretariat and the ability of OCHA to ensure adequate deployment to support the HC and UNCT in planning, design and coordination of humanitarian response as well as OCHA's ability to act as a bridge between the agencies and CERF secretariat on the ground have been important elements contributing to the effectiveness of the response. However, adequate resourcing of these efforts has been an issue in some situations, a point that needs addressing in the future.

The question of overheads on CERF grants is a critical one as it impinges on the cost-effectiveness of delivery of the CERF-funded response. While this is a complex issue, the value-added through the various tiers of overheads charges (UN Secretariat 3%, UN agencies/IOM 7%, NGOs variable) needs to be rationalised and related to the services provided.

## **CO-ORDINATION**

*Coordination refers to how the agency coordinates its activities with others*

The strengthening of the Humanitarian Coordinator system is perhaps the key to making all of the other components of humanitarian reform (HR) work effectively. To paraphrase the first CERF review (2007), where the HC system worked well, so did all of the components of HR. Although it is difficult to attribute improved coordination, wherever it happened, to CERF, the latter did have some impact on the RC/HC position and overall coordination in many countries where CERF funding was significant in relative volume: Peru, Dominican Republic, Mozambique, Ethiopia for example where the RC/HC saw CERF as a mechanism that enhanced coordination and the role of RC/HC. The fact that the UN could deploy "its own resources" gave the UN system (and therefore the office of the RC/HC) greater credibility in the eyes of the host governments in all of the cases studied for this evaluation. The use of clusters or strong pre-existing sectoral coordination in many countries has led to coordinated needs assessment. However, in countries where there are other significant funding mechanisms (DRC, Sudan) or where the role of HC has been weak (Bangladesh, Afghanistan), it is difficult to say that CERF has made any contribution to strengthening coordination.

It is important to note here that even if CERF has had a positive impact on coordination, this has been mostly in relation to coordination among the UN agencies and between the UN agencies and the government. Coordination with NGOs and the Red Cross/ Red Crescent which historically has been weak, continues to be so in most countries, and CERF has not made a significant difference.

## **IMPACT**

*Impact looks at the wider effects of the project - social, economic, technical, and environmental - on individuals, gender, age-groups, communities, and institutions.*

As has been mentioned in the 'Methodology' section, the most difficult question to answer at this stage is whether CERF is leading to better outcomes for the disaster affected. There is some evidence to suggest that improvements in terms of prioritisation of projects, decentralised decision making, rapid availability of funding have meant that projects respond to real needs in proper time. Access to funding for local NGOs either through mechanisms like ERFs or through UN agencies

means those closest to communities receive funding. There have also been examples of projects that have had little or no impact, either because they are late, or of poor quality or because they seek to address problems that are developmental in nature and require greater resources, a different approach, longer time frames and political will locally.

Where CERF has not had an impact is on the quality of the programmes that it funds, as these lie within the purview of the agencies. Quality remains variable, depending on the agency and the country.

The CERF has had a significant impact on UN agency funding, not necessarily in terms of volume but for all five major humanitarian UN agencies it has become one of their top sources of funding in emergencies. CERF has also had an impact on the predictability of funding with appeals funded at their highest percentage in a decade.

As a result of its emphasis on decision-making within country teams, CERF has mostly had a positive impact on the role of the humanitarian coordinator and the credibility of the UN system with governments. CERF also appears to be having a positive impact on UN agency capacity and the process of prioritisation and needs assessment, although such impacts are by no means universal. As has already been stated, CERF tends to accentuate already positive developments but has little or no impact in situations where practice is poor.

## **CONNECTEDNESS AND COHERENCE**

*Connectedness is about the need to assure that activities of a short-term emergency nature are carried out in a context which takes longer-term and interconnected problems into account and Coherence refers to policy coherence, and the need to assess security, developmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure that there is consistency and, in particular, that all policies take into account humanitarian and human rights considerations.*

The expanded CERF was introduced as part of a package of humanitarian reforms. Its relationship with the other components of this reform is at the heart of the question as to whether it is a 'coherent' tool, as is its relationship with other humanitarian financing instruments.

Despite the apparent simplicity of the reforms, their inter-relationship has been complex. The role of leadership is critical, and yet has not changed significantly over the two years since the CERF has been in operation. Where there is strong humanitarian leadership within the UN family, tools such as CERF and clusters have reinforced this, but where the leadership is weaker the various components of reform have tended to add greater confusion or contention. DRC and Sudan are examples of the former; the latter has been the case in several rapid onset disasters where RCs have had to quickly assume the functions of HC without prior knowledge or much institutional support. In highly politicised contexts such as Afghanistan, the reforms have yet to achieve much purchase, although CERF has certainly helped keep the humanitarian flame alive in that context.

CERF has not supported the cluster system in its implementation, although in examples where they worked together the sum seemed to be greater than the parts. Conversely, where CERF has been accompanied by an effort to introduce clusters, this has sometimes created controversy. In Bangladesh, the RC and the UNCT did not want clusters and did not want OCHA 'taking over'. In Peru too, the UNCT felt they had a working coordination model without clusters. In both places the shelter sector suffered significantly from a lack of strategic oversight which appropriate use of clusters could have helped.

The final component of humanitarian reform is partnerships with non-UN actors and in this regard CERF has helped to strengthen partnerships with governments, but has not helped and has possibly even soured relations somewhat with NGOs. NGOs feel largely left out of CERF discussions and feel the money is usually secured by UN agencies for their own purposes, leaving them ‘scraps from the table’.

This evaluation has found that whilst CERF’s effectiveness is enhanced when the other three components are working well, it does not influence or promote these components as currently configured. This evaluation has also found that where CERF is used to try and promote other aspects of humanitarian reform, the results are mixed. The question of how to promote these more difficult aspects of reform is outside of the scope of this evaluation. Nevertheless it is interesting to note that part of the CERF’s success is its simplicity. Clusters in particular are often viewed as complex and burdensome.

In relation to other aspects of humanitarian financing, this evaluation has found that CERF is primarily a tool for enabling UN agency early response. It is a valuable tool, promoting decentralised decision-making, evidence-based needs assessment and prioritisation and positively enhancing coordination in many cases. It remains a small part of the overall humanitarian response however, at less than 4% of global financing. It can only be successful if it is complemented by robust financing for other parts of the humanitarian system.

## 8. CONCLUDING REMARKS

***CERF's contribution to overall humanitarian architecture:*** In its first two years, the CERF made considerable progress towards meeting its principal objectives of improving the timeliness of initial response to sudden-onset emergencies and correcting the inequities of humanitarian financing of 'neglected' emergencies. It has already established itself as an impartial humanitarian financing tool, and helped accelerate response, increase coverage and reinforce the importance of needs assessments as the basis for humanitarian response. The CERF has also attracted an unprecedented coalition of contributors and should reach its annual target of US\$ 450 million in 2008. Though CERF accounts for only a small fraction of overall humanitarian funds globally, its added value comes from its ability to work with other pillars of humanitarian reform and thereby *improve humanitarian outcomes and get better value for money from each humanitarian dollar given by donors*. In several places, CERF has contributed positively to coordination among the UN agencies and between the UN agencies and the host government. Coordination with NGOs and the Red Cross/ Red Crescent movement continues to be weak in most countries.

***Timeliness, Appropriateness and Effectiveness of CERF:*** The timeliness of CERF funding has progressively improved over the past two years as all actors have gained experience in using this new financing tool. However, the time taken in disbursement of funds, especially from the UN agencies to their country offices, and then in forward disbursements to implementing partners, has often been too long. CERF funds have generally been used for relevant and appropriate humanitarian interventions, especially in rapid response situations, and in cases when agencies receiving CERF funds had strong humanitarian programming capacity. The efforts of the CERF Secretariat and the ability of OCHA to ensure adequate support for the HC and UNCT in planning, design and coordination of humanitarian response have been important elements contributing to CERF's effectiveness. Besides these, an important contributing factor to CERF's overall effectiveness in future will be its ability to engage the NGOs and ensure that they have a key role to play in CERF-funded humanitarian response.

***CERF Allocation criteria:*** The application of currently defined life-saving criteria for CERF allocations, for both rapid response and underfunded crises, does not always lead to an objective and transparent process of decision making with regard to selection of projects as well as countries for funding. The flexible use of the life-saving concept especially in underfunded crises has not always lived up to the central purpose of the CERF and may have on occasion gone beyond what can be called 'core emergency humanitarian needs'. This is an issue that the ERC, in collaboration with the IASC, needs to address.

***Quality Assurance:*** CERF is not a donor agency, and as a 'humanitarian pooled fund' provided by donors, the CERF mechanism involves managing the funds on behalf of those who contribute. Although individual agencies are responsible to ensure proper accounting for and monitoring and evaluation of projects funded through the CERF, the continuation of CERF will depend upon the trust and confidence that member states continue to repose in the management of the funds and the results they deliver. This evaluation makes a strong case for the ERC to put in place robust quality assurance and peer review mechanisms to ensure continuous improvement, learning and accountability at every stage of the CERF related processes namely, project appraisals, implementation and evaluation.

## **ANNEX 1: Terms of Reference**

**Terms of reference:**  
**External Evaluation of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)**  
**United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)**

**1. Background**

The CERF is becoming one of the key humanitarian financing mechanisms. Since its launch in March 2006, the CERF has attracted more than \$582 million in paid contributions and has disbursed \$446 million for over 692 projects in 53 countries. The main goals of the CERF are to promote early action and timely and equitable response to reduce loss of life; that it enhances response to time-critical requirements based on demonstrable needs and to strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in under-funded crisis.

The CERF was created in December 2005 through General Assembly (GA) resolution 60/124 pursuant to a report of the Secretary General [A/60/432] for the need to improve on the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF). The new CERF was set up to add a major grant element to the existing loan element. The Fund's loan mechanism of \$50 million, is a revolving fund that is used as a cash-flow mechanism by eligible humanitarian organizations. The loan mechanism allows rapid access to funds ahead of the transfer of donor pledges.

The CERF is funded by voluntary contributions from donors and is managed, on behalf of the Secretary General, by the UN's Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) who serves as Programme Manager for the Fund. The ERC regularly consults with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and humanitarian/resident coordinators as appropriate, on matters relating to the utilization of the funds in order to obtain guidance support when determining priorities for their use. An advisory group of 12 experts representing the humanitarian community provides the ERC with broad policy advice on the implementation of the Fund to ensure accountability and transparency.

The Fund is supported by a secretariat and by other branches in OCHA. It is governed by UN Financial Regulations and Rules of the UN and financially administered by the Office of the Controller.

Pursuant to the General Assembly Resolution 60/124, the Coordinator, in consultation with the IASC, shall commission an independent, retrospective and substantive evaluation of the functioning and utilization of the Fund at the end of the second year of its operation.

Prior to this, an independent CERF Review commissioned by OCHA was conducted between March and September 2007. The objective of that review was to provide performance (effectiveness) and management (efficiency) feedback to CERF stakeholders with the aim of contributing to strengthening the effectiveness of the mechanism and its potential impact on overall humanitarian response in response to the needs of people affected by humanitarian crisis. The review team, consisting of two consultants, assessed the CERF in six countries (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Somalia) and interviewed staff from UN agencies, international and local NGOs, which have implemented projects funded by the CERF. The information and main conclusions gathered from the CERF Review was intended to provide a baseline for this "two-year after" evaluation of the CERF.

The review concluded that significant progress has been made in the implementation of the CERF in its first year of operations. However, there are a number of issues which need to be clarified, including ensuring a common understanding of the scope of the CERF, providing more effective management of the CERF within OCHA, strengthening working relationships with UN agencies and the NGO community at both the global and field levels, and finally, providing more effective and transparent information on CERF as a mechanism and on its performance.

The review also made some recommendations regarding the preparation of this GA mandated evaluation. Specifically, the review recommended that OCHA put in place measures to ensure that complete documentation on CERF processes and grants is maintained and readily available at the field and global levels, that the Terms of Reference include a systematic analysis of CERF grants at the global level, and finally that the review process is initiated early and includes sufficient resources to allow for an in-depth evaluation at both the country and project level.

This Evaluation is distinct from the first CERF Review completed in September 2007 in three ways:

- Incorporation of greater depth of analysis on CERF's efficiency and effectiveness;
- Use of increased range of methodologies with a reliance on newly-available quantitative data and reporting as well as field methods including interviews with key stakeholders;
- Focus on provision of strategic guidance to donors and the UN system on the future of the CERF.

## **2. Purpose and Objectives**

The overall purpose of the evaluation is:

- To provide a diagnosis of the current state of affairs to the main stakeholders;
- To learn from ongoing practice.

Overall objectives:

- To assess the CERF in a comprehensive manner, based on project data and frameworks, covering the benefits and disadvantages to the CERF as an approach to humanitarian financing, and
- To provide recommendations to donors and the UN system at strategic and operational levels as to whether the CERF should be continued in its current form and if so, how it should be improved.

The focus will be on four key areas

- The “value added” of the CERF grant and revolving fund in the context of the overall humanitarian financing architecture;
- The strategic, managerial and operational aspects of the CERF, covering high level leadership, advocacy, as well as administrative issues such as efficiency and effectiveness, fundraising issues such as promotion and take-up, and distributive issues such as the criteria for allocation for funds;
- The contribution of the CERF to improved humanitarian performance
- Internal (e.g. capacities) and external factors (e.g. political factors) which influenced the ability of the CERF to deliver on its objectives.

These areas are in line with UN General Assembly Resolution 60/124 paragraph 22, which stated that the evaluation should assess “the grant and revolving elements of the Fund, its administration, criteria for resource allocation, actions and responses supported by it and its ability to meet its objectives, and to submit a report in this regard to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session”.

The evaluation report will be submitted to the Secretary General in July 2008, so that the SG can submit a report to the General Assembly in August 2008.

### **3. Key issues / Evaluation questions**

The evaluation should focus on a number of key issues, as specified in the GA Resolution:

#### **I. The grant and revolving elements of the Fund: wider implications**

The questions should address the benefits and disadvantages of the CERF grant and revolving fund mechanisms in the context of the overall humanitarian financing and wider humanitarian response architecture.

Specific questions to be asked should cover:

##### *Benefits and shortcomings*

- Examine the contribution that the CERF makes to the current delivery system.

##### *Complementarity and overlap with other funding and reform initiatives*

- Examine the interaction between the CERF, other pooled funding mechanisms (such as the Emergency Response Funds, the Peacebuilding Fund and Common Funds), the Consolidated / Flash Appeals, UN agency internal reserves and emergency funds. Examine the extent to which a clear sequencing in funds is evident;
- Examine the CERF in the context of the initiatives shaping the wider humanitarian reform agenda, including the strengthening of the leadership of the HCs, strengthened partnerships and improved coordination (e.g. through the clusters);
- Examine access to and the outcome of the CERF for different stakeholders, including implementing partners, host governments, NGOs, in financial and other terms.

#### **II. The administration of the CERF and use of criteria for resource allocation**

The questions should address the strategic, managerial and operational aspects of the CERF, covering strategic issues such as high level leadership and advocacy, administrative issues such as efficiency and effectiveness, marketing issues such as promotion and take-up, and distributive issues such as the criteria for allocation for funds.

Specific questions to be asked should cover:

##### *Strategic leadership of the CERF*

- Examine the role of the ERC in leading the CERF process, and undertaking advocacy around replenishment;

*The administration of the CERF*

- Examine the effectiveness of the management accountability and arrangements that govern the CERF funds including: the advisory boards, disbursement mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation and reporting arrangements;
- Examine the use of financial monitoring tools and processes, their quality and cost;
- Examine the use of evaluation and learning approaches in order to improve the CERF practices;
- Examine the extent to which the recommendations from the first CERF Review were followed-up and changes made accordingly.

*The process of decision making and resource allocation*

- Examine the criteria for assessing need (e.g. mandate defined by the GA Res. 60/124, the new CERF Life-Saving Criteria), their scope, appropriateness and application, and the process involved in the allocation of funds;
- Evaluate the methods used to prioritise projects, including the role of needs;
- Identify the reasons for the rejection of CERF applications and assess the various roles of the HC/ RCs and the CERF Secretariat in screening and rejecting funding applications;
- Examine the effect of the quality of applications and the guidelines provided on the speed of the application process;
- Consider the extent to which clusters, NGOs (including but not limited to implementing partners) and host governments are included in the application and decision making process;
- Determine the time taken from identification of need / decision of the Country Team to apply for CERF to 1) allocation decision by ERC and 2) confirmation that grant approved to Implementing Partner or first money received by Implementing Partner.

### **III. Actions and responses supported by the CERF**

The questions should address the contribution of the CERF to improved humanitarian performance. They assess the CERF in terms of its key objectives, namely, to reduce loss of life, respond to time-critical requirements, and to provide timely and predictable financing according to demonstrable needs.

Specific questions to be asked should cover:

*Hoped for versus actual outcomes of CERF*

- Assess the extent to which the CERF has responded to time-critical requirements with the aim of reducing loss of life;<sup>88</sup>
- Consider whether it has strengthened the response to under-funded crises by filling gaps and covering needs in under-funded emergencies so as to improve the humanitarian situation;
- Assess the contribution of the revolving fund to emergency capacities.

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<sup>88</sup> Life-saving and time-critical are related but distinct concepts. For some recipients of CERF funding, a time-critical response may involve saving lives in the longer-term and not necessarily immediately.

*Influence on coordination mechanisms and emergency capacities*

- Assess the extent to which the CERF has had a beneficial influence on the office of the ERC as well as on cluster and donor coordination;
- Assess the alignment of the CERF with the other pillars of humanitarian reform;
- Assess the role of the CERF in supporting Government-led response where such capacity exists and would be helpful.

**IV. Factors affecting the ability of the CERF to meet its objectives**

The questions should address the internal (e.g. capacities) and external factors (e.g. financial commitments, political issues, GHDI and principles) which have influenced the ability of the CERF to deliver on its objectives. It should consider the factors beyond the scope of the CERF that effect its performance.

Specific questions to be asked should cover:

*Predictability and additionality*

- Consider the extent to which the Fund is replenished and able to respond to demand from clients;
- Determine the degree to which the CERF has contributed new (additional) money in addition to other existing donor funding. This should include the impact of the CERF on agency and NGO funding. To the extent possible, it should also determine whether the CERF has affected development funding levels.

*Institutional capacities*

- Consider the extent to which institutions involved have had the appropriate mix of skills and capacities at different levels in order to deliver on the objectives of the CERF;
- Examine the effectiveness of CERF training and other capacity building efforts for potential users;
- Examine the ability of the CERF to monitor and report on performance.

*Relationships with, attitudes of and actions of wider stakeholders (e.g. NGOs, IFRC, governments, academics, think tanks etc)*

- Examine relationships, perspectives and actions of wider stakeholders in the process;
- Examine the role of the host governments particularly in contexts where the government is resistant to allowing an international appeal.

**4. Methodology**

The evaluation should provide a global analysis of the efficiency and effectiveness of the CERF deduced from sector, country and project-level detailed assessment. The methodology will be data-driven, as far as is possible, with field visits to fill in information gaps within sample locations. The selection criteria for sampling the field locations to be visited are yet to be determined. It may be that a random or purposive sample is used to select the countries and projects to be evaluated.

In-country research will be conducted in close liaison with HC/RCs, host governments, NGOs and relevant donors.

The Evaluation is based on accepted criteria for the evaluation e.g. the OECD-DAC criteria of appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness and coherence.

Desk review: A quantitative analysis should be conducted on the data, reports and files available at the HQ level. These include:

- Global humanitarian funding data, including funding from sources other than the CERF (e.g. OCHA's Financial Tracking System, OECD DAC figures);
- timelines on sums requested, allocated from CERF database (end 2007);
- CERF financial spreadsheets on funds pledged and contributed in 2006 and 2007;
- CERF country reports on context, needs, status of implementation, activities, results and lessons learned (2006 and mid-year 2007);
- CERF meeting minutes and notifications of application decisions;
- CERF Project files;
- RTEs and other evaluations with findings on the CERF and other instruments.

Time permitting, desk reviews should also be conducted in the selected countries prior to the field visits.

Data will be analysed by funding window type. It should also benefit, where possible, from an analysis of change in the operation of the CERF over time. The CERF Review will be used as a baseline for this evaluation as far as is possible.<sup>89</sup>

The global funding data will help build a profile of the proportions of funding allocations over time disbursed through different funding mechanisms. This will include a trend analysis of the types of crises and geographical areas as well as sectors that receive funding by funding type.

The CERF specific data will provide information on the timeliness and effectiveness of the administration of the CERF.

To complement data collection and analysis, a targeted stakeholder review and interviews at agency HQs with all key stakeholders, such as the CERF Secretariat, ERC, Office of the Controller, OCHA, IASC Principals and Working Group Members, the CERF Advisory Group, global clusters leads, NGO partners, donors (in the capitals as well as New York, Geneva and the field), member states, host governments and disaster-affected populations, should be conducted. In March, interviews will be conducted at the HC/RC retreat, and the Good Humanitarian Donorship meeting.

Semi-structured interviews at the field level with IASC partners, cluster leads, host governments, partners implementing projects with CERF as well as those without access to CERF funds.

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<sup>89</sup> The sample of countries used in the CERF Review (selected because they were the biggest recipients of CERF funding) will limit the extent to which the Review can be used as a baseline.

Stakeholder survey to collect the views of the direct beneficiaries (recipients of CERF funding including agencies and implementing partners) on their expectations of the CERF and its results and impact.

Surveys and / or interviews via telephone and the internet in countries not deemed necessary to visit but where there are gaps in information.

Workshops at the field and HQ level will be used as learning opportunities to discuss and validate the findings and explore possible recommendations.

## **5. Proposed Team**

The Team will consist of one leader and approximately three members, which together have the following skills:

- Expertise in UN humanitarian reform & financing and knowledge of the CAP and Flash Appeal process;
- Expertise and extensive experience in humanitarian evaluation preferably with an outcome and impact focus;
- Expertise in analysing statistical and financial data in tandem with other types of information;
- Expertise in strategic management & project implementation;
- Knowledge, including field experience, with one or more of the main humanitarian actors including UN agencies, local government disaster response structures and systems, and NGOs,
- For the Team Leader, proven experience in the Team Leader role;
- Working level English and French and / or Spanish;
- Familiarity with complex emergency and natural disaster settings in Africa, Asia, South and Central America and the Middle East.

The team may include 1-2 members who are nationals from the countries being evaluated or alternatively, additional national consultants would be recruited for specific country level analysis.

The team of consultants will be selected based on independent rankings by members of the Review Advisory Group. Each consultant (or team of consultants) will be ranked according to the 8 criteria listed in the call for expressions of interest. The rankings will then be combined to select the highest scoring applicant.

## **6. Evaluation Management and Support**

### Review Advisory Group

The Evaluation will be managed by OCHA Evaluation and Studies Section, in partnership with the Review Advisory Group (RAG), established for the now-completed 2007 CERF Review, which will meet at critical junctures in the process. ESS is located within the Policy Studies and Development Branch OCHA and is institutionally separate from the CERF Secretariat. The RAG acts as a Steering Committee, the function of which is to ensure the independence of the evaluation and transparency in the decision-making processes affecting it. It also provides quality control and standards for the evaluation. The group is composed of evaluation experts whose role is to endorse

the TORs, select the consultants, provide feedback on the inception report and approve the final report as well as engage in other technical issues arising along the way. The RAG includes representation by OCHA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, WHO, Care International, Oxfam International, Le Groupe URD, the ALNAP Secretariat and several donors.

#### CERF Management

The CERF Secretariat, Office of the Controller and OCHA will be regularly consulted, including during the preparation of the TORs, the inception report and the final draft of the report.

#### Field

The field will also be consulted on the TORs for the evaluation. The RAG decided that the draft TORs should be shared with the HC/RCs of the countries covered as case studies in the CERF Review - the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Somalia. The draft report will be shared for comment with the countries sampled in the evaluation.

It may also be advisable to include government representatives of recipient countries to review the draft report.

#### CERF Inter-Agency Meeting

The CERF Inter-Agency Meeting, an informal group consisting of UN agencies, IOM, IFRC and NGOs that meets via teleconference, will also be consulted in the preparation of the TORs. They have provided comments on the initial one-page outline on the evaluation and the TORs. The draft evaluation report will be shared with the Inter-Agency Meeting.

#### CERF Advisory Group

The CERF Advisory Group, an independent body comprised of 12 experts acting in their individual capacity, provide policy guidance and expert advice to the ERC on the use and impact of the fund. This group will provide strategic guidance and advice on the TORs when they meet in October 2007.

#### IASC Working Group

The IASC Working Group, which meets at the beginning of November 2007 in Rome, will be informed on the TORs and have an opportunity to make final comments.

## **7. Deliverables**

- An inception report describing the proposed methodology and outline for the report. This report should include a recommended baseline for the evaluation based on the CERF Review.
- The final output for the consultancy will be an evaluation report, which shall contain the elements specified in the document on standards for evaluation (pp. 17-23) developed by the United National Evaluation Group (available at: <http://ochaonline.un.org/esu>). It will include concise and fully edited report in English of no more than 20,000 words (excluding appendices) in an electronic version and an Executive Summary (up to 2,500 words). The report should be structured to provide succinct conclusions for each issue as well as specific, targeted and action-oriented (i.e. addressed to the entities / stakeholders that need to take

action) key recommendations. The annexes will include a description of the methods used, a bibliography, list of persons interviewed and the TORs.

- As intermediary steps, the following deliverables will be requested:
  - Inception report
  - Preliminary analysis of emerging issues following the Desk review and HQ level interviews
  - A first draft report
  - A draft final report, reflecting comments received by the Steering Group;
  - Presentation of the final draft report (including PPT and proposal for the utilization of the findings and a Management Response Matrix for which Evaluation and Studies Section can provide a template)
  - Workshop with key stakeholders on the final draft report
  - Final report taking into account pertinent comments made during the workshops.

## **8. Intended Uses and Users**

In order to ensure that the results of the evaluation are taken up and ultimately incorporated into strategic planning following the evaluation, the process is designed to build ownership among stakeholders. It is consultative, ensuring that the evaluation purpose and approach is clarified and agreed among the key stakeholders, and matches the users' needs and interests. The meaningful and quality participation of stakeholders (through steering committees, workshops and other mechanisms described in sections 6 and 7) will encourage key decision makers to use the results. To promote transparency and raise awareness for the evaluation, the ToRs will be posted on the ESS website.

The evaluation's conclusions and recommendations will be presented to the GA for action and planning. Power point displays and discussions are tentatively planned for presentation to the CERF Advisory Group, the IASC WG, donors, the CERF Secretariat, ERC, Office of the Controller, OCHA and other key decision makers. The findings of the evaluation and the Management Response Matrix will be posted on the internet and Reliefweb to promote learning and transparency.

The key issues/evaluation questions have been grouped into 4 sections addressed mainly to different stakeholders. The main stakeholders are the General Assembly, the CERF Secretariat, ERC, Office of the Controller, OCHA, IASC, NGOs, effected populations, national and local level governments and the CERF Advisory Group.

Section I: The General Assembly, CERF Advisory Group, donors and the ERC

Section II: The CERF Secretariat, OCHA, the office of the Controller, UNCT, HC/RC

Section III: UNCT, HC/RC NGOs, effected populations, national and local level governments

Section IV: All stakeholders

## **9. Timeline**

October      TORs shared for comments with the RAG, OCHA, IA Meeting Group on the CERF, IASC WG and the CERF Advisory Group.

|          |   |
|----------|---|
| November | Consultants shortlisted, ranked and selected  |
| December | Consultants recruited   |
| 1 Feb    | Schedule of countries to be visited finalized   |
| 15 Feb   | Inception Report Submitted  |
| 1 June   | 1 <sup>st</sup> draft of evaluation, including preliminary recommendations, distributed |
| June     | Presentation of findings in Ad hoc meeting of CERF Advisory Group                       |
| July     | Report Finalized and submitted to Secretary General before GA in September              |

## **ANNEX 2: Inception Report**

## **1. Background – CERF and the Current Evaluation**

The CERF was created in December 2005 through General Assembly (GA) resolution 60/124 pursuant to a report of the Secretary General [A/60/432] for the need to improve on the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF). The new CERF was set up to add a major grant element to the existing loan element. The CERF is becoming one of the key humanitarian financing mechanisms. Since its launch in March 2006, the CERF has attracted more than \$582 million in paid contributions and has disbursed \$446 million for 692 projects in 53 countries, as of December 2007. The main goals of the CERF are to promote early action and timely and equitable response to reduce loss of life; to enhance response to time-critical requirements based on demonstrable needs and to strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in under-funded crises.

The Fund's loan mechanism of \$50 million, is a revolving fund that is used as a cash-flow mechanism by eligible humanitarian organizations. The loan mechanism allows rapid access to funds ahead of the transfer of donor pledges.

The CERF is funded by voluntary contributions from donors and is managed, on behalf of the Secretary General, by the UN's Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) who serves as Programme Manager for the Fund. The ERC regularly consults with the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) and humanitarian/resident coordinators as appropriate, on matters relating to the utilization of the funds in order to obtain guidance support when determining priorities for their use. An advisory group of 12 experts representing the humanitarian community provides the ERC with broad policy advice on the implementation of the Fund to ensure accountability and transparency.

The Fund is supported by a secretariat and by other branches in OCHA. It is governed by UN Financial Regulations and Rules of the UN and financially administered by the Office of the Controller.

This evaluation is undertaken pursuant to the General Assembly Resolution 60/124 which required that the Coordinator, in consultation with the IASC, shall commission an independent, retrospective and substantive evaluation of the functioning and utilization of the Fund at the end of the second year of its operation.

Prior to this, an independent CERF Review commissioned by OCHA was conducted between March and September 2007. The objective of that review was to provide performance (effectiveness) and management (efficiency) feedback to CERF stakeholders with the aim of contributing to strengthening the effectiveness of the mechanism and its potential impact on overall humanitarian response in response to the needs of people affected by humanitarian crisis. The review team, consisting of two consultants, assessed the CERF in six countries (the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Somalia) and interviewed staff from UN agencies, international and local NGOs, which have implemented projects funded by the CERF. The information and main conclusions gathered from the CERF Review were intended to provide a baseline for this "two-year after" evaluation of the CERF.

The review concluded that significant progress has been made in the implementation of the CERF in its first year of operations. However, there are a number of issues which need to be clarified, including ensuring a common understanding of the scope of the CERF, providing more effective management of the CERF within OCHA, strengthening working relationships with UN agencies

and the NGO community at both the global and field levels, and finally, providing more effective and transparent information on CERF as a mechanism and on its performance.

The review also made some recommendations regarding the preparation of this GA mandated evaluation. Specifically, the review recommended that OCHA put in place measures to ensure that complete documentation on CERF processes and grants is maintained and readily available at the field and global levels, that the Terms of Reference include a systematic analysis of CERF grants at the global level, and finally that the review process is initiated early and includes sufficient resources to allow for an in-depth evaluation at both the country and project level.

This Evaluation is distinct from the first CERF Review completed in September 2007 in three ways:

4. Incorporation of greater depth of analysis on CERF's efficiency and effectiveness;
5. Use of increased range of methodologies with a reliance on newly-available quantitative data and reporting as well as field methods including interviews with key stakeholders;
6. Focus on provision of strategic guidance to donors and the UN system on the future of the CERF.

## **2. Objectives and scope of the evaluation**

This evaluation is to be undertaken at the behest of the General Assembly (GA) of the United Nations and its objectives and scope are set out in GA resolution 60/124. The overall purpose of this evaluation is to **provide strategic guidance to member states and the UN system on the future of the CERF**<sup>90</sup>. In its resolution the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to commission an independent review of the Fund at the end of the second year of operation to assess:

- Both the grant and revolving elements of the Fund,
- Its administration, criteria for resource allocation,
- Actions and responses supported by it and
- Its ability to meet its objectives

The findings of the evaluation are to be presented at the General Assembly's sixty-third session in a report summarizing key strategic recommendations (see section 7 deliverables).

The Terms of Reference for the evaluation outline two core objectives and four key areas:

### **Objectives:**

- To assess the CERF in a comprehensive manner, based on project data and frameworks, covering the benefits and disadvantages to the CERF as an approach to humanitarian financing, and

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<sup>90</sup> CERF was founded under the GA resolution 60/124 to ensure a more predictable and timely response to humanitarian emergencies, with the objectives of promoting early action and response to reduce loss of life, enhancing response to time-critical requirements and strengthening core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises, based on demonstrable needs and on priorities identified in consultation with the affected State as appropriate.

- To provide recommendations to donors and the UN system at strategic and operational levels as to whether the CERF should be continued in its current form and if so, how it should be improved.

**Key areas:**

- The “value added” of the CERF grant and revolving fund in the context of the overall humanitarian financing architecture;
- The strategic, managerial and operational aspects of the CERF, covering high level leadership, advocacy, as well as administrative issues such as efficiency and effectiveness, fundraising issues such as promotion and take-up, and distributive issues such as the criteria for allocation for funds;
- The contribution of the CERF to improved humanitarian performance
- Internal (e.g. capacities) and external factors (e.g. political factors) which influenced the ability of the CERF to deliver on its objectives.

**3. Methodology**

The evaluation will focus on the four areas set out in GA 60/124 and provide detailed analysis, assessment and recommendations based on internationally accepted OECD/DAC criteria for humanitarian evaluations, namely: Relevance, Appropriateness, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact, Coherence and Coordination. The report’s findings and recommendations will then be synthesised into an Executive Summary.

**3.1 Methodological approach**

The overall methodology will be based on both inductive and deductive approaches using quantitative and qualitative data gathered from a carefully selected range of sources as indicated below. The data will be gathered from carefully selected samples at various levels of the entire delivery mechanism involving CERF: inputs (funding, disbursements etc), outputs (actions supported), outcomes (intermediate results against the objectives of specific CERF support), impact /potential impact (wherever indicative data are available in relation to the overall achievement of goals). For qualitative data, evaluators will use the lead questions found in Section 3 Table 1, around which detailed open-ended questions will be framed for each individual interview or focus group discussion (FGD). Attempts will be made to obtain concrete examples/case stories/critical incidents to back up all interviewees’ answers to the questions asked, and all information thus gathered will be triangulated using different sources.

**3.2 Data collection tools**

The review will employ the normal range of social science research methods employed in standard humanitarian evaluation, namely:

- A comprehensive document review using both internal and external documents, correspondence, reports and data.
- Field visits and observations.
- Statistical analysis of data.
- Questionnaires/ online survey.

- Semi-structured and structured interviews, individual and focus groups both in person and by telephone with a range of stakeholders including beneficiaries, UN, NGOs, donors, international organisations and governments.

### **3.3 Organisation of the evaluation**

The evaluation is managed by the Evaluation Studies Section (ESS) of the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The ESS is situated within the Policy Development and Studies Branch of OCHA. The evaluation will also be overseen by a review advisory group (RAG) made up of evaluation experts from key stakeholders such as governments, UN agencies and NGOs. The RAG acts as a Steering Committee, the function of which is to ensure the independence of the evaluation and transparency in the decision-making process. It also provides quality control and standards for the evaluation.

### **3.4 Key informants and agencies**

Key informants will be:

- Governments who both contribute to, and receive assistance from the UN as a result of the CERF.
- Key managers and stakeholders within the secretariat of the UN, especially OCHA and the Office of the Controller.
- UN agencies active in humanitarian action that are the recipients of CERF funding (WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP, WHO, UNFPA, FAO and IOM): CERF focal points, cluster leads, Humanitarian Directors and relevant managers, Staff responsible for developing proposals and for reporting, M & E staff, etc.
- Other humanitarian actors such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and non-governmental organisations.
- People, families and communities who have received assistance partly or wholly funded by CERF.

### **3.5 Key evaluation questions**

As outlined in Table 1.

### **3.6 Performance criteria**

Broadly the following three criteria will be used to assess the quality of the evaluation process and outcome:

- (i) The evaluation process needs to engage a sizeable section of the humanitarian community, especially those at the operational end of humanitarian action, and organisations receiving CERF funding;
- (ii) The report establishes clear links between the evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations on the specific questions outlined in the TOR.
- (iii) The recommendations are SMART and provide clear guidance for action by CERF management.

### 3.7 Constraints

i) Given the time-frame for submission of evaluation findings to the GA, the evaluation will be carried out over a three month period, starting from March 1, with deadline for submission of the Draft report being 7 June. This limits the number of countries and the duration of visits to each country for data gathering as well as the number of stakeholders that can be interviewed (donors, NGOs, UN agencies).

ii) Attribution of outcome/results to CERF funds will be difficult given that CERF funding is only a proportion, often small, of funds applied on a particular programme by an agency.

iii) This is not an impact assessment of CERF. Any examination of impact in relation to OECD/DAC criteria will only be limited to how an agency is tracking impact, what mechanisms and systems it has put in place. However, wherever, agencies have carried out their own evaluations/impact assessments, this evaluation may draw on relevant findings from these secondary sources for its analysis.

iv) Given the vast scope of the evaluation and the time-constraints under which it has to be completed, evaluators will rely on a significant amount of relevant data being made available by the agencies/OCHA/CERF.

### 4 Issues to be studied

The following table takes both the terms of reference and the GA resolution and develops more fully the questions that need to be addressed to determine key objectives, and the techniques, sources of information and types of data collection the team will undertake.

**Table 1: Detailed Enquiry Areas/Lead Questions and identification of potential Interlocutors and Appropriate tools to be used in data-gathering**

| <i>Key Issue for evaluation</i>   | <i>Lead Questions/Detailed Enquiry areas</i>  | <i>Sources of information</i>   | <i>Techniques/tools to be used/ Action to be taken</i>   |
|---|---|---|--|
| <b>1. The grant and revolving elements of the fund and how these relate to other funding mechanisms and have a bearing on the humanitarian reform agenda.</b> | i) What are the various types of pooled funds for humanitarian programmes available now and how do they relate to/complement/overlap with each other? and what are the comparative strengths/weaknesses of the CERF as well as Agencies' own emergency funds? | UN documents; UN staff in HQ and 7 countries identified for visits; INGO staff & key government officials, and local donors in the countries visited. | *Key informant interviews (KII).<br>*Analysis of selected CAP/CHAPs, CERF, ERF and PBF grants, CHF and other pooled funds. |
|   | ii) How has CERF funding affected the   | OECD/DAC financial figures;   | *Data analysis of global humanitarian financial  |

| <i>Key Issue for evaluation</i> | <i>Lead Questions/Detailed Enquiry areas</i>   | <i>Sources of information</i>   | <i>Techniques/tools to be used/ Action to be taken</i>  |
|---------------------------------|--|---|---|
|                                 | overall funding for humanitarian programmes? What impact has the CERF had on the funding of UN agencies and NGOs? Has the CERF increased or reduced funding availability for UN agencies, INGOs and governments for time-critical response, and has it strengthened or weakened their response capacity?   | OCHA FTS; UN and INGO reports (eg., UNICEF, Oxfam, CARE, Save). Donor reports of contributions to humanitarian programmes for current and previous years. Donors, UN and INGO personnel, Government officials.  | flows 2006-2007.<br>*Analysis of reports.<br>*Focus Group Discussions involving UN, INGOs & Govt. representatives in selected countries.<br>*KII with UN and INGO HQs, governments and INGO field staff;<br>*Donor agency interviews in HQ and countries. |
|                                 | iii) How has CERF contributed to strengthening the HCs, Cluster approach, Coordination and partnership with NGOs, host governments? To what extent are CERF priorities decided in consultation with host governments and the latter enabled to lead coordination?  | Cluster evaluation reports (Pakistan Earthquake RTE), Mozambique and Pak Floods RTE, other documents; UN staff in HQ and 7 countries identified for visits; INGO staff & key government officials in the countries visited. Donor agencies in field and HQ. | *Focus Group Discussions involving UN, INGOs & Govt. representatives in selected countries. *Key informant interviews in UN HQs and INGOs, donor agency HQs.  |
|                                 | iv) To what extent has the CERF strengthened humanitarian response in forgotten/under-funded crises? How does CERF's time-frame (6 months) affect response in protracted crises?<br>v) How is the revolving fund used? What has been the contribution of the revolving fund to the overall response capacity? Should the evolving fund be continued? | CERF funding database; UN agency reports; survey data; UN and agency field staff.   | *Telephone interviews with non-visited countries; *KII with key UN & INGO staff in field; *Data analysis of all CERF grants; * A structured survey questionnaire to be administered to about 50 KIIs from different segments.                             |

| <i>Key Issue for evaluation</i>  | <i>Lead Questions/Detailed Enquiry areas</i>   | <i>Sources of information</i>  | <i>Techniques/tools to be used/ Action to be taken</i>   |
|--|--|--|--|
|  | vi) What role should CERF play in the overall global humanitarian response?  | ERC office; Donor HQs; UN and NGO HQs, humanitarian academics, advocacy agents   | *KIIs with sources.<br>*Telephone interviews with selected individuals like Peter Walker, Hugo Slim, Jan Egeland, someone from RCRC (Mukesh Kapila? David Horobin? Nick Young?), Nick Stockton, Ian Smillie, Larry Minear, James Darcy, etc. |
|  | vii) To what extent are the CERF processes, systems, etc. in line with the GHDI and Paris Declaration principles; in particular, flexible financing, reduction of transaction costs and more comprehensive programme approaches? |  |  |
| <b>2. The administration of the CERF and criteria for resource allocation.</b> | i) How effective has been the role of ERC in promoting CERF as a global tool for humanitarian response and in advocacy with donors and recipient countries for its uptake and broadening the donor base?                         | ERC office, Donor HQs, UN agencies, RC/HCs, Government officials in countries visited.                                       | *KII with ERC, Donors, UN agencies etc.  |
|  | ii) To what extent has the ERC been able to mobilise additional resources and engage donors in ensuring that humanitarian funding is in proportion to the needs?   | Reports of humanitarian responses for some of the recent disasters (Pak/Mzb floods, DRC, Bangldsh, Sri Lanka, Dom. Rep, etc. | *Analysis of reports.<br>*Focus Group Discussions involving UN, INGOs & Govt. representatives in selected countries. *Key informant interviews in UN HQs and INGOs, donor agency HQs.  |
|  | iii) How is the principle of demonstrable needs  | Documentation on CERF allocations  | *KII with RC/HCs and needs assessment cluster  |

| <i>Key Issue for evaluation</i>  | <i>Lead Questions/Detailed Enquiry areas</i>  | <i>Sources of information</i>  | <i>Techniques/tools to be used/ Action to be taken</i>   |
|--|---|--|--|
|  | taken into account in appraisal of applications and funding decisions? How consistently are the criteria for assessing needs/life-saving needs applied across different countries and 'projects'?   | relating to the use of life-saving criteria; RC/HCs and cluster leads in selected countries.   | leads;<br>* KII with UN, INGOs & Govt. operational staff in countries visited/interviewed.<br>*Data analysis.  |
|  | iv) Are the processes, systems, time-frames and criteria applied in the development, appraisal and approval/rejection of proposals by HC/RC in country and by CERF secretariat in New York appropriate? How effectively are they applied? | Logbooks of proposals reviewed, accepted, rejected etc kept in country and CERF Sectt., UN, NGO and Government staff.  | * KII with UN, INGOs & Govt. operational staff in countries visited/interviewed.<br>*Analysis of how decisions are communicated/ incorporated in lessons for future.                               |
|  | v) How quickly are funds disbursed for time-critical response? What contributed to or constrained timely disbursement and how could this be improved?"  | Records of entire funds disbursement chain (CERF-Controller-Agency HQ-Agency CO): Logbooks for funds request and receipt kept at country level by different UN agencies, NGO interviews. | *Focus Group Discussions involving UN, INGOs & Govt. representatives in selected countries. *Key informant interviews in UN HQs and INGOs, donor agency HQs.<br>*Analysis of disbursement records. |
|  | vi) How has CERF funding been used i.e. % for overheads, % for capacity building and administration, % for direct delivery?   | Data from global, local UN agencies and partners.  | Develop an extrapolated picture on the basis of data collected globally and at country level during case studies.  |
| <b>3. Action and responses supported by the CERF to improve humanitarian performance in relation to saving</b> | i) What types of response have been supported by CERF, both Rapid Response and Underfunded, and how relevant are the types of response supported by   | Documents, data from CERF Sectt., UN agencies and partners.  | *Analysis by agency, implementing partner and sector of documentation collected at a global level and during country case studies (as much   |

| <i>Key Issue for evaluation</i>   | <i>Lead Questions/Detailed Enquiry areas</i>  | <i>Sources of information</i>   | <i>Techniques/tools to be used/ Action to be taken</i>   |
|---|---|---|--|
| <b>lives, responding to time-critical requirements and providing predictable and timely financing based on needs.</b> | the CERF, to the objectives of the fund?  |   | information is held by agencies locally).  |
|   | ii) How has CERF impacted the capacity for timely and predictable responses, and has it enabled time-critical responses in rapid-onset and under-funded crises?   | Documents, data, government officials, CERF, OCHA staff, RC/ HCs, UN agency and NGO staff. Timelines for recent recurring responses in selected countries (e.g., floods in Bangladesh 2007, 2005-06; DRC Katanga crisis 2006 & ongoing 2007). UN and NGO staff in selected countries. | *Develop extrapolated picture based on data analysed and information collected. *Construct Timelines through key informant interviews and FGDs: Case study of recent Bangladesh flood response – compare this with previous flood responses (almost an annual/biennial phenomenon). Similarly for DRC and Haiti which historically have been under-funded, how have CERF changed things in the past 18 months? *Interviews with disaster victims. *KII with INGOs, government officials in countries visited. * A structured survey questionnaire to be administered to about 50 KIIs from different segments. |
|   | iv) To what extent has the CERF helped people affected by chronic crises traditionally viewed as ‘neglected’? Probe into whether UF grants are currently addressing this concern, and if not what should be changed? Is the | Beneficiaries, UN agency staff, UN missions, HC/RCs, OCHA, partners.  | *Analysis of qualitative, triangulated data. i.e. this will be more about a synthesis of people’s knowledge rather than ‘statistics’ per se.   |

| <i>Key Issue for evaluation</i>        | <i>Lead Questions/Detailed Enquiry areas</i>  | <i>Sources of information</i>   | <i>Techniques/tools to be used/ Action to be taken</i>   |
|--|---|---|--|
|  | <p>process as envisaged at the moment effectively addressing the purpose of UF grants? A probe is required into the current methodology by which UF countries are selected by the ERC, and by which the projects in a selected country are determined by the HC/RC. If a country is selected on the basis of the underfunding of <u>on-going</u> projects, can <u>new</u> projects be introduced (as opposed to only funding the existing under-funded projects)?</p> |   |  |
|  | <p>v) What has been the quality of needs assessments that underpin proposals to CERF and to what extent have the identified needs been met by CERF allocations?</p>   | <p>Records of needs assessments and project submissions by UN and partners, and CERF allocations. Data gathered during country visits. RC/HCs, UN agency and NGO staff.</p>                             | <p>*Analysis by sector and geographically of records, data and country visit information. *KIIs with RC/HCs and NGO staff in selected countries.</p> |
|  | <p>vi) How effective have CERF supported projects been?</p>   | <p>Data on key humanitarian indicators i.e. CMR. Monitoring and evaluation data. Records/reports on crises of similar nature where CERF has not been allocated (i.e. historically). Project visits.</p> | <p>*Document review both internal and external (hard and soft data). *KII with policy makers, academics, UN and NGO field staff.</p>                 |
| <p><b>4. Factors affecting the</b></p> | <p>i) To what extent is the CERF replenished in a</p>   | <p>CERF database. UN reports.</p>   | <p>*Data analysis. *KIIs with ERC, Controller,</p>   |

| <i>Key Issue for evaluation</i>                    | <i>Lead Questions/Detailed Enquiry areas</i>  | <i>Sources of information</i>   | <i>Techniques/tools to be used/ Action to be taken</i>   |
|--|---|---|--|
| <b>ability of the CERF to meet its objectives.</b> | timely manner? Do UN agencies reimburse the Revolving Fund in a timely manner?  |   | CERF Sect.   |
|  | ii) To what extent is the CERF able to respond to demands from clients? Is the Fund too big/too small?  | Data from CERF Sectt.,RC/HCs and project holders on all original project submissions. | *Survey key informants.<br>*Analysis of data from original submissions.<br>*KIIs and telephone interviews in selected countries. |
|  | iii) Are the funds in the CERF additional to other donor funding?   | OECD/DAC financial figures.<br>OCHA FTS.  | Data analysis. KIIs with donors, UN agencies, NGO HQs.   |
|  | iv) To what degree has the administrative and management capacity of CERF Sectt enabled CERF to play the critical role it was designed for?   |   |  |
|  | v) Have donors and CERF Sectt complied with GHDI principles in the overall fundraising and its allocations?   | Donors, CERF Sect.<br>DARA  | *KIIs with donor HQs and CERF Sectt.   |
|  | vi) How are the capacity and skills/competence of the institutions receiving CERF funding assessed and do they have the procedures necessary to implement the projects effectively and efficiently? | Project submissions and reports. Field visits.  | Analysis of submissions and reports. KIIs in selected countries, including RC/HC, UN agencies.                                   |
|  | vii) Is the training provided on the CERF appropriate, and does it reach the people who need it?  | CERF Training materials. CERF public information materials and CERF website.          | Focus groups in countries visited. KIIs with UN agencies, NGOs. Survey of RCs in countries with no CERF projects.                |
|  | viii) What reporting and accountability   | Advisory Board members. Financial   | *KII Advisory Board on member's role. Analysis   |

| <i>Key Issue for evaluation</i> | <i>Lead Questions/Detailed Enquiry areas</i>  | <i>Sources of information</i>  | <i>Techniques/tools to be used/ Action to be taken</i>  |
|---------------------------------|---|--|---|
|                                 | mechanisms are in place to advise on, monitor and evaluate and report on CERF funding, and <i>how efficient and effective/useful</i> are these reporting and accountability mechanisms.   | monitoring and other CERF and OCHA reports. UN agency and NGO reports in selected countries. | of reports and of their costs. KIIs with donors, RC/HCs.  |
|                                 | ix) Given that one of key aims of humanitarian reforms is to strengthen the national government's capacity for disaster response and preparedness, to what extent are host governments involved in decision-making, implementation and monitoring of projects funded by the CERF? | CERF project submissions and reports.  | KIIs with RC/HCs, UN agency reps and government officials in selected countries.  |
|                                 | x) How does the CERF communicate with wider stakeholders, including governments, civil society, media and academic institutions?  | CERF public information materials and CERF website.  | Analysis of distribution of public information materials, media references and use of the website. *Survey of RCs. *KIIs with NGOs. |
|                                 | xi) To what extent does the fact that only UN agencies can access the fund limit the potential for rapid humanitarian action? Could NGOs be given direct access?  |  | KIIs with HCs and NGOs. KIIs with UN Controller. KIIs with donors.  |

## Plan of work

i) Of the 60<sup>91</sup> CERF recipient countries, 23% (14) to be studied. In-depth study at country and project level (field visits) will be conducted in 7 countries, and another 7 countries will be telephone-interviewed and desk-reviewed. The selection of the countries was based on the following factors:

- Size of CERF funding
- A good mix of rapid response and under-funded window
- Countries in different regions (Asia, Africa and Latin America/Caribbean)
- A mix of natural disasters and complex emergencies.

ii) Key Informant Interviews (visit by at least one evaluator to HQ of each agency) with selected NGO/RCRC interlocutors (CARE, Oxfam, IRC, WVI, Save, MSF, ICRC, Mercy Corps, IFRC).

iii) Key Informant Interviews with donor agencies (visit by at least one evaluator to HQs of the largest donors): Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, Spain, Sweden, UK and US, Switzerland (Australia, Canada, Korea, and some medium-level donors will be also interviewed on telephone).

iv) Key Informant Interviews (visit by a two-member team to HQ each agency): FAO, IOM, OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO.

### 5.1 Country visits and telephone interviews

Countries to be visited:

| Country       | Rationale for selection                           |
|---------------|---|
| DRC           | Largest funds disbursement; complex emergency     |
| Sudan         | Second-largest funds; protracted crisis           |
| Afghanistan   | Large CERF funding as well as well-funded country |
| Bangladesh    | Rapid onset and underfunded refugee crisis        |
| Peru          | Rapid onset                                       |
| Haiti         | Haiti: Under-funded & 'neglected' crisis          |
| Dominican Rep | Rapid onset                                       |

Countries where telephone interviews and in-depth data analysis will take place:

| Country  | Rationale for selection                        |
|----------|--|
| Ethiopia | Substantial funding for both rapid and complex |
| Pakistan | Rapid onset                                    |
| DPRK     | Forgotten, protracted, off-media crisis        |

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<sup>91</sup> As of December 2007

|            |                              |
|------------|------------------------------|
| Somalia    | Complex                      |
| Mozambique | Rapid onset                  |
| Chad       | Complex                      |
| Bolivia    | Rapid onset in Latin America |

## 5.2 Country visit Format

a) Orientation meeting (To be organised by RC/HC's Office or Lead Agency): the visit will begin on the first morning with a 2-3 hours joint meeting with key staff/representatives of all agencies involved in the country which are part of CERF – the consultants will outline the key elements of the evaluation objectives and methodology. Participants will have a chance to share their ideas and ask the consultants any question. FGDs on specific questions will also be facilitated by the evaluators during this meeting.

b) Visits to agency/ project/partner offices to undertake tasks specified in table above:

c) Key informant interviews: senior international and local staff in each relevant UN agency, INGOs/other humanitarian agencies, Government, donor embassies and other relevant agencies.

d) Field trip: visits to the communities affected

e) Debriefing on the final day for key staff/representatives (normally the same group as the orientation) to validate main findings and provide feedback that could be useful for field staff on the basis of observation.

## 5.3 Support required for country visits

OCHA office in country or specifically designated UN agency to organise all logistics for receiving the evaluators and organising the following:

- Arranging/facilitating visa, hotel accommodation, and all logistics.
- A briefing meeting for 3 hours on morning of Consultant's first working day in the country;
- Hiring a local consultant for up to 10 days (details will be confirmed by Evaluation team for each country separately) to support the team in data-gathering and follow up (a local consultant with mid-level knowledge of humanitarian operations and evaluation will do);
- Arranging security briefing, security protocols for the evaluators;
- Transport for field trip;
- Hiring a translator for the days when evaluators visit the communities and/local NGOs;
- Organise detailed schedule of meetings and visits.
- Organising a debriefing meeting at the end of the visit.

## 5 Timetable

Detailed time-table is provided in the attached spreadsheet. The key milestones are as follows:

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| Conclusion of field visits and all interviews:   | 12 May    |
| Evaluation team meeting in London and agreement on findings, conclusions and recommendations | 13-15 May |

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| Debriefing in NY (OCHA/CERF)                   | 19-20 May |
| First Draft submitted to commissioning manager | 07 June   |
| Presentation to CERF Advisory Group            | 25 June   |
| Informal briefing in margins of ECOSOC         | 15 July   |


## **6 Reporting**

The evaluation team will present a draft to the senior management of OCHA and the review advisory group on 7 June 2008. In addition there will be feedback to the country team following every country visit before the team leaves and regular updates to the managing staff within OCHA on progress. The timetable for the final report is still being determined by the commissioning manager. The report will follow the UNEG guidelines and Quality Compass format for evaluation reports and will answer the four key questions laid down by GA using the OECD/DAC criteria.

## **7 Deliverables**

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| (done)  | Inception Report – according to ESS template   |
| June 7  | Draft Evaluation Report  |
| June 28 | Deadline for comments on draft   |
| July 7  | Short Report summarizing key findings submitted to USG John Holmes, that will be submitted to the General Assembly on July 15  |
| July 31 | Final Evaluation Report: maximum words 20,000 including an executive summary of maximum 2,000 words containing recommendations |

Flow Chart of Activities - Activity/month/date





**ANNEX 3: List of People Interviewed**

**FIELD VISIT INTERVIEWS**

| <b>NORTH AMERICA</b>                       |  |   |
|--|--|---|
| <b>Person Interviewed</b>                  | <b>Organization</b>                      | <b>Position</b>   |
| <b>UN AGENCIES</b>                         |  |   |
| 1. John Holmes                             | OCHA                                     | USG/Emergency Relief Coordinator  |
| 2. Catherine Bragg                         | OCHA                                     | Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator   |
| 3. Rashid Khalikov                         | OCHA                                     | Director, New York Office   |
| 4. Shoko Arakaki                           | OCHA                                     | Head, Donor and External Relations Section                                  |
| 5. Hansjoerg Strohmeyer                    | OCHA                                     | Chief, Policy Development and Studies Branch                                |
| 6. David Kaatrud                           | OCHA                                     | Director, Coordination and Response Division                                |
| 7. David Del Conte                         | OCHA                                     | Desk Officer Sudan  |
| 8. Heidi Kuttab                            | OCHA                                     | Desk Officer Afghanistan, Peru and Dominican Republic                       |
| 9. Kate Burns                              | OCHA                                     | Senior Gender Advisor   |
| 10. Aimee Wielechowski                     | OCHA                                     | Humanitarian Reform Support Unit  |
| 11. Severine Rey                           | OCHA                                     | Desk officer, Haiti   |
| 12. Miguel Bermeo,                         | UNDP                                     | Deputy Director, BCPR   |
| 13. Jennifer Worrell                       | UNDP                                     | Chief, Early recovery Team, BCPR  |
| 14. Bisrat Akililu                         | UNDP                                     | Director, Multi-Donor Trust Fund Unit                                       |
| 15. Kathleen Cravero                       | UNDP                                     | Director, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery                         |
| 16. Lisa Doughten                          | UNICEF                                   | Senior Adviser, ODA Policy and Strategic Planning                           |
| 17. Henia Dakkak                           | UNFPA                                    | Health Advisor, Humanitarian Response Unit                                  |
| 18. Elke Mayrhofer                         | UNFPA                                    | Programme Specialist Humanitarian Response Unit, Africa Division            |
| 19. Nina Sreenivasan                       | UNFPA                                    | Humanitarian Liaison Officer, HRU Office in Geneva                          |
| 20. Warren Sach                            | United Nations, Department of Management | Controller  |
| 21. Raj Rikhy                              | Dep. of Management                       | Deputy Director , Accounts Division   |
| 22. Florence de Saint Giniez               | Dep. of Management, PPBD                 | Programme Budget Officer  |
| 23. Tarun Chakravorty                      | Dep. of Management, PPBD                 | Programme Budget Officer  |
| 24. Safia Boly                             | Dep. of Management, PPBD                 | Financial Management Officer  |
| 25. Carolyn McAskie                        | Peace-building Support Office            | Assistant Secretary-General   |
| <b>CERF ADVISORY GROUP</b>                 |  |   |
| 26. Marika Fahlen,<br>(in Stockholm)       | Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs     | Ambassador/Special Envoy Horn of Africa, (and chair of CERF Advisory Group) |
| 27. Gregory C. Gottlieb<br>(in Washington) | USAID                                    | Deputy Assistant Administrator, and Member of the CERF Advisory Group       |
| 28. Moazzam Malik                          | DFID                                     | Director (Acting), UN Conflict and  |

*CERF Two Year Evaluation – Annex 3 List of Interviews (July 2008)*

|                                  |  |   |
|----------------------------------|--|---|
| (in London)                      |  | Humanitarian Division, and member of the Advisory Group                         |
| 29. Toril Brekke<br>(in Oslo)    | Norwegian Refugee Council  | Deputy Director, International Department and member of the CERF Advisory Group |
| 30. Ron Waldman<br>(in New York) | CERF Advisory Group  | Member  |
| 31. Simon Mechale<br>(in Geneva) | CERF Advisory Group  | Member  |
| <b>CERF SECRETARIAT</b>          |  |   |
| 32. Rudolph Muller               | CERF Secretariat   | Chief   |
| 33. Felipe Camargo               | CERF Secretariat   | Head of Programme Unit  |
| 34. Janet Puhlovic               | CERF Secretariat   | Underfunded Programme Officer   |
| 35. Susan Christofides           | CERF Secretariat   | Head of Reporting Unit  |
| 36. Samir Mahmoud                | CERF Secretariat   | Associate Reporting Officer, Reporting Unit                                     |
| <b>MEMBER STATES</b>             |  |   |
| 37. Rodrigo Andrade Cardoso      | Permanent Mission of Brazil to the UN  | Second Secretary  |
| Gregory C. Gottlieb              | USAID  | Deputy Assistant Administrator, and Member of the CERF Advisory Group           |
| 38. Victor Carvell               | Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)   | Director-General, Humanitarian Assistance, Peace and Security                   |
| 39. Stephen Salewicz             | CIDA   | Chief, Peace and Security Unit  |
| 40. Joshua Tabah                 | CIDA   | Manager, Natural Disaster Response and NGO Relations Group                      |
| 41. Krista House                 | CIDA   | Senior Program Officer  |
| 42. Michael Bonser               | Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada  | Senior Policy Advisor   |
| 43. Janil Greenaway              | Permanent Mission of Antigua and Barbuda to the United Nations   | Minister Counsellor   |
| <b>NGOs</b>                      |  |   |
| 44. Jim Bishop                   | InterAction  | Vice President  |
| 45. Gorel Bogarde                | Save the Children  | UN Representative   |
| 46. Vesna Selmanovic             | World Vision   | Programme Associate   |
| 47. Paul Mikov                   | World Vision   | Senior Policy Advisor   |
| 48. Abby Stoddard                | Center on International Cooperation  | Non-Resident Fellow   |
| InterAction, Washington, DC      | ADRA, International Medical Corps, Mercy Corps, Refugees International, World Vision   | Representatives   |
| <b>GROUP MEETINGS</b>            |  |   |
| <b>Name</b>                      | <b>Attendance</b>  |   |
| NGOs                             | 3 INGOs representatives (Oxfam GB, World Vision, Save the Children)  |   |
| CERF Contributing States Group   | 15 member States   |   |
| UNICEF                           | 7 staff members, including: Annalies Borrel Chief, Humanitarian Policy and Advocacy Unit, Office of Emergency Programmes and Gary Stahl, Deputy Director, Public Sector Alliances & Resource |   |

|                                    |  |   |
|------------------------------------|--|---|
|                                    | Mobilization Office                                |   |
| CERF Inter-Agency Group            | UN agencies  | Representatives   |
| CERF Secretariat                   | OCHA   | Senior staff  |
| Coordination and Response Division | OCHA   | Representatives   |
| <b>EUROPE</b>                      |  |   |
| <b>GENEVA</b>                      |  |   |
| <b>Person Interviewed</b>          | <b>Organization</b>                                | <b>Position</b>   |
| 49. Patricia Reber Hashemee        | IOM  | Donor relations officer   |
| 50. Clarissa Azkoul                | IOM  | Chief, donor relations division   |
| 51. Marco Tulio Boasso             | IOM  | Head, emergency and post crisis division.   |
| 52. Claire Messina                 | OCHA   | Senior Coordinator. Humanitarian Coordinator system strengthening project                   |
| 53. Magda Ninaber Van Eyben        | OCHA   | Chief, Donor and External Relations Section   |
| 54. Sharon Rusu                    | OCHA   | Chief, External relations and support mobilization branch.                                  |
| 55. Fabrizio Gentiloni             | OCHA   | Chief, Emergency preparedness section   |
| 56. Tullio Santini                 | UNDP   | Senior advisor, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery.                                  |
| 57. Miroslav Medic                 | UNHCR  | Associate donor relations officer   |
| 58. Gesche Karrenbrock             | UNHCR  | Deputy Director, division of operational services   |
| 59. Angela Li Rosi                 | UNHCR  | Head, Policy Unit, Bureau for Europe  |
| 60. Alessandro Loretto             | WHO  | Coordinator, Emergency response and operations, health action in crises.                    |
| 61. Daniel Lopez-Acuna             | WHO  | Director, Recovery and Transition Programmes in the cluster of Health Action in Crises, HAC |
| 62. Eric Laroche                   | WHO  | Assistant Director-General , HAC  |
| 63. Inga Lohse                     | WHO  | Technical Officer for Eastern Mediterranean, HAC  |
| 64. Christine Tretter              | WHO  | Technical Officer for Africa Region, HAC  |
| 65. Chen Reis                      | WHO  | Technical Officer, Emergency Response and Operations, HAC                                   |
| 66. Nicole Adler                   | WHO  | Technical Officer -External Relations, HAC  |
| 67. Jan Brouwer                    | WHO  | Technical Officer, Emergency response and operations, HAC                                   |
| 68. Jukka Sailas                   | WHO  | Head of External Relations, HAC   |
| 69. Cristina del Pueyo             | WHO  | Technical Officer -External Relations, HAC  |
| 70. Jette Michelsen                | Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations | Counselor   |
| 71. David Mouyal                   | Permanent Mission of Denmark                       | First Secretary   |
| 72. Kristina Bendtzen Rashid       | Permanent Mission of Denmark                       | Assistant Attache   |
| 73. Veli-Pekka Kaivola             | Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations | First Secretary   |

|                                      |   |   |
|--------------------------------------|---|---|
| 74. Hirose Shinichi                  | Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organisations in Geneva | First Secretary   |
| 75. Flemming Nielsen                 | IFRC  | Head, Operations Department coordination team.  |
| 76. Peter Rees-Gildea                | IFRC  | Head, Operations Support Department.  |
| 77. Jean Daniel Tauxe                | ICRC  | Head, External resources division   |
| 78. Robert Mister                    | IFRC  | Coordinator, Inter-agency cooperation   |
| 79. Lise S. Boudreault               | ICRC  | Diplomatic advisor, Humanitarian diplomacy unit   |
| 80. Neil McFarlane                   | AusAID  | Counselor (Development)   |
| 81. Leonie Oates-Mercier             | AusAID  | Program Officer   |
| 82. Jonathan Mitchell                | CARE  | Emergency Response Director   |
| 83. Jock Baker                       | CARE  | Standards and Accountability Coordinator  |
| 84. Emmanuel Tronc                   | Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF)  | Policy and Advocacy Coordinator   |
| 85. Lars Gustavsson                  | World Vision  | Vice President, Humanitarian and Emergency Affairs  |
| 86. Philippe Guiton                  | World Vision  | Director of Humanitarian Affairs and International Relations                                  |
| 87. Ton van Zutphen                  | World Vision  | Director for Quality Assurance  |
| <b>BELGIUM</b>                       |   |   |
| 88. Marie-Paule Duquesnoy            | Belgian Government, Development Cooperation                             | Technical Expert  |
| 89. Antoon Delie                     | Belgian Government, Development Cooperation                             | Head, Department of Emergency Aid   |
| 90. Kristin Hedstrom                 | ECHO, Brussels  | Policy Affairs, Strategy, Evaluation  |
| 91. Johannes Luchner                 | ECHO, Brussels  | Head of Unit, Policy Affairs, Strategy and Evaluation   |
| 92. Kathrin Schick                   | NGO VOICE   | Director  |
| <b>FRANCE</b>                        |   |   |
| 93. Marc Giacomini                   | Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes, France                | Directeur-adjoint, Nations Unies et Organisations Internationales (NUOI)                      |
| 94. Olivier Guerot                   | Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes, France                | Sous-directeur des affaires budgétaires et des contributions internationales                  |
| 95. Claire Lignières                 | Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes, France                | Sous-directrice, Délégation à l'Aide Humanitaire  |
| 96. Coordination Sud, Paris          | ACF, AMI, Handicap International, MdM, SIF, Solidarités                 | Representatives   |
| <b>GERMANY</b>                       |   |   |
| 97. Ambassador Busso von Alvensleben | Federal Foreign Office  | Commissioner for Global Issues: Humanitarian Aid, Human Rights, Terrorism and Organised Crime |
| 98. Ursula Muller                    | Federal Foreign Office  | Head of Division, Humanitarian Task Force and Mine Action                                     |

*CERF Two Year Evaluation – Annex 3 List of Interviews (July 2008)*

|                              |                             |   |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| 99. Clemens Kroll            | Federal Foreign Office      | Counselor, Task Force Humanitarian Aid.   |
| 100. Miriam Lenz             | Federal Foreign Office      | Desk Officer, Task Force Humanitarian Assistance                                      |
| 101. Petra Milewski          | Federal Foreign Office      | Assistant Desk Officer  |
| <b>ITALY</b>                 |                             |   |
| 102. Terri Toyota            | WFP                         | Director, Government Donor Relations  |
| 103. Eddie Rowe              | WFP                         | Chief Programme Officer, Operations Department Programming Services                   |
| 104. Calum Gardner           | WFP                         | Chief, Operations Department, Programming Services                                    |
| 105. Caroline Heider         | WFP                         | Director, Office of Evaluation  |
| 106. Chad Mortino            | WFP                         | Operational Reporting Group   |
| 107. Naoko Fukunaga          | WFP                         | Chief, Contributions & Project Accounts   |
| 108. Alain Cordeil           | WFP                         | Senior Evaluation Officer   |
| 109. Victoria Sun            | FAO                         | Operations Officer, Bangladesh, Nepal   |
| 110. Fatouma Seid            | FAO                         | Operations Officer, West Africa   |
| 111. Regina Gambiro          | FAO                         | Procurement Strategy & Monitoring   |
| 112. Gary M. Tounkara        | FAO                         | Emergencies Operations Office   |
| 113. Hilde Niggemann         | FAO                         | Senior. Operations Officer  |
| 114. Suzanne Raswant         | FAO                         | Senior Planning Officer   |
| 115. Richard China           | FAO                         | Chief, Rehabilitation & Humanitarian Policies   |
| 116. David Macfarlane        | FAO                         | CERF Focal Point  |
| 117. Cynthia Cruz            | FAO                         | Head, Projects Accounting Group   |
| 118. Juan Fajardo            | FAO                         | Agriculture Department, Seed Service  |
| 119. Danilo Mejia            | FAO                         | Agriculture & Food Engineering  |
| 120. Rachel Bedouin          | FAO                         | Evaluation Service  |
| 121. Anne M Bauer            | FAO                         | Director, Emergencies Operations & Rehabilitation Division                            |
| 122. Fernanda Guerrieri      | FAO                         | Chief, Emergency Operations Service   |
| 123. Jean-Alexandeer Scaglia | FAO                         | Liaisons and Operations Officer   |
| 124. Charlota Ogvist         | FAO                         | Head, Project Accounting Group  |
| 125. Carolina Ummarino       | Italian Cooperation         | Emergencies Officer   |
| 126. C.U. Pantenius          | FAO                         | Plant Protection Service  |
| <b>THE NETHERLANDS</b>       |                             |   |
| Ruud J.Treffers              | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Director-General for International Cooperation, and member of the CERF Advisory Group |
| 127. Peter M. Flik           | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Head, Humanitarian Aid Division   |
| 128. Nicolette Koopman       | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Senior Policy Advisor   |
| <b>NORWAY</b>                |                             |   |
| 129. Susan Eckey             | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Deputy Director-General, Section for Humanitarian Affairs.                            |
| 130. Eric Frimannslund Brede | Ministry of Foreign Affairs | Advisor   |
| Toril Brekke                 | Norwegian Refugee Council   | Deputy Director, International Department and member of the CERF Advisory Group       |

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|                              |  |  |
|------------------------------|--|--|
| 131. Elisabeth Rasmusson     | Norwegian Refugee Council  | Secretary-General  |
| <b>IRELAND</b>               |  |  |
| 132. Donal Kenneally         | Irish Development Cooperation Agency, Dublin                         | Deputy Head, Humanitarian Aid Section  |
| <b>SPAIN</b>                 |  |  |
| 133. Juan Pablo de Laiglesia | Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development, Madrid | Director   |
| 134. Ricardo Polastro        | Dara, Madrid   | Evaluation Officer   |
| <b>SWEDEN</b>                |  |  |
| Marika Fahlen                | Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden                                  | Ambassador, and Special Envoy, and Chair of the CERF Advisory Group                        |
| 135. Per Orneus              | Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden                                 | Director, Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Issues  |
| 136. Mikael Lindvall         | Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden                                 | Deputy Director, Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Issues                                   |
| <b>SWITZERLAND</b>           |  |  |
| 137. Franklin Thevenaz       | Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation, Berne                      | Deputy Head, Department for Humanitarian Aid.  |
| 138. Patrizia Palmiero       | Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation, Berne                      | Chargée de Programme   |
| <b>UNITED KINGDOM</b>        |  |  |
| 139. Moazzam Malik           | DFID   | Director (Acting), UN Conflict and Humanitarian Division, and member of the Advisory Group |
| 140. Ian Howard Williams     | DFID   | Deputy Head. CHASE-OT.   |
| 141. Mary Shockledge         | Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK                                  | Team Leader, Conflict Prevention Team  |
| 142. Brendan Gormley         | DEC  | Chief Executive  |
| 143. Annie Devenport         | DEC  | Humanitarian Programme Advisor   |
| 144. Suzi Faye               | Oxfam GB   | Humanitarian Funding Manager, Programme Funding Department                                 |
| 145. Amelia Bookstein Kyazze | Save the Children  | Humanitarian Policy  |
| 146. Amanda Wiessbaum        | Save the Children  | Deputy Director, Humanitarian Department   |
| 147. David Wightwick         | Save the Children  | Humanitarian Advisor   |
| 148. Amos Doornbos           | World Vision UK  | Emergencies Programme Officer, WVI Global Response Team                                    |
| 149. Yves-Kim Creach         | Merlin   | Merlin Response Team Manager   |
| 150. Marion Khamis           | Action Aid   | International Emergencies and Conflict team  |
| 151. Beverley Storer         | HelpAge International  | Programme Funding Officer  |
| <b>Telephone Interviews</b>  |  |  |
| 152. Jan Egeland             | NUPI, Oslo   | Director   |
| 153. Rony Brauman            | Foundation MSF, Paris  | Research Director  |
| 154. Toby Lanzer             | UN, Central African Republic   | Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator  |

| <b>AFGHANISTAN</b>         |                                 |  |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|--|
| <b>Person Interviewed</b>  | <b>Organization</b>             | <b>Position</b>  |
| <b>UN AGENCIES and IOM</b> |                                 |  |
| 155. Tomio Shichiri        | FAO                             | International Project Manager, emergency and rehabilitation unit |
| 156. Serena di Matteo      | IOM                             | Officer in charge, Herat   |
| 157. Francesco Motta       | UNAMA                           | Human Rights Officer, Herat                                      |
| 158. Seif Ibrahim Kibayasi | UNAMA                           | Civil Affairs Officer, Herat                                     |
| 159. Raana Rahim           | UNAMA                           | Political Affairs Officer  |
| 160. Sikander Khan         | UNICEF                          | Deputy representative  |
| 161. Rabbani Wardati       | UNICEF                          | Health and nutrition, Herat.                                     |
| 162. Arman Harutyunyan     | UNHCR                           | Senior Programme Officer   |
| 163. Adam Moller           | UNHCR                           | External relations officer                                       |
| 164. Mohideen Bawa         | UNHCR                           | Programme Officer, Herat   |
| 165. Abdul Karim           | UNHCR                           | Programme Officer, Herat   |
| 166. Rikki Maliklali       | WFP                             | Deputy Country Director  |
| 167. Pilja Stevan          | WFP                             | Chief Movement Coordination Center                               |
| 168. Yoko Honda            | WFP                             | Pipeline officer   |
| 169. Sven Thelin           | WFP                             | Head of WFP Area Office, Herat                                   |
| <b>DONORS</b>              |                                 |  |
| 170. Segolene de Beco      | ECHO                            | Head of Office   |
| <b>NGOs</b>                |                                 |  |
| 171. Chrissie Hirst        | DACAAR                          | Chief of Policy and Advocacy.                                    |
| 172. Naik Mohammad         | AITM                            | Finance Manager  |
| 173. Marit Glad            | CARE                            | Advocacy Coordinator   |
| 174. Khial Shah            | AREA                            | Managing Director  |
| 175. Fazal Karim Najimi    | FEWS NET                        | Country Representative.  |
| 176. Shah Rauf             | DACAAR                          | Representative of DACAAR in western Afghanistan, Herat           |
| 177. Salahuddin Darwish    | Cooperation for Peace and Unity | Peace building Program Officer                                   |
| 178. Harlan Hale           | OFDA                            | Senior Humanitarian Advisor                                      |
| 179. Lucia Fernandez       | DARA                            | Coordinator, Evaluation and Studies.                             |
| 180. Alfred Ahora          | HELP (Germany)                  | Director, Herat  |
| 181. Haider Amiri          | HELP                            | Operations Manager, Herat  |

| <b>BANGLADESH</b>          |  |  |
|----------------------------|--|--|
| <b>Person Interviewed</b>  | <b>Organization</b>                    | <b>Position</b>  |
| <b>GOVERNMENT</b>          |  |  |
| 182. Mohammad Abu Sadeque  | Government of Bangladesh.              | Director, Disaster Management Bureau   |
| 183. Younus Ali            | Government of Bangladesh Barisal City  | Superintendent Engineer, DPHE  |
| 184. Lokman Hossain        | Barguna City                           | Magistrate, D.C.Office   |
| 185. Shahjahan             | Barguna Puroshava                      | Chairman   |
| <b>UN AGENCIES</b>         |  |  |
| 186. Renata Lok-Dessallien | UN                                     | Resident Coordinator   |
| 187. Jan Kellett           | Office of the UN Resident Coordinator  | Coordination Specialist  |
| 188. Rune Brandrup         | Officer of the UN Resident Coordinator | UN Programme Officer   |
| 189. Abu Sayed Mia         | FAO                                    | National livestock Specialist, Emergency Recovery and Coordination Unit                  |
| 190. Ad Spijkers           | FAO                                    | FAO Representative   |
| 191. Alfred Osumsanya      | FAO                                    | International Consultant, Agronomist   |
| 192. Nishat Chowdhry       | IOM                                    | National Programme Officer   |
| 193. Mahbubur Rahman       | IOM                                    | Project Assistant  |
| 194. Steven Goldfinch      | UNDP                                   | Programme Officer  |
| 195. Tarik-ul-Islam        | UNDP                                   | Assistant Country Director (Disaster Management)   |
| 196. Amzad Hossain         | UNDP                                   | Field Team Leader  |
| 197. Mr. Kabir             | UNDP                                   | District Coordinator (REOPA)   |
| 198. Touhid UIAlam         | UNFPA                                  | National Programme Officer Strategic Development   |
| 199. Pia Prytz Phiri       | UNHCR                                  | UNHCR Representative   |
| 200. Marina Aksakalova     | UNHCR                                  | Programme Officer, Cox's Bazar   |
| 201. Zahid Jamal Khattak   | UNHCR                                  | Health and nutrition coordinator, Cox's Bazar  |
| 202. Zulfikur Ali Khan     | UNICEF                                 | Emergency Specialist   |
| 203. Misaki Akasaka Ueda   | UNICEF                                 | Chief. Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Section.                                      |
| 204. Deqa Ibrahim Musa     | UNICEF                                 | Project Officer, Monitoring and Evaluation   |
| 205. Mr. Taufiq            | UNICEF                                 | Divisional Coordinator, Barisal Office   |
| 206. Kenneth Ged           | WHO                                    | Medical Officer EHA  |
| 207. Duangvadee Sungkhobol | WHO                                    | WHO Representative   |
| 208. Roderico H. Ofrin     | WHO                                    | Technical Officer, Emergency and humanitarian action, WHO Regional Office (SEARO) Delhi. |
| 209. Edward Callón         | WFP                                    | WFP Representative a.i.  |
| 210. Enamul Haque          | WFP                                    | Head, Advocacy Unit  |
| 211. Mr. Khawja Kutubuddin | WFP                                    | Emergency Officer, Barisal Field Office  |

| <b>DONORS</b>   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| 212. Tony Conlay  | DFID   | Humanitarian Specialist, London                       |
| 213. Abul Monsur Muhammad Moniruzzaman  | DFID   | Deputy Programme Manager , Bangladesh Governance      |
| 214. Bo Sundstrom   | DFID   | Head of Corporate Business, Bangladesh                |
| <b>IFRC/NGOs</b>  |  |   |
| 215. Selvaratnam Sinnadurai   | IFRC   | Head of Delegation                                    |
| 216. Shail Shrestha   | IFRC   | Programme Coordinator                                 |
| 217. Suman SMA Islam  | CARE   | Humanitarian assistance coordinator                   |
| 218. Chitta Ranjan Biswas   | CARE   | Technical Coordinator Humanitarian Assistance         |
| 219. Tapan Kumar Brama  | BRAC   | Senior Regional Manager Disaster Management Programme |
| 220. Heather Blackwell  | Oxfam GB   | Country Programme Manager                             |
| 221. Md. Sajan  | Manashatali Union Parishad (No. 9)                               | Chairman, BargunaUpazila                              |
| 222. Ziaul Huq Hiru   | Badorkhali Union Parishad (No. 1)                                | Chairman, BargunaUpazila                              |
| 223. Johirul HuqPonu  | Chairman, Burir Char Union Parishad) (No. 6),                    | UP Member, BargunaUpazila                             |
| <b>GROUP MEETINGS/FIELD VISITS</b>  |  |   |
| <b>Description</b>  | <b>Place</b>   | <b>Attendance</b>                                     |
| Discussion with Local people  | Nishan Baria, Gazi Mahol Ward-7, Barguna                         | Beneficiaries: 35 Persons                             |
| Discussion with Local People  | Gorjon Bunia Bazar, Barguna                                      | Beneficiaries: 25 Persons                             |
| Discussion with Local People  | Khajurtola, W-2 Barguna  | Beneficiaries: 20 Persons                             |
| Discussion with Local People  | Baijora 1 No Union Sapleja, Mathbaria Upazila, Pirojpur District | Beneficiaries: 20 Persons                             |
| Local NGO ‘national development programme’ – site visit to two projects and discussion with groups of approximately |  | Beneficiaries: 20 people.                             |
| Visit to two refugee camps  | Cox’s Bazar  | Beneficiaries: 20 people                              |
| Visit to three refugee shelters and interviews with families each time.   |  |   |

| <b>DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO</b>      |  |   |
|--|--|---|
| <b>Person Interviewed</b>                | <b>Organization</b>                            | <b>Position</b>   |
| <b>GOVERNMENT</b>                        |  |   |
| 224. Batonnier Jean-Claude<br>Muyambo K. | Ministry of Humanitarian<br>and Social Affairs | Minister  |
| <b>UN AGENCIES</b>                       |  |   |
| 225. Ross Mountain                       | UN   | DSRSG/ RC/ HC   |
| 226. Musa Saihou Mbemnga                 | FAO  | Representative  |
| 227. Pierre Vauthier                     | FAO  | Responsible for Humanitarian<br>Planning and Coordination |
| 228. Zein Muzamil                        | FAO  | Chief Department of Monitoring and<br>Evaluation          |
| 229. Guigma Salif                        | FAO  | Regional Technical Coordinator,<br>Goma                   |
| 230. Laurent Ikundji                     | FAO  | I/C M & E, Goma   |
| 231. Michel Ngongo                       | FAO  | Technical Coordinator, Lubumbashi                         |
| 232. Gloria Fernandez                    | OCHA   | Head of Office  |
| 233. Andrew Wyllie                       | OCHA   | Deputy Head of Office                                     |
| 234. Andrea de Domenico                  | OCHA   | Head, OCHA/UNDP Joint Pooled<br>Fund Support Unit         |
| 235. Richard Guerra                      | OCHA   | Humanitarian Affairs Officer                              |
| 236. Claudia Rodríguez                   | OCHA   | Humanitarian Affairs Officer                              |
| 237. Patrick Lavand'homme                | OCHA   | Head of Office, North Kivu                                |
| 238. Noel Moshi                          | OCHA   | Associate Humanitarian Affairs<br>Officer, Lubumbashi     |
| 239. Asseta Ouedrago                     | MONUC  | Gender Adviser, Kinshasa                                  |
| 240. Maud Ropars                         | MONUC  | Civil Affairs Officer                                     |
| 241. Pierre Shamwol                      | UNFPA  | Assistant representative                                  |
| 242. K. Ouedraogo                        | UNFPA  | Dy. Representative, Kinshasa                              |
| 243. Francesca Fontanini                 | UNHCR  | External Relations Officer                                |
| 244. Eusebe S. Hounsokou                 | UNHCR  | Representative  |
| 245. Mohamed Toure                       | UNHCR  | Deputy Representative                                     |
| 246. Marie Antoinette Okimba             | UNHCR  | Field Officer, Goma                                       |
| 247. Anthony Bloomberg                   | UNICEF   | UNHCR Representative                                      |
| 248. Katrien Ghooos                      | UNICEF   | Nutrition manager   |
| 249. Jean Pierre Kabuto                  | UNICEF   | Financial Manager   |
| 250. Damian Lilly                        | UNICEF   | Emergency Specialist                                      |
| 251. Patrick Codjia                      | UNICEF   | Nutrition Specialist                                      |
| 252. Sayo Auki                           | UNICEF   | Education specialist, Goma                                |
| 253. Saidou Diallo                       | UNICEF   | Health and nutrition, Goma                                |
| 254. Pernille Ironside                   | UNICEF   | Protection specialist, Goma                               |
| 255. Francois Ballet                     | UNICEF   | Water and Sanitation Specialist,<br>Lubumbashi            |
| 256. Badho Nsiama Afkel                  | UNICEF   | Water and Sanitation, Lubumbashi                          |
| 257. Justin Ntamuguma<br>Mutarabanyi     | UNICEF   | Emergency Officer, Lubumbashi                             |
| 258. Harouna Ouedraogo                   | UN Mine Action<br>Coordination Centre          | Programme Manager, Kinshasa                               |
| 259. Charles Vincent                     | WFP  | WFP Representative  |

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|                             |  |   |
|-----------------------------|--|---|
| 260. Richar Verbeek         | WFP  | Deputy Country Director                       |
| 261. Gilbert Gitelman       | WFP  | Responsible for Logistic Cluster              |
| 262. Joan Mites             | WFP  | Logistics specialist                          |
| 263. Robert Deckker         | WFP  | Head of Programme                             |
| 264. Aline Samy             | WFP  | Reporting Unit                                |
| 265. Aya Shneerson          | WFP  | Head of Office, N. Kivu                       |
| 266. Georges Dopavogui      | WFP  | Programme Officer, Lubumbashi                 |
| 267. Jean-Baptiste ROUNGOU  | WHO  | WHO Representative                            |
| 268. Brice Ahounou          | WHO  | EHA Focal point /Programme Officer            |
| <b>DONORS</b>               |  |   |
| 269. Sebastian Fouquet      | DFID   | Humanitarian Adviser, Kinshasa                |
| 270. Victoria Luque         | International Cooperation, Spain                             | Humanitarian Adviser                          |
| 271. Luc St-Laurent         | CIDA   | Second Secretary, Kinshasa                    |
| 272. Roy Hans               | Dutch Embassy  | Second Secretary, Kinshasa                    |
| 273. Alain Decoux           | ECHO   | Head of Office, Kinshasa                      |
| 274. Stephen Haykin         | USAID  | Mission Director, Kinshasa                    |
| <b>ICRC and NGOs</b>        |  |   |
| 275. Max Hadorn             | ICRC   | Head of Delegation, DRC                       |
| 276. Isabelle D'Haudt       | Action Contre la Faim/USA                                    | Head of Mission                               |
| 277. Sital Kumar            | Action Aid   | Emergency Programme Manager                   |
| 278. Edoardo Tagliano       | AVSI   | Head of Programme, Goma                       |
| 279. Christina Kaiser       | Caritas Germany  | Representative                                |
| 280. Blaise Mbo             | Caritas  | DRC Coordinator                               |
| 281. Viateur Semarome       | Caritas  | Nutrition supervisor, Goma                    |
| 282. Ludovica Ghitardi      | CESVI  | Field Officer                                 |
| 283. Patricia Aleaga        | COOPI  | Medical coordinator, Goma                     |
| 284. Roghas Wakenge         | IMC  | Nutrition Programme officer, Goma             |
| 285. Nick Martlew           | Inter-NGO  | Rep. NGO consortium                           |
| 286. Nicolas Coutin         | NRC  | Head of office, Goma.                         |
| 287. Masuoi Nkumbilwa       | LWF  | Chief, Nutrition Section. Goma                |
| 288. Olivier Thonet         | UNICEF   | Wat/San Programme Officer, Goma               |
| 289. Katherine Haver        | Oxfam GB   | Policy Adviser                                |
| 290. Hussein Mursal         | Save the Children  | Country Director                              |
| 291. Maria Mora             | Save the Children  | Field Manager, North Kivu                     |
| 292. Paul Makoma            | VSF  | Technical Officer, Goma                       |
| 293. Jean Marie Crasimba    | VSF  | OIC, Goma                                     |
| 294. Robert Tshibangu       | WVI  | Nutrition coordinator, Goma                   |
| 295. Benedict U Rimando     | World Vision   | Eastern DRC Regional Manager                  |
| 296. Gaetan Ducroux         | Solidarites  | Liaison Officer, Kinshasa                     |
| 297. Zouzou Shamamba        | Solidarites  | Programme coordinator, Nutrition, North Kivu. |
| 298. Philippe Lwabo Waliuzi | LIDEAS (Ligue pour le Developpement et l'Assistance Sociale) | Programme Officer, Lubumbashi                 |
| 299. Jeff Seed              | CARE International   | National Director                             |

| <b>DOMINICAN REPUBLIC</b>       |                                      |   |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| <b>Person Interviewed</b>       | <b>Organization</b>                  | <b>Position</b>   |
| <b>GOVERNMENT</b>               |                                      |   |
| 300. Rosa del Carmen Mena       | Education Ministry                   | Director General, Basic Education                             |
| 301. Jose Mieses                | Ministry of Health                   | Director of Mental Health                                     |
| 302. Nelson A Rodriguez Monegra | Ministry of Health                   | Vice Minister, Public Health                                  |
| 303. Susana Gamez               | Social Cabinet                       | Technical Director  |
| 304. Santo Gamboa               | Ministry of Agriculture              | Regional Agriculture Director, Barahona                       |
| 305. Rolando Doverge            | Ministry of Health                   | Regional Mental Health Director, Barahona                     |
| 306. Rafael Sanchez             | Ministry of Health                   | Regional Health Director                                      |
| 307. Ana Rodriguez              | Vicente Noble Hospital               | Director  |
| 308. Rosa Nilda Felix           | C.R School, Uvilla                   | Principal   |
| 309. Digna Peña                 | Ministry of Agriculture, Govt. of DR | Director of Department for Agricultural Economy               |
| 310. Noesterling Díaz           | Ministry of Agriculture, Govt. of DR | Director of Department for Monitoring, Control and Evaluation |
| <b>UN AGENCIES</b>              |                                      |   |
| 311. Antonio Morales            | FAO                                  | Representative  |
| 312. Rolando Gonzalez           | FAO                                  | Consultant for Emergency Response                             |
| 313. Juan Ramírez Montás        | FAO                                  | Consultant for Emergency Response                             |
| 314. Audrey Gavard              | FAO                                  | Consultant for Emergency Response                             |
| 315. América Domínguez          | FAO                                  | Project Assistant   |
| 316. Graciela Uriburu           | PAHO/WHO                             | Consultant for emergency response projects                    |
| 317. Carlos Morales             | PAHO/WHO                             | Environmental Health Advisor, Disaster Focal Point            |
| 318. Jorg Schimmel              | UNDP                                 | Coordination Officer  |
| 319. Tad Palac                  | UNICEF/ResCoord                      | UNICEF Representative & Resident Coordinator a.i              |
| 320. Carmen López               | UNICEF                               | Infant Development Officer                                    |
| 321. Gilka Meléndez             | UNFPA                                | Representative a.i  |
| 322. Bernardo Santana           | UNFPA                                | Consultant Disaster Focal Point                               |
| 323. Ana Antonia Lopez          | UNFPA                                | Projects Coordinator  |
| 324. Luz Mercedes               | UNFPA                                | Medical Coordinator   |
| 325. Paulo Sassarao             | UNICEF                               | Deputy Representative   |
| 326. Sara Menéndez              | UNICEF                               | Officer for Health and HIV/AIDS                               |
| 327. Ana Boccardo               | UNICEF                               | Assistant in youth/early child participation                  |
| 328. Pavel Isa                  | WFP                                  | National Officer in Charge                                    |
| 329. Mauricio Ramírez           | UNDP                                 | RR a.i.   |
| 330. María Eugenia Morales      | UNDP                                 | Environmental M & E Evaluation Specialist                     |
| 331. Ana María Pérez            | UNDP                                 | UNETT coordinator   |
| 332. Silvia Viñals              | UNDP                                 | Health and HIV/AIDS Officer                                   |
| 333. Nicola Popovic             | UN-INSTRAW                           | Associate Expert on gender, Peace and Security                |

| <b>NGOs</b>              |                            |                             |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 334. Andrea Brechelt     | FAMA                       | Executive Director          |
| 335. Rosa Rita           | MUDE                       | Executive Director          |
| 336. Ernesto Diaz        | Plan International         | National Protection Officer |
| 337. Anabel Marinez      | World Vision International | Programme Manager           |
| 338. Esteban Cuevas      | World Vision International | Coordinator                 |
| 339. Bernardo Rodriguez  | World Vision International | Emergency Coordinator       |
| 340. Fritz Foster        | Plan International         | Country Director            |
| 341. Riccardo Capocchini | Ucodep                     | Country Director            |

| <b>HAITI</b>                |                                  |   |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|---|
| <b>Person Interviewed</b>   | <b>Organization</b>              | <b>Position</b>   |
| <b>UN AGENCIES</b>          |                                  |   |
| 342. Dr. Escobedo Urquizo   | FAO                              | Regional Emergency Coordinator, LAC                       |
| 343. Volny Paultre          | FAO                              | Representative Assistant                                  |
| 344. Judy Dacruz            | IOM                              | Project Development Officer                               |
| 345. Manuela Gonzalez       | OCHA                             | Head of Office  |
| 346. Narciso Rosa-Berlanga  | OCHA                             | Associate Humanitarian Affair Officer                     |
| 347. Rony Bayard            | UNICEF                           | WES Specialist  |
| 348. Mariavittoria Ballotta | UNICEF                           | Protection Officer  |
| 349. Eriko Patricia Suzuta  | UNICEF                           | Protection Officer  |
| 350. Cecilia Sanchez Bodas  | UNICEF                           | Health Officer  |
| 351. Joel Boutroue          | UNDP                             | DSRSG/HC/UNDP Resident Representative                     |
| 352. Jean-Francois Laurent  | UNOPS                            | Project Coordinator                                       |
| 353. Philippe Allouard      | WHO                              | Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Relief                  |
| 354. Olivier Kleitz         | WHO                              | Project Manager, Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Relief |
| 355. Raphael Chuinard       | WFP                              | Program Officer   |
| <b>NGO</b>                  |                                  |   |
| 356. Samuel Louis           | Foundation for Nonviolent Change | Program Coordinator                                       |

| <b>PERU</b>                                 |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| <b>Person Interviewed</b>                   | <b>Organization</b>                      | <b>Position</b>   |
| <b>GOVERNMENT</b>                           |  |   |
| 357. Aristides Mussion Pinto                | INDECI                                   | Director, National Operations                               |
| 358. Alberto Bisbal Sanz                    | INDECI                                   | Director, National Prevention                               |
| 359. General Luis Felipe Palomino Rodríguez | INDECI                                   | Head  |
| 360. Katuska Tapia                          | APCI, Government of Peru                 | Law Division  |
| 361. Vivian Weiner Brandes                  | APCI, Government of Peru                 | Management and International Negotiation Division           |
| 362. Lucero Aguirre                         | APCI, Government of Peru                 | Operations and Capacity Development Division                |
| 363. Carlos Benites Saravia                 | Ministry of Women & Social Development   | General Director, Social Policies                           |
| 364. Carlos Vallejos Sologuren              | National Institute of Malignant Diseases | Head of the Institute and Former Health Minister (2007)     |
| 365. Victor Raul Diaz Chavez                | Ministry of Education                    | Vice Minister of Institutional Management                   |
| 366. Luis Huaylinos Maravi                  | Ministry of Education                    | Head of the Office for Educational Infrastructure           |
| 367. Nilo Figueroa Cortavarria              | Ministry of Foreign Affairs              | General Director for Coordination                           |
| 368. Maria Isabel Millan de Chiabra         | Peruvian National Commission for UNESCO  | National Secretary  |
| 369. Jose Navarro Grau                      | Chincha Provincial Government            | Mayor Chincha   |
| 370. Juan Vergara                           | District of San Andres                   | Mayor District San Andres                                   |
| 371. Carmen Rosa Ferreira                   |  | Governor of Pisco   |
| <b>UN AGENCIES</b>                          |  |   |
| 372. Jorge Chediak                          | UN                                       | RC/HC   |
| 373. Silvia Rucks                           | UNDP                                     | Deputy Resident Representative                              |
| 374. Raul Salazar                           | UNDP                                     | Programme Officer   |
| 375. Katherine Muller-Marin                 | UNESCO                                   | Representative  |
| 376. Florence Bauer                         | UNICEF                                   | Deputy Representative                                       |
| 377. Guy Gauvreau                           | WFP                                      | Representative  |
| 378. Pilar Norza                            | IOM                                      | Director, Regional Office for the Andean countries          |
| 379. Jorge del Castillo Reyes               | IOM                                      | Programme Officer, Regional Office for the Andean countries |
| 380. Marc Vandermissen                      | FAO                                      | Emergency Coordinator                                       |
| 381. Eduardo Alarcon                        | UNICEF                                   | Finance Officer   |
| 382. German Perdomo Cordoba                 | PAHO/WHO                                 | Advisor in Health Services and Policies                     |
| 383. Jose Luis Zeballos                     | PAHO/WHO                                 | Emergency and disasters consultant                          |
| 384. Dr. Celso Bambaren Alatriza            | PAHO/WHO                                 | Emergency Programme for the South                           |
| 385. Edgar A. Ramirez                       | UNFPA                                    | Assistant Representative                                    |
| 386. Ion Ibarquengoitia Goirizelaia         | UNDP                                     | Coordination Assistant, UN Coordination Office in Ica       |
| 387. Victor Manuel Ramirez                  | OCHA                                     | Coordinator, UN Coordination Office in Chincha              |

*CERF Two Year Evaluation – Annex 3 List of Interviews (July 2008)*

|                                 |   |   |
|---------------------------------|---|---|
| 388. Gabriel Dario Samudio Diaz | UN Coordination Office in Pisco   | Coordinator   |
| 389. Cecilia Davila             | UNICEF  | Local coordinator in the Emergency area                                 |
| 390. Efrain Chacon              | UNICEF  | Education Specialist in the emergency area                              |
| 391. Fernando Alvarado Pereda   | FAO   | Consultant in the emergency area  |
| 392. Ruben Mori Kuriyama        | FAO   | Coordinator in Ica in the emergency area                                |
| 393. Humberto Rivera Cajo       | IOM   | Local representative in the emergency area                              |
| 394. Gustavo Leal               | OCHA  | Coordinator   |
| <b>DONORS</b>                   |   |   |
| 395. Karl-Heinz Vogel           | European Union Delegation   | Cooperation Attaché and Earthquake coordinator                          |
| 396. Jean-Charles Fiehren       | European Union Delegation   | Advisor and Head of the Cooperation and Development Section             |
| 397. Larry Zacks                | USAID   | Deputy, Democratic Initiative Office                                    |
| 398. Clay Epperson              | USAID   | Head, Programme Office  |
| <b>IFRC AND NGOS</b>            |   |   |
| 399. Giorgio Ferrario           | IFRC  | Regional Representative   |
| 400. José Tejada                | Caritas Peru  | Emergency Project Coordinator   |
| 401. Jennifer Bonilla           | Caritas Peru  | Project and development manager , International Cooperation             |
| 402. Dilma Davila               | Oxfam   | Risk Management Coordinator   |
| 403. Pabel Angeles              | Peruvian Red Cross  | National Aid Director   |
| 404. Denisse Chavez             | Peruvian Red Cross  | Director, Development & Cooperation Office                              |
| 405. Gabriela Ramos             | Peruvian Red Cross  | Director of Volunteering  |
| 406. Rosario Higashi Beltran    | Peruvian Red Cross  | Director Administration and Finance                                     |
| 407. Luis Enrique Machuca       | Peruvian Red Cross  | President   |
| 408. Giovana Santillan Chaupis  | Soluciones Practicas ITDG   | Project manager, Project for the prevention of disasters and governance |
| 409. Sonia Jauregui Rivera      | CARE Peru   | Emergency Advisor   |
| <b>BENEFICIARIES</b>            |   |   |
| 410. Baltazar Lantaron Nunez    | Ica Regional Education Directorate  | Director  |
| 411. Pablo Machado              | Elementary School in Chincha Alta (“Esperanza Carrillo de Pesqueira”) built by UNESCO | School Director   |
| 412. Giuliano Murayco del Valle | Parents Association of the School Esperanza Carrillo de Pesqueira                     | President   |
| 413. Sara Autai Casterira       | School Esperanza Carrillo de Pesqueira  | Student’s mother  |
| 414. Isabel Sebastian Pachas    | School Esperanza Carrillo de Pesqueira  | Student’s mother  |
| 415. Nicanor Perez Quispe       | Comatrana Fisherman Union   | President   |

| <b>GROUP MEETINGS/FIELD VISITS</b>                                  |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| <b>Name</b>   | <b>Place</b>  | <b>Attendance</b>   |
| Donors  | Lima  | Annika N. Anchorena SIDA, National Programme Coordinator; Jose Hermoza, Spanish Cooperation Office; Sebastian Eugster, Swiss Cooperation Office in Peru, Deputy Director for Humanitarian Assistance; Pierre Charlier and Koen Van Acoleyen, Embassy of Belgium; Domenico Bruzzone and Marco Gaspari, Italian Cooperation Regional Office in Bolivia; Fabienne Weber Aguinaga, French Embassy; Antonello Luorio and Tiziana Marini, Italian Embassy |
| Meeting at the UN coordination house                                | CHINCHA   | 30 people (Municipal and provincial Governments, UN Agencies, Local NGOs)   |
| Joint project of UNESCO, UNICEF, PAHO/WHO; and the support of IOM); | “Esperanza Carrillo de Pesqueira” Elementary School in Chincha Alta | Beneficiaries: Children and parents   |
| FAO project   | Artisanal fishing pier at Tambo de Mora                             | Beneficiaries: Fisherman  |
| WFP project   | Food distribution at Tambo de Mora                                  | Beneficiaries: vulnerable groups  |
| Meeting at the UN coordination house                                | PISCO   | 15 people (Municipal and provincial Governments, UN Agencies, Local NGOs)   |
| UNICEF project  | San Martin School   | Beneficiaries: school director and parent’s association   |
| Joint Project of IOM, UNICEF and UNDP                               | “United Nations” squatter settlement, district of San Andrés        |   |
| PAHO/WHO project  | Visit to the San Juan de Dios Hospital                              | Beneficiaries: Hospital director and staff  |
| Meeting at the UN coordination house                                | ICA   | 40 people (Municipal and provincial Governments, UN Agencies, Local NGOs)   |
| FAO project   | Comatrana Fishermen Union   | Beneficiaries: fisherman and families   |
| UNICEF projects   | “Antonio Moreno” and “San Luís Gonzaga” schools                     |   |
| WFP project   | Food distribution at Salas Guadalupe                                | Beneficiaries: children   |

*CERF Two Year Evaluation – Annex 3 List of Interviews (July 2008)*

| <b>SUDAN</b>                  |                            |  |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| <b>Person Interviewed</b>     | <b>Organization</b>        | <b>Position</b>                                  |
| <b>GOVERNMENT</b>             |                            |  |
| 416. Dr. Balla Abass          | Government Hospital        | Medical Director, Geneina                        |
| <b>UN AGENCIES</b>            |                            |  |
| 417. Antoine Gerard           | OCHA                       | Manager, Darfur Cell                             |
| 418. Tom Shortley             | OCHA                       | UN & Partners Work Plan team , KTN               |
| 419. Simone Holladay          | OCHA                       | M & E Officer, KTN                               |
| 420. Michael Selch Jensen     | OCHA                       | Manager Policy & Planning Unit, KTN              |
| 421. Tensai Asfaw             | OCHA                       | Planning Officer, Juba                           |
| 422. Christine Kuhn           | OCHA                       | Planning Officer, KTN                            |
| 423. Farah Bello              | OCHA                       | Field Officer, Geneina                           |
| 424. Amy H. Martin            | OCHA                       | Area Coordinator, Geneina                        |
| 425. Mike McDonagh            | OCHA                       | Chief, KTN                                       |
| 426. John Kargotich           | OCHA                       | Civil Military coordination Officer, West Darfur |
| 427. Tesfai Ghermazien        | FAO                        | Sr. Emergency & Rehabilitation Coordinator, KTN  |
| 428. Emmanuel J. Lujuo        | FAO                        | Dy. Emergency Coordinator, KTN                   |
| 429. David Greesly            | UN                         | Dy. RC/HC, Juba                                  |
| 430. Enrico Gaveglia          | UNDP                       | Fund Manager                                     |
| 431. Athanse Nzokirishaka     | UNFPA                      | Deputy Representative                            |
| 432. Mustapha B. A. Medph     | UNFPA                      | Reproductive Health Coordinator, Geneina         |
| 433. Ted Chaiban              | UNICEF                     | Representative , KTN                             |
| 434. Sampath Kumar            | UNICEF                     | Sr. Programme Officer, WES, KTN                  |
| 435. Caesar Hall              | UNICEF                     | WES Specialist, KTN                              |
| 436. Dr. Ali Dowelbail        | UNICEF                     | PO – Health & HIV/AIDS, Geneina                  |
| 437. Douglas Jayasekaran      | UNICEF                     | Nutrition consultant, Geneina                    |
| 438. Joyce Ayume              | UNICEF                     | Nutrition Officer, Geneina                       |
| 439. David Tsetse             | UNICEF                     | WASH Specialist, Geneina                         |
| 440. Naqibullah Safi          | UNICEF                     | Regional Programme Officer, West Darfur          |
| 441. Mahera Khatun            | UNICEF                     | Sr. Programme Officer, West Darfur               |
| 442. Chrysanthus Ache         | UNHCR                      | Country Representative                           |
| 443. Craig Sanders            | UNHCR                      | Deputy Representative                            |
| 444. Iain Hall                | UNHCR                      | Head of Sub-office, Geneina                      |
| 445. Peter Trotter            | UNHCR                      | Senior Protection Officer, El Geneina            |
| 446. Kenro Oshidari           | WFP                        | Representative, KTN                              |
| 447. Dr. Mehboob Ali Badini   | WHO                        | CDC Coordinator, Geneina Office                  |
| 448. Dr. Md. Abdur Rab        | WHO                        | WHO Representative                               |
| 449. Ms. Beth Shelley Muldrew | WHO                        | External Relations Officer WCO                   |
| 450. Mohammed Musa Hussein    | WHO                        | External Relations Officer WCO                   |
| 451. Dr. Nagwa Salih Abubaker | WHO                        | National Medical Officer                         |
| 452. Dr. Tahani Malik Abdalla | WHO                        | Medical Officer, Geneina                         |
| <b>NGOs</b>                   |                            |  |
| 453. Abebaw Zekele            | Save the Children - UK     | Country Director                                 |
| 454. Mareng Tafere            | World Vision International | Director, Northern Sudan                         |
| 455. Sarah McNiece            | CARE International         | Logistics Coordinator                            |

| <b>I. TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS</b> |                                     |   |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|
| <b>Person Interview</b>        | <b>Organization</b>                 | <b>Position</b>   |
| <b>BOLIVIA</b>                 |                                     |   |
| 456. Mr. Franklin Condori      | Bolivian Civil Defense Office       | Emergency Advisor                                       |
| 457. Vitoria Ginja             | UN                                  | RC/ HC a.i., WFP Representative                         |
| 458. Walter Arce               | IOM                                 | Emergency coordinator                                   |
| 459. Camil Morilo              | IOM                                 | HA Officers   |
| 460. Vaz Vargas                | IOM                                 | HA Officers   |
| 461. Horacio calle             | IOM                                 | HA Officers   |
| 462. Susana Sandoz             | UNICEF                              | Emergency Focal Point                                   |
| 463. Rocio Chain               | UN Emergency Technical Team (UNETE) | UN Focal point  |
| 464. Max Bonnel                | OCHA                                | Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Regional Office in Panama |
| 465. Roger Quiroga B.          | Oxfam                               | Risk Management and Humanitarian Coordinator            |
| 466. Ms. Nancy Gutiérrez       | World Vision                        | Humanitarian Assistance Manager                         |
| <b>CHAD</b>                    |                                     |   |
| 467. Kingsley Amaning          | UN                                  | EHA Project Officer                                     |
| 468. Serge Male                | UNHCR                               | Representative  |
| 469. Ann Maymann               | UNHCR                               | External Liaison Officer                                |
| 470. Felix Bamexon             | WFP                                 | Representative  |
| 471. Paul Brandrup             | Oxfam                               | Country Manager   |
| <b>DPRK</b>                    |                                     |   |
| 472. Nagi Shafik               | WHO                                 | EHA Project Officer                                     |
| 473. Michel Le Pechoux         | UNICEF                              | Representative  |
| 474. Sune Gudnitz              | OCHA                                | HRSU, Geneva  |
| <b>ETHIOPIA</b>                |                                     |   |
| 475. Vincent Lelei             | OCHA                                | Head a.i.,  |
| 476. Amare Gebre Egzibher      | UNHRC                               | Programme/Environment Officer                           |
| 477. Abbey Maxman              | CARE                                | Head  |
| <b>MOZAMBIQUE</b>              |                                     |   |
| 478. Ndolamb Ngokwey           | UN                                  | RC  |
| 479. Leila Pakkala             | UNICEF                              | Representative  |
| 480. Martin Acosta             | IFRC                                | Representative  |
| <b>PAKISTAN</b>                |                                     |   |
| 481. Dr. Khalif Bile           | UN                                  | UN Representative a.i and WHO Representative            |
| 482. Giovanni Bosco            | OCHA                                | Deputy Head of Office, Uganda                           |
| 483. Anwar UIHaq               | UNORC                               | Advisor on Area Coordination                            |
| 484. Fawad Hussain             | UNORC                               | National Humanitarian Affair officer                    |
| 485. Dr. Rayana                | WHO                                 | EHA Coordinator operations.                             |
| <b>SOMALIA</b>                 |                                     |   |
| 486. Bastien Vigneau           | UNICEF                              | Head, Emergencies                                       |
| 487. Ivana Unluova             | UNHCR                               | Cluster Coordinator                                     |
| 488. Keith Ursel               | WFP                                 | Head of Operations                                      |
| 489. Hala Suliman              | WFP                                 | Pipeline Officer  |
| 490. N. Paranietharan          | WHO                                 | EHA Focal point , WHO Somalia Office                    |
| 491. Tony Burns                | NGO SAACID                          | Director of Operations                                  |

**Summary Statistics of Interviewees (does not include group interviews):**

UN Agencies/IOM: 303

NGOs: 105 (+ group meetings)

Member States/Donor Representatives: 62

Government: 34 (+ group meetings)

Beneficiaries: 6 (+ group meetings)

**ANNEX 4: Itinerary of Interviews**

| <b>Date</b>                         | <b>Place</b>             |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>AFGHANISTAN</b>                  |                          |
| 30 March, 2 to 4 April              | Kabul                    |
| 31 March and 1 April                | Harat                    |
| <b>BANGLADESH</b>                   |                          |
| 20, 24 and 27 -28 April             | Dhaka                    |
| 23 April                            | Sirajganj                |
| 25 – 26 April                       | Cox Bazaar               |
| <b>DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO</b> |                          |
| 9-19 March                          | Kinshasa                 |
| 14-16 March                         | Goma                     |
| 15-16 March                         | Lubumbashi               |
| <b>DOMINICAN REPUBLIC</b>           |                          |
| 31 March-03 April                   | Dominican Republic       |
| 01 April                            | Barhona                  |
| <b>EUROPE</b>                       |                          |
| 31 March                            | The Hague                |
| 2 April                             | Stockholm                |
| 3 April                             | Oslo                     |
| 4 April                             | Berlin                   |
| 7-14 April                          | Geneva                   |
| 17-18 April                         | Paris                    |
| 20-23 April                         | Rome                     |
| 24 April                            | Brussels                 |
| 28 April                            | London                   |
| 29 April                            | Dublin                   |
| 30 April                            | Madrid                   |
| 1 May                               | London                   |
| <b>HAITI</b>                        |                          |
| 04-08 April                         | Port-au Prince           |
| <b>PERU</b>                         |                          |
| 9-11 and 14-15 April                | Lima                     |
| 12-13 April                         | Chincha, Pisco and Ica   |
| <b>SUDAN</b>                        |                          |
| 3-5 and 9-13 May                    | Khartoum                 |
| 6-8 May                             | El Geneina (West Darfur) |
| <b>NORTH AMERICA</b>                |                          |
| 2-8 March                           | New York                 |
| 19-20 May                           | New York                 |
| 21 May                              | Washington               |
| 22-23 May                           | New York                 |
| 26 May                              | Ottawa                   |

## **ANNEX 5: Country Reports**

## AFGHANISTAN REPORT


### 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Afghanistan has received the third largest amount of CERF funding at approximately \$51m (an allocation was in process at the time of the evaluation). The CERF has been granted four times:

- A joint drought appeal by the government of Afghanistan and the UN in 2006. The appeal ‘update’ also contained significant elements of response to displacement caused by fighting in the south of the country.
- A response to a forced return of Afghans from Iran in mid-2007.
- An ‘underfunded’ grant in early 2008 that responded to both the consequences of a harsh winter in the west and preparation for further Iranian expulsions.
- A food aid response to the sharp increase in grain prices caused by world markets, some emergency funding to keep UNHAS flying and some money for emergency telecommunications.

The table below (Table 1 and Figure 1) shows the overall division of CERF funding by agency over the last two years.

|        |            |
|--------|------------|
| WFP    | 37,019,688 |
| UNICEF | 2,952,428  |
| IOM    | 4,114,936  |
| WHO    | 3,693,037  |
| FAO    | 2,485,077  |
| UNHCR  | 1,095,590  |
| Total  | 48,290,184 |



### 2. FUNDING MECHANISMS AND HUMANITARIAN REFORM

#### 2.1 RAPID RESPONSE, UNDER-FUNDED AND LOANS

The vast majority of the CERF funding in Afghanistan has been from the ‘rapid response’ window, with only \$4m in 2008 coming from the underfunded.

The underfunded allocation was suggested to the country team by the CERF secretariat following a request by WHO to include Afghanistan as a non-CAP country. The CERF secretariat suggested a \$5m allocation; agencies bid for \$4.8m.

Among the UN country team there was still some uncertainty about what they could apply for, and the basis on which allocations could be made. WFP for instance were keen to explore the loan facility to cover the funding gap that they had for the UNHAS service; other agencies were not clear

about the basis on which the underfunded allocation had been proposed, or how the CERF secretariat made the decision on the level of proposals that could be funded.

## **2.2 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FUNDING**

The CERF occupies a unique and interesting position in Afghanistan. In comparison to other international funding, it is a modest amount. Since 2001 approximately \$15bn has been provided in reconstruction and development aid. Over the same time \$25bn has been donated for building the Afghan security forces. The US military spends \$36bn a year for the Afghan operation. The US military's 'provincial reconstruction teams' (assistance projects carried out by their armed forces) have a budget of approximately \$400m a year. CERF has been approximately \$51m over a two year period, a tiny sum in relation to overall aid figures.

In terms of humanitarian funding however, it is far more significant. A very rough average for humanitarian spending for the last two years is about \$160m a year (taken from the OCHA FTS). UN agencies account for about half of that amount, meaning that CERF has constituted about a third of all UN humanitarian funding in the last two years.

That suggests that CERF is the main source of humanitarian funding for a number of the UN agencies, making CERF a first, rather than last resort. Of course the argument can be made about what is humanitarian. Many aspects of WFP's \$400 million and UNICEF's \$100 million country programmes could be classed as humanitarian. The UNHCR, WHO, FAO and IOM 'regular' programmes all have elements that are described as humanitarian. Nevertheless there is no humanitarian appeal, and apart from a humanitarian coordinator and a handful of humanitarian affairs people in UNAMA (the mission), there is little that could be recognised as the traditional humanitarian architecture. ECHO is the major 'humanitarian' donor in the country, with a budget of 31m Euro for 2008. The US OFDA is recently arrived and works only in Kabul for the time being.

This situation is extraordinary for a country where conflict has raged for the past 30 years and indicators on human well-being are so hard to come by that the country does not even figure on the Human Development Index (HDI). The ICRC recently issued a statement stating that they had less access to people displaced by conflict than any time in the last 20 years, and say that the "humanitarian situation is worsening as hostilities spread"<sup>92</sup>. The fact that there is no common appeal or humanitarian strategy has led to a heavy reliance on the CERF. Although Afghanistan has received the third highest global allocation of CERF funding, it has no humanitarian appeal or even plan. And 2008 looks likely to bring increased humanitarian needs.

## **2.3 COORDINATION**

Coordination in Afghanistan for humanitarian affairs falls to a unit within the UNAMA mission. This consists of four people in Kabul and one officer in each of the eight UNAMA regional offices. The head of the humanitarian affairs unit (HAU) reports to the humanitarian coordinator (HC), who as with all integrated missions is also the RC and the DSRSG for the second 'pillar' within UNAMA for reintegration, relief and rehabilitation (RRR).

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<sup>92</sup> "Humanitarian situation worsens as Afghan hostilities spread". International Committee of the Red Cross. 18 February, 2008. <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/Afghanistan-interview-180208>

The HAU brings together the major actors regularly at national and regional levels. The unit is well regarded by UN agencies and NGOs, but in reality is only just starting up, having recently expanded. Even now, the unit is significantly under-resourced. Over the last three decades Afghanistan has often set the humanitarian agenda, through the courage of the people involved in humanitarian action, the incredible levels of need, the difficulty in reaching people, and the constant innovation of those involved. To see humanitarian action at such a low point – so under resourced, so weak – is a reflection on an international strategy that has squeezed the space accorded to neutral, independent humanitarian action until it barely exists.

As a result of this decline of traditional humanitarian action, coordination is patchy. There are good examples of coordination – some inspired by the CERF process. The recent inter-agency planning for another wave of deportations from Iran in the western region has been well-coordinated, bringing agencies together to formulate a common strategy and plan and resourced in part by the latest CERF allocation. There are other examples of where assistance has not been so well coordinated amongst the agencies – for example the shelter programme for the deportations in 2007 where IOM built different sized shelters to the ones UNHCR had built for registered returnees in the same districts, causing considerable problems for both (this was eventually resolved).

The ‘normal’ coordination issues that exist among UN agencies, and between the agencies and NGOs are as nothing compared with the coordination between ‘traditional’ actors and the military. The US-led PRT structure alone has \$400m a year at its disposal. PRTs continue to operate to different frameworks and mandates – reporting through their national structures rather than NATO command in Afghanistan. UNAMA has one civil-military advisor for humanitarian affairs, who whilst doing an excellent job is stretched to make the required linkages.

## **2.4 STRENGTHENING HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR**

The humanitarian coordinator role appears to be weak in Afghanistan. The HC is also the RC and the DSRSG within a political mission. The mission was conceived of as integrated, and humanitarian coordination does not sit separately from wider concerns of nation building in Afghanistan.

Understandably the government is reluctant to talk in terms of humanitarian issues when there is so much work to do in rebuilding shattered public services. The nations which have supported the Afghanistan government are also keen to see their investment as building the nation, and do not want to hear about conflict and conflict affected populations.

Against this delicate political background it must be difficult for an official within the political mission to talk of ‘humanitarian crisis’. When nobody knows the extent of displacement in the south, perhaps it can be debated whether or not there is a crisis. In any event, the advocacy role of the ‘classic’ humanitarian coordinator is not being filled in Afghanistan. CERF has little effect on that.

As a result, the role of the humanitarian coordinator in CERF allocations appears to be little more than a post-box for the agencies. Correspondence provided to the evaluation team does not indicate critical analysis, or leverage of the CERF to achieve greater coordination or action. Instead the HC has – from the evidence provided – merely forwarded communications from New York to the agencies and vice versa.

## **2.5 CLUSTERS APPROACH**

The cluster approach has not been introduced in Afghanistan, partly because there is no CAP/CHAP and as a result no ‘humanitarian’ programme as such. There are now moves to introduce clusters, although this is still in its infancy. A protection cluster was about to launch at the time of the evaluation visit, chaired by UNHCR. There was some discussion amongst UNCT members interviewed for the evaluation about using the clusters as a place where CERF allocations could be discussed, although this was not decided.

## **2.6 ROLE OF GOVERNMENT**

The Afghan government has played a strong role in the majority of CERF allocations, both as instigator and implementer, although sadly it was not possible to interview any officials despite several attempts (flight cancellations were partially responsible for this.).

The 2006/7 drought appeal was launched at the government’s request. The UN agencies assisted in the Iran deportee action as a result of a request from government. The response to the latest food price rise was also prompted by a government request. In this regard it is the government that has led humanitarian action in the country – rightly so. There is a healthy symbiosis in much of this relationship – UN agencies have often been responsible behind the scenes for pushing government to appeal. This attitude, instinct, of UN agencies to work with and for government is commendable.

Nevertheless there are some issues with the role of the government. The first is that government does not have implementation capacity in the remotest or most difficult places where humanitarian action is needed. This is hardly surprising. Government health workers, teachers and officials in sub-district level are paid \$50/ month<sup>93</sup> – not enough to feed the family. Most do not have transport, communications and so on. This means that asking them to distribute food, or non-food items, or medicines, or run therapeutic feeding centres with all of the technical skill and time commitment required in these activities is unrealistic. Nevertheless, this is what UN agencies for the most part have relied on for their implementation. Where access is possible, agencies like WFP have tended to do the work themselves – working with local villages (community development committees or Shura) to prioritise needs and develop plans. In remoter, more difficult to access areas however, government has been the partner. As a result, the results of interventions in many places are largely unknown. Many of those interviewed in the course of this evaluation voiced concerns that local officials distributed aid partially or that there was corruption.

## **2.7 PARTNERSHIPS WITH NGOS**

The NGO community in Afghanistan appears to have been affected by the same pressures that bear down on UN agencies. There are few international NGOs working nationally, and the few that are, do not appear to have a strong humanitarian mandate (MSF left for example in 2005 after the

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
<sup>93</sup> This is being remedied in a programme of upgrading civil service salaries, but of course takes time to reach the remotest parts of the country.

assassination of six of their staff). The national NGO community appears to be relatively vibrant, but this evaluation was too short to make a proper assessment of their capacity.

As a result of this reduced NGO presence, and as a result of most of the UN agencies' own concentration on things other than the humanitarian, there are few strong partnerships between UN agencies and NGOs for humanitarian work. The majority of UN agencies largely implement programmes through government or themselves, and this has meant that most NGOs were not aware of CERF's existence prior to this evaluation<sup>94</sup>.

## 2.8 FUNDING IMPACTS ON NGOS AND AGENCIES

**Figure 2: Humanitarian Funding for UN Agencies 2004-2008**



As has already been stated, the total humanitarian spending in Afghanistan has averaged around \$160m a year over the past four years, although 2005 was about half this amount. This suggests that the CERF impact on overall humanitarian funding is not that straightforward.


For some agencies CERF has had a major impact (see Figure 3 Sources for WHO Humanitarian Funding for instance). For others (UNHCR for example), CERF has made very little difference. Overall it is a significant percentage during its lifetime – around 15% of the total – but interestingly it has not altered the overall amount particularly, suggesting that is either making up a shortfall in certain years, or that it is substituting for other sources of funding in some years. It is most likely that it is the former, and that the CERF in Afghanistan has provided some level of predictability of humanitarian funding, which is one of its main purposes.

The CERF has almost certainly had very little impact on the funding of NGOs, as so few receive any funds through UN agencies. The WFP table below gives an idea of how funds are being channeled through different partners. The percentages relate to MT of food, rather than absolute funds, but this it is a good enough indication.

Graphs (Figures 3 and 4) taken from FTS showing UN agency spend and overall humanitarian spend for the years 2004 – 2008 in US dollars.

<sup>94</sup> NGO paper provided by CARE.

**Figure 3: Sources of WHO humanitarian funding 2004 –08.**



**Table 2: WFP implementation through different channels**

| Organisation            | % of total |
|-------------------------|------------|
| Community <sup>95</sup> | 25.32%     |
| Government              | 50.56%     |
| International NGO       | 5.03%      |
| National NGO            | 17.22%     |
| UN                      | 1.87%      |
| TOTAL                   | 100%       |

## 2.9 EFFECT ON RESPONSE CAPACITY

The CERF has had a highly significant impact on the response capacity of UN agencies (save perhaps UNHCR who do not access much CERF funding). The situation in Afghanistan – the lack of appeal, the lack of traditional architecture – has meant that humanitarian work has taken place almost under the radar. The 2006/7 drought appeal and extension were in fact partly related to the effects of the insurgency. The largest WHO allocation to date has been exclusively about the conflict. Even more significantly, because these ‘crises’ have in effect merged into each other in terms of timing, aid intended for one ‘crisis’ has often ended up benefiting people in the next one. A good example is the 2007 WHO allocation which was granted for helping war affected and deportees, but also ended up assisting those affected by the harsh winter (see below). Another example is the current FAO allocation for fodder to keep animals alive during the recent harsh winter. The proposal was only submitted and approved after the worst of the winter was over, and in April 2008 FAO had not yet procured this material despite the fact that winter was over. Any animals which were going to die because of the harsh winter had already done so; nevertheless it appears that there may well be a drought this year – the fodder will end up being very useful in responding to this, and will probably arrive just in time.

While these examples, and others, reflect to some extent a failure of needs assessment and rapid response mechanisms, they are more an illustration of the challenging response environment in Afghanistan, and the ongoing nature of crisis. As an example, WFP has to pre-position food in over 600 sites nationally in advance of the harsh winter that makes roads impassable.

<sup>95</sup> Community in this context means implemented through village development committees, or Shuras.

Although the CERF has contributed positively to UN agency response capacity – arguably several UN agencies would not have responded without these funds, and this would definitely have reduced assistance to those in need – there are some major response capacity weaknesses. The biggest of these is an over reliance on government capacity. Whilst it is right to support and work through government, the quality of government work in providing relief assistance in these remote and difficult areas simply cannot be monitored.

UN agencies also have to take their commitments to emergency response seriously if they are going to bid for CERF funds. A good example of this is WHO's response to the 2007 deportees. One component of this was ambulances to be placed on the border in readiness for those in need of urgent assistance. As of the beginning of April 2008 – some nine months later – these ambulances had not arrived. Perhaps they will be in place for the next round of deportations. This is simply not acceptable as part of an emergency response.

### **3.PERFORMANCE**

#### **3.1 LIFE-SAVING CRITERIA**

The CERF applications in Afghanistan have certainly conformed to the letter of the life-saving criteria. The 2006/7 drought application was mostly about providing food for extremely food insecure people, with acute malnutrition and medical interventions also based around this idea. The 2007 deportee intervention was designed to help the most vulnerable – families crossing the border with few possessions and in great need of assistance. The 2008 winter assistance and wheat price rise fell within the definition of life-saving set out by the CERF secretariat.

Difficult issues remain, however. The CERF has provided a lifeline in Afghanistan for many UN agencies, and hopefully therefore for the people they aim to serve. At the same time, these are not rapid onset emergencies in the traditional sense, or even spikes of extreme vulnerability in an ongoing complex emergency (except maybe for the conflict displacement). During the 2006/7 drought operation the majority of WFP's distribution (60%) was in 'food for work' (FFW). Whilst the 'life-saving criteria' do not explicitly forbid this type of work, neither do they mention it. Food is supposed to be for 'minimum requirements', specifically "general food distribution and targeted distribution for most vulnerable groups (complement gaps)." Food for work is typically deployed when populations are food insecure and vulnerable, but not in a dire situation.

The same could also be said for the impact of price rises of wheat. This intervention is aimed at urban and rural populations equally, and is typically more about preventing riots and preserving stability. This makes a lot of sense in a fragile political situation such as Afghanistan. The question is, however, whether this is something an *emergency* fund should be used for. These issues are discussed further in the main report (Section 4.1)<sup>96</sup>.



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<sup>96</sup> Whether or not food for work constitutes an emergency response has been the subject of much debate during the feedback to this report, including within the evaluation team. WFP point out this is the government's preferred response.

### 3.2 NEEDS ASSESSMENT

There is a general lack of good data on the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan. The UN cannot access 45% of the country as a result of insecurity; neither can NGOs and even the ICRC relies on the Afghan Red Crescent for information. Government capacity is also weak. In addition there are an unknown number of people displaced by the conflict. For instance, UNICEF in the October 2006 ‘drought appeal’ extension talk about 15,000 families displaced in Kandahar region and a further 10,000 families displaced in neighbouring provinces.

The response to the 2006 drought was undertaken after assessments from the Ministry of Agriculture assisted by FAO<sup>97</sup>. The extension in October 2006 also cites reports by FEWS, Christian Aid, FAO and WFP confirming the urgency of the action. UNICEF reported in their 2007 humanitarian action report that there had been a significant increase in children admitted into malnutrition programmes in 2006 compared to 2005 (4,405 compared to 2,030). Interestingly, the hard data does not appear to support the notion of a lack of food availability. The FEWS report of September 2006 shows little variation of wheat prices compared with 2005. The WHO epidemiological report of June 2006 shows the usual seasonal variations (see Figures 5 and 6 below).



Of course data can be wrong – most difficult to collect in the hard to access places, often the hardest hit. And the WHO DEWS does not appear to collect mortality and morbidity data as a result of malnutrition. Similarly crop failure does not necessarily result in decreased access to food, and figures of children admitted to feeding centres can easily grow as a result of expanded access. WFP, perhaps in tacit acknowledgement that the 2006/7 ‘drought’ response was as much about prevention, or chronic poverty and under-development, distributed 60% of its emergency food as ‘food for work’. UNICEF too, in their ‘extension’ appeal did not even mention drought, but instead focused on the conflict in the south.

What is clear from the above analysis is that needs assessment is patchy and subjective. What is not in dispute is that Afghanistan has serious and ongoing humanitarian needs.

<sup>97</sup> Afghanistan Drought Joint Appeal, 2006.

### **3.3 TIMELY RESPONSE**

CERF funding appears to have allowed agencies to respond quicker than they might otherwise have been able to do. A good example of this is the 2006/7 drought response. When the drought appeal was launched, the government was keen to see WFP respond immediately; CERF funding allowed them to quickly use food they had in the 'pipeline' for their regular programmes. Without CERF funding IOM would not have been able to transport deportees to their final destination, or provide them with non-food items.

Perhaps even more important for one respondent was that CERF funding allowed agencies to get on with the job – not to have to worry about resource mobilisation.

### **3.4 OUTCOMES**

As a result of time constraints, and because WFP received almost 80% of CERF funds committed to date to Afghanistan, the 'case study' on outcomes is almost exclusively centred on that agency, although others which received funds were also interviewed and documents provided, allowing for some brief commentary.

WFP received the largest allocations for the 2006/7 drought (see above). The evaluation team visited the Herat office, which manages the western region. A third of the drought food programmed went to the western region (15,932MT from 49,950MT or 32%). Although it was not possible to visit the worst affected areas, it was possible to see some drought projects in Herat district and to discuss implementation with the team.

Some 60% of WFP food was distributed as 'food for work' (FFW), repairing roads, canals and walls. Where WFP have had access, this appears to have been done well. The work has been done properly – WFP have distributed food on time and the quality was good. The village that the evaluation team visited had used the WFP food to clear an irrigation canal that serves eight villages in total and provides water to some 3,000ha. The canal clearing is an annual task, although it appears the village took advantage of the FFW to do a more extensive job.

The other 40% of the food has been distributed to vulnerable families, which seems appropriate given that this was essentially an emergency measure.

Further away from Herat town, in more inaccessible places, WFP has had to rely on the Department for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (DRRD) to distribute food and to monitor. This is especially the case in the remotest parts of Ghor province in winter, and in the insecure parts of Farah and Badghis provinces. Here there are reportedly more issues – one NGO told us that they had to help the DRRD transport WFP food in Ghor as they did not have the resources, and there have been persistent reports of officials either distributing food unfairly or selling it.

Rumours aside, it is clear that the food aid has had a positive impact, and continues to do so. FEWS report in the latest bulletin that "in locations such as Ghor and Faryab province where food aid is available – both pre-positioned and the arrival of new food aid following a recent appeal – the rise in wheat prices has been prevented which indicates comparatively good access to food for households that currently rely on the market. For example, wheat prices in Ghor are 17.5 Afs/kg,

while in Herat province wheat prices are 19.8Afs/kg, even though Herat is the main supplier of Ghor”.

In an extremely challenging environment WFP is managing to deliver large amounts of food aid all over the country. There is an incredible juggling operation of moving food from one ‘pipeline’ to another, and huge logistical challenges of getting food around the country. There are many issues – from the correct identification of vulnerability to monitoring and oversight of distributions. WFP is aware of all of these issues and is working hard to ensure that their programme is the best it can realistically be. Staff travel to hostile and remote places when they can to try and ensure food goes to the neediest, and there is an ongoing assessment of the capacity of partners that will probably result in the inclusion of more NGO partners.

One issue that the CERF does throw into sharp relief for WFP is that of whether the ‘food’ in their name always has to be delivered as a commodity. The CERF grants of 2006 were given in cash, which was then used to purchase food from Pakistan. This was complex, time consuming, dangerous and arguably much costlier than simply distributing the cash equivalent. Afghanistan has well functioning markets and WFP could have simply paid people for the ‘public works’ type projects and given grants to vulnerable families. Countless studies have shown how effective this form of programming can be, and there are many provinces in Afghanistan where such a scheme would have benefited all<sup>98</sup>.

WFP also received funding for the UNHAS flight service and data and communications. The UNHAS flights were well used in 2007, carrying 41,572 passengers through the year. The majority of passengers were from the UN, closely followed by NGOs and “diplomats”. The UNHAS flies from Kabul to Dubai and to all major and quite a few minor towns in Afghanistan. Currently UNDSS does not allow UN staff to fly to Dubai on any other carrier than UNHAS. Even so, UNHAS is not operating at a profit, and donors are reluctant to keep funding it. ECHO funds an alternative humanitarian flight (Pactec), and the US embassy has a private contract for flights internally in Afghanistan. That means the CERF is again substituting for a “regular” source of humanitarian funding in Afghanistan.

Currently UNHAS appears to be unsustainable. The service appears well run, and the case for having some kind of UN run humanitarian air capacity seems strong. It is essential for evacuation and for getting to difficult to reach places. It seems less essential for routes covered by private sector carriers such as major Afghan towns and Dubai. This also appears to be the main reason why donors are not supporting UNHAS in its current form. Ultimately it is likely UNHAS will have to adjust its scale and ambition to ensure continued service. That there is a need for some UNHAS capacity is beyond question.

In addition to visiting the WFP projects the evaluation also reviewed project reports from WHO, FAO, IOM and UNICEF and conducted interviews with staff from all of those agencies. All four agencies have received CERF funding for a variety of projects including the winter drought, response to conflict displaced, deportees from Iran and the latest winter and wheat price rises.

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<sup>98</sup> WFP in feedback to this report point out that a) they are planning to pilot such studies and b) that this is a complex operating environment and potentially dangerous to move cash around.

Generally the CERF has played a positive role in these responses. It has allowed UN agencies to respond, which they may not have been able to do otherwise. Good examples of this include IOM's assistance to the deportees from Iran, the WHO epidemiological bulletin (DEWS), the use of WHO supplied emergency health kits during the winter assistance and the FAO seed cultivation and distribution programme (spoken of very highly by one NGO in the western region) following the 2006 drought.

There have also been the 'usual' UN agency flaws in these programmes. Those affecting FAO, WHO and IOM have already been described. UNICEF have been distributing supplies for therapeutic feeding centres to government hospitals and clinics in Ghor and other western and southern provinces, but are not able to monitor whether nutritional care for acutely malnourished children is being properly implemented. Based on experience in other countries, it is highly unlikely this regime is being followed without extra, specialist, support, rendering the UNICEF supplies practically useless<sup>99</sup>.

In many ways the ongoing nature of the Afghan crisis renders much of this above critique irrelevant. The flexibility of CERF funding means that it can be used for what is most important at that moment. In Afghanistan currently there are, sadly, multiple crises both concurrently and over time. What is not used for one crisis, will probably be used for the next one. In other ways however, the 'typical' UN agency humanitarian response shortcomings – overly bureaucratic systems that generally lead to poor and slow logistics, weak monitoring that may compromise the effectiveness of operations, infighting amongst agencies that weakens the effectiveness of coordinated operations – are exposed by the rapidity and flexibility of CERF funding. These performance issues cannot be blamed on donors or on tardiness of funding.

## **4. ADMINISTRATION**

### **4.1 OCHA CAPACITY**

OCHA is not present in Afghanistan – humanitarian affairs come under the remit of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). The humanitarian affairs unit (HAU) is growing, and now has one person on an OCHA contract.

### **4.2 AGENCIES IN-COUNTRY CAPACITY**

WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR have good in-country capacity, and IOM, FAO and WHO all have emergency teams (although the latter is currently only one person). WFP, UNICEF and UNHCR have regional presence and long standing experience in Afghanistan. The WFP programme is \$190m<sup>100</sup> a year, and the UNICEF programme \$100m a year. This means that all of the CERF receiving agencies, bar perhaps WHO, have ample capacity for programming CERF funds responsibly.


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<sup>99</sup> UNICEF reported that in total, 4,405 children were admitted to therapeutic feeding centres in 2006 as compared to 2,030 cases of malnourished under-five children in 2005. 3,484 admissions were registered between January and September 2007. The status/ improvement rates/ criteria for admission and so on was not available to the team, as mentioned in the footnote above.

<sup>100</sup> Including both Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation PRRO 10427.0 and UNHAS Special Operation 10514.0

### 4.3 TIMELINE FOR MONEY FLOW

Example: wheat price rise 2008.



### 4.4 PSC, TRANSACTION COSTS

There appears to be less of an issue around overheads and transaction costs in Afghanistan than in other countries with big CERF allocations, as the majority of the funds do not go to NGOs. The CERF has set the ceiling for administration at 7% and this is by and large what agencies take (although a couple have taken a little less). In addition, several of the agencies have kept, or intend to keep, the overhead funds to cover in-country running costs rather than repatriating them to their HQ.

## 5. FACTORS AFFECTING ABILITY TO MEET OBJECTIVES

### 5.1 REPORTING MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Reporting to CERF is through the mechanism of the RC/HC mid-year and annual report. In addition agencies such as WFP submit their general annual reports. Neither of these has a great amount of detail. It is hard to know beyond the very general what agencies do with the funds – WFP will

report that 5,000MT of food has been distributed in a province, but the effect of this is either not detailed because of lack of data, or is set out in a few paragraphs.

The same is true of financial reports. In the case of CERF they are little more than a guarantee that the agency's financial controller has passed the country office's accounts. This means that the real business of understanding what is happening with assistance provided is done internally. This in turn depends on the sophistication and capacity of agencies' internal monitoring and evaluation regimes. In Afghanistan this is not robust.

There do not appear to have been any evaluations by the UN agencies of their CERF-funded activities in Afghanistan over the time period under examination.

## **5.2 TRANSPARENCY**

There has been little transparency outside the UN family around the CERF allocations, with the CERF funding being seen by all as the UN agencies' own private fund. NGOs are not informed about CERF allocations – either before or after they are made. As the evaluation did not speak to government it is impossible to comment on their knowledge of the mechanism. The CERF is not publically highlighted beyond the CERF secretariat web site.

## **5.3 ACCOUNTABILITY**

There is little specific accountability for the CERF funds. The reporting is cursory, and even financial reporting is little more than a page with a stamp on it. Accountability is through 'normal' measures; that is to say that individual UN agencies are accountable to the government of Afghanistan, to their own senior managers and board, and through the board to the General Assembly. As mentioned in the section on outcomes, UNICEF did not even feel obliged to provide requested information to this General Assembly mandated evaluation, despite many requests.

There is also, at least in some measure, a degree of accountability to communities with whom they work. Whilst no UN agency has taken any special measure (at least none that the evaluator saw) to introduce accountability to communities, communities will sometimes try and hold UN agencies to account if they feel they need to. This is certainly the case for WFP; disputes do arise when communities feel improperly treated. In such cases village elders will often make representations at the WFP office, or with the provincial governor.

## **6. CONCLUSIONS**

1. The easy availability of CERF may have allowed the UN Country Team to avoid developing a humanitarian strategy and appeal.
2. The ERC has approved funding requests from UN agencies, which have not been subjected to serious consultation processes at the national and provincial levels.
3. The decision of some UN agencies to allow overhead charges to be retained by the country offices to cover their administrative costs is welcome.
4. CERF funds have been made available to at least one UN agency, which has not deployed the necessary emergency response capacity to the country.

5. The use of CERF to mitigate the effects of food price rises on urban populations raises important questions.
6. WFP has used CERF to purchase food outside the country for FFW projects, when it would have been more effective to use the cash to pay for work.
7. The use of CERF to fund a loss-making air service in a protracted crisis may simply defer tough decisions that need to be taken on the basis of demand.

## BANGLADESH REPORT

### 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Bangladesh is one of the world’s most disaster prone countries. In 2007 UN and partner agencies responded to the effects of cold waves, flash floods, mudslide, two waves of flooding and a devastating cyclone. Throughout the year UNHCR, with UN, NGO and government partners provided support to some 27,000 refugees.


In particular, the CERF funded responses funded:

- Shelter support to refugees
- Response to major flooding that at its height displaced 400,000 people (and affected 13 million).
- Response to cyclone Sidr, a category 4 storm that killed 3,347 people and destroyed 563,877 homes completely.

Bangladesh has received the third largest global CERF allocation in 2007, and overall approximately US\$ 27 million by the beginning of March 2008. The table and figure 1 below shows the allocations by agency.

**Table 1 CERF allocations per Agency**

|               |                   |
|---------------|-------------------|
| <b>WFP</b>    | <b>14,029,000</b> |
| <b>UNDP</b>   | <b>4,462,007</b>  |
| <b>UNICEF</b> | <b>3,725,360</b>  |
| <b>WHO</b>    | <b>2,063,361</b>  |
| <b>UNHCR</b>  | <b>1,000,000</b>  |
| <b>FAO</b>    | <b>1,337,256</b>  |
| <b>UNFPA</b>  | <b>130,112</b>    |
| <b>Total</b>  | <b>26,747,096</b> |



The greatest part of this allocation has come from the rapid response ‘window’ with only US\$ 1 million coming from under-funded.

### 2. FUNDING MECHANISMS AND HUMANITARIAN REFORM


#### 2.1 Rapid response, underfunded and loans

As can be seen from the introduction, the vast majority of the CERF funding in Bangladesh has been from the ‘rapid response’ window, for the floods in 2007 and the cyclone later that year. In addition there has been a \$1m allocation to UNHCR through the “underfunded” window to assist refugees from Myanmar. Over this time there have been no loan allocations.

## 2.2 Relationship to other funding

The CERF in Bangladesh has played an important role in allowing UN agencies to respond quickly and visibly to emergencies. As can be seen from the table below, it enabled the UN to be the third largest source of funds for the cyclone response. It contributed to UN agencies’ first response; other donors then responded. As of 23 January 2008, the CERF had contributed US\$ 19.7 million, an additional US\$ 7 million was mobilized from UN agencies’ existing resources and US\$ 32 million was provided to UN agencies by donors specifically for the cyclone response<sup>101</sup>.

**Figure 2: Top 20 contributors to cyclone Sidr response. The government raised a total of US\$ 410 million in pledges from 40 countries.**



Whilst the CERF generally responded very quickly (see timeline below), and allowed UN agencies the confidence to respond immediately, there were other donors who were equally fast, notably ECHO, DFID and USAID. ECHO appears to have been fastest with its “72 hour” response mechanism. DFID has a large development portfolio in Bangladesh and allowed partners to rapidly respond with some of these funds, as did USAID, before making “humanitarian” funding decisions. The timeframe for these two donors was similar to CERF in the cyclone – in the flood response DFID was quicker by a week. In the (very) recent allocation for a crop failure in the Chittagong Hills, ECHO waited to see what CERF would fund before making its decision.

<sup>101</sup> Note on the Humanitarian Response to Cyclone Sidr, with special emphasis on the role of the UN system. 23 January 2008.

Some UN agencies are concerned by this type of donor action, which they see as a trend in Bangladesh for smaller scale disasters. In this analysis some donors wait to see whether and to what level CERF will fund before making their own decisions, rather than making decisions immediately based on their independent assessment of need<sup>102</sup>. For others CERF can work in precisely the opposite way, where donors will respond because CERF has; i.e. CERF gives an official stamp of approval that the emergency is serious enough to respond to.

One interesting issue that has been highlighted in the Bangladesh response is the role of the flash appeal. The government of Bangladesh was not keen to issue an international appeal – they felt it did not do justice to their capacity to respond, and that it didn't add anything in terms of donations received<sup>103</sup>. CERF in some ways substituted for a flash appeal, although of course UN agencies got extra funding from other donors. The average time to produce a flash appeal in 2007 was over 30 days. OCHA has recognized that the system needs fine-tuning<sup>104</sup>. CERF plays an important role in funding the very fast initial response – a revision to the quick flash appeal could come later, once more in-depth assessment has been made and gaps in needs and/funding are known.

### **2.3 Impact on neglected crises**

Bangladesh received one allocation from the underfunded window of CERF, through UNHCR for refugees from Myanmar (Burma). There are two camps relatively near to the border of the two countries where roughly 27,000 people live. They have been refugees for approximately 16 years.

The fortunes of this refugee population are closely linked with the politics of Bangladesh. A thawing of official policy towards the refugees meant that UNHCR could seize the opportunity to improve their living conditions. The CERF was extremely useful as funding source to exploit this opportunity, as UNHCR budgets are not flexible enough to rapidly scale up and UNHCR was not in a position to persuade its traditional donors of the need for extra resources. In this sense the Bangladesh refugees were a 'neglected crisis' on their own, and the CERF proved to be a funding source flexible enough to respond to changing circumstances. The work that UNHCR was able to undertake with the CERF funding demonstrated to other donors what was possible and now there are several large donors who are willing to contribute to both ongoing and upgrading work with the refugees.

The new operational confidence this has given UNHCR has also enabled them to work with several unofficial refugee caseloads and to open access further, both for refugees to lead more normal lives, and for other agencies to work with this vulnerable population.

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<sup>102</sup> Although a major donor agency pointed out to this evaluation that CERF is designed precisely to avoid multiple donor agencies making their own ill-informed judgments on need.

<sup>103</sup> Interviews.

<sup>104</sup> See Main Report, Sections 4.5 and 5.5

## **2.4 Coordination**

Coordination for the UN system in Bangladesh for humanitarian affairs fell to the office of the Resident Coordinator during both the flood response and the cyclone. OCHA did provide support at the very beginning of the cyclone to draw together the CERF proposal and the rapid needs assessment. This was a timely and much appreciated intervention, and should be standard in situations like Bangladesh where OCHA is not in place and a country team may not know some of the intricacies of the system.

Coordination for the humanitarian response more widely is undertaken by the Bangladesh government through the Disaster Emergency Response (DER) group. The DER is headed by the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management and through their Disaster Management Bureau (DMB) and supported by a WFP managed secretariat. The DMB is also supported by UNDP through their Comprehensive Disaster Management Programme (CDMP). The table below gives an idea of the sophistication of the Bangladesh system for both preparedness and response.

The DER meetings are attended by government, donors, UN agencies, International NGOs and National NGOs, as well as any others who might be involved in Disaster Management. During the cyclone Sidr response, some of those who attended early meetings described them as more like press conferences than coordination meetings – government giving updates and hundreds of people attending to hear what was happening – although this quickly changed. Government rapidly moved coordination out of Dhaka however to Barisal, the town nearest to the cyclone affected areas, and put the equivalent of a Minister in charge of the operation. This helped immensely, making operational coordination more practical.

For the UN system the Resident Coordinator's Office (ORC) continued to play the coordination role in cyclone Sidr. Clusters were "partially activated" (see below). OCHA did not deploy in strength, and apart from the initial two people from the regional office, their role was confined to compiling sitreps and providing some information management support at a distance.

The RC was not HC during the disaster. Yet the RC felt that she performed most, if not all of the functions that an HC would have. There did not seem to be a clear answer as to why she was not appointed HC during the relief effort. The RC and OCHA discussed and agreed upon support needed and how to provide it, in the context of Bangladesh. There was concern that the presence of OCHA would bring extra work and complexity with the added disadvantage that through ignorance they might spoil the good relationship the UN had with government.


As a result of OCHA not deploying, coordination was under-resourced within the UN system compared to a standard humanitarian response. The country team is tight-knit and had already worked together considerably on preparedness (see Figure 3 below). They had the recent experience of the flood response, and as a result had a good sense of how to work together. WFP was helping to run the DER, UNDP was helping the DMB through their CDMP project and the ORC was collating UN system type information, so the coordination tasks were shared to some extent. As the response appears to have been a successful one in the early days, the relatively light coordination footprint did not make a dramatic difference early on.

Nevertheless, the absence of OCHA left some holes, and raises some questions. The ORC did not have an expert knowledge of the humanitarian system and all of the various tools and initiatives that

exist. The HC role could have been far better supported in this regard. Information on the response remained fragmented and thus very few people had an overview. Some of the information management tools that OCHA has developed over the years (such as Humanitarian Information Center), rapidly deployed might have helped in gaining this comprehensive overview. As a result there was no real understanding of where the gaps were in the response, and thus agencies and donors did not know where to act. At the time of the evaluation team visit, a fuller picture was still being developed, although it is clear there are still major shelter needs.

The question that this raises of course is why an office specifically designed to support the Humanitarian Coordinator during large-scale disasters was not deployed. A subsidiary question is whether CERF could or should be used as leverage for OCHA deployment.

**Figure 3: Disaster Management Institutions in Bangladesh**



## 2.5 Strengthening the Humanitarian Coordinator

The Resident Coordinator appears to have done a great job of representing the UN system during both the floods and especially the cyclone response. She worked closely with government to ensure the UN system responded to their needs, and supported their efforts. The UN is respected and appreciated by government because of their speedy response, and their responsiveness in listening to government. The CERF decisions were also taken quickly in the cyclone response and allocations seemed to correlate well with needs, capacities and resources of the various agencies.

Nevertheless the “humanitarian coordinator” role – as distinct from the individual, or the role of coordinating the UN system – remains weak to non-existent in Bangladesh. This may be partly the context – where government is strong, there is much less need for an individual to “lead” the response. Nevertheless, some outside the UN felt there was a need for strategic leadership of the

“community of actors” separate, but complementary to government, and that there was also a need for an advocate on behalf of the affected with government. This type of leadership is the classic “humanitarian coordinator” role<sup>105</sup>.

## **2.6 Clusters approach**

The cluster approach was only partially introduced in Bangladesh, “partially activated” in the language used locally. UNICEF brought in a separate WASH cluster coordinator from their regional office, who seems to have done the job well and gained respect from all involved as a result. Other clusters “activated” were food (WFP), health (WHO), shelter (IFRC), early recovery (UNDP) and logistics (WFP).

The “partiality” of the cluster system in Bangladesh appears to be two-fold. Firstly that only six of the potential 13 were introduced. Second, these groups appeared to be mostly akin to the old “sector” approach, being primarily about sharing information rather than setting policy and strategy.

The main reason for the partial introduction of the cluster system in Bangladesh appears to be the fear that the system was too complex and too heavy to be implemented in the midst of a fast moving emergency. There were also concerns that government might feel the UN was trying to take over its coordination role.

One senior UN staffer’s perspective on humanitarian reform was that CERF had been the most successful aspect because it was the simplest. For that individual, clusters were a noble aspiration (to be more accountable), but in practice rather daunting in the midst of a crisis.

From the NGO perspective, one of the biggest problems with the clusters is that many of the meetings took place in Dhaka, whilst the operation was coordinated from Barisal (including by the government which had deployed a minister-level ex-general to head up their response). This was not the case for all clusters however, with the WASH cluster regularly meeting in Barisal.

## **2.7 Role of government**

The Bangladesh government plays a strong role in response, as already outlined above. The response to cyclone Sidr is widely viewed to have been better than previous responses. The army was immediately deployed to clear roads, re-establish communications and begin relief work. The government has a “standing order on disaster response” which is part of the legislative framework in Bangladesh. Bangladesh also has a world-renowned system for emergency early warning for cyclones, linked to cyclone shelters. The cyclone was tracked from some 10 days before landfall and over that time 650,000 people were evacuated ahead of it reaching the coast. There was a DER meeting hours before landfall. Government also keeps a variety of emergency stocks (some together with the UN) and these were immediately deployed and distributed, and a large amount of relief funding immediately made available.

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<sup>105</sup> The Oxfam briefing note “after the cyclone: lessons from a disaster” is the most obvious place where the case is made, although the evaluation team heard this sentiment expressed in a number of interviews as well.

The government did not directly participate in the design or decision-making process for CERF allocations. Even so, the UN was in close contact with the government from before the cyclone hit and immediately afterwards. The UN rapid needs assessment (started two days after the cyclone hit and published five days later), closely involved government. As a result, government reported being very pleased with the rapidity of the UN response – CERF certainly played a part in enabling this. The RC also reported the significant increase in credibility that the UN had in the cyclone Sidr response with the government, as they became the third biggest ‘donor’. They were seen not just as recycling donors’ money, but bringing resources that might not otherwise have been there.

## **2.8 Partnerships with NGOs**

Bangladesh has a vibrant NGO community, including by some measures the world’s largest NGO (BRAC) and Nobel prize winning Mohammed Yunus’ Grameen Bank. As a result national NGOs have significant capacity to respond and it is through these and local NGOs that all UN agencies and International NGOs work.

The UN system had taken the innovative step prior to the floods of 2007 of “pre-qualifying” 39 international and national NGOs. This process looked at their capacity, their financial and their management systems, and included training them in how to use UN agency systems properly. UNDP, UNICEF and WFP managed the pre-qualification process jointly.

The pre-qualification proved one of several essential mechanisms that allowed UN agencies to respond quickly to the cyclone. They were able to ask their pre-qualified partners to respond immediately, and several did. In addition some of the UN agencies had pre-positioned stocks so that partner NGOs could use these in their responses.

The pre-qualified partners ranged from NGOs such as CARE International, who were a major partner of WFP’s in post-cyclone response to National Development Programme (NDP) who had been one of UNDP’s implementing partners in the flood response. The evaluation team visited NDP and were impressed with their general level of organisation, staffing and connections to the community.

Both CARE (who have a substantial programme in Bangladesh) and NDP had good relationships with their UN agency partners. They felt their partners had been responsive during the emergencies. In both cases the negotiation to get contracts finalised took a little longer than they would have liked (the floods took over a month, WFP/ CARE timeline is set out below). Both partners felt that they were given sufficient operational costs to do the job properly. CARE fell foul of the ‘three month’ rule however, in that it eventually took 5 months from the start date to distribute all of the food, and because the WFP money was from CERF, CARE had to cover operational costs for the last two months themselves.

Despite this generally positive report card, there were definitely issues between NGOs and the UN agencies. There was a general complaint (which is not peculiar to Bangladesh) of “attitude”. One NGO senior staff member said to the evaluation team that there two ways of working together “let’s solve the problem together,” or “it’s your problem – solve it” and too often UN agencies took the second attitude. Reports demanded from NGOs are of far greater detail than those the UN agencies are themselves obliged to produce, as is accountability generally. BRAC for instance were less keen to work with UN agencies in emergencies after their 2004 experience. Whilst they would not

expand on the reasons, they did tell the team of a story where they had purchased some roofing sheets that were of the wrong thickness according to the UN agency funding, and so ended up paying for them themselves.

**Table 2: UNDP implementation cyclone Sidr %**

| Organization type   | % of total  |
|---------------------|-------------|
| Government          |             |
| INGO                | 4.6 %       |
| National/ local NGO | 88.9 %      |
| Own implementation  | 6.5 % (PSC) |

**Table 3: UNICEF implementation cyclone Sidr %**

| Organization type   | % of total |
|---------------------|------------|
| Government          | 5%         |
| INGO                | 3%         |
| National/ local NGO | 80%        |
| Own implementation  | 12%        |


## 2.9 Consultation/decision making

Consultation and decision making around CERF prioritisation was between UN agencies and the RC's office, although individual agencies did consult government and NGOs about the design of individual, CERF funded projects.

## 2.10 Funding impacts on NGOs and agencies

It is notoriously difficult attempting any sort of comparison between emergencies, especially because no two emergencies are the same. Bangladesh had floods in 2004 before the CERF came into being, and then again in 2007 where UN agencies were funded to respond from the CERF. The floods in 2004 affected 33 million people, whereas the floods in 2007 affected somewhere in the region of 12 million people – roughly a third. This simple comparison does not help us greatly, and the evaluation team did not have the time to make a more exhaustive comparison. Nevertheless, Figure 4 below is quite interesting as it shows that the UN agencies formed a much greater part of the 2004 flood response by volume of funding than in 2007, despite the CERF being available (or perhaps because of it?).

**Figure 4: Funding to 2004 and 2007 Floods**



## **2.11 Effect on response capacity**

The CERF has had a positive impact on the response capacity of UN agencies. As outlined above, the UN agencies have been involved in preparedness on a number of levels, particularly UNDP, UNICEF and WFP. These three agencies pre-qualified NGO partners and purchased contingency stocks to enable immediate response.

Government and UN capacity to respond has been in place for over a decade and even before that; the 1971 events brought agencies like BRAC into being, and after 1991 many agencies invested in greater Disaster Management capacity. There have also been big disasters regularly enough in Bangladesh – huge floods in 1998 and 2004 – to keep agencies on their toes, reminding them of the need to keep contingency plans and stocks in place. In this context the CERF has not been the main factor in UN agencies ability to respond. Even so, it has had a positive impact, adding to agencies confidence that if they respond immediately the resources will be there.

An interesting aspect of the CERF funding is the way it has helped the UN profile and influence with the Bangladesh government. As can be seen from the table on page 2, the UN is the third largest source of funds to the cyclone response after the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This means that the government sees added value in the UN system, where previously it might have viewed it as a rival for funding.

Whilst the CERF was beneficial in the cyclone response, the situation with regard to smaller disasters is less clear. As the graph above shows, the UN response was far greater to floods in 2004 than in 2007. In 2004 the floods were larger scale and there was a flash appeal, which the government was not keen on in 2007. The (comparatively) easy availability meant that the UN was able to respond, but there is a lingering question as to whether without CERF the UN agencies might have tried harder to fund raise and thus mount a larger response. In the end these questions are academic – the context is likely to be the major difference. It is interesting however that even with a good response capacity and the availability of CERF, the 2007 flood response was less than that in 2004 proportionately.

## **3.0 PERFORMANCE**

### **3.1 Life-saving criteria**

Bangladesh is one of the world's most disaster prone countries, and it is also one of Asia's poorest. Many people have died from disasters in Bangladesh's recent history, starting with five million people in the Great Bengal famine of 1944, followed by 500,000 people during the 1970 cyclone and 150,000 people during the 1991 cyclone. Cholera was endemic until quite recently, and 30% of the population are considered "ultra poor".

As a result, most interventions during disaster and its immediate aftermath can be considered life-saving. The CERF allocations have by and large responded to life threatening situations in the rapid response window. The provision of safe drinking water during the aftermath of the cyclone, of food, of essential drugs are all potentially life saving activities.

There is an issue however, of how the CERF responds in smaller disasters. Two good examples were the floods, and the very recent allocation for food in Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Understandably the CERF secretariat has to make a judgement about not only whether an individual agency part of the response fits the criteria, but about whether a situation merits a CERF response overall. In the floods in 2007, areas were certainly very badly affected, comparable with 2004 and 1998. The area is very poor, and communities migrate to nearby high ground whilst their area is flooded (typically a road or railway). During this period of displacement they live on relief. UN relief certainly contributed to the response.

In the case of the floods, the UN relief came late, as a result of discussions about whether CERF should fund or not, but this did not appear to matter greatly. Other actors had responded more swiftly (DFID for example, two weeks earlier) and so the CERF funded response merely contributed to the whole.

This goes right to the heart of one of the central issues that humanitarian response continues to face – the lack of empirical measures that allow for objective decision-making. In a big disaster like cyclone Sidr it is obvious that people are in need. It is on the world's media, the centre of NGO attention. For a disaster that does not make the world's media, the judgement is harder, especially when several are competing for limited funding at once.

This also hints at the distrust that continues to exist within the UN system; agencies may be suspected of 'trying it on', making up for shortfalls in regular budgets by calling something a disaster. OCHA and CERF can be viewed with hostility and suspicion, with country teams and agencies grateful of the resources but resentful of the need to justify their demands.

### **3.2 Needs Assessment**

The UN system mounted a joint assessment two days after cyclone Sidr hit, publishing the results five days later. The assessment included WFP, UNICEF, UNDP and WHO, with OCHA helping to write up the findings.

This was a fast assessment and regarded as useful by many. It didn't wholly serve as the justification for CERF proposals (they had been submitted and approved before the assessment was completed), but UN agency staff in the affected areas contributed to the rough CERF outline.

The office of the RC issued an early recovery needs assessment in April 2008 – the first joint assessment to be published following the initial one. This was late by the standards of most recent humanitarian responses.

### **3.3 Timely response**

UN agencies in Bangladesh had good preparedness, not least because they were still finishing the implementation of the flood response projects started in August 2007. As has already been set out, agencies had stocks; pre-agreements with NGO partners, WFP and UNDP were assisting government with various aspects of emergency coordination. Nevertheless, CERF did contribute to the timely response, as it gave agencies the confidence to respond at full capacity, knowing that

funding would not be an issue. Within the first 72 hours the UN system had delivered the following relief:

- WFP had distributed survival biscuits to approximately 327,270 people.
- UNICEF had provided:
  - 1,100,000 water purification tablets
  - 6000 jerry cans
  - 2 mobile treatment plants
  - Cash to the Department of Public Health Engineering
  - 1914 recreational kits.
  - Essential drugs through local authorities including ORS, IV Saline, and antibiotics.
- UNDP had provided:
  - 350 MT flattened (preserved) rice
  - 70 MT molasses
  - 400 Water purifying filters
  - 240,000 packets of water purification powder
  - 18,000 sheets of plastic sheeting
- WHO had pre-deployed medical teams to the cyclone affected area.

3.4

## Outcomes

The majority of assistance provided by UN agencies through their partners appears to have been appropriate and relevant, especially in the emergency phase. In the floods and the cyclone agencies provided basic necessities and all groups of beneficiaries talked to in this evaluation valued those inputs. In the immediate aftermath of the cyclone – as can be seen from the list above – all four UN agencies mentioned rapidly deployed both personnel and supplies (WHO had supplies with the MoH). Beneficiary groups interviewed in Barguna – one of the cyclone-affected areas – particularly remembered UNICEF’s drinking water provision.

This was similar in the flood-affected areas. Although the assistance was late compared to some, beneficiary groups remembered UNDP supplied assistance as appropriate, of good quality and better than similar assistance provided in 2004. In both the villages where beneficiaries were interviewed, people compared assistance provided in 2007 favorably with that provided in 2004.

As set out above, UNHCR also used their CERF under-funded grant to great effect, using it to exploit an opportunity to improve refugees living conditions by providing new shelters. The old ones were extremely decrepit, but the UNHCR had not been permitted to make improvements and government policy at the time was to encourage the refugees to return to Myanmar (Burma). This led to other agencies being permitted to work in the camps, and other donors funding work in the camps. As a result, conditions are much improved compared to before the CERF grant, although refugees are understandably angry about their status (effectively in limbo for 16 years).

The cyclone response was widely accepted to have been fast and effective. Excess morbidity was low<sup>106</sup> and most people appear to have received assistance relatively quickly (although difficult to reach areas didn’t receive assistance until up to a month later)<sup>107</sup>. The next phase of ‘recovery’ has

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<sup>106</sup> There is an ongoing debate about whether natural disasters necessarily lead to excess mortality. Reference TEC.

<sup>107</sup> Interviews with affected communities.

not gone as well however, with many thousands of people still without adequate shelter, and those with shelter complain that it is inadequate for their needs. This is not the realm of the CERF – those projects funded by CERF in the emergency phase seem to have gone well. There is also some concern about the costliness of the shelters built by UNHCR for refugees with the CERF funds.

## **4.0 ADMINISTRATION**

### **4.1 RC leadership**

There was strong leadership from the Resident Coordinator (RC) in both the floods and the cyclone response. The RC chaired meetings around CERF allocations, and the UN Country Team (UNCT) appears to have agreed on a sensible and appropriate division of resources. The RC worked closely with government, ensuring that the UN response was in line with the government's and mindful of their capacities and plans. The response to cyclone Sidr went well in the early stages, although at the time of the evaluation visit, there remained significant outstanding needs. As indicated above, the "humanitarian coordinator" role was not as well filled, partly because the RC did not know the job, had not been trained to carry it out, and was not sufficiently well supported to do it.

### **4.2 Flexibility of funding**

Whilst CERF funding was rapid in Bangladesh – at least in cyclone Sidr – it has not always been flexible. A good example of this is UNICEF, which works in a number of different sectors and is forced to write proposals for each. WFP, WHO, FAO, UNFPA usually only work in one sector and therefore mostly submit one proposal. UNICEF works in WASH, health, nutrition, child protection and education and often ends up writing proposals for each (UNHCR also works in multiple sectors, but chose only shelter for CERF). This then means there are four or five reports due, and more importantly there is no flexibility to move money between the sectors. The advantages of having a more flexible system are clear – proposals are written at the start of an operation and needs involve substantial guess work at that time. Things change rapidly in the aftermath of emergencies and WASH may need more resources and nutrition less. The ability to move funds across budget lines would greatly facilitate response. The evaluation team believes that the benefits of separate proposal-writing for each sector outweigh the added flexibility of joint proposals. However, once an agency receives approval for a set of projects, it should receive a single transfer of funds, be given flexibility to move funds within and between projects, under the general oversight of the HC, and should be expected to present a single report on activities<sup>108</sup>.


Another issue around flexibility of funding arising from the Bangladesh context is the time-limit for rapid response grants, currently set at three months. The rationale for this is to limit the use of CERF funds to the immediate response period. On the down side, if the agency is unable to raise other funds to complement CERF money, it may have to rush to finish work before the deadline. As with CARE above, this can mean NGOs absorbing the costs for a project ostensibly 'managed' by a UN agency. With a smaller NGO, the project might simply have stopped. In fact the guidelines for the three-month rule are still unclear. Agencies have to commit funds within this period, but each agency interprets this differently.

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<sup>108</sup> See Main Report, Section 5.4.

### 4.3 Timeline for money flow

Example: WFP and CARE in Sidr (please see figure below). In this example the CERF grant was approved quickly (only ECHO's 72 hour facility currently works quicker than this – dispersing funds within 72 hours of the event). The agency, however, took some time to negotiate the details of the operation with their implementing partner and get the food supply arranged, so that the emergency operation did not start until 3 weeks after the disaster had struck. This is average/ poor in terms of an emergency response – within the first week is good, second week OK and third week a little slow, although the CARE project was not the sum of WFP's emergency activity (see below section on timely response).



The flood response earlier in the year was far less timely, both in terms of submission of proposal and in terms of turnaround. Because floods are not precise in terms of a date of commencement, it is harder to make a timeline such as that above. NDP – UNDP's flood partner visited by the evaluation team – started their emergency flood operation at the end of June. The UNDP support came at the beginning of August (3.08.07). The evaluation did not develop a precise timeline for this example but there was certainly some delay in submitting proposals and a further delay whilst negotiation took place with the CERF Secretariat.

#### **4.4 Project support costs and overheads**

As with other case studies in this series, the issue of overheads and project support costs is complex. Each agency defines what are support costs and what are overheads differently, and currently the budgeting and reporting do not allow for detailed comparisons.

UNDP allows its partners a 4% overhead, which includes project support costs. UNDP charges CERF a 7% overhead, for which it provides the overall management in a portfolio of almost exclusively NGO implementation. WFP negotiates overheads and operational support costs individually with NGO implementers, usually in the form of a price per MT of food delivered. For CARE this worked out at about an equivalent of 8%, but as with the NDP example above this included all of the project costs including staff distributing and monitoring distributions.

### **5.0 FACTORS AFFECTING ABILITY TO MEET OBJECTIVES**

#### **5.1 Reporting**

*“They are well known for reporting impact before they’ve started implementation”. UN agency commenting on the activities of one of their sister agencies.*

As in the section on accountability above, the reporting is standard agency reports as well as the RC annual report. Financial reporting is the standard CERF report to the Controller indicating that the agency’s financial controls are in place.

#### **5.2 Monitoring & Evaluation**

There is no specific CERF related monitoring or evaluation beyond agencies’ standard monitoring activities. UNICEF, UNDP and WFP all employ field staff to monitor their programmes, and UNICEF is in the process of developing further a system of monitoring based on indicators derived from their internal ‘core commitments to children in emergencies’. WHO has recently employed a consultant to monitor the impact of their assistance through government in cyclone Sidr.

#### **5.3 Transparency**

There has been little transparency outside the UN family around the CERF allocations, with the CERF funding being allocated within the UN Country Team (UNCT). UN agencies interviewed on this did not see how they could have consulted more widely given the rapid nature of decision-making required in the cyclone response in particular.

#### **5.4 Accountability**

The lines of financial accountability for CERF funding are through the regular agency reporting channels. The ORC coordinates the annual RC report on the CERF, and gathers implementation reports and financial data, but is not involved in monitoring programme quality, nor does the ORC have the capacity to do this. The same is true of government – UN agencies are accountable through their usual channels. NGOs are not aware of CERF allocations, as outlined earlier.

## **6.0 CONCLUSIONS**

1. The UN is well set up to respond to emergencies alongside the government in Bangladesh. The UN responded rapidly and effectively in the first phase of cyclone Sidr. The UN agencies have NGO partners pre-qualified, supplies available and emergency people on standby.
2. The government was pleased with the UN response. CERF helped to improve UN credibility with government, and was the third largest funding source to cyclone Sidr.
3. The CERF substituted to some extent for a flash appeal, which the government was not keen on. It allowed the UN to respond regardless of this.
4. Although CERF was technically quite slow for a rapid onset emergency, and much slower in the floods, it allowed the agencies to respond immediately, which they did. In fact CERF provides agencies with the confidence to spend their own funds and use their own supplies to respond immediately. These funds and supplies remain essential for rapid response.
5. There is still an issue of UN agency attitude towards NGOs, whom they seem to view merely as implementers. Many NGOs such as BRAC will not partner with UN agencies as they feel it is not worth the hassle.
6. There were issues around OCHA surge, the nomination of the RC as HC and the implementation of clusters. The allocation of CERF funding did not add or detract from these issues and as such stood separately from other aspects of 'humanitarian reform' in Bangladesh. Strategic leadership of the response after the initial, well-executed emergency activity may have been affected by these issues.
7. The needs assessment was good and rapidly carried out.

### 3. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has received the largest share of CERF grants of any country so far, mostly from the under-funded window (UFE). In 2006-07, DRC received US\$ 90.5 million of CERF grants, approximately 14% of all CERF allocations made during the period.

**Table 1: CERF Funding per Window (US\$)**


|              | 2006       | 2007       | Total      |
|--------------|------------|------------|------------|
| <b>RR</b>    |            | 2.493.370  | 2.493.370  |
| <b>UFE</b>   | 38.000.000 | 50.013.208 | 88.013.208 |
| <b>Total</b> | 38.000.000 | 52.506.578 | 90.506.578 |

**Table 2: CERF Funding per Agency (US\$)**

|              | 2006              | 2007              | Total             |
|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| FAO          | 5.300.000         | 3.711.830         | 9.011.830         |
| IOM          | 680.000           |                   | 680.000           |
| UNDP         | 1.849.462         |                   | 1.849.462         |
| UNFPA        |                   | 2.089.946         | 2.089.946         |
| UNHCR        | 3.900.538         | 13.447.246        | 17.347.784        |
| UNICEF       | 15.520.000        | 20.748.870        | 36.268.870        |
| WFP          | 7.224.000         | 9.860.701         | 17.084.701        |
| WHO          | 3.526.000         | 2.647.985         | 6.173.985         |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>38.000.000</b> | <b>52.506.578</b> | <b>90.506.578</b> |

Source: CERF Database 06 March 2008

**Figure 1: CERF Funding per Agency (%)**



DRC has also been one of the two countries (with Sudan), which have seen the introduction of Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF)<sup>109</sup> around the same time as CERF was launched in 2006.

<sup>109</sup> The Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) in DRC is locally known as the Pooled Fund. However, OCHA prefers the use of ‘Pooled Funds’ (PF) to refer to all such mechanisms, including CERF and ERFs.

Thanks to the availability of the CHF, several major donors have been able to increase their funding in DRC, as they were able to manage one common grant portfolio rather than numerous small grants. Table 3 demonstrates that the combined share of total humanitarian funding from the largest donors has increased compared to previous years. It also shows that donors continue funding bilaterally, in addition to the CHF and CERF.

**Table 3: Funding for DRC by donors to Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) (2004-7)**

|              | 2004              | 2005              | 2006              |   |                    | 2007               |   |                    |
|--------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---|--------------------|--------------------|---|--------------------|
|              | Total             | Total             | Pooled Fund       | Other funding (UN Agencies, NGOs, gov.) | Total              | Pooled Fund        | Other funding (UN Agencies, NGOs, gov.) | Total              |
| Belgium      | 13,918,257        | 13,249,037        | 1,973,684         | 18,252,465                              | 20,226,149         | 814,660            | 19,092,322                              | 19,906,982         |
| Canada       | 10,580,876        | 11,309,082        | 3,126,747         | 6,585,083                               | 9,711,830          | 3,079,555          | 5,205,615                               | 8,285,170          |
| Ireland      | 2,629,250         | 3,754,552         |                   | 7,087,466                               | 7,087,466          | 9,416,750          | 659,181                                 | 10,075,931         |
| Netherlands  | 7,681,168         | 11,149,405        | 14,724,000        | 3,491,658                               | 18,215,658         | 22,228,000         | 15,760,156                              | 37,988,156         |
| Norway       | 3,120,054         | 5,281,869         | 3,273,322         | 9,192,894                               | 12,466,216         | 3,303,055          | 14,432,984                              | 17,736,039         |
| Sweden       | 7,872,602         | 17,173,319        | 14,796,470        | 4,735,110                               | 19,531,580         | 14,765,596         | 7,669,874                               | 22,435,470         |
| UK           | 16,825,966        | 30,617,487        | 54,072,031        | 30,236,370                              | 84,308,401         | 58,592,500         | 3,866,490                               | 62,458,990         |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>62,628,173</b> | <b>92,534,751</b> | <b>91,966,254</b> | <b>79,581,046</b>                       | <b>161,835,470</b> | <b>112,200,116</b> | <b>66,686,622</b>                       | <b>178,886,738</b> |

Source: FTS. April 2008 (Amounts in US\$)

Total humanitarian funding to the DRC grew from \$137m to \$273m between 2002 and 2005. In 2006, humanitarian funding increased sharply to \$441m following a near trebling in the size of the humanitarian appeal. In 2007, the amount appealed for was \$ 686m, against which the actual funding was \$ 497m.

The sectors receiving the largest allocations in 2007 were food security (32%), logistics, coordination and telecommunications (10%) and, health and nutrition (9%). However, while funds for food security covered 73% of the needs, health and nutrition received only 34%. In terms of implementing partners, 63% of the total funding in 2007 was allocated to the United Nations agencies and 31% was distributed directly to NGOs. Table 4 below illustrates the variation of funding received by organizations for the past four years. It can be seen that after 2006, with the introduction of the CHF, there was a decrease in the proportion of the total funding received directly by the NGOs, while the UN agencies had a 9% increase, although in terms of actual amounts received, all organisations experienced substantial increases.

**Table 4: Humanitarian funding by type of recipient organisation**

| Type of organization                          | 2004          | 2005          | 2006          | 2007          |
|---|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| Government                                    | 0.5%          | 0.8%          | 0.3%          | 0.2%          |
| Inter-governmental orgs.                      | 0.0%          | 0.2%          | 0.3%          | 0.3%          |
| NGOs  | 42.1%         | 36.2%         | 29.5%         | 30.7%         |
| Red Cross / Red Crescent                      | 3.4%          | 6.2%          | 3.6%          | 3.3%          |
| UN Agencies                                   | 53.6%         | 54.3%         | 63.3%         | 62.7%         |
| Other (including private org. & foundations ) | 0.4%          | 2.4%          | 3.0%          | 2.8%          |
| <b>Total</b>                                  | <b>100.0%</b> | <b>100.0%</b> | <b>100.0%</b> | <b>100.0%</b> |

Source: FTS. April 2008.

## **2. FUNDING MECHANISMS AND HUMANITARIAN REFORM**

### **2.1 Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) and Emergency Response Funds (ERF)**

DRC was a pilot country for several humanitarian reform initiatives, including the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Initiative, Common Humanitarian Funds (CHF), and cluster processes. The CHF was introduced in DRC in 2006 as a mechanism to finance both newly emerging humanitarian needs and existing humanitarian priorities (as identified in the 2006 Humanitarian Action Plan). The CHFs in DRC (and Sudan) are country-specific funds established by a small group of donors (Belgium (in DRC), Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the UK) to ensure a coordinated approach to funding in protracted crises. The CHFs give the HCs increased authority over humanitarian funding allocations. Although initially projected to receive about \$20m in 2006, the CHF in DRC received nearly \$90m, which made it the DRC's single biggest source of funding (USAID in 2006 provided \$77 m and ECHO provided \$67m). The CHF in DRC provided \$ 118 million in 2007.

Several major donors increased their contributions to DRC substantially after the introduction of the CHF: for example DFID's contribution jumped from \$16m in 2004 to \$84m in 2006, while the Netherlands government increased its contribution from \$7m in 2004 to \$18m in 2006.

The Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) are small country-specific funds, managed by OCHA, established so far in 10 countries, designed to quickly provide small grants to meet unforeseen critical needs and fill gaps. In DRC the CHF is providing financing to the ERF, which has now become complementary to the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), managed jointly by UNICEF and OCHA (and another type of humanitarian pooled fund). The ERF funds responses outside of RRM focal point areas, or tops up RRM funding.

The RRM, set up in 2004, enables UNICEF to pre-position stocks (NFIs) and pre-finance selected NGOs for specific emergency operations which address watsan and emergency education needs. The mechanism has operated mainly in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri though it has also been used in Katanga. OCHA and UNICEF select an NGO focal point in each province and UNICEF pre-finances the NGO so that it has the capacity to undertake a needs assessment and respond when an emergency occurs. The RRM was previously funded by bilateral donors, but since the CHF has been established, it has funded the RRM. In addition, the RRM received \$4.9 million through the CERF. The RRM is managed by the HC who gets the proposals reviewed and discussed with Comités Provinciaux Inter-Agences (CPIA), relevant Cluster groups and the CHF Board by e-mail.

### **2.2 CERF Rapid Response (RR) and Underfunded (UFE) windows**


CERF grants to DRC are primarily from the UFE window. The determination of underfundedness is based on the level of response to the HAP (Humanitarian Action Programme). The DRC CAP for 2005 was \$ 174.7m. The 2006 HAP based on a multi-sector needs assessment carried out in 2005, was for US\$696m, almost exactly four times the request in the previous year (Figure 2). However, donors did not increase their contributions to the HAP to the same degree, and hence DRC was considered to be particularly 'under-funded' and therefore a priority country for the new CERF.

Several donor representatives in DRC expressed the view that the HAP in 2006 had been inflated, and did not distinguish between what were genuinely humanitarian needs and those that arose from failure of development over the past forty years in the country. These donors felt that CERF had ended up funding the ‘under-funded’ development in the country.

In DRC, core programmes of some UN agencies which are of an ongoing nature have been funded through the UFE. For example, in 2007:

- UNFPA Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) programme focusing on coordination of joint initiatives and strengthening of national institutions and local associations.
- Funding for ongoing immunisation campaigns run by WHO and UNICEF.
- UNHCR’s work with returnee women included sensitisation on human and civil rights, training in leadership and access to capital and markets, community-led assistance to victims of violence and abuse.

**Figure 2: Humanitarian Action Programme in DRC (million US \$)**




While one can argue that decades of conflict and lack of development have meant that in some areas the most basic needs of people remain unmet and that this may constitute a humanitarian crisis, the fact remains that using a short-term humanitarian approach such as the CERF to address issues which require more long term and structural responses, can only alleviate the situation, and may mask the symptoms of chronic under-development for a time. Provision of basic healthcare, for example, needs a different approach from what would be acceptable in emergency healthcare, a point which will be discussed further in the section on life-saving criteria later in the report.

### **2.3 Funding Impacts on agencies**

FTS shows that UN agencies have all dramatically increased their funding in DRC between 2004 and 2007, with a major jump coming between 2005 and 2006 when both CHF and CERF were introduced. The graph doesn’t quite show the dramatic jump for WHO which went from \$300,000 in 2004 to \$12m (a 40-fold increase!) in 2007. The slight dip for UNICEF in 2007 may simply be a case of not all 2007 funding entered into FTS. There is also no doubt that agencies can respond faster and more substantially than they could a few years ago.

**Figure 3: UN Agencies Annual Funding in DRC**



Source: FTS, May 2008.

#### 2.4. Coordination and Strengthening of the Humanitarian Coordinator

As a key component of one of the pillars of humanitarian reform, CERF was designed to play a complementary role to the other three pillars, and contribute to strengthening coordination and the role of the HC. In 2007, the CHF and CERF together constituted some \$170 million of humanitarian funding, nearly 30% of the HAP requirements. This gave substantial leverage to the HC to allocate funding strategically. It is clear that in DRC the HC, being an experienced humanitarian leader, has used this leverage to strengthen the processes of coordination, including cluster processes and partnerships between the UN agencies and NGOs. There is no doubt that the “humanitarian pooled fund” process in the clusters forces agencies to sit down and talk to each other, and to debate what sorts of projects get funded. The HC has pushed the UN agencies into working collaboratively with other agencies and NGOs as well as encouraged them to develop plans that are output and indicator oriented, as the HAP 2008 demonstrates.

By the time of the first round 2008 CERF allocation, two UN agencies had not submitted the required reports for the previous year. Consequently, the HC did not include their submissions in the initial package of proposals that he sent to New York for CERF funding. The agencies got the message, the reports were submitted and the agencies’ proposals were later added to the package. (This contrasts with the experience of the CERF Secretariat, which was unable to produce an annual report on CERF grants in 2006, since so many narrative reports had not been received from the UN agencies).

In DRC the consensus amongst those interviewed was that the concentration of authority over humanitarian funding in the hands of the HC had been beneficial for the coherence and coordination of the overall humanitarian effort. However, some expressed concern that the close ties of the HC to the UN peacekeeping mission, MONUC, where he also serves as Deputy Special Representative, might lead him to take political considerations into account that a strict humanitarian would ignore. The evaluation did not find any evidence of this, however.

## **2.5. Cluster Approach**

‘Clusters’ were introduced in DRC in 2006. The clusters operate at both national and provincial levels. The performance of the clusters varies widely in the quality of their work, depending primarily on the cluster leads. Some clusters, such as education, are highly participatory and operate at a fairly strategic level, involving both UN agencies and NGOs. However, there is a consensus that some other clusters have not operated as expected or required. Consequently, several NGOs and even some UN agency representatives reported that they had stopped attending certain cluster meetings or were sending junior staff to ‘sit in’ for them. Some NGOs stated that UN agencies do not take some cluster meetings seriously, especially inter-cluster meetings, and that this reduces their value.

There is one area in which clusters have become very important in DRC, however, and this is in the area of funding allocation. The clusters have become an integral part of decision making for CHF allocations, and to a lesser extent for CERF. Allocations for CHF are discussed and projects decided collectively at provincial cluster level; these are then put together by the provincial ‘inter-cluster’ group and finally overseen by the Pooled Fund (CHF) Board in Kinshasa. The CERF process is somewhat different as it has recently changed to focus on national projects and is thus only discussed at the national cluster and inter-cluster level.

Attendance is high for cluster meetings that discuss CHF allocations; for CERF allocations there is far less NGO participation at meetings as they cannot directly benefit and also complain that the timeframe they are given for discussing CERF allocations is unrealistically short. The clusters are supposed to validate projects submitted for CERF funding once broad envelopes have been decided per cluster. However, many NGOs do not attend these meetings, as they do not feel the process really includes them. It was even reported that a UN agency had submitted a project proposal including a major NGO as implementing partner, without consulting the NGO<sup>110</sup>.

The coordination process in some clusters is widely felt to have suffered from the conflict of interest that is perceived to occur when the UN agency leading the cluster is also a major recipient of the funding<sup>111</sup>. The interviews confirmed that several UN agencies have difficulties in “changing hats” and going beyond institutional interests when leading clusters. Only in the logistics cluster has the lead agency followed the recommended practice of appointing a separate individual to lead the cluster who is not otherwise involved in WFP’s decision-making hierarchy. In the case of the health cluster, leadership is widely considered to be weak, and the institutional interests of the lead agency reportedly determine what gets funded. It may be noted here that WHO which is the lead agency for this cluster saw its funding for humanitarian aid increase by 612% from 2005 to 2006 (table 5), almost entirely due to CERF and the CHF. Of the CHF and CERF funds allocated to the health sector in 2007, WHO itself received 32% and UNICEF 30%.

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<sup>110</sup> See MSF internal report on humanitarian reform.

<sup>111</sup> See for instance, Impact of the Humanitarian Reform Mechanism in the DRC, January 2007, Oxfam.

**Table 5: Funding received by WHO in DRC for Humanitarian Assistance**

| Year                                 | 2004      | 2005        | 2006        | 2007         |
|--------------------------------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|--------------|
| Humanitarian funding received (US\$) | \$389,385 | \$1,191,820 | \$8,483,970 | \$12,323,611 |

*Source: FTS, April 2008*

It needs to be noted here that in principle, the cluster apparatus that exist in provinces, the Comité Provincial Inter-Agences (CPIA), could play an effective role in making CERF discussions open and transparent through greater active involvement of those NGOs who are on the CPIA. However, there are two problems in this regard: (1) the UN agencies do not consider it important to involve the clusters fully in CERF discussions, as the NGOs are not direct recipients of CERF grants; and (2) some NGOs, which do not attend these meetings, complained that the NGO co-leads do not systematically share the contents of the meetings with the wider NGO community, giving the impression that the select few who attend are gatekeepers for other NGOs (at least in some provinces).

Despite these weaknesses, a consensus seems to have emerged that the clusters have improved coordination within and between sectors in DRC and have allowed agencies to identify needs more quickly than they might have done before.

A good example of how a UN agency can use a cluster strategically is UNICEF’s work in Goma with the Water and Sanitation (WASH) cluster. UNICEF has a three phase strategy for responding to emergencies. The first response (72 hours) is undertaken by Solidarités and IRC through the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM); in the second phase Mercy Corps takes the lead (funded through CERF). In the third phase the WASH cluster looks at where semi-permanent “sustainable” solutions can be put in place to continue water provision without the expense and unpredictability of trucking. The cluster also has a prioritisation strategy for its interventions generally, based on four indicators – cholera, diarrhoea, malnutrition and return. Each district is given a number based on data about these four indicators and those with the highest number are prioritised.

This is an excellent example of how clusters can involve NGOs in decision-making and together, the cluster sees itself collectively responsible for providing maximum coverage. However, the experience of the WASH cluster in Katanga in late 2007 provides a salutary lesson of how good work at the level of provincial clusters can be frustrated if it is not supported by other key actors and other elements of the overall coordination system. As a cholera outbreak was spreading south towards Lubumbashi, the provincial WASH cluster developed an emergency response package for CERF funding. However, the provincial government was unwilling to acknowledge the cholera outbreak. This, and poor communications between key UN actors in Lubumbashi and Kinshasa, meant that a period of nearly three months went by, during which time the outbreak reached Lubumbashi itself, before the plan could be put into effect and the outbreak was halted.

## **2.6. Role of Government**


The Government of the DRC does not play a significant role in the development of the HAP or in the allocation of donor resources. Of the UN agencies, only WHO and FAO systematically seek to involve government structures in their sectors of activity. In the past the Congolese authorities had the reputation of being the biggest obstacle to humanitarian programming and merely interested in

rent-seeking. The DRC is listed as the 3rd weakest state globally by the Brookings Institute (after Somalia and Afghanistan<sup>112</sup>). In terms of funding received from international donors by government organizations for humanitarian actions, the Table 2 shows that in the past 4 years the amounts have been negligible.

## 2.7. Partnerships with NGOs

The chart below taken from the 2006 pooled fund (CHF) report shows that NGOs receive a significant amount of funding through these new mechanisms, and this increased in 2007. The picture is more complex than this however, as some UN agencies are better set up to work with NGOs (and report on such things as funding flows) than others. NGOs have also been cagey about the degree to which their funding has increased or otherwise as a result of the CHF and CERF experience in DRC – generally despite many requests this data was not provided to the evaluation team.

**Figure 4 Pooled Funding in DRC in 2006 indicated by implementing agency**



What can be surmised clearly in DRC, however, is that UN agencies and NGOs are being brought into a far closer relationship than before the advent of these funds. The majority of NGOs interviewed reported significant percentage increases in funding they received either through the CHF or through UN agencies, making ‘the UN’ the largest source of funding of many. This in turn has thrown into sharp relief the internal procedures (and attitude sometimes) of UN agencies with regard to dealing with NGO partnering and funding. Where this is well developed the relationship is relatively smooth – where it is not the relationship can be more difficult.

This has led to some NGOs feeling excluded from the CERF allocation process and viewing it as being “carved up” amongst the UN agencies. This is also the perception of some donors and even some of those within OCHA.

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<sup>112</sup> Rice, S and Patrick, S. Index of state weakness in the developing World. The Brookings Institution, Washington, 2008

## **2.8. Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD)**

The ‘Good Humanitarian Donorship’ initiative (GHD) was launched in June 2003 by 18 main donors in order to strengthen the coherence and efficiency of international responses to humanitarian crises. It is based on a set of principles and best practices, including those related to: financial forecasts and flexibility of funding uses; rapid disbursement; financing in relation to needs; and an inclusive and participatory approach to planning, implementing, monitoring and assessing humanitarian activities.

Donors decided to pilot this initiative in two countries: DRC and Burundi. The project has been implemented under the auspices of Belgium and the United States in DRC, and is strongly supported by humanitarian actors. Further initiatives, such as DRC’s CHF, established under the GHD guidelines, show how the continued application of GHD principles is having a positive and tangible effect on the quality and scope of humanitarian programming in DRC.

## **2.9. Consultation and decision-making on CERF and CHF allocations**

Consultations on CHF are generally regarded as transparent and inclusive: all discussions are put on the web, and NGOs can participate more actively. For the CHF, each cluster has a co-facilitator that is an NGO. This is not the case for CERF, where some NGOs and UN agencies reported that cluster meetings have often been scheduled in the very last days of the 7-day deadline given for proposal submission to CERF, and that the NGOs are therefore faced with a *fait accompli*.

Apart from the cluster meetings, the HC also seeks the advice of the DRC Pooled Fund Board (PFB) on CHF grants. The PFB comprises three of the largest donors (UK, Sweden and the Netherlands), three UN agencies (UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP) representing clusters and two international NGOs representing the wider NGO community<sup>113</sup>. ECHO and USAID are also included in discussions. On one occasion, the HC also consulted the PFB regarding a package of CERF allocations. However, this was not the practice at the time of the evaluation.

## **3. PERFORMANCE**

### **3.1. Life saving criteria**

The CERF ‘Life-saving criteria’ were issued by the ERC in August 2007, in an effort to define more clearly what kind of activities the CERF would support. The life-saving criteria were drafted primarily to guide the use of rapid response funding, and it is not entirely clear how strictly or consistently they are applied in relation to under-funded window grants in the DRC and elsewhere.

There is vigorous debate among the aid community in DRC on this matter. On one side, some donors warn that both CERF and CHF are paying for ‘development’ or at least ‘recovery’ work, and that such activities fall outside the definition of ‘humanitarian’. The HC, OCHA and others argued

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<sup>113</sup> The NGOs have nominated three members - Action Contre la Faim, Solidarités and Save the Children UK and agree between themselves which two should attend meetings

that crude mortality rate (CMR) is higher in some provinces in the west or centre of the country than it is in the conflict-affected areas in the east, and that the humanitarian imperative requires them to assist. Another element of this debate is that the cause of this high CMR is predominantly malaria, followed by diarrhoea. Both relate largely to the break-down in the health system and infrastructure generally, and as such are difficult to fix with the type of short term emergency responses that are characterised by the “classic” humanitarian programming (water trucking, feeding centres, mobile clinics etc). If a malaria intervention in DRC reduces the CMR measurably, then arguably it must have “saved lives”.

This raises the question: is this what CERF was set up to support? The crux of this issue is the nature of the UFE itself. In a country like DRC the things that are under-funded will always tend to be the long-term chronic issues such as the lack of social safety nets. Addressing these issues requires longer-term projects, more explicitly linked to recovery and development.

### **3.2 Needs assessment**

The HAP 2008 has attempted a national needs assessment based on indicators and using the combined capacities and data of UN agencies and NGOs. Looking at displacement, protection, sexual violence, nutrition and health, each district has been ranked giving an idea of where the priority areas for intervention are (and the priority sectors within those areas). That in turn should be the basis for the allocation of funding. This is an excellent initiative, and certainly is a progression from the idea of multiple donors independently deciding which areas or which sectors they would like to see funded. This method has been driven by the decentralised nature of CHF and CERF funding. Faced with un-earmarked funding, OCHA have tried to develop a scientific and transparent method to distribute funds. In the process they have also devised a system that is theoretically based more on need than on impression, whims or politics. Of course this method itself is still contested.

There are two significant critiques that appear valid. The first is that in a place like DRC the data is patchy and probably of a mid to low quality. Anthropometric nutritional surveys as an example are costly and labour intensive to run. They are not carried out routinely by the DRC public authorities and so are only undertaken in those places where agencies have presence and funding. Naturally this will skew the prioritisation towards areas where agencies have presence. The second critique is that the choice of indicators, and in particular the weighting, are political and that certain regions or sectors will be prioritised depending on the weighting given. Having looked at the weighting, the team does not agree with this critique – an epidemic outbreak gets 5 points which is the highest rating alongside infant mortality above 2/10,000/day, severe acute malnutrition above 2% and more than 100,000 displaced.

Needs assessment in DRC is complex, given the protracted nature of the crises and the extremely low development indicators in the country, which have steadily declined. Although, the HAP is based on multi-sector needs assessments, it is unclear what criteria are used for prioritisation of needs and proposals put forward for CERF grants. Representatives of donors and NGOs interviewed were of the view that while some of the CERF and CHF supported programmes in the past two years were humanitarian priorities, a large number of allocations were made for non-humanitarian work, often driven by the need to maintain a delicate balancing act within the UN system in the country. The CERF life-saving criteria are so broad that in a country like DRC with desperate needs, almost everything can be justified as humanitarian.

The CERF and the CHF allocation processes have led to greater attention to prioritisation methods, and as a result an attempt to use indicators and evidence for decisions. The Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) 2008 is evidence of this process. It is an improved tool if compared with the HAP 2007, as it used thresholds based on international standards (health, etc.) in five priority areas, which set the basis for allocating resources and for measuring improvements. Although it is considered a work in process, this has sparked a healthy debate on which indicators should be used and how humanitarian need is defined.

### **3.3 Agency Capacity for providing life-saving assistance**

Agency capacity for providing life-saving assistance appears largely related to their pre-existing and indeed global capacity. Where an agency has strong presence and expertise, and a critical mass of staff and funding, capacity is strong. Where an agency is relatively new to emergency programming, it is not as well developed.

UNICEF is implementing a huge scope of work competently and professionally. The team visited a nutrition centre run by a partner, met the UNICEF NGO nutrition partners and saw a couple of IDP camps where UNICEF was providing water and sanitation. CERF funding had given them the flexibility and resources to ensure maximum coverage and this appeared to be an outcome that would not have been achieved without these funds. This coverage meant that Cholera was being contained, undoubtedly saving lives.

In contrast, the team looked at an emergency WHO vaccination project funded by CERF. WHO staff stated that they had not been able to carry out the project due to insecurity and that they were planning to implement it in 2008. Whilst it was certainly the case that there was conflict in the areas where the project was to take place, another UN agency had been able to carry out emergency vaccinations with the health department (the same partner WHO would have used) in 2007, which suggests that WHO could perhaps have carried out this project. Instead, WHO showed the team a maternity wing for a local health centre. Despite this being funded in 2006, it was still not finished in March 2008 and it was unclear when it would be.

### **3.4. Transparency**

In DRC, the decision-making process in relation to the CERF was not fully transparent. Most of those interviewed, including senior UN officials, stated that CERF was often used to fund shortfalls in the UN agencies' national programmes. It is also felt that CERF allocations were made with less scrutiny than CHF and therefore tend to be preferred by the UN agencies as the easier option. The CHF allocation process is considered more transparent than the CERF, as it is based on the recommendations of the provincial clusters and CPIAs (Provincial Inter-Agency Committees) and the decision-making is assisted by a Pooled Fund Board, on which NGOs and donors are represented.

Almost all donor agencies and NGOs spoken to in DRC criticised the CERF process for its lack of clarity in the criteria being used for funds allocation, and for a lack of transparency in decision-making. One of the UN agency heads in Goma categorically stated that his agency had not received any CERF funding in N. Kivu. When the evaluator pointed out that the list of CERF grants made

during 2007 does list a project for \$2m specifically for N. Kivu, the agency head suggested that the decision to apply for CERF funding for this project must have been taken in Kinshasa, and certainly in the branch they had no idea that this was the case. While the HC has decided that CERF funding decisions should indeed be taken at national cluster level, and the evaluation would not argue that every grant decision needs to be known to everyone, what is clearly important is that donors, UN agency personnel responsible for humanitarian programmes and NGOs should all have confidence that the decision-making process on grant allocations is fully transparent and based on a rigorous and objective assessment of priority needs. When the evaluation team visited DRC, this was not the case.

### **3.5. Accountability**

Accountability for funds made available to UN agencies through CERF and CHF was another major concern for several interlocutors. UN agency reports are considered to be of patchy quality and there is a sense that some UN agencies do not feel that they are answerable to the HC or ERC for their use of CERF or CHF funds. Some donors also expressed concern that some of the CHF and CERF grants have gone to UN agencies with little capacity for humanitarian programming. It is also believed that the UN agencies see these funds as easy money to be shared among all agencies, regardless of their capacity and competence or the priority assigned to their activities. The Center on International Cooperation and ODI report on CHF evaluation found that agencies with limited humanitarian experience have benefited disproportionately from the new funding stream – FAO's funding increased by 168% in DRC in 2006, and WHO's funding increased by 612%.

The HC and OCHA are aware of these issues and reporting formats have been changed in 2007 to reflect this concern. Whilst the evaluation was ongoing the HC had informed two UN agencies that they would not be eligible for further funding in the absence of timely reports.

Nevertheless, weaknesses in reporting and accountability generally were brought up with the evaluation team by several donors, one of which informed the evaluation that it has stopped funding to CHF as a result. This government is among the top contributors to CERF globally, and has a long and strong history of support for multilateral institutions. Maintaining donor confidence remains a significant challenge for the UN humanitarian community in DRC.

### **3.6. Impact on neglected crises**

The introduction of CERF and the Common Humanitarian Funds in 2006 coincided with the immediate aftermath of the elections in DRC and a dramatically improved environment in which to deliver aid programmes. The CERF and CHF enabled the international community to ratchet up the level of humanitarian funding much more quickly than would previously have been possible. The underfunded window of CERF has proven to be a flexible mechanism for increasing the scale of activities of the UN agencies.

It is a matter for debate, however, as to whether humanitarian programmes, such as those contained in the DRC HAP, are the most appropriate form of assistance for a country emerging from 40 years of neglected development and collapsed infrastructure.

## **4. ADMINISTRATION**

### **4.1. OCHA capacity**

The administration of the CERF has been combined with that of the CHF in a unit, which reports to the Head of OCHA and through her to the HC. The creation of a separate unit was intended to ensure a clear separation of functions within OCHA DRC (between funding and coordination), and also to ensure coherence between OCHA and UNDP. There are now five people in the pooled fund unit. OCHA has made important strides in improving its administration for the CERF and CHF in DRC.

The tools and the system to manage the CERF and CHF (allocation of resources, reporting, monitoring, etc.) are being created while implementation is taking place, since OCHA HQ was given no time to develop procedures before starting to disburse funds. The result is that the office in DRC has developed tools specific to the DRC, while other OCHA offices may be developing similar, but different tools in their countries. While there has clearly been an improvement in the quality of fund administration since 2006, the constant changes introduced either from the CERF Secretariat in New York or by OCHA locally have inevitably led to confusion.

### **4.2. Timeline for money flow**

The processing time from the first submission of the proposal to disbursement of the funds in 2007 was an average of 35 days. Considering that the funds come from the under-funded window of CERF, this is considerably faster than most traditional bilateral funding. It was not possible to obtain accurate information regarding the timelines of funding transfers from the agencies' HQs to their country offices and subsequently to the implementing organisations. Some UN agencies are able to advance funds from their own reserves as soon as the ERC approves a project. Whether this is done or not may depend on the urgency of the project. The timely transfer of funds onward from the country office to the implementing NGOs may also be subject to delays. Some NGOs expressed concern that UNICEF contracts start from the date UNICEF informs the NGO verbally about a project approval; however, signing the contract may take up to 4 weeks, but the completion date remains unchanged. Most NGOs are unwilling to start work without a formal contract being signed, and some cannot start until the funds are received. This inevitably squeezes the time-frame for implementation.

In case of RR grants (only one made in DRC so far), based on the information made available by the CERF Secretariat, the average number of working days it takes between submission of final proposal to disbursement to the Agency HQ is about 15.

The evaluation noted that once the Agency HQs received funds from the UN Secretariat, it took varying lengths of time ranging from a week to two months for the country office to receive the money. In case of UNFPA in particular, as the funds are handled by UNDP, it always took longer than for other agencies for the country office to receive the money.

NGOs which received CERF funds through UN agencies in DRC stated that although the funds were often late in reaching them in relation to the implementation schedule, it was no more delayed than when they received grants from ECHO or OFDA etc.

### **4.3 PSC, Transaction Costs**

Several NGOs raised the question of the level of administrative overheads they were permitted to charge by the UN agencies from which they received CERF funding. Most UN agencies apply their own policies inconsistently, even within the same country, so that in some projects NGOs may not be authorised to levy any administrative overhead at all, whereas in others, figures ranging from 1 to 12% may be applied. In North Kivu, however, CERF funding did appear to have enabled UNICEF to pay adequate overhead costs for their NGO partners in the watsan sector, which in many other situations is not the case. FAO, however, was quoted as providing no support costs for projects of seed distribution, while a major international NGO claimed that they could not work with UNHCR, since support costs were inadequate. Local NGOs also complained that the UN agencies made use of their extensive networks of community partners, but provided them with completely inadequate support costs. The pooled fund has now standardised its overhead at 7% (in line with CERF) although this does not resolve the issue of individual UN agency practice.

## **5. FACTORS AFFECTING ABILITY TO MEET OBJECTIVES**

### **5.1. Donor confidence**

Donor agencies recognise the exceptional challenges posed by conditions in the DRC and they also recognise the achievements that some agencies have recorded. However, they expect further improvements, particularly in the areas of transparent processes, improved accountability and monitoring of outcomes. Donor representatives in Kinshasa were not universally confident in the ability of all UN agencies to deliver in proportion to the significant increase in their funding. Several expressed frustration at what they saw as the inability of the UN agencies to step outside their parochial institutional viewpoints and embrace a common agenda for improving the humanitarian situation. Nevertheless, most donors appeared willing to give the UN team some more time.

### **5.2. Additionality**

It is clear from FTS data that DRC has seen a massive increase in humanitarian funds between 2004-05 and 2006-07. Several donors also made it clear that they could not have increased their funding to DRC to the levels seen in 2006 and 2007, without the CHF mechanism and the CERF. They simply do not have the personnel in their head offices to administer the funds bilaterally.

### **5.3. Reporting**

Several UN agency interlocutors suggested that the CHF and CERF have cumbersome reporting procedures, as agencies are required to report on 'projects' as against programmes. They maintain that this requirement contradicts the principles of GHD, which seek to eliminate project-level reporting. NGOs which have received CHF/CERF funds through UN agencies also voiced their concern that they are being asked to submit even monthly reports by some UN agencies.

The evaluation team has examined a few reports submitted to the CERF management and noted that the reports were of variable quality and output-oriented, with poor reference to outcomes and results achieved.

Without getting into the debate whether a project approach or a programme approach is more effective, the evaluation team cannot help emphasising that regardless of which approach one takes, agencies receiving funds have an obligation to report on outcomes/results. To this end, the recent changes in CERF annual reporting format are timely and should provide clear guidance to agencies on what level of outcomes and results are to be reported against. With this simplified reporting format in place, the ERC and HC will be more than justified in holding up future disbursements to agencies which fail to fulfil the reporting requirements.

#### **5.4. Monitoring & Evaluation**

Since the UN agencies implement CERF funded projects under their own procedures, they are responsible for all monitoring in relation to these activities. OCHA has no role in this regard. The extent to which projects are monitored varies considerably between the agencies.

However, the evaluation team noted (see Section 6.3 of the main report) six projects funded by CERF in DRC, whose budgets contained significant amounts for monitoring and/or evaluation. At the time of the evaluation, only one report resulting from the use of such funds was made available to the team.

It is the view of the evaluation that all CERF projects should contain provision for monitoring by the agency itself, and that the results should be routinely shared with the HC. The evaluation also recommends a number of ways in which the ERC could commission external evaluations of projects and programmes funded by the CERF.

## **6. CONCLUSIONS**

1. CERF and the other humanitarian pooled funds (CHF, RRM and ERF) have given the HC significant authority to take strategic decisions on humanitarian funding allocations in the DRC.
2. CERF has been one of the contributing factors to increased humanitarian funding in DRC.
3. At the provincial and national levels, the consultation and decision-making process regarding projects to be funded by CERF lacks transparency and, in practice, excludes NGOs.
4. The speed of decision-making and release of funds in relation to CERF grants are considered satisfactory by most stakeholders and compare favourably with other donor funding in DRC.
5. In many instances, CERF has funded activities which are ongoing operations of agencies and have limited humanitarian justification.
6. The impact of the CERF and CHF on the quality of the performance of the UN system in relation to humanitarian needs in DRC remains unclear, and there is concern over weak prioritisation of needs and poor levels of accountability.

## DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REPORT

### 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A tropical storm, Noel, hit the Dominican Republic (DR) during the week of 28 October to 3 November 2007, killing 129 people, and causing flash floods, landslides and flooding of low lying areas in much of the country. Around 65,000 people were severely affected, with most of these requiring to be accommodated in temporary shelters at some point.

### 2. CERF & OTHER FINANCING MECHANISM

#### 2.1 Flash Appeal

An emergency flash appeal was prepared and launched on 6 November amounting to \$13.8 million. To cover the most urgent needs, CERF funding was requested on 6 November for \$3.1 million. It is important to note here that although the flash appeal took eight days to be launched, this was the fastest flash appeal during 2007, with the average being 29 days<sup>114</sup> for the other 14 flash appeals issued that year. As the country was recovering from the impact of Noel, a second tropical storm, Olga, hit the country in mid-December, causing damage on a similar scale to that caused by Noel. The flash appeal was revised and an additional \$800,000 CERF funding requested, bringing the total CERF funding to \$3.9 million (see table below).

Table 1: CERF Funding per Agency

| Agencies     | 2007 (US\$)      |
|--------------|------------------|
| FAO          | 600,000          |
| UNDP         | 550,301          |
| UNFPA        | 120,000          |
| UNICEF       | 1,055,100        |
| WFP          | 1,014,492        |
| WHO          | 540,000          |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>3,879,893</b> |

Source: CERF Database 06 March 2008

Despite the fact that the DR flash appeal was relatively fast in comparison with other appeals, it still took eight days to launch. Reasons for this slight delay in issuing the flash appeal included: (i) the lack of reliable information for several days as many communities remained cut off, and (ii) the government’s initial reluctance to declare a national emergency for fear of adverse effects on the

<sup>114</sup> ‘Flash Appeal Overhaul Discussion Paper’, February 2008, OCHA.

tourism industry, causing some initial hesitation in launching the appeal. The UNCT, with the help of the UN Emergency Technical Team (UNETE) was however able to obtain approval from the government's lead emergency operations agency to deploy an United Nations Disaster Assistance and Coordination team (UNDAC) and OCHA staff support on the third day of the emergency, while the effects of the storm were still being felt in many parts of the country. During the preparation of proposals to CERF, several agencies (UNICEF, WHO/PAHO, WFP) were able to bring in emergency support staff to help plan and support the UN's response.

## **2.2 Additional funding**

Several agencies mobilised additional resources for the response, and CERF funds helped them to kick start their rapid response. UNDP used CERF funds to support the work of Social Cabinet, which helped the latter to obtain further funding from the government. UNDP also obtained funds from its own Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR).

## **3. STRENGTHENING HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION**

The fact that a joint proposal was prepared by the UNCT under overall facilitation of the RC/HC encouraged programmatic discussions and coordination among individual agencies and gave a sense of joint responsibility of the UN system towards delivering a rapid response. CERF funding constituted about a quarter of the flash appeal and was critical to a timely response with regard to provision of food, water and immediate health/hygiene response in the first 8-10 weeks after the disaster. It also enabled the UN to position itself as a reliable partner to the government in its emergency response.

### **3.1 Sectors and Clusters**

Clusters were not activated formally, as it was felt that the government would not be in favour, for fear of losing its control over the relief operations. From early on in the emergency response the UN system organized itself into a cluster-like arrangement that more or less matched existing Government sectoral coordination arrangements for emergencies. At the operational level, under the leadership of the Government and with the support and involvement of UN agencies and other partners, structures (Coordination Tables or Working Groups) were set up that worked on identifying the needs and coordinating the responses in the following areas:

**Health** - under the leadership of the Ministry of Health and with PAHO/WHO acting as the UN's focal point/lead and involving all other UN (UNICEF, UNFPA, UNAIDS) and external partners;

**Water and Sanitation** - based on the existing emergency coordination mechanisms, the Ministry of Health took the lead supported by PAHO/WHO and with the participation of relevant UN and other partners;

**Provision of food and nutrition** interventions - WFP took the lead in collaboration with UNICEF and others. The Dominican Red Cross was a key partner in planning as well as implementation.

**Management of temporary shelters** - the Civil Defence coordinated in collaboration with the Ministry of Health and the Dominican Red Cross, and several UN and other partners, including IOM, were involved.

**Early agricultural and agricultural livelihood recovery** - led by the Ministry of Agriculture, where the FAO acted as the focal point;

**Psycho-social support** - the Ministries of Health and Basic Education played the leading roles, with UNICEF as the lead agency from the UN side.

Subsequently an **Early Recovery** working group was established, with UNDP taking the lead.

Some of the government-led structures which were set up under the auspices of the Emergency Operations Centre did not function effectively. Support for people accommodated in shelters set up by the civil defence was somewhat problematic as it involved multiple sectors, without any real overall leadership. Amongst the UN agencies, there was little capacity to work on shelter issues<sup>115</sup>, with a CERF proposal for IOM's involvement in coordination of the sector being rejected. Working closely with the national and local authorities, the national Red Cross and IFRC played a significant role in shelter provision; however, UN agencies were unclear as to the mandate of these agencies in relation to sectoral coordination, and coordination arrangements on shelter remained unclear, even though the ERC advised the UNCT on 12 November that an appropriate division of labour needed to be worked out in consultation with the IFRC as the convenor of the global emergency shelter cluster in natural disasters<sup>116</sup>. Discussion with senior government officials revealed that there was a lack of understanding of clusters.

In one of the earliest communications from the ERC<sup>117</sup> to the RC, the ERC highlighted how activation of the cluster process could bring greater transparency and inclusiveness to consultation processes involving UN agencies, NGOs, Red Cross and government agencies in all aspects of the response and strategic planning process. It was suggested that existing capacities of government needed to be taken into account while deciding on the cluster arrangements and not all the eleven global clusters needed to be activated in situations where government capacity was strong.

Coordination with government departments was predominantly between individual agencies and particular ministries, which sometimes caused overlaps. For example, the Directorate of Basic Education (UNICEF partner) and the Directorate of Environmental Education (PAHO partner), each received support from their respective UN agency partner for similar work on public hygiene promotion. Although there were overlaps, there were also attempts to coordinate the work on hygiene.

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<sup>115</sup> Shelters were set up by national and local authorities, and UN agencies worked to provide inputs (in sectors such as Health for example) for people located in them, using direct Government channels or NGO channels.

<sup>117</sup> Email communication from John Holmes to Tad Palac, RC, dated 07 November 2007

### **3.2 Partnership with NGOs**

Several local NGOs and international NGOs like World Vision acted as implementing partners for FAO, UNDP and UNICEF programmes in particular. For the most part, NGOs were not paid any overhead costs by the UN agencies; WFP did not pay any administrative costs for food distribution – only food was provided; FAO sometimes provided part of administrative costs, but the practice was not uniform. NGOs mentioned that consultation with UN agencies was predominantly one-to-one, and there was little involvement of NGOs in any sectoral coordination which may have been taking place within UN agencies. There was very little discussion with NGOs on overall programme planning and strategy development. It must also be said that too often many of the NGOs' main interest was in obtaining funds rather than participating in a coordinated response.

A rapid multi-sector assessment was carried out on 2 November by six evaluation teams comprising staff from various UN agencies, government institutions and key NGO partners, coordinated by UNETE and UNDAC. This assessment served as the basis for the flash appeal and CERF proposal which were also discussed with donors and key implementation partners like Dominican Red Cross, and NGOs. Although incomplete information on the situation and needs made prioritisation difficult, by focusing on areas of distinctive competence of each agency and taking into account existing working relationships with key NGOs and community organisations, the UN team was able to determine a list of priority interventions that reflected the essential needs. A second round of inter-agency assessments was carried out after about 3 weeks and the outcome fed into planning of activities.

## **4 PERFORMANCE**

### **4.1 Life Saving Criteria**

Both UNICEF and WHO/PAHO supported water tanks, portable latrines, water purification kits and solid waste disposal in the temporary shelters. These in conjunction with public health education and environment cleaning helped in containing an outbreak of Leptospirosis which is prevalent in the country in flooded areas. PAHO/WHO also supported health authorities in creating monitoring and testing facilities for Leptospirosis which facilitated surveillance and early detection, as previously all testing had to be carried out in Santo Domingo, delaying early detection. WFP's food rations to nearly 50,000 displaced living in temporary shelters were critical for survival of these families. FAO's work on livelihoods recovery (debris clearing in banana fields, restoration of irrigation channels, agricultural input distribution, etc) for small farmers affected by tropical storm Noel were also life-saving in the sense that without these interventions, farmers would have been left with no means of reclaiming their land and having access to any temporary employment in the aftermath of the destruction left behind by the storm. However, for a variety of reasons, the work has been painfully slow and in April 2008 was still less than half done in the areas visited<sup>118</sup>, raising questions about the life-saving nature of the work six months after the disaster.

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<sup>118</sup> FAO commented that this observation is inaccurate, as the majority of CERF-funded purchases was completed on 26 February 2008 and all funds for brigades were spent and their work carried out. Due to the non-availability of banana and yuca plants (equivalent of US\$ 56,620), FAO first requested, successfully, an extension period for the purchase. Given that the problem could not be solved, FAO revised the budget, permitting the formation of some new

The boundary between what is life-saving and what is early recovery is not always clear in any emergency. In many situations, families want to begin a semblance of normal life as soon as they can and for this they require basic support in activities like debris clearing, temporary employment and income for survival, and these certainly constitute life-saving interventions, enabling people to begin their own recovery processes. During the field visits to several FAO projects on livelihoods (agricultural inputs, tools, repairs and restoration of irrigation canals, debris clearing from banana fields, etc) it became apparent that the work was sometimes life-saving and sometimes more towards early recovery, depending upon who the beneficiaries were, as the following observations show:

- There were some extremely poor small farmers who could not have recovered their productive capacity for a long time without the CERF assistance, and the process of reclamation of their land also provided them with short term income in the early weeks which was critical to their household food security.
- Some of the farmers met had alternative livelihoods, with larger plots of land, and six months after the disaster they were in a much better position to survive without any assistance, although they have not yet fully recovered their livelihoods. As mentioned earlier, the work is still in progress, and for families like these, the interventions are not strictly life-saving.

In other words, the same intervention which can be life-saving for some can be recovery for others, depending on the beneficiaries' own capacity and vulnerability. Targeting and assessment of vulnerability therefore have to be taken into account when deciding what is life-saving and what isn't.

#### **4.2 Understanding of CERF Processes and Criteria**

Although the CERF Secretariat has conducted training courses for some agency staff at the OCHA Regional Office in Panama<sup>119</sup>, greater understanding of CERF mechanisms among the agency staff would have ensured that the proposals were better thought through and fulfilled the criteria. In some instances, agencies spent time preparing proposals which were then rejected by the CERF Secretariat, sometimes putting the RC in a difficult position. These situations could be avoided with greater clarity in the CERF criteria and processes. The need for better communication and understanding of CERF processes and protocols also applies to some agency HQs – for instance, UNDP HQ took over six weeks to decide who should sign the LOU, causing months of delay in the country office receiving the funds.

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brigades that could respond to the continuing rehabilitation needs, and all activities were reported completed by 20 March.

<sup>119</sup> The only training on CERF mechanisms that was provided to two members of the UNETE was provided in early December 2007 in Panama, during the ongoing emergency response. The UNCT and the UNETE had to basically learn as they prepared the CERF proposals in the first days of the emergency. The presence of an OCHA staff member was very helpful in this regard.

A proposal from IOM which was rejected – rightly, in the team’s view - was for IOM to set up its office base (salary, travel, vehicles, DSA, computers, communications etc) for \$250,000 with the stated intent of facilitating coordination in the shelter cluster<sup>120</sup>. A revised version of the proposal was re-submitted for a much lower amount which was also rejected by the ERC, as coordination and assessment *per se* did not meet the life-saving criteria of CERF.

**Some examples of proposals which failed the life-saving criteria and hence were rejected:**

HIV/AIDS activities - prevention activities (education and awareness promotion) and capacity building of local organisations: these activities were not seen as priorities in terms of life saving following the disaster.

Strengthening local capacity for sexual reproductive health care and promotion, and human rights promotion.

### **5.1 Timelines for money flow**

The first batch of CERF proposals was approved on 13 November (7 days after submission) for \$2.8 million. Proposals were generally dealt with by the CERF Secretariat fairly rapidly, although in some cases lack of clarity in the original proposals led to back and forth correspondence which delayed the process. UNDP’s proposal for support to the spontaneous return of population had to be resubmitted, which delayed its approval by about ten days. UNDP received CERF funds for shelter and non-food items only at the end of December and hence the debris cleanup activities could not be carried out until the beginning of 2008, almost a two-month delay. Following Olga in mid-December, UNDP submitted further proposals on 20 December, the funds arriving only in early March. UNICEF obtained rapid funding from its own Emergency Programme Fund (EPF), which enabled it to start providing support immediately. Likewise, WFP used its Immediate Response Account (IRA) to launch a rapid response. For UNFPA, the LOU was signed at their HQ on 16 November and funds were received there from the Controller’s Office on 26 November. However, funds only became available to the UNFPA Office in the Dominican Republic on 7 December, over five weeks after the disaster.

Understanding of the CERF processes is still poor among some agencies, and this applies to both the country offices (CO) and HQs. In the case of UNDP, apart from the CO’s original submission to the CERF secretariat needing revisions which caused some delays, greater confusion and delays were caused by the fact that the UNDP HQ did not appear to understand who should sign the LOU. Although the CERF secretariat sent the LOU to UNDP HQ on 21 November, information about this was conveyed to the CO only on 26<sup>th</sup>, and the LOU was finally signed on 15 December. Work finally commenced only in January, almost a two-month delay in launching a rapid response.

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<sup>120</sup> Dominican Republic CERF Application, October 31, 2007

## **6 KEY CONCLUSIONS**

1. The early deployment of OCHA staff was critical in enabling the UNCT to prepare the flash appeal and CERF proposal reasonably rapidly, although there remains room for improvement in the achievement of appropriate timelines.
2. More work needs to be done to communicate the intention of the cluster approach to governments and UNCTs. The role of clusters in providing governments with a reliable and well-coordinated UN partner needs to be emphasised. Currently the widely-held view is that activation of clusters is somehow intended to limit the government's influence over UN operations. It also needs to be emphasised that clusters should be adapted to specific country contexts and reflect the capacity of the government, the Red Cross movement, NGOs and UN agencies.
3. For rapid response to be 'life-saving', as per CERF's criteria, implementing agencies must have access to stocks and cash which they can draw on immediately upon receipt of approval of CERF grants. UN agencies which wait for money to arrive through the UN system before they can start work lose precious time which is critical for the affected communities. In other words, applicant agencies' own capacity for rapid response must be taken into account by the HC and ERC when considering applications.
4. While OCHA and the CERF secretariat have rolled out the training on CERF processes in the Latin America region, more in-country workshops will be helpful to enable key programme staff and heads of agencies to better appreciate the purpose and criteria for CERF grants.
5. An intervention which can be life-saving for some beneficiaries may constitute recovery assistance for others, depending on the beneficiaries' own capacity and vulnerability. Targeting and vulnerability analysis therefore have to be taken into account when deciding what is 'life-saving' and what is not.
6. CERF funding in response to tropical storms Noel and Olga was critical to the provision of a timely response to the needs and helped the UN to position itself as a reliable partner to the government.

## HAITI REPORT

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### 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Haiti is the poorest country in the Western hemisphere and ranks 153 out of 177 countries in the UNDP Human Development Index. Of a population of 8.2 million, 76 % of Haitians live on less than \$ 2 a day, while 55 % live on less than \$ 1 a day. Decades of conflict, political instability and violence have left the country in a state of chronic underdevelopment with key indicators close to or below the threshold level, as the following data reveal:

- 23% of the population suffer from chronic malnutrition and 4.5% suffer from acute malnutrition.
- 4 million people are food-insecure.
- 16 percent of children suffer from moderate malnutrition and 8 percent from severe malnutrition, as indicated by their rate of stunting (low height for age).
- 45,000 deaths every year from HIV/AIDS

The country does not have a CAP as the government does not accept that there is a humanitarian crisis. A transition appeal was produced in 2006 for \$98 million, which was funded only 14 % (\$13 million). Being in the Caribbean region, Haiti often faces hurricanes and tropical storms. In 2007, Haiti was hit by hurricane Dean following which CERF made three grants through the RR window.

### 2. CERF FUNDING

CERF funding to the country totalled \$1m in 2006 and \$3.87m in 2007, including about \$600,000 for RR (see tables and figure below). For the year 2008, Haiti was not included in the UFE countries list, as the UN Country Team did not bid for the country to be included. However, this in no way means that the situation in the country has improved; on the contrary, political unrest and food insecurity increased in early 2008, leading to violence and riots on the streets of the capital during April, which coincided with the visit of the evaluation team<sup>121</sup>. Several agencies in the country were not aware of the reason why Haiti was not included in the UFE list for 2008 or how this decision was made.

**Table 1: CERF funding per window (US\$)**

|              | 2006      | 2007      | Total     |
|--------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| <b>RR</b>    |           | 591,817   | 591,817   |
| <b>UFE</b>   | 1,000,000 | 3,276,605 | 4,276,605 |
| <b>Total</b> | 1,000,000 | 3,868,422 | 4,868,422 |

Source: CERF Database 06 March 2008

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
<sup>121</sup> The evaluation team was informed that in response to the food crisis, the UN resident coordinator made a request on 16 May 2008, and a RR grant of US\$ 2,517,657 was approved.

**Table 2: CERF Funding per Agency (US\$)**

|              | 2006             | 2007             | Total            |
|--------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| FAO          |                  | 337,157          | 337,157          |
| IOM          | 270,000          | 476,615          | 746,615          |
| UNICEF       |                  | 1,332,150        | 1,332,150        |
| WFP          |                  | 1,000,000        | 1,000,000        |
| WHO          | 500,000          | 722,500          | 1,222,500        |
| UNOPS        | 230,000          |                  | 230,000          |
| <b>Total</b> | <b>1,000,000</b> | <b>3,868,422</b> | <b>4,868,422</b> |

Source: CERF Database 06 March 2008

**Figure 1: CERF Funding per Agency (%)**



Source: CERF Database 06 March 2008

### 3. HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION

Haiti is a country with a PRSP having its own mechanism for coordination and joint planning involving the government, UN agencies, civil society, NGOs etc. The cluster approach developed by the IASC is a humanitarian mechanism which does not always fit into already-established PRSP processes involving sector coordination and working groups. Like in Dominican Republic, most interlocutors felt that imposing clusters in a situation like this would have undermined the existing processes.

### 4. PERFORMANCE - LIFE-SAVING CRITERIA

CERF has funded several projects under the UFE window which have a significant life-saving role: UNICEF's nutritional interventions targeting pregnant women and children under 5, working mainly through paediatric wards in two hospitals in the country; FAO's agricultural rehabilitation programme following the floods in 2007; WFP's food distribution programme; water and sanitation work in Port-au-Prince by UNICEF; improvements in temporary shelter (IOM) following the floods in 2007, etc.

In a situation of chronic poverty, under-development, and ongoing instability in the country where there are huge unmet needs in almost every sector, there is a danger that CERF ends up funding

basically what is a problem of under-development and neglect by the government and aid community. Several grants made by the CERF over the past two years fall into this category, with poor connection to the life-saving criteria. The following examples can be cited:

1. A programme for immunization was funded in 2007 through the UFE window. At the time of the evaluation, the work was still going on and was scheduled to be completed in May 2008. This is part of a regular government programme of immunization. The government approached WHO/PAHO with a request for funding, as there were some gaps in funding and this was then funded by CERF.
2. A programme to address child trafficking was launched by IOM through CERF funding. Child trafficking in Port-au-Prince is a decades-old problem. Children from remote areas are brought into the capital on the promise of educating them, but frequently these children end up as unpaid domestic workers, abused sexually and end up on the streets as sex workers or drug traffickers. Under this project, IOM, through its partner NGO, identified about 150 such children and facilitated their return to their homes which are often in poorer areas. Families visited by the evaluator belonged to poorer strata of society and were provided assistance for income generating activities (poultry, goat rearing, retail vending etc) under this project and assisted with the child's school fees for one year. The work is definitely making an impact on these families. One can argue that the intervention is life-saving in the sense that these children's rights were seriously compromised and they were in real danger of ending up as prostitutes or drug traffickers if the CERF project had not come to their rescue. However, given that this is a chronic problem and estimates suggest that there are tens of thousands of such children all across the country, one wonders what impact the CERF grant of \$220,000 had on this major long-term problem by rescuing just 150 children. As these 150 children were being returned to their families, how many more children were making a journey in the reverse direction?
3. The city of Port-au-Prince has a serious problem of drainage and sanitation. Years of neglect and under-funding has virtually brought its entire drainage system and solid waste disposal to collapse. The network of open canals which used to be the main drainage system have been totally blocked for several years, because of the fact that all solid waste is dumped in the canal leading to it being filled up and unable to carry the sewage water, causing overflow throughout the year. The purpose of the UNOPS emergency project in 2006 was to reduce immediate hazardous health risks to the population in Cité Soleil (part of Port-au-Prince). The funds of \$230,000 were used to clean one of the major drainage canals crossing the area, removing all the debris and solid waste deposited in it and thereby contain the spread of diseases that are present in the stagnant water, and reduce the risk of flooding which affected some 70,000 residents living along the canal. CERF funds helped to rent heavy machinery in order to ensure major earth works. Although this project sounds like an appropriate response that could fulfil the life-saving criteria, the problem was that simply cleaning the 2.5 kilometres of the canal had little impact, as the canal got filled up again in a matter of 3-4 months. In the absence of any garbage disposal system in the city, people filled it up again – a fact which should have been foreseen at the time of conceptualisation. In this case, rather than have any life-saving effect, the funds went down the drain, literally.

These examples reflect the weak vetting process in CERF proposals at country level and at the CERF secretariat. It has been suggested that sometimes proposals are couched in a language which

gives them a sense of urgency, even though they may relate to a long standing problem which can only be addressed with long-term recovery/development interventions, and this often makes appraisal difficult. At the country level, it is often difficult to raise tough questions among peer groups, and there is an expectation that when proposals are recommended from the HC/RC, these would undergo critical scrutiny by the CERF secretariat, which sometimes has not happened.

These examples raise general questions about the proper purpose of the under-funded window of the CERF.

## **5. ADMINISTRATION**

### **5.1. TIMELINESS**

Available records indicate that disbursement of funds by the UN secretariat has been fairly rapid (about ten days from the date of approval) although in some cases it took anything between 31-90 days for funds to reach UN agency offices in Haiti, causing delays in implementation especially for agencies which cannot start work until they receive the cash from CERF (IOM, WHO/PAHO). In one case (WHO), funds reached them three months after approval of the project<sup>122</sup>. For its potable water project in the slums of Port-au-Prince, which was approved in the middle of May, WHO/PAHO received funds only in the middle of August, 2007. It was reported that the delay was caused at PAHO-end as its Washington office delayed communication with the CERF secretariat.

### **5.2. SHORT TIME-FRAME FOR LONG TERM WORK**

Through a RR grant made by CERF, FAO provided life-saving assistance to families affected by floods and landslides in 2007 in parts of the country. The assistance was in the form of seeds and tools, and goats to some of the families. The area has a high concentration of poverty and farming is at a sub-subsistence level, with little investment made so far in land shaping or terracing in highly degraded mountainous terrains which are prone to regular erosion, landslides and flooding. The seeds (maize and Cajanas (Cajun) were sown by farmers using the dribbling method, with no soil and water conservation measures undertaken in any of the fields visited. The FAO officials acknowledged that production from such farming is minimal; however, since the CERF project had to be implemented in a short time, there was very little room to introduce complementary measures which could have enabled the farmers to use the seeds and tools more effectively, as such measures take much longer than 3-4 months.

This example also raises interesting questions about the design and review of livelihoods projects under the Rapid Response window of CERF.

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<sup>122</sup> CERF Statistics 2007 - Haiti

## **6. CONCLUSIONS**

1. The method and criteria used for inclusion of a country in the UFE window are not well understood by relevant UN agency personnel, and appear to rely on the perceptions and initiative of individual agency staff.
2. The process of appraisal of CERF grants has been weak. Life-saving criteria have been applied to addressing issues of under-development and chronic poverty or social problems.
3. The short term nature of CERF grants has prevented agencies from designing interventions which could have lasting impact on the lives of people.
4. Although IOM correctly identified child trafficking as a critical issue, the example cited shows that short-term interventions aimed at addressing a deep-rooted structural problem can have very little humanitarian outcome, unless they are designed as a first, or pilot, phase in a properly planned long-term intervention.

## PERU REPORT

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### 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

On the early evening of Wednesday 15 August 2007, an earthquake of 7.9 magnitude (Richter scale) hit the coastal and hilly areas in the Southern region of Peru, 100 miles from the capital city. Around 460,000 people were affected; nearly 100,000 houses were destroyed or severely damaged. The most affected areas were the cities of Pisco, Chincha and Ica, where public infrastructure (schools and health centres) and basic services were severely affected. The severity of the disaster overwhelmed the capacity of the government. Not being a country with an ongoing humanitarian crisis, Peru did not have any OCHA presence at the time of the disaster. By the second day of the disaster, OCHA deployed a senior operations officer from its regional office in Panama to support the RC and an UNDAC team of 12 was also deployed before the end of the first week.

### 2. CERF & OTHER FINANCING MECHANISMS

The RC acted quickly in bringing all the UN agencies together and began dialogue with the government to develop an appropriate response. An Emergency Flash Appeal (FA) was prepared (\$ 36.9 million) which included \$ 9.6 million of projects for which funds were requested from the CERF. The final draft of the FA was sent to OCHA HQ on 21 August<sup>123</sup> along with the proposal for CERF funding, and on 22 August, the UN agencies received the letter of approval for the CERF projects. This timeliness of the preparation process of the Flash Appeal responded to the suggested timeline set by OCHA's<sup>124</sup> Guidelines for Flash Appeals and facilitated rapid approval of the CERF.

The Flash Appeal was prepared with the support of the UN Emergency Technical Team (UNETE) and United Nations Disaster Assistance and Coordination team (UNDAC), in consultation with the Government and some international NGOs. Although the amount allocated by the CERF was considered appropriate, the criteria used to determine the CERF allocation were not clear to the actors interviewed. The CERF Secretariat indicated to the RC that a figure of about US\$ 10 million (26% of the Flash Appeal), would be considered, although this was higher than the average contribution of CERF to a FA. This decision was based on a consideration of the challenges of raising humanitarian resources for Peru.

UN agencies spoken to by the evaluators confirmed the appropriateness of project formulation and fund allocation, which responded to the priorities and to the capacity of UN agencies to mobilize additional funds. UNICEF, for example, had the capacity to mobilize additional funds and needed CERF to kick start its intervention. The grant of \$200,000 requested by UNICEF from CERF represented 7% of the \$ 2.7m mobilized by the agency in 2007 to respond to the emergency. In the case of IOM, on the contrary, CERF represented 90% of the funds IOM received, and nearly 47% of the total CERF funding for Peru. UNFPA participated for the first time in a humanitarian


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<sup>123</sup> However, the OCHA secretariat records indicate that the FA was launched only on 29 August, i.e., two weeks after the disaster.

<sup>124</sup> IASC. CAP Sub-Working Group. *Guidelines for Flash Appeals*. October 2006.

intervention and requested \$49,969 from CERF for initial actions and later mobilized \$718,343 from other emergency funds. In the case of WHO/PAHO during the emergency period and before receiving CERF funds, the agency was able to deploy funds from its regular budget as well as from other sources.

**Table 1 and Figure 1: CERF Funding per Agency**



Source: CERF Database 06 March 2008

### 3. STRENGTHENING HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION

#### 3.1 Overall Coordination of Response

The National Institute for Civil Defense (INDECI - Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil) is the government institution responsible for coordination of emergency response in Peru. The scale of the disaster was one of the biggest in living memory in Peru and overwhelmed the local institutions, and posed a challenge to efficient coordination. At National level, INDECI established an Operations Centre, which was the main reference point for NGOs and coordination among various government agencies. At the local level, INDECI established an Operations Centre in Pisco air-base, which was used mainly for information sharing and in general did not lead to coordinated actions amongst humanitarian actors. INDECI was not free from political pressures and influences from local mayors in different regions, and despite its best efforts, relief distribution was sometimes influenced by political considerations.

In parallel to the INDECI group, under the leadership of the RC, the UNETE and the UNDMT organized a 24hrs Operations Centre, with the participation of WFP, UNICEF, FAO, UNESCO, ILO, UNDSS, PAHO/WHO, UNFPA, UNAIDS and UNDP. It was noted from the interviews that this group was quite effective in getting UN agencies to coordinate actions and that it worked as a reference point for government officials for information sharing and programming. The UNDAC team (12 members, with expertise in different sectors like logistics, coordination, warehousing, civil-military cooperation, etc.) played a critical role in supporting the preparation of the Flash

Appeal and CERF proposals. The presence of these specialists improved coordination and provided the interface between the UN and the INDECI operations centres.

In general, all agencies interviewed during the evaluation felt that coordination was well managed in Lima and gave credit to the RC. Within the UN agencies, there were examples of good inter-agency coordination: PAHO/WHO conducting watsan assessments jointly with UNICEF; UNESCO working with UNICEF and WFP on temporary school facilities; PAHO/WHO and UNICEF providing water pumps for the water supply systems; PAHO/WHO conducted health services capacity assessment and UNFPA complemented it with the evaluation of reproductive health services; etc. The government acknowledged the UN's support in coordination and help in shaping the response. In the early weeks, one of the UNDAC members with GIS expertise was based in the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation (Agencia Peruana de Cooperación Internacional - APCI) offices helping the latter in gathering information and handling communications. In the first seven days, APCI had no database to record the donations and the UNDAC team helped them develop a system for this.

UNDP established a Coordination Center in Pisco after UNDAC's departure, financed solely by the granted CERF funds for Coordination (US\$100,000). During the crucial period between mid-September and end of November, the RC requested additional coordination staff from OCHA. The request was reinforced by a visit of a senior OCHA official from New York who recommended the deployment of a small team of OCHA staff to support the coordination of relief and recovery operations. However, it was only after two months that OCHA mobilized funds from ECHO and two staff members were engaged for the establishment of two additional coordination centres in Chinchá and Ica. In the end of November, when staff was deployed, relief operations were coming to an end and recovery was beginning.

Despite these efforts, the coordination in the field was problematic, especially between mid-September and end of November, after UNDAC's departure and until the establishment of the two additional coordination centres in Chinchá and Ica in November. In Tambo de Mora, for example, after some time food was no longer considered to be a critical need, but water-sanitation was a huge issue. Due to coordination problems and lack of accurate information, food continued coming from government and non-governmental organizations, and very little was done on sanitation.

The coordination centers in Chinchá, Pisco and Ica helped all agencies in the field to come together. FAO for example was renting its own premises in Chinchá and when the coordination centre was opened by OCHA, they all moved into the same building.

Apart from the UN-led coordination, there was another forum for coordination which was facilitated by ECHO for its NGO partners and the Red Cross movement. Discussions in this forum involved joint strategising and drawing up common action plans. The UN has been successful in operational coordination; however, there is a sense that overall strategic coordination between the government, Red Cross, NGOs and the UN has been weak.

One area where the national government agencies felt overwhelmed and did not know what to do was the issue of unwanted relief materials arriving from various parts of the world which were clogging up the warehouses and increasing the costs of logistics management for INDECI. Tonnes of bottled water, second hand clothes which Peruvians never use, expired food stuff, medicines, high-healed shoes etc., kept arriving in the first three weeks. INDECI estimates that of the 4,000

tonnes of goods that arrived, most was of no use and they were forced to spend scarce resources unnecessarily to handle them in the midst of managing the disaster response.

This is a major problem in most disaster response and nothing seems to be done about it. While educating the donors and better communication on the needs by the countries' governments and UN can help, it is worth exploring if the UN Joint Logistics Centre can help set up systems whereby chaos caused by unwanted donations can be minimized.

### **3.2 Strengthening the HC**

The RC in Peru was designated HC for the disaster response and played a significant role in facilitating coordination amongst the UN agencies, government, donors and other international organizations. There is a general acknowledgement by all actors of the RC's role in coordination of the response. The establishment of a 24hrs Emergency Operations Centre managed by UN agencies for 10 days facilitated information sharing and programming activities not only for UN agencies but also for government and other international organizations. With the resources that the UN agencies could bring in rapidly, the HC was able to play a critical role in facilitating inter-agency coordination within the UN system as well. At the time of the evaluation, the UNCT was assisting the government in mapping all disaster-prone areas and in developing a disaster management strategy. The HC felt that the role played by the UN system during the disaster response helped them to introduce these initiatives.

### **3.3 Sectors and Clusters**

The cluster approach was not activated, following a consensus decision taken by the UN agencies. It was considered that the cluster approach would not bring any added value. It was felt that the government feared losing leadership, if the cluster approach was adopted. The country team shared the view that the cluster approach would bring in a whole raft of bureaucracy and would undermine the leadership role that the government agencies were supposed to be playing.

The UN formed working groups, which were led by the Ministries in coordination with leading UN agencies/IOM, such as: Shelter and Camp Management (lead: IOM), Food Assistance (lead: WFP), Health (lead: PAHO/WHO), Water and Sanitation (leads: PAHO/WHO & UNICEF), Education (lead: UNESCO), Protection (convenor: UNICEF), Early Recovery (lead: UNDP), IT/Telecommunications (lead: WFP), Temporary Employment (lead: ILO), Safety and Security (lead: UNDSS) and Coordination (lead: UNDP).

Some of these groups were not activated in practice (i.e IT/telecommunications) as the country has a reasonable communication infrastructure. In some of the groups, there was duplication and a fragmented approach to programming. In the shelter/housing sector for example there were at least three groups working without coordination: the government ministries on one side, IFRC/Peruvian RC and CARE International leading the NGOs response, and the IOM leading the UN response. None of these groups involved the private sector (control the prices of construction material) or the universities (research on improved technology for reconstruction) in the discussions. It can be argued that not adopting the cluster approach meant that the best expertise and leadership in each sector was not mobilized.

For temporary shelters immediately after the earthquake, IOM took the lead on behalf of UN agencies and provided 14,000 temporary shelters (tents), in addition to Non Food Items<sup>125</sup>. IOM set up three coordination and distribution centers in Pisco, Chincha and Ica, in coordination with the Resident Coordinator and with the INDECI Director General. It was assumed at the time of providing the tents that people would be living in those tents for a few weeks and then be moved to transition shelters to be built within 2-3 months. The tents were of poor quality which were designed to last no more than 6-8 weeks, and do not conform to SPHERE standards<sup>126</sup>. The IFRC, Peruvian RC (7,500 family tents), CARE (1,638 family tents and 903 temporary shelters) and Oxfam also provided tents by the middle of October, that is within 8 weeks of the disaster. Although not many tents now stand, as people have moved into transition shelters, of the few dozen tents seen by the evaluators, the IOM tents were of the worst quality. Those provided by the RCRC, Oxfam etc were of far better quality and do conform to SPHERE standards.

IOM's temporary shelters were slightly delayed and could only be completed by 25 November as the first supply of shelters arrived only around 3 September, after IOM received approval from the CERF (23 August). The RCRC also provided 5,000 transition shelters (which families can live in for 2 years or more before they are moved to their permanent houses) which were completed by mid-February. There was little coordination between IOM and the Red Cross.

Shelter is one of the most complex operations in any emergency, and there are not many agencies which have developed expertise in dealing with temporary shelter, transition shelter, and least of all permanent housing. It is only recently that the Red Cross, Oxfam and CARE have acquired some capacity to provide reasonable quality temporary and transition shelters in major emergencies. The evaluation team believes that activating the shelter cluster would have enabled the agencies to work together, led by the IFRC which has better capacity than the UN system in shelter. This would have also enabled the UN system to play a more effective role in shaping the reconstruction plan of the government which has only recently been produced (early April 2008). In the first three months, there was no coordination among the various agencies on temporary shelter; some coordination started only after agencies began building transition shelters.

### **3.4 Role of Government**

The agencies that had long-standing relationships with the government, such as UNESCO, PAHO/WHO, UNICEF and WFP were able to implement projects in close coordination with the government. WFP was approached by the government to procure food locally from a grant made by the latter as the government had little technical capacity to handle large scale procurement. UNESCO's temporary schools project and PAHO/WHO's collaboration with regional health authorities are examples of good coordination with government. The UNESCO project to rebuild four schools using an innovative model for comprehensive and participatory educational spaces,

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<sup>125</sup> IOM's intervention reached around 137,000 people, an estimated 49% of the affected population, with tents, folding beds, blankets, sheets, mattresses and sets for kitchen and personal hygiene. *IOM's Final Report to the UN RC.*

<sup>126</sup> IOM argues that the selection of the tents was the most appropriate decision considering the availability and affordability of the product in the market, as well as the social and political factors influencing decisions at the time of the emergency. IOM states that the decision to buy that particular type of tent took into account the main norms and indicators from OCHA and SPHERE. According to the agency, the tents provided were adequate to respond to the specific needs of the beneficiaries and to the Government's indications to provide tents to individual families in their own plots.

education material and concepts, was developed in close collaboration with the Ministry of Education.

### **3.5 Partnership with NGOs**

Most CERF-funded projects were implemented directly by the UN agencies/IOM. In a few cases, such as the WFP project for food distribution in Guadalupe District, NGOs were used as sub-contractors for the implementation of components of the projects. The reason cited for weak partnership with NGOs was the limited presence of NGOs in the affected area, which is normally considered a relatively prosperous zone in the country.

In general terms, NGOs felt that while there were adequate forums for information sharing, there was weak coordination with the UN agencies for the preparation of consolidated strategies and projects.

## **4. PERFORMANCE**

### **4.1 Life Saving Criteria**

By and large, activities funded by CERF were of a life-saving nature: WFP's food distribution to about 80,000 people in the first 12-16 weeks, NFI distribution by IOM and UNICEF, strengthening of reproductive health services by UNFPA, provision of temporary schools by UNICEF/UNESCO, etc. Water and Sanitation projects were implemented by UNICEF and PAHO/WHO in areas where the infrastructure had collapsed and in shelter camps. Together with the disease surveillance and early warning systems, put in place by PAHO/WHO, these measures prevented the outbreak of disease. PAHO/WHO's work in temporary shelter facilities, repairs of water and sewage systems and clearing of debris from damaged hospitals undertaken with CERF funding, and UNICEF's provision of water bladders and rehabilitation of sewerage systems, were good examples of life-saving work.

In Pisco, PAHO/WHO has now started construction of a temporary hospital. The evaluation team was informed that the work of construction would be completed by May 2008. The original hospital had been fully destroyed and then the government built three temporary blocks which were already functioning. PAHO/WHO also built the boundary wall for the hospital with CERF funding. The evaluation team does not see the life-saving justification for this substantial construction work for temporary accommodation and boundary wall at this late stage when the government had already provided functioning accommodation for the hospital by January. The PAHO/WHO staff members accompanying the evaluation team, however, argued that the boundary wall was essential for safety and security of the patients and hence was a life-saving intervention.

Mention has been made earlier about FAO's work with affected fishing communities. Timeliness is critical to any life-saving work, and the evaluation team could not find any reasonable justification for a delay of nearly eight months in the distribution of boats and nets for about 200 fishermen. The evaluation team was informed that FAO's procurement systems and strict insistence on technical specifications recommended by the HQ delayed procurement of the materials, and hence the delay of eight months. The FAO team recognized that with faster implementation, they could have made a significant impact on the livelihoods of the affected fishermen.

FAO is also supporting promotion of ‘urban agriculture’ or homestead gardening in the urban areas of Pisco. The concept is to provide seeds, tools and training to families to grow vegetables in their backyard/homestead gardens. The evaluation team met with some families who were doing a good job of this; however, it needs to be noted that it provides only a small supplementary income/saving to the family, and the evaluation team concluded that such work, though interesting, constitutes more of a recovery and development intervention, and that it cannot be classified as life-saving.

#### **4.2 Needs Assessment**

One of the main challenges acknowledged by all actors interviewed was the difficulty to carry out assessments in the early days and obtain relevant information in the hours following the disaster, as access to the area was disrupted. The UNDAC team and Inter-agency missions were sent to the field and managed to make a rapid assessment of needs two days after the event. Together with the information provided by INDECI and NGOs, this was the basis for the formulation of the Flash Appeal.

#### **4.3 Gender Issues**

At a practical level, in the relief response, agencies have paid attention to women’s needs in relief supplies like provision of non food items, targeted food distribution for pregnant women and infants, etc. UNFPA supported the health authorities to assess the capacity of primary health centres to continue providing reproductive health services and focused on provision of reproductive health kits for hospitals and health centres in the affected area. In Peru, there is a strong tradition of women’s associations at the grassroots level throughout the country. The evaluation found little evidence of engagement with these community-based organisations by the UN agencies during implementation of CERF funded response.

#### **4.4 Outcomes**

UNESCO’s work on temporary schools using CERF funds is an example of a critical contribution that CERF can make to build response that can be long lasting and a basis for early recovery and development. UNESCO was able to improve the model for building temporary schools with the project for the installation of four schools with 75 temporary classrooms. The schools were built based on a holistic approach to comprehensive education space, in a cost effective and climate adapted design for pre-fabricated buildings, developed with the Ministry of Education (MoE). UNESCO was able to collaborate with UNICEF in developing a psychosocial programme which was integrated into the school curriculum, integrate a nutritional programme in collaboration with WFP, and work with the community to obtain greater involvement of parents in managing the school. UNICEF also built sanitary facilities in 26 schools including in these four schools. This whole concept of holistic education space involving community oversight was fully adopted by the MoE, and has become part of the Education Policy to guide the construction of school infrastructure in the country.

For WFP, the earthquake-affected areas are not a conventional priority focus. However, through their involvement in the area after the earthquake, WFP identified some groups of internally

displaced people from conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s who have had little access to any support from government or other humanitarian organisations. At the time of the evaluation, WFP was providing supplementary feeding to pregnant women, children and vulnerable individuals of this group of IDPs. While the work is not funded by CERF as such, the CERF grant certainly enabled WFP to identify pockets of vulnerability and provide life-saving assistance.

## **5. ADMINISTRATION OF CERF**

### **5.1 Timeline for money flow**

The CERF Secretariat dealt with funding proposals from Peru very rapidly. The funding request was sent on 21 August; the following day the agencies received the approval letter and before 31 August all agencies with the exception of IOM had signed the LoU<sup>127</sup>. The average number of days from proposal submission to the disbursement of funds to the agencies' HQ was 13 days; only in the cases of WFP and IOM this period was 29 days. UNICEF signed the LoU on 31 August and received the first installment on 14 September. This delay did not disrupt the immediate implementation of the projects because the agencies were able to use other funds (Immediate Response Account in the case of WFP; EMOP funds in case of UNICEF) while waiting for CERF funds to come through. UNICEF was also able to draw on \$300,000 from its central emergency funds within the first 24 hours without waiting for CERF and launch its response immediately.

### **5.2 Timely response**

CERF fulfilled its role as a kick-start mechanism in the case of WFP food distribution, NFIs provided by IOM/UNICEF, provision of temporary schools by UNICEF/UNESCO, water and sanitation projects implemented by UNICEF and PAHO/WHO in shelter camps, the disease surveillance and early warning systems put in place by PAHO/WHO, and UNICEF's provision of water bladders etc.

However, there were several interventions which were delayed: at the time of the evaluation. FAO's project component to support the fishermen started to distribute the fishing equipment<sup>128</sup> in the first week of April, 8 months after the earthquake. This delay was due to the selection of the 213 beneficiaries, which took nearly 2 months, and the procurement of the equipment in the international market.

### **5.3 Proposal development and appraisal**

The support of the UNDAC team was considered essential for the preparation of CERF proposals. Even though there are guidelines, the life-saving criteria are considered to be very broad, which makes the preparation of CERF proposals difficult if country offices do not have people who have a solid understanding of life-saving humanitarian response. In disaster-prone countries such as Peru there is a need to enhance the humanitarian preparedness and response capacity of the UN system,

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<sup>127</sup> These are based on records made available by the RC office in Lima.

<sup>128</sup> FAO distributed fishing nets, small boats and outboard engines (10).

which would also enable the UN to play a more active role prior to disasters in developing local capacity for emergency response.

## **6. FACTORS AFFECTING ABILITY TO MEET OBJECTIVES**

### **6.1 Additional funding**

Most UN Agencies/IOM mobilized additional resources for the emergency response. PAHO/WHO mobilized nearly \$ 3m additional to CERF funds from several donors; IOM received \$500,000 from ECHO to complement CERF funding; UNICEF used CERF funding together with its internal emergency fund and emergency stocks to kick start its operation. UNFPA mobilized \$718,343 in addition to CERF funds from other sources. WFP mobilized an additional \$ 3m from several sources representing 60% of the total funding received. In addition, WFP received \$ 16 m from the Ministry of Women and Social Development to procure food items in the local market for the emergency.

Amongst the key donors, ECHO provided €8 m for immediate relief operations which were disbursed through pre-selected European NGOs that had good capacity to launch immediate response within three days of the disaster. In addition, ECHO funded OCHA/UNDP to set up coordination offices on the ground.

### **6.2 Timeline for Project Implementation**

The three months requirement for the implementation of the projects is considered by several agencies interviewed as being unrealistic. In cases such as FAO projects, implementation is linked to the planting season and therefore it is not possible to follow this restriction. FAO asked for an extension up to the end of March which was granted by the CERF secretariat.

### **6.3 Reporting**

CERF is considered by UN agency staff in Peru to be an easy mechanism to use, with narrative reporting requirements that are simpler than other donors. Each agency sent the information about the projects to the HC in the CERF country report. However the financial reporting requirements for CERF were most complex and time-consuming. The agencies are required to report expenses against budget-headings which are entirely different from how their own systems record expenditure.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

1. The deployment of OCHA staff and an UNDAC team within the first 4-5 days was critical to the development of the flash appeal and to early coordination, and shaped the overall response.
2. In countries where there is no OCHA presence, a small team of staff needs to be deployed right from the start for at least a period of 3-4 months in major emergencies. In this case, not having any OCHA staff present between weeks 4 and 12, during a critical period for the response, had a damaging impact on overall coordination and response.

3. At the country level, the early commitment and rapid availability of funds from the CERF gave the RC/HC and UNCT a level of confidence in their dialogue with the government, and this enabled them to influence and shape the government response significantly.
4. Inter-agency coordination is also strengthened by the process of transparent consideration (within UN agencies) of CERF allocations.
5. There is a perception within the UNCT, UN agencies and the government that the cluster approach undermines the government's control and leadership over emergency response and creates a bureaucratic superstructure which the UNCT and the government will not be able to handle.
6. Clusters need not be seen as rigid mechanisms requiring a one-size-fits-all approach. In Peru, while the government had some capacity and resources to manage several aspects of the response on its own, with advisory support from UNCT (and OCHA/UNDAC), this was not the case in the shelter/housing sector, where there was little capacity to provide adequate leadership, either within the government or the UN agencies. The activation of a cluster in the complex area of shelters could have led to an improved response as far as beneficiaries were concerned. Several non-UN agencies had greater capacity in this area, and they could have provided stronger leadership.
7. An intervention which is conceptually life-saving ceases to be so in practice, if it is not delivered on time. When making decisions on funding allocations, CERF grant appraisals therefore need to assess the ability of agencies to deliver on time.
8. Unintentionally, CERF has ended up supporting projects which have little life-saving value. This is due in part to the inability of the CERF secretariat, without first-hand knowledge of the ground realities, to conduct systematic appraisals that can differentiate between early recovery and life-saving initiatives.
9. Timely response in provision of NFIs, water bladders, water and sanitation facilities in shelters, temporary schools, the disease surveillance etc., carried out with CERF funding, were critical life-saving interventions for affected communities.
10. Although intended only for immediate response, CERF can support innovative initiatives which lay the foundation for 'building back better', as was exemplified by the joint work of UNESCO/UNICEF and WFP in temporary schools.

## SUDAN REPORT

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### 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Decades of conflict, natural disasters and chronic poverty have all contributed to massive levels of displacement in Sudan. There are about 5.4 million IDPs in the country, representing about 14 % of the total population. In addition, over 700,000 people live as refugees outside the country<sup>129</sup>. The twenty-year conflict between the North and South was brought to an end through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. However, conflict and insecurity in Darfur continue to destroy lives and livelihoods of millions of people.

During 2007 and 2008, widespread fighting and violence in Darfur have displaced large numbers of people into camps and IDP locations, overstressing the capacity of existing camp facilities. Humanitarian indicators such as global acute malnutrition, crude mortality rates, access to clean water and basic health care have deteriorated sharply for an already impoverished and vulnerable population.

To respond to the ongoing crisis, the UN agencies and partners appealed for US\$1.3 billion for their humanitarian work during 2007, against which the actual funds raised stood at \$1.01 billion (78%).

### 2. CERF AND OTHER FINANCING MECHANISM

Sudan has several financing mechanisms in place, some for emergency response and others for long-term work in the country. The following are particularly significant:

1. **Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) Standard Allocation:** a Pooled funding mechanism, like in DRC, to provide early predictable funding for priority activities within the UN and Partners Work Plan for the country (equivalent to CAP). The allocation process is managed by OCHA and disbursement of funds is handled by UNDP. Decision-making authority lies with the HC, with advice from the IASC humanitarian country team supported by a CHF advisory group.
2. **CHF Emergency Reserve:** An emergency reserve is kept within the CHF to meet unplanned needs outside the standard allocation. Allocation and disbursement of these funds can be fast-tracked in times of emergency response. Decision-making authority lies with the HC, with advice from the IASC humanitarian country team supported by a CHF advisory group. This fund is usually about 10% of the total CHF funds during a year.
3. **Emergency Response Funds:** Rapid funding mechanism for NGOs and UN agencies in Southern Sudan for emergency response. Managed by OCHA on behalf of the Deputy HC for Southern Sudan. Decision-making rests with the DHC for Southern Sudan. Average grant \$50,000.
4. **Bi-lateral donor funding:** By far the largest and most significant funding source, donors providing bilateral funding to humanitarian programmes inside or outside the UN and Partners Work Plan.

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<sup>129</sup> 2007 Sudan CERF Report

**Table 1: Total Funding for Sudan during the year 2007 was as follows:**

| Funding mechanism       | Total Amount (\$)            | Per cent of Total |
|-------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|
| Bilateral Donor funding | 1,148 m <sup>130</sup>       | 86.6 %            |
| CHF standard Allocation | 127 m                        | 9.6 %             |
| CHF Emergency Reserve   | 23 m                         | 1.7 %             |
| ERF                     | 1.5 m                        | 0.1 %             |
| CERF RR                 | 19.5 m                       | 1.5 %             |
| CERF UFE                | 6 m                          | 0.5 %             |
| <b>Total</b>            | <b>1,325 m<sup>131</sup></b> | <b>100</b>        |

## 2.1 Donor funding trends

During 2006, 71% of the appeal requirements for humanitarian action in Sudan were met. Donors committed US\$172 million to CHF during 2006, and \$167m in 2007. For 2008, \$103m had been pledged by 10 April, with another \$60m or so expected later during the year. Of the six donors to the CHF (Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain (only in 2007), Sweden and UK), funding from the two largest donors declined between 2006 and 2007, as the following table 2 shows:

**Table 2: Humanitarian Funding in Afghanistan**

|             | 2006 contributions(\$) | 2007 contributions (\$) | 2008 Pledges <sup>132</sup> (\$) |
|-------------|------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Ireland     | 2.5 m                  | 4 m                     | 6.3 m                            |
| Netherlands | 51.3 m                 | 37 m                    | -                                |
| Norway      | 14 m                   | 17.5 m                  | 17 m                             |
| Spain       | -                      | 9.5 m                   | -                                |
| Sweden      | 16 m                   | 20 m                    | -                                |
| UK          | 88.5 m                 | 79 m                    | 79.5 m                           |
| Total       | 172.3 m                |                         |                                  |

Several agencies in Sudan reported that donors in-country had reduced their direct funding. In 2005, WFP received about \$ 50m from DFID, but for 2008 for instance there is apparently no direct funding foreseen to WFP; a similar reduction has happened with respect to funding from the Netherlands. The total funding from CERF during a year to WFP is no more than \$5-6 m and from CHF another \$11.5 m (plus an additional \$ 2 m for UNHAS). Although the reductions in funding by traditional donors like DFID and the Dutch have been offset by other donors (Canada, Japan and Australia) which have increased their funding for WFP in Sudan, this has put increased pressure on the WFP country staff, as they cannot predict CERF funding during a year. NGOs reported similar reductions as many donors now usually direct them to CHF and CERF whenever approached with a funding request. Although precise figures were not available, NGOs met during the evaluation argued that, since they cannot apply for CERF funds directly and are only minor players in the CHF

<sup>130</sup> \$308 m of this was not included in the Annual Work Plan; i.e., the work plan component funded by bi-lateral sources is only \$841 million.

<sup>131</sup> The net appeal for 2008 is \$1.18 billion

<sup>132</sup> As of 10 April 2008

allocations, collectively, NGOs' direct access to humanitarian funds in country has declined. This perception however, that NGOs are only minor players in CHF, may not be borne out by the facts: NGOs directly received 39.4% of CHF funds in the first 2008 allocation (up from 15% in 2006 and 24% in 2007), in addition to the additional CHF funds sub-contracted to NGOs by recipient UN agencies.

## 2.2 CERF Funding in Sudan

Unlike DRC, Sudan is not considered an underfunded country, although during the early part of 2007, as there was a shortfall in funding in four sectors (watsan, Food, Health and Education), CERF UFE window was approached for a grant of \$6 m. Determining the scale of 'underfundedness' of a sector is problematic in the first half of the year, as donor pledges and disbursements usually continue to be made during this period. It is only in the latter part of the year that the picture of underfundedness becomes clearer. Moreover, as up-to-date information-sharing among agencies on their state of funding is weak, there is no way of knowing if the entire sector is underfunded; it is usually the lead agency which gives the first shout if its own programme remains underfunded, rather than the determination being based on an assessment of *sectoral* underfunding as a whole.

Several agencies were unclear about the criteria for UFE, and the decision-making was not seen as transparent. Interlocutors questioned why DRC was considered underfunded while Sudan was not. The argument that DRC's appeal is consistently underfunded as compared to Sudan's was felt to be misleading, given that DRC's CAP is considered by many to be inflated.

**Table 3: CERF funding per window and CERF funding forwarded to NGOs**

|  | 2006      | 2007      |
|--|-----------|-----------|
| CERF RR window   | \$ 35.5 m | \$ 19.5 m |
| CERF UFE window  | 0         | \$ 6 m    |
| CERF funding forwarded to partners (NGOs) <sup>133</sup> | 3.1 m     | \$ 8.6 m  |

**Table 4: CERF Funding per Agency (US\$)**


|        | 2006       | 2007                     | Total      |
|--------|------------|--------------------------|------------|
| FAO    | 1,000,000  | 1,254,611 <sup>134</sup> | 2,254,611  |
| UNDP   |            | 1,575,000                | 1,575,000  |
| UNFPA  |            | 214,000                  | 214,000    |
| UNHCR  | 1,500,000  | 4,719,318                | 6,219,318  |
| UNICEF | 9,900,000  | 11,091,442               | 20,991,442 |
| WFP    | 20,894,400 | 3,500,000                | 24,394,400 |
| WHO    | 2,224,699  | 3,120,662                | 5,345,361  |
| Total  | 35,519,099 | 25,475,033               | 60,994,132 |

<sup>133</sup> This figure may not represent the true picture as not all agencies provided detailed information in this respect.

<sup>134</sup> FAO commented that their figure is slightly different from official CERF figures: FAO puts it at \$ 1,504,611.

Source: CERF Database 06 March 2008

**Figure 1: CERF Funding per Agency**



### 2.3 CERF Loan Window

UN agencies in Sudan have made extensive use of the loan window to resolve cash flow problems: UNICEF and WHO in particular have made use of the loan facility during 2007. Early in 2008, UNICEF made a request for a loan of US\$17 million for time-critical interventions, as the agency was waiting for CHF funds to come through; however, back and forth correspondence with the CERF secretariat over the size of the request and assurances regarding reimbursement took over five weeks and by this time the CHF funds had been received by UNICEF and hence the request was withdrawn. In most parts of Sudan, the dry season (December-April) is the time for carrying out physical implementation of activities, as during the rainy season access becomes difficult. Most of the donor pledges are received in January and February, and the funds follow in about April. In order to tide over this gap, agencies usually have to borrow from different sources/budget lines during January to March, and it is at this point that CERF loan window can be useful.

### 3. STRENGTHENING HUMANITARIAN COORDINATION AND THE ROLE OF HC/RC

The humanitarian system in Sudan has evolved over the past two decades in response to ongoing humanitarian crises. The HC is supported by two deputies, one each for the north and south of the country. The UN's role in coordination, through a predictable and centralised coordination structure at field level under the direction of an Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) mechanism, was well accepted by various actors. In Khartoum and in the regions, the role of the HC and DHCs, supported by OCHA, is widely appreciated by agencies. The introduction of pooled funding mechanisms in early 2006 has played a significant role in strengthening coordination and planning across sectors and regions.

### **3.1 Sectors and Clusters**

Sudan has not formally activated clusters, but has, through its long established coordination structures at national, regional and sectoral levels, used key elements of the cluster approach. In essence, the cluster approach involves strengthening humanitarian response in three main ways:

1. Ensuring that roles and responsibilities among humanitarian partners are worked out through transparent, inclusive, consultative processes, in line with the Principles of Partnership developed by the Global Humanitarian Platform.
2. Ensuring leadership and responsibilities are established at the sectoral level, thereby clarifying lines of accountability to national authority counterparts, local actors, humanitarian partners and other stakeholders.
3. Ensuring that all relevant sectors and cross-cutting issues for the humanitarian operation are covered.

In Sudan, most of the above principles underpin sectoral coordination, which involves the government authorities and NGOs, in addition to UN agencies. The only notable exception to the IASC cluster roll-out guidelines<sup>135</sup> is the lack of clarity on ‘provider of last resort’.

In Khartoum, the HC chairs the weekly IASC Humanitarian country team meeting, where policies and recommendations are discussed among the UN Heads of Agencies, INGOs and ICRC Representatives. Parallel weekly meetings are held in Juba, chaired by the DHC for Southern Sudan, and regional/state level coordination meetings are also held regularly. In Darfur, humanitarian coordination remains under the leadership of the HC with the support of OCHA leading the Inter-Agency Management Group. All sectoral meetings are usually chaired by relevant government officials who are co-leads with designated UN agencies.

A long tradition of working along sectoral lines has helped the UN and its partners (both NGOs and government agencies) to develop fairly robust planning and coordination mechanisms in various sectors. The country work plan is divided up at regional level as well as sectoral level and includes the following sectors for which lead (and co-lead) agencies are designated.

- Basic Infrastructure and Settlement Development
- Common Services and Coordination
- Cross Sector support for Return and Reintegration
- DDR
- Education and Culture
- Food security and Livelihoods
- Governance and Rule of Law
- Health and Nutrition
- Mine Action
- NFIs and Emergency Shelter
- Protection and Human Rights
- Water and Sanitation

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<sup>135</sup> Rome Statement on cluster Roll-Out, IASC Working Group, November 2007

For all sectors, there are designated lead agencies (UN) as well as corresponding Government counterparts.

All these mechanisms have clearly helped in planning and prioritization of CERF proposals. However, existing sector structures put high pressure on staff workload of sector lead agencies, as the sector leads are responsible for leading the development of sector plans for the UN and Partners Work Plan, coordination of the sector allocation process for the CHF, and reporting against the work plan. Currently sector lead functions are performed by agency staffers who also have significant programmatic responsibilities within the agencies.

In order to support the sector lead role of agencies in Sudan a number of sector strategy and coordination advisers (SSCA) (3 in the North, and 3 in the South, covering four sectors) have been provided to key humanitarian sectors. Several agencies have proposed that this support be expanded further to allow key sectors to have full-time senior staff as sector leads with no agency-specific duties, so as to emphasise the element of neutrality in the sector lead role which is critical in the context of fund allocation from the CHF/CERF etc<sup>136</sup>. NGOs interviewed during this evaluation strongly supported the view that UN agencies need to separate their coordination role from their role chairing discussions on fund allocations, as there is a perceived conflict of interest, especially if the lead agency is also seeking funding (which is usually the case). One suggestion is to have an NGO co-lead to chair sectoral meetings assessing CERF proposals, particularly as NGOs cannot be direct recipients of CERF funds.<sup>137</sup>

### **3.2 Partnership with NGOs**

Of the total CERF funding in Sudan during the years 2006 and 2007, about 10% and 34% respectively have gone to the NGOs<sup>138</sup> and non-UN agencies through the UN agencies, which means that over two-thirds of the funds have been used by UN agencies for direct implementation.

There are some excellent examples of partnership between UN agencies and NGOs which CERF was able to support:

#### **3.2.1 Common Pipeline Project:**

In December 2006, a RR grant for \$5.5 m was made to UNICEF and UNJLC for setting up in partnership with CARE International a common pipeline for NFI and shelter materials. UNICEF was responsible for procurement and transportation of NFIs to CARE warehouses, CARE was responsible for warehousing and transport to the distribution sites, and UNJLC ensured effective supply chain management and coordination of the NFI pipeline. OCHA assists with needs verification, coordination of assessments and information sharing. The INGOs and NGOs play the main role in distribution of the items to targeted beneficiaries.

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<sup>136</sup> Cluster Approach Questionnaire – Sudan, 14 February 2008

<sup>137</sup> See Main report, Recommendation 4, p61.

<sup>138</sup> It is understood that these figures may be an under-estimate of the total funds channelled through NGOs as some UN agencies' reports do not show the figures. The increase in the NGO figures from 2006 to 2007 is likely to be more a result of improved reporting, rather than increased participation of NGOs in implementation of CERF-funded projects.

### **3.2.2 Pass-through Grants to NGOs in south Sudan:**

For years, the conflict in Northern Uganda has spilled over into Southern Sudan through the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) who were freely operating out of the Southern Sudan when they were pushed out by Ugandan military action. Following a temporary lull in its activities in the later part of 2006, the LRA stepped up its campaign of lootings, attacks on civilians and abductions in western and eastern Equatoria region. This led the UN agencies and NGOs to conduct a series of inter-agency assessments led by OCHA to identify unmet humanitarian needs. A CERF RR grant for \$1.5 m was obtained to fund the work of a few key NGOs in the LRA-affected areas and was managed by UNDP on behalf of the HC/DHC. The selection of projects/NGOs was done through a call-for-proposals process vetted by OCHA and UNDP. Proposals were collected by OCHA and presented to a selection committee composed of the DHC, UNDP, representatives of the NGO steering committee, sector leads, the OCHA head of office for Southern Sudan and the head of OCHA Emergency Preparedness & Response. The final decision on project allocations was made by the DHC.

### **3.3 Consultation/decision making**

In Sudan, there exists a well-developed process for allocation of funds at regional and sectoral levels for CHF grants. The CHF regional meetings reporting system attempts to ensure that sectoral allocation decisions for the region are well documented, showing who the participants were and indicating clear links to the Work Plan priorities, and that the decision making was transparent, although at times these systems do not work so effectively in practice.

Prioritisation of CERF proposals is not systematic, and often depends on the sector lead agency. Most CERF grant discussions are held at short notice involving a limited number of agencies. Even some UN humanitarian agencies complained that sometimes they were not involved in the discussions and found out about CERF proposals when they received the meeting minutes. Most interlocutors held the view that the CHF funding allocation process, though time-consuming, is more transparent than the CERF allocation process which even some UN agencies found lacking in transparency. Meetings were held at very short notice and some alleged that minutes were sometimes written up to suit the convenience of one or two agencies, in a way that did not fully reflect the discussions in meetings. NGOs were usually excluded from any discussion on CERF grants; several UN agency interlocutors argued during the evaluation that since NGOs cannot be direct recipients of CERF grants, there was no point in involving them in decision-making.

## **4. PERFORMANCE**

### **4.1 Life-Saving Criteria**

A large proportion of CERF grants to Sudan during 2007 went to health and nutrition sector (32%), followed by watsan sector (21%), protection and human rights sector (19%) and common services and coordination (12%), which were by and large in response to floods, outbreak of rift valley fever and acute water-borne diseases (AWD) and fresh waves of displacements (and returns) during the year. The application of life-saving criteria in discussions on CERF proposals and submissions has been generally robust, as was evident from the field visits during this evaluation. The common services cluster provided a grant of \$3 m to WFP for provision of the Humanitarian Air Services, the life-saving nature of which lies in the fact that, as attested to by the various agencies

interviewed, without HAS flights in Western Darfur, most agencies would find it difficult to operate in the area as access is only by air. However, to put it in context, CERF funding was only \$3m out of the UNHAS total budget of \$77m.

In Western Darfur, using CERF funds in 2007, an emergency immunization programme was carried out in several communities which had had no access to immunization for several years due to ongoing fighting. However, for a few weeks there was an improvement in the situation which was seized upon for an emergency immunization. The evaluation considers this to be an appropriate intervention for CERF to support, although similar support for immunization programmes which are part of ongoing work of the government or UNICEF/WHO may not qualify as life-saving interventions worthy of CERF support.

#### **4.2 Needs Assessment**

Regular sectoral meetings and weekly humanitarian country team meetings in Khartoum provide a forum where unmet needs are picked up and a fairly accurate picture of the humanitarian situation is captured by the country team. Although the evaluation team has not seen any needs assessment document, at least on two occasions involving CERF grants, joint assessments were carried out to inform CERF proposals: an assessment of the LRA-affected areas in south Sudan facilitated by OCHA with the involvement of other agencies and NGOs, and a joint assessment and proposal for the RVF outbreak, developed by WHO and FAO.

#### **4.3 Time-frame for implementation of CERF-funded projects under RR grants**

The 3-months time-frame for implementation of CERF projects is seen to be too short on many occasions. In West Darfur, work on watsan got delayed due to problems of access and security concerns. This is an area where car-jacking and forcibly removing equipment like drilling machines etc., have been common and hence UNICEF had to wait to start work until the safety of their equipment could be ensured. Moreover, in some of the villages visited by the evaluation team, as the security situation had not fully returned to normal, many families who came back earlier had fled the villages again.

In the case of the LRA-affected project, although the implementation was to be completed in a period of three months, the activities could not be completed before the end of the fifth month due to logistical difficulties (in several areas, roads become impassable during heavy rains) in the peak rainy season. Although the initial idea of putting together a RR proposal was mooted in September 2006, the first review of proposals (in country) took place in July 2007 as the HC/DHC could not find an agency which would act as 'Managing Agent' for the grants to NGOs. The proposal had to go through several revisions, as the long time lapse between the emergency and project approval meant that needs had changed, and what could be considered life-saving in September 2006 was no longer so by July 2007.







### **5. ADMINISTRATION OF CERF**

#### **5.1 Timelines for CERF Approval**

It was generally acknowledged by most interlocutors that the CERF mechanism is fairly rapid as compared to bi-lateral funding, although sometimes CERF funding took weeks to arrive. Field data

gathered by Oxfam<sup>139</sup> revealed an element of learning and improvement in the speed of disbursement, as the CERF Secretariat became more established, processes were standardised, and field agencies became more familiar with the mechanism. Sudan was cited in Oxfam’s report as an example of how the disbursement of funds had speeded up. The first CERF allocations to Sudan in 2006 took an average of 48 days to be disbursed to UN agencies assisting over 200,000 IDPs in Darfur and some 14,000 Chadian refugees; the second allocation during the same year took only a week<sup>140</sup>.

However, during the floods of 2007, the process took longer. As the following diagram shows, the total timeframe for submission of the CERF proposal took nearly 2 weeks, and the complete allocation process took almost a month after submission of the document to the CERF secretariat<sup>141</sup>. Considerable time was spent in back and forth correspondence between Sudan and New York on the size of the envelope the CERF could support and life-saving criteria.

| Steps in CERF funding/flash appeal                      | 5 July          | July  |       |       | August |       |       |       |       | September |        |        |        |
|---|-----------------|---|-------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----------|--------|--------|--------|
|   | Onset of floods | Week1   | Week2 | Week3 | Week4  | Week5 | Week6 | Week7 | Week8 | Week9     | Week10 | Week11 | Week12 |
| In-country discussions on development of CERF proposals |                 |  Discussions began immediately after the disaster, continued for another 3 weeks |       |       |        |       |       |       |       |           |        |        |        |
| Submission to CERF secretariat                          |                 |  Submitted to CERF Secretariat on 31 July                                      |       |       |        |       |       |       |       |           |        |        |        |
| Revised version submitted to CERF                       |                 |  Revised proposal submitted to CERF 05/08                                      |       |       |        |       |       |       |       |           |        |        |        |
| Approvals from CERF Secretariat                         |                 |  Approvals in 2 stages, first on 07/08   |       |       |        |       |       |       |       |           |        |        |        |
| Development of flash appeal                             |                 |  Draft shared with donors locally 09/08  |       |       |        |       |       |       |       |           |        |        |        |
| Formal launch of flash appeal                           |                 |  Launched on 27/08  |       |       |        |       |       |       |       |           |        |        |        |

<sup>139</sup> Oxfam International Briefing Paper, 2007: The UN Central Emergency Response Fund one year on

<sup>140</sup> Kenya was cited as another example, with rapid-response funding after the floods in November/December 2006 approved and disbursed very swiftly. In contrast with the CERF’s drought relief funding in Kenya, UNICEF reported that approval was given for \$1m of funding for flood-related programmes within 24 hours, and that the UN Secretariat disbursed funds within a week.

<sup>141</sup> Lessons Learned: Northern Sudan Floods Response 2007

In the Rift Valley Fever (RVF) outbreak, it took FAO and WHO about two weeks<sup>142</sup> to prepare a proposal and submit it to the CERF Secretariat on 27 November<sup>143</sup>. Following one revision of the proposal, it was approved on 14 December, and funds were disbursed to WHO on 27 December and to FAO on 4 January. It is to be noted here that the first suspected cases were reported from early October, and by 20 November 2007, the Federal Ministry of Health had reported at least 164 deaths due to the RVF.

Records kept at the CERF secretariat give slightly different time-lines, as the date of submission of proposals for the CERF Secretariat is the date they receive the final proposal (after revisions made by country team in response to feedback from the CERF Secretariat). In New York, the time taken for preparation of proposals is not counted. The net result is that the system contributes to delays in rapid response at both ends – that other donors' systems may be more dilatory can be little consolation for a funding mechanism whose *raison d'être* lies in its ability to provide rapid time-critical response in times of emergencies.

The country team has drawn up detailed timelines summarising the time taken at various stages of obtaining CERF grants<sup>144</sup>. Taking a sample of 17 different agency grants made in 2007 through the RR window, the analysis found that the average time taken were as follows:

- Proposal development in the country & forwarding to New York: 21 days
- Approval by NY (date of country submission to date of formal approval): 11 days
- Funds disbursement (date of approval to the date of disbursement) 16 days
- Total average time taken from disasters to disbursement: 46 days

As most agencies in Sudan receiving CERF funds have pre-financing capacity, they do not have to wait for money to arrive before they start work. Usually, the formal approval by the ERC is what they need. Even then, the average time taken to access CERF funds by recipient agencies with pre-financing capacity is about five weeks (21+11=33 days). All actors involved in the process - the agency field office, agency HQ, the RC/HC, and CERF Secretariat bear a part of the responsibility for this.

## 5.2 Flash Appeals

During the 2007 floods in Sudan, it took over three weeks to prepare the flash appeal and launch it in Khartoum on 9 August. The final launch globally was on 27 August. The HC allocated US\$4.8m from the CHF for immediate response, and the CERF allocated an additional \$8.68m. This allowed the UN agencies to provide immediate response. The work on development of a CERF proposal started a week after the onset of the emergency and it took about four weeks by the time the final version was submitted to New York.

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<sup>142</sup> 2007 Annual Report of the Humanitarian Coordinator on the Use of CERF grants to Sudan

<sup>143</sup> The delay in approaching CERF had a political background which is widely known at country and international level. The Federal Ministry of Health declared the outbreak on 24<sup>th</sup> Oct.; however, the Ministry of Animal Resources only agreed to announce the outbreak in early November.

<sup>144</sup> 2007 Sudan CERF Report

### **5.3 Timelines for Funds Disbursement**

For the common pipeline, CARE received funds from UNICEF. The CERF proposal was approved in August, and CARE received funds from UNICEF only on 13 November, although that did not affect CARE's ability to deliver, as it could use its own funds. However, procurement through the UN system was hugely time-consuming – some supplies for the flood response arrived only in February 2008 (although the bulk came earlier), over six months after the floods for which the common pipeline grant was requested. In the case of the RVF outbreak, WHO and FAO took about 2 weeks to prepare the proposal as they had to consult with the government as well. Once the proposal was submitted, it took about three weeks to receive approval and another 4 weeks to get the funds in the country. The five weeks it took to prepare, discuss and get the proposal approved was a critical time for the response; WHO staff argued that although they began their response in a small way almost as soon as the RVF outbreak was suspected, the response would have been more robust had they known or been able to predict that about \$500,000 of CERF funds would be available.

### **5.4 PSC, Overhead costs**

The administrative arrangements for disbursing funds to NGOs vary from agency to agency. UNHCR, in line with UN Financial Rules, discourages pre-financing by NGO implementing partners. Once agreement has been reached on activities to be implemented, a first installment is released allowing an NGO to start operations. Subsequent installments are disbursed upon receipt of certified financial statements - subject to availability of funds. UNHCR provides 7% overhead to international NGOs; local NGOs do not receive a fixed amount but receive funding to cover administrative costs.. UNICEF provides an advance and subsequent payments are made on receipt of accounts from the NGOs; UNICEF provides for an overhead, but this needs to be negotiated for each grant on a case-by-case basis and varies from 3-5%. Usually the grants made to NGOs are very small and fragmented (several grants for several sectors) requiring them to submit a large number of reports which are costly for the organisations. Most UN agencies demand quarterly reports from NGOs for grants usually in the range of \$10,000-\$100,000 (in exceptional cases, grants are upwards of \$250,000).

During the CHF allocation for 2008, roughly 40% of the total funds were allocated directly to NGOs. As UNDP is the managing agent for NGO grants, it obtains an overhead of 5% for all the grants forwarded to NGOs. This is in addition to the 1% it is allowed to charge as administrative agent for all CHF funds. Similarly for the LRA grant made by CERF in 2007, UNDP was the managing agent for which it received an overhead of 7%. UNDP's role in this was managing the contract and dealing with the funds; as UNDP does not have expertise in emergency response, its role in programmatic monitoring and oversight is minimal. This is usually provided by OCHA and the IAMG. While an overhead charge of 5% may be justified in the first case, a 'pass-through' charge of 3% would seem more appropriate in the second, as UNDP accepts, in similar circumstances, for projects in Iraq.

## 6. FACTORS AFFECTING THE ABILITY TO MEET OBJECTIVES

### 6.1 Reporting

Sudan UNCT has developed a systematic reporting system on CERF grants, with inputs coming from individual agencies which are then pulled together by OCHA on behalf of the HC/RC. OCHA's Policy and Planning Unit in Khartoum is well resourced and is primarily responsible for the work planning process as well as for maintaining a comprehensive reporting system on CHF and CERF grants. The reports are some of the best the evaluators have seen, and the reports provide clear data on the following aspects which most other country reports lack:

- Names of Agency partners and details of activities carried out by the partners;
- Amount of funds provided to each partner;
- Results/outcome achieved in each sector
- Breakdown of number of beneficiaries by age group (adult, children), gender and type (IDP, newly displaced, refugees etc).

#### **An example of details provided in the report for one CERF grant made to deal with AWD:**

| Agency         | CERF grant (\$) | Implementing Partners      | Primary Activities  | CERF funds received (\$) |
|----------------|-----------------|----------------------------|---|--------------------------|
| WHO/<br>UNICEF | 1,024,699       | IFRC                       | Rehabilitation of boreholes   | 40,000                   |
|                |                 | Rural Water Department     | Chlorination  | 1,937                    |
|                |                 | WFP                        | Travel & freight costs  | 153,337                  |
|                |                 | MEDAIR                     | Water treatment, latrines & hygiene promotion   | 85,812                   |
|                |                 | Swedish Free Mission       | Disinfection of 100 boreholes, installation of 100 latrines & hygiene promotion in Juba | 65,328                   |
|                |                 | International Aid Services | Management of emergency water services in Yei   | 8,763                    |
|                |                 | Public Health Department   | Assembling of 100 wheel barrows for garbage collection in Juba                          | 300                      |
| Total          | 1,024,699       |                            |   | 335,477                  |

### 6.2 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

The monitoring of CERF grants in Sudan takes place at two levels: first, monitoring of the overall process of accessing and utilising CERF grants to Sudan which is done by OCHA; and second is the monitoring of the implementation of CERF supported projects, which is done at the individual agency level.

Prioritisation comes through sector discussions which are all led by UN agencies. In the regions, there is an Inter Agency Management Group which functions like IASC. The first level of discussions on CERF grants takes place at the IAMG level.

For CHF, the M & E responsibilities lie with the HC/RC supported by a dedicated M & E Unit. The RC/HC does not monitor individual agencies and projects which is the responsibility of individual agencies; however, the RC/HC is responsible for monitoring and evaluation of Work Plan outcomes (impact and effectiveness) of the work undertaken through CHF funds<sup>145</sup>. In the case of NGOs receiving CHF or CERF funds (through UNDP), programmatic monitoring is done by OCHA and HC/DHC, while administrative monitoring is carried out by UNDP.

## **7. CONCLUSIONS**

1. Several donors in Sudan have reduced their direct funding to a number of agencies (both UN and NGOs) on the pretext that their funds are now going to the CHF and/or CERF, leading to a generally-held view that at least in Sudan, CERF has not been additional.
2. The trigger and criteria for deciding on underfunded allocations are unclear and perceived to be non-transparent.
3. The CERF loan window can be highly useful in countries like Sudan which have several in-country funding mechanisms in place; however, procedures for accessing loans need to be reviewed.
4. The cluster approach has not been formally activated in the country owing to fear of undermining the coordination system that has been developed over the years. However, key principles underpinning the cluster approach were in operation in the country for humanitarian coordination and planning.
5. The common pipeline project supported by CERF is an innovative example of joint programming which has enabled humanitarian agencies (both UN and NGOs) to have ready access to standardised NFIs and shelter materials and ensured that there is no duplication in distribution.
6. The proposal development and approval process in country for CERF grants lacks transparency and leaves key organisations out of the discussions.
7. The 3-months time frame for project implementation is too short, even for rapid response, in areas affected by security and access problems.
8. The life-saving criteria for CERF grants have been better applied in Sudan than in several other countries visited during this evaluation.
9. Despite the fact that CERF secretariat has put in place systems for rapid approval of grants once a final proposal is received at its end, the average total time taken from the date of disaster to formal approval was about five weeks in Sudan for 2007 grants. This is too long.
10. There is a lack of consistency and transparency in the overhead costs charged by UN agencies and in the overhead charges allowed to NGOs.
11. The Policy and Planning Unit of OCHA in country plays a critical role in facilitating and maintaining a reporting system and in compiling progress reports from all agencies.
12. The arrangements developed in Sudan, for reporting on CERF and CHF grants, as well as monitoring and evaluation, could serve as a model for use in other countries.

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<sup>145</sup> Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF): Revised Terms of Reference, January 2008

## **ANNEX 6: Telephone Interviews Report**

## TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS

### 1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION – COUNTRIES INTERVIEWED


As part of the CERF two-year review a number of telephone interviews were carried out with seven CERF receiving countries. The number and rationale is summarized in the table below.

| Country    | Rationale for selection  | No interviewed |
|------------|--|----------------|
| Bolivia    | Rapid onset, Latin America   | 11             |
| Chad       | Protracted crisis, high CERF funding, difficult logistics, Africa. | 5              |
| DPRK       | Rapid onset and protracted crisis, Asia.                           | 3              |
| Ethiopia   | Rapid onset and protracted crisis, high CERF funding, HRF, Africa. | 3              |
| Mozambique | Rapid onset two years in row, high CERF funding, Africa.           | 3              |
| Pakistan   | Rapid response and UFE funding, no flash appeal, Asia.             | 5              |
| Somalia    | Protracted crisis, ERF, high CERF funding, Africa.                 | 6              |
| Total      |  | 36             |

Interviews were with UN agencies, RC/HCs and RC offices, governments, international and local NGOs and the Red Cross Movement. The interview questions were structured around the report themes and the most salient points are summarized below under those headings. In addition, basic information on CERF funding to those countries is set out in the following section<sup>146</sup>. The telephone interviews were used as one of several streams of source material for the main findings and conclusions of the evaluation. They were not intended to be exhaustive investigations of the use of CERF in each country, rather an opportunity for those who had been involved in running CERF projects to provide reflection to the evaluation team in key areas of investigation. The report of the interviews is therefore laid out along the same lines as the themes in the inception and main reports.

### BOLIVIA

| CERF Funding to UN Agency (US\$) |                  |                  |                  |
|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                                  | 2007             | 2008             | Total            |
| FAO                              | 300,000          | 288,600          | 588,600          |
| UNDP                             | 100,000          |                  | 100,000          |
| UNFPA                            | 30,000           | 48,150           | 78,150           |
| UNICEF                           | 510,000          | 487,310          | 997,310          |
| WFP                              | 960,000          | 1,023,320        | 1,983,320        |
| WHO                              | 100,000          | 160,500          | 260,500          |
| IOM                              |                  | 263,994          | 263,994          |
| <b>Total</b>                     | <b>2,000,000</b> | <b>2,271,874</b> | <b>4,271,874</b> |




<sup>146</sup> Source of tables and graphs is FTS, May 2008.

**CHAD**

| Funding per CERF Window (US\$) |                   |                  |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
|                                | RR                | UF               |
| 2006                           | 3,152,623         | 6,268,442        |
| 2007                           | 7,280,842         | 979,050          |
| <b>Total</b>                   | <b>10,433,465</b> | <b>7,247,492</b> |
| %                              | 59%               | 41%              |


| CERF Funding to UN Agencies (US\$) |                  |                  |                   |
|------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|
|                                    | 2006             | 2007             | Total             |
| FAO                                | 269,333          | 605,085          | 874,418           |
| UNHCR                              | 3,700,000        | 1,000,000        | 4,700,000         |
| UNICEF                             | 2,453,062        | 2,481,180        | 4,934,242         |
| WFP                                | 2,998,670        | 2,518,671        | 5,517,341         |
| UNDP                               |                  | 214,000          | 214,000           |
| UNDSS                              |                  | 319,930          | 319,930           |
| UNFPA                              |                  | 445,000          | 445,000           |
| WHO                                |                  | 676,026          | 676,026           |
| <b>Total</b>                       | <b>9,421,065</b> | <b>8,259,892</b> | <b>17,680,957</b> |



**DPRK**


| CERF Funding to UN Agencies 2007 (US\$) |                   |
|---|-------------------|
| FAO                                     | 1,300,000         |
| UNFPA                                   | 600,000           |
| UNICEF                                  | 5,300,000         |
| WFP                                     | 3,098,577         |
| WHO                                     | 800,000           |
| <b>Total</b>                            | <b>11,098,577</b> |

| CERF Funding (2007) |                   |             |
|---------------------|-------------------|-------------|
| CERF Window         | US\$              | %           |
| RR                  | 6,100,000         | 55%         |
| UFE                 | 4,998,577         | 45%         |
| <b>Total</b>        | <b>11,098,577</b> | <b>100%</b> |



**ETHIOPIA**


| <b>CERF Funding to UN Agencies (US\$)</b> |                  |                   |                   |
|---|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|   | <b>2006</b>      | <b>2007</b>       | <b>Total</b>      |
| FAO                                       | 910,850          |                   | 910,850           |
| UNDP                                      | 80,000           | 290,209           | 2,030,000         |
| UNFPA                                     | 49,755           | 220,000           | 417,419           |
| UNHCR                                     | 600,000          | 2,075,730         | 3,413,419         |
| UNICEF                                    | 3,795,093        | 4,143,903         | 6,390,098         |
| WFP                                       | 3,173,688        | 3,345,247         | 5,424,670         |
| WHO                                       | 1,363,600        | 2,290,570         | 2,758,189         |
| <b>Total</b>                              | <b>9,972,986</b> | <b>12,365,659</b> | <b>22,338,645</b> |



| <b>CERF Funding per Window</b> |               |              |
|--------------------------------|---------------|--------------|
|                                | <b>RR</b>     | <b>UFE</b>   |
| <b>2006</b>                    | 8,972,986.04  | 1,000,000.00 |
| <b>2007</b>                    | 3,367,543.00  | 8,998,115.97 |
| <b>Total</b>                   | 12,340,529.04 | 9,998,115.97 |
| <b>%</b>                       | 55%           | 45%          |

**MOZAMBIQUE**


| <b>CERF Funding to UN Agencies (US\$)</b> |                   |                  |                   |
|---|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
|   | <b>2007</b>       | <b>2008</b>      | <b>Total</b>      |
| FAO                                       | 1,102,609         |                  | 1,102,609         |
| IOM                                       | 795,010           | 599,200          | 1,394,210         |
| UNDP                                      | 395,834           |                  | 395,834           |
| UNFPA                                     | 505,072           | 50,000           | 555,072           |
| UNICEF                                    | 2,667,519         | 1,233,930        | 3,901,449         |
| WFP                                       | 6,371,479         | 2,018,864        | 8,390,343         |
| WHO                                       | 395,472           | 388,253          | 783,725           |
| <b>Total</b>                              | <b>12,232,995</b> | <b>4,290,247</b> | <b>16,523,242</b> |



**PAKISTAN**

| <b>CERF Funding to UN Agencies (US\$)</b> |                  |                  |                   |
|---|------------------|------------------|-------------------|
|   | <b>2007</b>      | <b>2008 (*)</b>  | <b>Total</b>      |
| FAO                                       | 417,300          | 1,500,000        | 1,917,300         |
| IOM                                       | 693,850          | 517,496          | 1,211,346         |
| UNFPA                                     | 99,510           |                  | 99,510            |
| UNHCR                                     | 622,468          | 1,100,000        | 1,722,468         |
| UNICEF                                    | 1,287,451        | 1,520,000        | 2,807,451         |
| WFP                                       | 1,789,983        | 963,458          | 2,753,441         |
| WHO                                       | 896,403          |                  | 896,403           |
| UNDP                                      |                  | 36,380           | 36,380            |
| <b>Total</b>                              | <b>5,806,965</b> | <b>5,637,334</b> | <b>11,444,299</b> |


| <b>Funding for CERF Window (US\$)</b> |                  |                  |
|---------------------------------------|------------------|------------------|
|                                       | <b>RR</b>        | <b>UFE</b>       |
| 2007                                  | 5,806,965        |                  |
| 2008                                  |                  | 5,637,334        |
| <b>Total</b>                          | <b>5,806,965</b> | <b>5,637,334</b> |
| <b>%</b>                              | <b>51%</b>       | <b>49%</b>       |



**SOMALIA**

| <b>CERF Funding to UN Agencies (US\$)</b> |                   |                   |                   |
|---|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|   | <b>2006</b>       | <b>2007</b>       | <b>Total</b>      |
| FAO                                       | 1,395,864         |                   | 1,395,864         |
| UNDP                                      | 2,080,000         | 2,091,400         | 4,171,400         |
| UNICEF                                    | 3,128,026         | 3,316,567         | 6,444,593         |
| WFP                                       | 9,150,825         | 7,556,043         | 16,706,868        |
| WHO                                       | 854,340           | 1,700,765         | 2,555,105         |
| UNHCR                                     |                   | 1,000,000         | 1,000,000         |
| <b>Total</b>                              | <b>16,609,055</b> | <b>15,664,775</b> | <b>32,273,830</b> |

| <b>Funding for CERF Window (US\$)</b> |                   |                  |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|
|                                       | <b>RR</b>         | <b>UFE</b>       |
| 2006                                  | 16,609,055        |                  |
| 2007                                  | 14,664,775        | 1,000,000        |
| <b>Total</b>                          | <b>31,273,830</b> | <b>1,000,000</b> |
| <b>%</b>                              | <b>97%</b>        | <b>3%</b>        |



## **2.FINDINGS**

### **2.1 FUNDING MECHANISMS AND HUMANITARIAN REFORM**

#### **2.1.1 RAPID RESPONSE, UNDER-FUNDED AND LOANS**

CERF has been an important source of funding in the countries interviewed. The resources from the UFE window sometimes covered sectors and funding gaps which would probably not have been funded without the CERF. There were also some concerns expressed about whether the UFE should fund programmes that had been in place for many years.

The RR window contributed substantially to countries with flash appeals, and in Mozambique brought in more resources than might otherwise have been the case. It kick started responses in places like DPRK where the political environment makes judgements about flash appeals challenging, and in Bolivia where a late flash appeal meant mobilising donors funds took time. The RR also contributed to countries without flash appeals such as Pakistan, where it kick started the UN agency response and is now seen as useful by both UN and government.

#### **2.1.2 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FUNDING**

CERF is seen as impartial compared to other funding sources by UN agency respondents in most countries interviewed, especially those in protracted crisis. CERF has also ensured a predictability of funding in protracted crisis such as Chad where despite a well funded CAP many see the funding environment as difficult and slow. Several respondents saw CERF as a source of funding that is “too easy” for some UN agencies, and as a consequence has become the funding of first, rather than last resort. Most agreed that CERF added value at the beginning of a response.

Agencies’ own funding is seen as critical in facilitating rapid response. The combination of CERF and agencies’ own emergency funds can lead to a rapid and sustained scale up. Conversely, where agencies did not have their own emergency funds they have been slow to respond, despite CERF. For many, CERF continues to be only a small proportion of total programming.

CERF has been complemented by other common humanitarian pooled funds such as the HRF in Ethiopia and the ERF in Somalia. In Somalia CERF contributed directly to the ERF, which in turn funded local NGOs who previously had difficulty accessing larger grants. This has in turn led to some effective programme work. In Ethiopia the governance board of the HRF mechanisms also oversees CERF and is seen by all as inclusive and as a result effective. Both the HRF and the ERF are seen as good sources of funding for NGOs, complementing CERF, which is seen as more of a funding mechanism for UN agencies.

In Mozambique the IFRC felt that there was not as much money coming into their system because donors are putting money into the UN and mechanisms like CERF.

#### **2.1.3 COORDINATION**

One of the principal aspects of CERF is that it is an inter-agency mechanism and approach. For the majority of respondents this was one of the most positive aspects of the CERF, and this in combination with clusters, is seen to have brought about a more systematic approach. All of the countries telephone interviewed highlighted the positive effect CERF had on coordination, even if

sometimes allocations were made on the basis of ‘dividing the pie’. For most it was a ‘catalyst’ or ‘forced agencies to prioritise’ or ‘forced agencies to have discussions on the issues’.

#### **2.1.4 STRENGTHENING HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR**

The CERF has made a significant impact on the role of the humanitarian coordinator in many of the countries telephone interviewed. In several countries (Ethiopia, Mozambique, Pakistan) the CERF was seen to give the UN credibility with government, as it enabled them to mobilise resources more quickly than before.

The evidence as to whether CERF has strengthened the HC role is divided. Many respondents felt that the HC role was strengthened – that the HC role in allocation of resources enhanced their convening power and this in turn had a positive effect on strategy. In this analysis, the office of the HC has more credibility as a result. Increased HC credibility not only leads to a more coherent UN response, but can also be important in negotiation for access and bringing together other actors.

For others, involving the HC in decisions around financial allocation makes the position a more controversial one. Opinion is also diverse as to how accountability should work within this new system with some seeing the HC as accountable for CERF performance, others the clusters and many the agencies individually.

As with the country case studies, respondents in telephone interviews indicated that the experience and leadership skills of the HC determined how CERF and other reforms were introduced and implemented. Where an HC had emergency experience the CERF could be very positively used; where the HC had less experience or authority the picture could be more mixed. Whilst the CERF was seen as a contributor to change in the HC role in some countries, in others changes occurred simply because of the circumstances. One respondent felt that CERF was mostly dealt with by the ‘machine’ underneath the HC, with that position mostly signing off, rather than directing.

#### **2.1.5 CLUSTERS APPROACH**

Most respondents in the telephone-interviewed countries identified a relationship between CERF and the cluster approach. Many saw the clusters as having improved the work, and in particular the prioritisation process. When it is working well this adds value to the CERF process. Nevertheless there were also challenges identified. The ‘inter-cluster’ process often still needs work even when clusters are working well. Some agencies perceive cluster lead agencies using the position to secure resources from CERF. Clusters are dependent on personalities, especially of those who lead them. At the same time several agencies and countries saw a responsibility to cluster partners to mobilise resources for identified priorities, using both CERF and other funding sources. For one interviewee this responsibility meant they were happier not introducing CERF into cluster discussions as failure to mobilise resources adequately could spoil previously good working relationships.

Where clusters have been introduced, they have improved over time, both in the way they work and their inclusive nature. This was perceived to be the case in Mozambique, Pakistan and Ethiopia. One respondent felt that this required a mindset change however, and creative work to break down traditional institutional barriers. Some now feel that clusters should be permanently maintained in risk prone countries as a preparedness measure.

Clusters have not been introduced in Bolivia where there was a pre-existing sector coordination mechanism, which also included government. For many of those interviewed there was a feeling that the change from sector coordination to clusters was more than just a name change, entailing also a clear tightening of accountability.

#### **2.1.6 ROLE OF GOVERNMENT**

There were not as many government representatives interviewed by telephone as had been wished, mostly as a result of timetabling issues. Nevertheless, government was involved in leading response in the majority of the telephone interview countries. In Pakistan the government committed to 80% of the response to the flooding of 2007, asking the UN, Red Cross and non-government sector to help with 20%. The government was also very involved in CERF allocations, helping to determine priorities. In Mozambique, the government response was widely acknowledged as effective. In Bolivia the government participated in the formulation of the flash appeal. In Ethiopia the government sits on the HRF board that also reviews CERF proposals.

#### **2.1.7 PARTNERSHIPS WITH NGOS**

The relationship between CERF and NGOs is necessarily complex because only the UN agencies and IOM have direct access. This means that apart from Somalia, where CERF contributes to an ERF that NGOs can directly access, the funding relationship is between NGOs and the UN agencies/ IOM who have received CERF funds. This in turn is framed by the policies, procedures and practice of the individual agencies, which differ from agency to agency and from country to country.

The feedback from the telephone interviews in this regard was mixed. The relationships continue to be strained and CERF does not appear to have changed that dynamic. On the positive side, there are models in both Ethiopia and Somalia that appear to work well. In Ethiopia the HRF review board appears to be an exemplary governance mechanism, held in high regards by government, NGOs and the UN. In Somalia, the ERF has provided substantial funding to local Somali NGOs who have the best access, allowing for them to innovate and run programmes arguably beyond the normal competence of traditional aid providers.

Where UN agencies were the providers of CERF funding to NGOs, the report card was mixed. In general NGOs were positive about the performance of UN agencies, although this was not universal. Mostly the commentary was that the advent of CERF had not changed practice at the point of delivery, and especially the quality of the work was heavily contextual. In terms of relationships there were many cases where NGOs felt they were not provided adequate resources to do the job asked of them properly – in particular projects support costs and overheads were routinely under-budgeted or not permitted. This means that NGOs are either faced with covering these costs themselves, which several elected to do, or not seeking this source of funding. This seemed iniquitous to some respondents given that UN agencies budget for both project support costs and overheads from CERF and yet do not pass these on when NGOs are doing the actual work.

Another common issue was the timeliness of onward disbursement, meaning that NGOs are routinely advancing funds to get projects started whilst waiting for reimbursement. For those without this luxury, they must wait until the funds are disbursed which in one case was over six

months. This issue is extremely variable. The same agency took six months to disburse funds in one context and guaranteed 24 hour NGO contract turnaround in another (keeping tables to track their performance and holding meetings with NGO counterparts to review performance).

Despite this commentary, NGOs did feel there was value in CERF, especially where it contributed to a more strategic approach to response.

### **2.1.8 CONSULTATION/DECISION MAKING**

The decision making process for CERF grants varies widely depending on context. In Ethiopia the HRF board reviews CERF proposals as already described above. Agencies argue the case for their proposals and decision-making is widely seen as fair. In Bolivia the decision making process was seen as participatory and fair. In other countries where telephone interviews were conducted decision-making was seen as more contentious; in Pakistan the government set priorities to enable the UN Country Team to reach consensus on which proposals should be funded. The key issue is prioritising proposals when the CERF allocation is less than the amount initially requested. This can cause much debate, and in some of the countries reviewed continuing bad blood between agencies.

The role of the HC is critical in the prioritisation process, and some of this has been covered in that section. The role of OCHA is important too. Many felt in the course of the telephone interviews that clusters were a natural forum for prioritisation discussions and the relative merits of this are touched on above. In countries where clusters existed, they were mostly involved in these discussions, although some respondents felt that the inclusion of NGOs in such decisions should be mandatory.

The CERF secretariat was generally seen as fast and responsive. In DPRK their decision-making was described as “lightning” by one UN agency. Nevertheless, there was also some consternation about the amount of time spent revising proposals with most telephone interviewees feeling that the CERF secretariat should be clearer from the outset what the ‘envelope’ is, allowing them to tailor proposals accordingly.


### **2.1.9 FUNDING IMPACTS ON NGOs AND AGENCIES**

**MOZAMBIQUE:** Comparison chart for the floods 2001, 2007, 2008.


|              | <b>Total Funding for Humanitarian Assistance</b> | <b>Total Funding for the Flood Emergency</b> | <b>UN Agencies response to the Flood Emergency</b> | <b>CERF Contribution</b> | <b>Number of People Affected (*)</b> |
|--------------|--|--|--|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| <b>2001</b>  | 28,053,541                                       | 23,156,311                                   | 7,856,745  |                          | 500,000                              |
| <b>2007</b>  | 49,468,942                                       | 46,921,742                                   | 24,271,408   | 12,232,995               | 155,000                              |
| <b>2008</b>  | 21,583,382                                       | 5,063,877                                    | 3,526,613  | 597,166                  | 200,000                              |
| <b>Total</b> | 99,105,865                                       | 75,141,930                                   | 35,654,766   | 12,820,161               |                                      |

Source FTS May 2008. (\*) SITREP OCHA


**MOZAMBIQUE:** Funding for floods in 2001, 2007, 2008.



**CHAD:** Humanitarian funding of UN and total humanitarian funding 2004 – 07 (FTS)



**SOMALIA :** Humanitarian funding of UN and total humanitarian funding 2000 – 07 (FTS)



## **2.2 ADMINISTRATION**

### **2.2.1 OCHA CAPACITY**

Having an OCHA presence was almost universally seen as important to the success of the CERF in all of the telephone interviewed countries. Having an OCHA presence provides capacity to set up and run processes in countries such as Somalia, Chad and Ethiopia. OCHA facilitates participation from NGOs. In rapid onset it provides a conduit to the CERF secretariat, which in turn expedites the process. This was the case in Mozambique where they felt the CERF would have taken longer without OCHA.

Despite the clear correlation for the majority of respondents between OCHA presence and good CERF allocations, many observed that OCHA has not got a strong surge capacity. In several countries respondents felt that the timeliness and quality of OCHA deployments was variable, and this affects the country teams willingness to request OCHA support, despite their perceived value. Key is having high quality OCHA staff who know their own system well. Where OCHA staff are not as experienced this can lead to delays.

There was also some disquiet about OCHA expansion and tension in some countries between OCHA and the agencies. Some felt OCHA were “too outspoken”, or involved themselves in decisions inappropriately. Others felt OCHA was not tough enough with agencies, still trying to be liked by everyone. This tension can also be a barrier to effective OCHA surge deployment.

### **2.2.2 AGENCIES IN COUNTRY CAPACITY**

The degree to which agencies can respond mostly depends on the context. In countries suffering protracted crisis, or where disasters are frequent agencies tend to have greater response capacity. In Mozambique, successive floods have led to both government and UN agencies having systems and stocks in place for rapid response. Unicef have money in the country budget for immediate response, and pre-positioned stocks. In Somalia, Ethiopia and Chad the nature of those countries means that agencies are responding to crisis often. This means that agencies have the skills for response, but capacity also depends on resources and even geographical factors. In Chad agencies responded to new influxes of refugees from CAR by ‘borrowing’ resources from other programmes, but the lead time for importing new supplies makes this a fragile situation as they do not have a lot of ‘fat’ in their systems.

For some agencies internal process can be a barrier to rapid response. WHO have access to world-class expertise, but can be slow with procurement. In Pakistan they were able to ‘borrow’ resources from a pre-existing programme; in DPRK supplies had to be ordered from scratch and took much longer to come. Unicef felt that their internal process slowed them down in countries where they were not used to responding to disasters.

Agencies own funds are also important in facilitating rapid response. In Bolivia WFP, Unicef and IOM all used their own funds to kick start the response whilst they waited for CERF. In Mozambique Unicef use their country budget, the agency’s internal response fund and CERF in conjunction to ensure speedy response.

### **2.2.3 TIMELINE FOR MONEY FLOW**

The timeline for money flows has varied according to context, but has mostly been on the slow side in the telephone interview countries reviewed. DPRK was the exception with funds coming very quickly once a request was made, although even this was sometime after the onset of the disaster due to contextual issues. Mozambique was average in terms of funding flows, with the RTE documenting a three week timeline between the initial disaster and the disbursement of funding. In addition to this there have been examples of where funding flows have been unacceptably slow:

- Local NGO SAACID, Somalia submitted one proposal to ERF (funded by CERF) 10.06.07. Final proposal submitted (after much negotiation) 28.9.07. Signature 13.10.07. Funding came 11.12.07 and started the project 25.12.07. Still waiting for \$48k from that project (balance as not all money comes up front).
- In 2008 CERF projects in Bolivia were submitted on February 3rd (around 10 days after the first event took place), and approved around the 14th. Some implementing partners received funding 45 days after the event took place, or about 25 days after project approval due to internal procedures of UN Agencies.

Another issue around timing is the degree to which agencies observe the ‘three month’ expenditure limit, with some interpreting this liberally and others being very strict. The use of the term ‘commitment’ in this context is not helpful.

### **2.2.4 PROPOSAL DEVELOPMENT AND APPRAISAL**

The process of developing proposals has taken place within individual agencies in all of the telephone interview countries. The process of prioritising those proposals has fallen to the UN Country Team in the majority of cases, save where there is a mechanism such as the HRF board in Ethiopia. These processes have already been well covered in this annex.

The way in which proposals have to be presented has not always been clear to respondents in telephone interviews, and several have advocated more country level training as a solution to this issue. This also seems to be connected to the previous mentioned issue (in the decision making section of this report) of having to accommodate several revisions, as the money available is often a lot less than initially asked for. In Somalia one CERF allocation was \$4m against an initial submission of \$13m.

The discussion around proposal appraisal in telephone interviews has mostly centred on the prioritisation process, which invokes strong feeling. Another critique of the appraisal process is that the CERF secretariat does not have sufficient technical expertise to judge proposals and sometimes does not allow elements of proposals that agencies see as essential for the work.

### **2.2.5 PSC, TRANSACTION COSTS**

Overhead costs for CERF are set at 7% and agencies routinely take this. Support costs vary according to context and the nature of the programme. In Ethiopia the HRF review board tried to ensure that the ‘machinery of delivery’ is no higher than 20%. In high security areas where MOSS compliance is necessary agency support costs can be much higher.

The situation with regard to onward disbursement of funds to NGOs by UN agencies is far more mixed. In Mozambique Unicef do not give NGOs overheads, but allow up to 20% for ‘operational costs’. WFP gave an implementing partner 5% overhead costs in Bolivia but do not do this as a general rule. Many NGOs will not work with UN agencies where they feel that this regime is unfair or impractical (see earlier section on NGO partnerships).

## **2.3 PERFORMANCE**

### **2.3.1 LIFE SAVING CRITERIA**

Most of the agencies telephone interviewed for the seven countries in this part of the study argued for greater flexibility in the use of the life saving concept. UNHCR made the argument for protection to be included as a life saving component in Chad, an argument that has now been acknowledged. Some agencies made an argument for greater personnel costs to be covered, others for the funding of preparedness efforts as ‘life-saving’.

### **2.3.2 NEEDS ASSESSMENT**

The needs assessment process has been well documented in the RTEs for Mozambique, Pakistan, Somalia and Ethiopia. In Somalia there have been many joint needs assessments, in Ethiopia the Ethiopian Early Warning System oversees crop and nutritional assessment. In Pakistan and Bolivia there were UNDAC deployments and in both cases the UNDAC team was very involved in the elaboration of CERF proposals. One agency interviewed felt that CERF proposals were least likely to be cut where needs assessments were of high quality and justified the needs indisputably.

### **2.3.3 TIMELY RESPONSE**

As has already been covered in the section on agency capacity, responses were fastest where agencies had pre-existing capacity and resources to immediately start irrespective of CERF. CERF added value to this pre-existing capacity by allowing agencies to use resources knowing they would be either reimbursed or complemented by CERF reasonably quickly. This was the case in Mozambique. There were other good examples of timely response; a neutral observer saw the UN agency response in Chad to various population displacements as timely within the context of that difficult operating environment. DPRK has already been mentioned as a rapid CERF response; that in turn allowed Unicef to mobilise a measles vaccination quickly.

There was lots of feedback from UN agencies in the telephone interviews on the ‘three month’ time limit. WFP felt that CERF is better suited to funding operations like UNHAS in countries like Chad than food as the procurement timetable is longer than three months. Most respondents felt that CERF should be more mindful of context in such situations, whilst not diminishing the essentially emergency nature of the fund.

Another suggestion for speeding the responsiveness of CERF funded operations was to transfer money directly to the agency in the country rather than through the headquarters where this causes delays.

#### **2.3.4 OUTCOMES**

*“If you don’t have resources you can’t deliver on your promises” HC Chad.*

In general the quality of programme work has depended on the agency implementing the CERF funding programmes, rather than on the way that CERF itself has been organised or delivered. For many respondents the performance and quality of UN agency work has not altered substantially in the two years that CERF has been in place. Nevertheless, there were good examples of where CERF contributed to outcomes that might otherwise not have been guaranteed:

- The CERF helped the UN Country Team respond to the refugee crisis in Chad generated by Central Africans crossing the border. Without CERF funding the UN agencies and their partners would not have been able to respond to that crisis in a timely fashion.
- The RTE for Mozambique found that CERF contributed to the timely response in that country to the 2006 floods. The fact that both morbidity and mortality was less than in similar floods at the beginning of the decade is a good indicator of the success of the overall operation in which CERF played a part.
- The partly CERF funded ERF in Somalia funded a Somali local NGO to do ‘wet-feeding’ in Mogadishu. They provide 80,000 meals a day in 10 sites going up to 16. Only the poorest queue – they think they have saved lives. They also do garbage collection by paying widows. This was not previously possible until the availability of ERF/ CERF type arrangements.
- The CERF-funded, WFP-managed, UNHAS freight service for Somalia was widely cited by agencies as critical to response.

In addition to these positive stories of CERF contributions, there were several stories of where CERF funded supplies had not arrived after a considerable period of time, rendering their eventual value marginal.

#### **2.3.5 TRANSPARENCY**

The majority of those interviewed by telephone felt that CERF processes could be more transparent. In several countries NGOs did not know whether they were being funded by CERF (via UN agencies). Several governments expressed interest in knowing more detail about CERF allocations and the process for allocation. Set against this are examples such as the HRF in Ethiopia, which as already stated is seen as a model of transparency.

#### **2.3.6 ACCOUNTABILITY**

There were many different ideas expressed in the course of the telephone interviews about the most appropriate accountability mechanism for CERF. This in turn reflects what is perceived as a complex web of accountabilities – generally respondents were unsure when pressed whether individual agencies were solely accountable or the degree to which HCs, OCHA and the CERF secretariat shared that accountability.

At least two humanitarian coordinators (HCs) saw themselves as accountable for the use of the funds to the ERC. Others saw the lines as more nuanced, especially when CERF is only a small percentage of funds being spent. Some commentators saw the allocation of CERF itself requiring accountability lines to be put in place – either ensuring a formal link from the RC/HC to the ERC or for the clusters to the HC, or at least formally set out.

OCHA was seen as key to improving oversight of the funds and the quality of the work; in Ethiopia they directly monitor the use of HRF funds, in all the other contexts this was not the case.

Several respondents also saw the idea of accountability as central to humanitarian reform, and felt that CERF was not necessarily advancing this central, core aspect of the reform. This was especially seen as the case when CERF funds were “too easy” and there was not a monitoring structure in place, and no sanction for under-performance.

## **2.4 FACTORS AFFECTING ABILITY TO MEET OBJECTIVES**

### **2.4.1 DONOR CONFIDENCE**

Maintaining donor confidence was seen as essential and obvious by most interviewed if CERF was to continue. The way in which this could be done differed however, broadly with agencies feeling that their regular reporting sufficed, and those who were not within UN agencies or IOM feeling that more needed doing to guarantee a minimum level of quality. Some expressed unease that OCHA was too “easy” as a donor and “trying to be everyone’s friend” something that might ultimately undermine donor confidence.

### **2.4.3 REPORTING**

Most of those interviewed in this part of the study felt that the CERF reporting format could be improved. This pre-dates recent changes and therefore elements of this critique may now be redundant. Broadly agencies felt the reporting format was too ad hoc, that it could be unnecessarily heavy and that consolidation was often difficult.

There was also a significant minority interviewed that felt the CERF reporting was not onerous, and in fact compared favourably with donor reporting requirements. Some felt the reporting could be more precise and informative.

### **2.4.4 MONITORING & EVALUATION**


Related to the above two sections it was generally acknowledged that there was more work needed in these two areas. Several suggestions or models emerged during the course of interviews, including:

- CERF secretariat should participate in joint donor missions.
- Monitoring could be done jointly by agencies, or even have a peer review system.
- OCHA in Ethiopia monitors agency projects through its regional offices. They do ‘spot checks’. Very ad hoc but they are now developing very detailed monitoring formats. They have asked for the money back recently from one NGO project.
- Can only do good monitoring if you have a good starting point. Need good proposals based on properly assessed need.
- In Pakistan the RCO has involved government in the monitoring of CERF funded flood proposals. Made them aware at a regional level of what UN agencies have been funded to do. Asked line ministries to be involved too. Set up a joint assessment team to look at impact.
- Monitoring is especially difficult in Somalia due to very limited humanitarian access.

**ANNEX 7: Results of the CERF Evaluation Survey**

## Number and Category of respondent


|   |            |
|---|------------|
| RC/HC/OCHA                                      | 41         |
| UN Agencies/IOM Headquarters (HQ) Desk Officers | 15         |
| Country Offices (CO) of UN Agencies/IOM         | 57         |
| Government Officials                            | 0          |
| INGOs HQ Desk Officers                          | 4          |
| Country Offices of INGOs                        | 6          |
| <b>Total</b>                                    | <b>123</b> |



### 1. Time-critical Response


#### Question 1.1

CERF funding has enabled time-critical response to rapid onset humanitarian crisis based on real needs



#### Question 1.2


CERF has strengthened humanitarian response in under-funded/neglected/ forgotten crises



Note: three questionnaires did not have an answer to this question


**Question 1.3**

**CERF has increased funds available for responding to humanitarian crises**




**Question 1.4**

**Funding provided by CERF for specific response is timely**




**Question 1.5**

**CERF funding is based on demonstrated needs which are central to saving lives now or in the immediate future**



**Question 1.6**

**CERF funding has helped to ensure a better overall humanitarian response**



**Question 1.7**

**CERF funding has increased your agency’s overall humanitarian funding in the country**

|                       |     |  |
|-----------------------|-----|--|
| Absolutely true (1)   | 43  |  |
| Generally true (2)    | 36  |  |
| Generally untrue (3)  | 7   |  |
| Absolutely untrue (4) | 10  |  |
| Can't Say (5)         | 27  |  |
| Total                 | 123 |  |

**Question 1.8**

**CERF funding has decreased your agency’s overall humanitarian funding in the country**

|                       |     |  |
|-----------------------|-----|--|
| Absolutely true (1)   | 2   |  |
| Generally true (2)    | 2   |  |
| Generally untrue (3)  | 20  |  |
| Absolutely untrue (4) | 51  |  |
| Can't Say (5)         | 47  |  |
| Total                 | 122 |  |

*Note: One questionnaire did not have an answer to this question*

**Question 1.9**

**Information on CERF is effectively communicated to wider stakeholders, including governments, civil society, media and academic institutions**

|                       |     |  |
|-----------------------|-----|--|
| Absolutely true (1)   | 13  |  |
| Generally true (2)    | 44  |  |
| Generally untrue (3)  | 41  |  |
| Absolutely untrue (4) | 12  |  |
| Can't Say (5)         | 13  |  |
| Total                 | 123 |  |

**Question 1.10**

**Training provided on the CERF is appropriate and reach the people who need it**

|                       |     |  |
|-----------------------|-----|--|
| Absolutely true (1)   | 8   |  |
| Generally true (2)    | 41  |  |
| Generally untrue (3)  | 41  |  |
| Absolutely untrue (4) | 12  |  |
| Can't Say (5)         | 21  |  |
| Total                 | 123 |  |

**2. HUMANITARIAN REFORM AGENDA**

**Question 2.1**

**CERF has contributed to strengthening the Humanitarian Coordinator's role in dealing with emergencies in countries**

|                       |     |  |
|-----------------------|-----|--|
| Absolutely true (1)   | 49  |  |
| Generally true (2)    | 51  |  |
| Generally untrue (3)  | 11  |  |
| Absolutely untrue (4) | 1   |  |
| Can't Say (5)         | 11  |  |
| Total                 | 123 |  |

**Question 2.2**


**CERF has enabled better coordination on the ground between humanitarian agencies including the local governments**

|                       |     |  |
|-----------------------|-----|--|
| Absolutely true (1)   | 24  |  |
| Generally true (2)    | 45  |  |
| Generally untrue (3)  | 36  |  |
| Absolutely untrue (4) | 2   |  |
| Can't Say (5)         | 15  |  |
| Total                 | 122 |  |

*Note: One questionnaire did not have an answer to this question*


**Question 2.3**

**CERF has enabled the UN system to forge stronger partnerships with NGOs and local governments**




**Question 2.4**

**CERF priorities (in country) are decided in consultation with NGOs (local and international) and host governments**




**Question 2.5**

**The processes and criteria used in countries for selection and appraisal of proposals are transparent (for implementing NGOs, governments and UN agencies).**




**Question 2.6**

**The criteria and processes for approval of CERF grants by the ERC and CERF Secretariat are clearly defined and known to all relevant people in the implementing agencies, including sub-grantees**



**Question 2.7**

**CERF has contributed to strengthening the cluster system**




*Note: One questionnaire did not have an answer to this question*

**3. ADMINISTRATION OF CERF**


**Question 3.1**

**Decision making on CERF proposals is fast and non-cumbersome, especially in a situation requiring rapid response**



**Question 3.2**


**Funds are made available to UN Agency HQs in a matter of days for onward transfer to their country offices (CO)**



Note: One questionnaire did not have an answer to this question

**Question 3.3**


**Funds are transferred from UN Agency HQs to UN COs in a matter of days**



Note: One questionnaire did not have an answer to this question


**Question 34**

**UN COs are able to make rapid transfer of funds to sub-grantees within the countries where projects are to be implemented**



Note: One questionnaire did not have an answer to this question

**Question 3.5**  
**The reporting requirements for CERF funds are simple and clear**



**ANNEX 8: Number of Projects – Largest recipient of CERF Funds**

*CERF Two Year Evaluation – Annex 8 Largest Recipients of CERF Funds (July 2008)*

| Countries                       | Number of projects approved |            |           |            | Projects Total Amount (US\$) |                       |                      |                       | CERF Window |            |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------|-----------|------------|------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-------------|------------|
|                                 | 2006                        | 2007       | 2008      | Total      | 2006                         | 2007                  | 2008                 | Total                 | UFE         | RR         |
| Afghanistan                     | 8                           | 5          | 3         | 16         | 32.304.626,61                | 5.434.407,00          | 8.002.060,00         | 45.741.093,61         |             | 16         |
| Bangladesh                      |                             | 18         |           | 18         |                              | 26.747.096,00         |                      | 26.747.096,00         | 1           | 17         |
| Central African Republic        | 25                          | 30         | 1         | 56         | 5.693.363,99                 | 6.778.721,70          | 999.983,00           | 13.472.068,69         | 47          | 9          |
| Chad                            | 11                          | 11         |           | 22         | 9.421.065,00                 | 8.259.892,00          |                      | 17.680.957,00         | 8           | 14         |
| DRC                             | 31                          | 29         |           | 60         | 38.000.000,00                | 52.506.577,92         |                      | 90.506.577,92         | 57          | 3          |
| Cote d'Ivoire                   | 13                          | 16         |           | 29         | 5.752.282,00                 | 8.494.860,08          |                      | 14.247.142,08         | 23          | 6          |
| Ethiopia                        | 21                          | 19         |           | 40         | 9.972.986,04                 | 12.365.658,97         |                      | 22.338.645,01         | 18          | 22         |
| Kenya                           | 24                          | 8          | 11        | 43         | 27.186.918,15                | 4.946.558,49          | 7.022.854,00         | 39.156.330,64         | 8           | 35         |
| Mozambique                      |                             | 14         | 10        | 24         |                              | 12.232.995,05         | 4.251.994,00         | 16.484.989,05         |             | 24         |
| Myanmar                         | 5                           | 4          |           | 9          | 3.803.739,50                 | 1.803.311,88          |                      | 5.607.051,38          | 4           | 5          |
| Palestinian territory, occupied |                             |            |           | 8          | 4.829.402,20                 | 6.185.459,00          |                      | 11.014.861,20         | 4           | 4          |
| Somalia                         | 15                          | 11         |           | 26         | 16.609.054,73                | 15.664.775,00         |                      | 32.273.829,73         | 1           | 25         |
| Sri Lanka                       | 13                          | 12         |           | 25         | 9.998.966,12                 | 10.888.084,50         |                      | 20.887.050,62         |             | 25         |
| Sudan                           | 11                          | 28         |           | 39         | 35.519.099,00                | 25.475.033,00         |                      | 60.994.132,00         | 11          | 28         |
| Zimbabwe                        | 8                           | 9          |           | 17         | 1.999.963,38                 | 11.999.076,41         |                      | 13.999.039,79         | 16          | 1          |
| <b>Total</b>                    | <b>187</b>                  | <b>220</b> | <b>26</b> | <b>432</b> | <b>201.091.466,72</b>        | <b>209.782.507,00</b> | <b>20.276.891,00</b> | <b>432.595.364,72</b> | <b>198</b>  | <b>234</b> |

Source: CERF Database 06 March 2008

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