

IASC

REAL-TIME EVALUATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE HORN OF AFRICA DROUGHT CRISIS

**SOMALIA
2011-2012**

EVALUATION

James Darcy, Paul Bonard, Shukria Dini

**Evaluation commissioned by
the Inter Agency Standing Committee**

MAY 2012

Funding for the evaluation was provided by
UNICEF, OCHA, UNHCR, WFP, FAO and Save the Children



Contents

Note for on-screen users:

The following listings are hyperlinked. Mouse-click any listing below to jump to that location within the document.

	Preface and acknowledgements	Page 05
	Abbreviations and acronyms	Page 06
	Executive Summary	Page 08
Section 1	Background and context	Page 11
1.1	Overview: a crisis within a crisis	Page 12
1.2	The RTE – purpose, scope, criteria, method	Page 12
1.3	Response to the drought crisis: context and evolution	Page 14
Section 2	Reading the situation: assessment, context monitoring and joint analysis	Page 17
2.1	Working with uncertainty: the problem of access and information	Page 17
2.2	Early warning and the response to alerts	Page 18
2.3	Needs assessment	Page 20
2.4	Main findings	Page 22
Section 3	Coordinated action (1): joint strategy, policy and planning	Page 23
3.1	Overview	Page 23
3.2	Contingency planning	Page 24
3.3	Joint strategy and response planning	Page 24
3.4	Main findings	Page 29
Section 4	Coordinated action (2): joint operational structures and processes	Page 32
4.1	Overview: adapting to the changing operational environment 2010-12	Page 32
4.2	The cluster system and field-level coordination	Page 32
4.3	Performance of the clusters	Page 34
4.4	Information management	Page 35
4.5	Monitoring performance	Page 36
4.6	Main findings	Page 37

Section 5	Working with others: communities, local agencies, government bodies	Page 39
5.1	Views of the affected communities	Page 39
5.2	Working with local and community-based organisations	Page 43
5.3	Working with local authorities	Page 43
5.4	Main findings	Page 44
Section 6	Funding, accountability and programme efficiency	Page 45
6.1	Overview of funding issues	Page 45
6.2	Financial accountability	Page 46
6.3	Donor coordination	Page 47
6.4	Programme efficiency and the transfer of value	Page 47
6.5	Main findings	Page 48
Section 7	Managing aid risks, insecurity and restricted access	Page 49
7.1	Risk management and the role of the RMU	Page 49
7.2	Security management and the role of DSS	Page 50
7.3	Securing access	Page 51
Section 8	Conclusions and recommendations	Page 53
	Endnotes	Page 59
-	Annexes	Page 65
Annex 1	IASC Somalia Drought Crisis RTE: Matrix of findings & recommendations	Page 66/67
Annex 2	Additional Key issues for Somalia	Page 74
Annex 3	Schedule of Interviews	Page 81
Annex 4	List of Documents Consulted	Page 89
Annex 5	On Methodolgy	Page 93

59–63 Endnotes: All endnotes are hyperlinked.

Clicking on the endnote number in the text will take you to the relevant endnote; clicking again on the endnote will return you to the relevant point of the text.

Preface and Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank all those who gave their time and assistance so generously during the course of this evaluation. These included members of Somali displaced communities in refugee and IDP camps whose lives had been turned upside down by 2011 crisis; and local agency staff who worked so hard to assist them. Among the many international organisations involved, the authors would like to thank in particular staff at the UN OCHA Somalia office in Nairobi for their help in organising and contributing to the evaluation at a particularly busy time, and especially Ms. Ivy Githinji for her patient and cheerful assistance with logistics and administration. The authors are grateful to Jock Paul of OCHA in New York for steering the process and advising the team. The in-country advisory group of agencies and donors also gave much valuable advice, as did the peer reviewers: Mark Bradbury, Hugo Slim and Peter Wiles.

The evaluation team comprised three independent consultants: James Darcy (team leader), Paul Bonard, and Shukria Dini. While the contents of this report have been widely consulted upon, responsibility for the findings remains with the authors alone.

The primary goal of this evaluation was a learning one. To the extent that it draws conclusions about performance, it does so mainly in relation to coordination bodies and systems rather than particular agencies or individuals within them. The evaluation team is conscious that in drawing conclusions about performance and applying standard evaluation criteria, the particular challenges of the Somalia context have to be borne in mind. The obstacles to effective operation are formidable, and where hindsight suggests that a different course might have been taken, it should be remembered that the context was often one of uncertainty and multiple competing pressures. Overall, the team would like to record its admiration for the dedication and professionalism of the staff in international, national and local agencies that it encountered in the course of the evaluation.

Abbreviations and acronyms

AMISON African Union Mission in Somalia

CAP Consolidated Appeal

CHF Common Humanitarian Fund

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

EFSA Emergency Food Security Assessment

FAO UN Food and Agriculture Organisation

FEWS NET Famine Early Warning Systems Network

FSNAU Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit

GAM Global Acute Malnutrition

HC Humanitarian Coordinator

HE Humanitarian Emergency

HCT Humanitarian Country Team

IDP Internally Displaced Person

INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

ICWG Inter-Cluster Working Group

IPC Integrated Phase Classification

MOSS Minimum Operational Security Standards

NERAD The National Environment Research and Disaster Preparedness
and Management Authority (in Somaliland)

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFAC	US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation

RMU	Risk Management Unit
RTE	Real Time Evaluation

SRCS	Somali Red Crescent Society
SMG	Monitoring Group on Somalia
SNDMA	Somalia National Disaster Management Authority

TFG	Transitional Federal Government
ToR	Terms of Reference

UNDSS	The United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNHCR	The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOSOM	The United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSC	The United Nations Security Council

WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive Summary

1.0 This real time evaluation was commissioned by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), as one part of a wider evaluation of the international response to the drought crisis in the Horn of Africa in 2011. It considers the question of how well the component parts of the international humanitarian system worked together and with others to address the drought crisis in Somalia. The security context dictated the evaluation methods, with heavy reliance on key informant interviews and documentary review and relatively little on field visits and community consultation. Field visits were limited to Mogadishu, Hargeisa in Somaliland, and the refugee camps of Dadaab in Kenya.

2.0 Though labelled a 'drought crisis', the crisis in Somalia that began in late 2010 has a number of causes. The immediate factors were the (La Niña-related) failure of two consecutive rains and the escalation of food prices relative to the value of livestock and wages. These combined with the effect of successive shocks in recent years to overwhelm people's already fragile livelihoods and purchasing power, particularly among the agro-pastoralist communities of South Central Somalia.

3.0 Within the overall crisis, several distinct but related crises can be identified: of food security and livelihoods, of access to water, of nutrition and health, of forced displacement and violent insecurity. While crisis conditions have existed for many years, 2011 saw a major escalation and large scale distress migration. Above all, this was an acute crisis of food access and (to some extent) availability, culminating in famine conditions in parts of South Central in mid-late 2011. The ongoing armed conflict, including its regional aspects, had a strong influence both on the nature of the crisis and the response to it.

4.0 Amongst the many constraints facing humanitarian assistance has been the limitation of secure access to the areas worst affected in the crisis, the culmination of several years of deteriorating access to South Central Somalia. This has limited the availability and quality of information as well as the ability to provide direct assistance. Heavy reliance on remote operations and untested partnerships has raised issues of effectiveness, quality and accountability. The absence of the UN World Food Programme (WFP) from these areas (forced to withdraw in 2010) left a major gap in the assistance chain, one that could only partly be filled by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and others.

5.0 This (Real Time Evaluation) RTE draws three 'top line' conclusions about the international crisis response:

■ Famine was not inevitable, nor was the scale of human suffering caused by the drought crisis. The political and military actors (Somali and international), whose conduct restricted people's access to humanitarian assistance, bear primary responsibility for the failure to respond earlier and more decisively. Early action could have prevented, or at least substantially mitigated, the worst aspects of the crisis, but this did not happen on the scale required. The reasons are largely political, but the international humanitarian system – including the donors – itself bears some responsibility for this failure. While some important early action was taken using available pooled funds, it was not on the scale required by the situation.

- The famine response when it came was proportionate and appropriate, though the extent of effective implementation is still uncertain, as is the impact of the response on the overall situation. Scaled-up implementation came well after the crisis had peaked in mid-2011 (see diagram below) but it appears to have had at least a substantial mitigating effect on the scale and intensity of the food and livelihoods crisis, and to have prevented the spread of famine to Gedo region.
- Though famine conditions have passed the situation remains critical for hundreds of thousands of Somalis. The potential for rapid deterioration remains and delivery capacity of the international system has been seriously compromised by the Al Shabaab ban on leading international agencies: UN, ICRC and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Humanitarian agencies and donors need to take urgent action to plan for the potential contingencies in 2012 and beyond.




Figure: Illustrating the evolution of the 2011 crisis and of the related humanitarian response (indicative only)

6.0 The evaluation team found much to admire in the way the system scaled up collectively in response to famine in the second half of 2011. This included examples of innovative and bold programme approaches, notably in market-based interventions such as the use of cash and food vouchers. Throughout the year, considerable flexibility and initiative was shown by agencies like UNICEF and FAO, and by NGOs like Concern and ACF, in adapting their approaches to the rapidly changing situation and attempting to fill the gaps left by the absence of WFP and other agencies from Al Shabaab controlled areas. But the team also found a number of systemic problems, some of which contributed to the severe lag in response illustrated above. This report highlights the following issues in particular:

- A systemic failure of early action – prevention and early relief – in response to early warning
- Lack of contingency plans for a major scaled-up drought crisis response
- A lack of strategic leadership from the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) at crucial moments
- Postponement of crucial decisions about alternative food security response options
- Underperformance of some clusters and lack of joined-up analysis
- Lack of accountability of agencies and clusters for performance in relation to the collective goals set by the Consolidated Appeal (CAP) and the Emergency Revision of the CAP.

7.0 These problems have to be seen in context. The failure of early action was as much a function of donor reluctance to fund as it was of failings of the UN-led humanitarian system. Contingency plans only have value if there is some prospect of their being resourced. Problems of effective capacity, secure access and limited response options also severely restricted the room for manoeuvre. Nevertheless the RTE team concludes that the coordinating bodies of the humanitarian system, together with their donor colleagues, could and should have done more to push for early action. This was in the face of the evidence from early warning systems and knowledge of critical risk factors, including the absence of WFP and the potentially catastrophic failure of two successive rainy seasons. Effective risk management demanded planning for the worst case scenario in this case.

8.0 The report makes a number of recommendations for action based on the findings of the RTE team and on discussion of provisional findings at a stakeholder workshop in Nairobi. These include a proposed requirement for contingency planning in the face of certain critical variables, with pre-agreed criteria for activating the plan and donor agreement in principle to fund where those criteria are met. Related recommendations are made concerning needs assessment and surveillance, and the need for better understanding of what is happening to vulnerable households over time. Further proposals are made concerning the need for quicker funding decisions, more decentralised (less Nairobi-centric) coordination, more investment in monitoring and work to improve accountability both to donors and affected communities.

Key recommendations

- The mandates and working practices of the HCT and ICWG should be reviewed, particularly with regard to strategic decision making, planning and cross-sector analysis, in the light of the findings of the RTE.
- Clearer lines of accountability and decision making need to be established between HCT, ICWG and clusters – and within these bodies themselves.
- ICWG and Clusters should be formally tasked with needs assessment and cross-sector analysis in response to major crises, facilitated by OCHA and reporting to the HCT. Field-level surveillance systems should be established in health, food security, nutrition and WASH as the basis for this.
- The HTC should require that costed, cross-sector contingency plans be drawn up as a matter of priority for both a large scale ‘preventive’ package of livelihood support, and a major Somalia-wide relief response, to be considered for implementation against agreed criteria in the event of a prospective food security crisis.
- In light of the growing dependence on local capacities, the HCT should task the clusters through the ICWG with conducting a local capacity review and drawing up a related investment plan.
- Urgent attention should be given to strengthening output reporting if the most basic accountability standards are to be met. More investment is also needed in assessing outcomes, linked to goals established through the CAP and other planning documents.

Section 1.

Background & Context

1.1.0 Overview: a crisis within a crisis

1.1.1 The causes of the recent crisis in Somalia are complex. The drought that hit between late 2010 and mid 2011 was the trigger for the crisis, yet it is potentially misleading to call this a 'drought crisis'. There have been many contributory factors. Some of these are chronic or structural: the cumulative effects of conflict, successive droughts, eroded livelihoods, resource scarcity, the absence of essential services and effective governance. Others are more immediate: the failure of two successive (*Deyr* and *Gu*) rains and subsequent harvests, related loss of income and assets, and the steep rise in staple food prices relative to livestock and wage labour. Many of the factors concerned remain in place to date (March 2012) and the state of crisis continues even though famine conditions have passed. Lack of humanitarian access, sometimes overstated as a causal factor, is crucial in this case, particularly given the absence of state services and the high levels of economic dependence on regular food aid distribution in the years up to 2010. The absence of WFP and US-based NGOs like CARE from Al Shabaab-controlled areas of South Central is particularly important in this respect; and the more recent bans of many leading UN and International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) leaves the delivery capacity of international assistance substantially depleted. Even the ICRC, which has played a vital role in filling the void left by WFP, remains formally banned. The conflict, meanwhile, continues to evolve rapidly and the prospects for humanitarian assistance are uncertain.

1.1.2 While the causes are complex, even to describe this crisis in terms of its symptoms is not simple. The crisis of food insecurity, and specifically of access to food, has been the dominant concern together with the related crisis of acute malnutrition, particularly since the declaration of famine in parts of southern Somalia in July 2011. Yet this can also be described as a livelihoods crisis; a health crisis; a water access crisis; and a protection crisis. These, together with food security, have been issues of on-going humanitarian concern for many years; but the rain failures of 2010/11 and the distress migration that these triggered saw an escalation of human suffering and death that has been extreme even by Somalia's standards. The number of excess deaths is uncertain, put at 'tens of thousands' by the UN and FSNAU/FEWS Net and 'between 50-100,000 people' by others.¹ The numbers of people displaced from their homes (internally and externally) primarily as a result of drought and food insecurity in 2011 was around half a million.² Meanwhile the armed conflict, including its regional aspects, has shaped both the nature of the crisis and the response to it.

1.1.3 Part of the concern of this RTE has been with how well the international humanitarian system 'read' the evolving 'crisis within a crisis'. This topic, including early warning and needs assessment, is covered in section two below. Section three is concerned with joint strategy, policy and planning, section four with issues of implementation and information management. The remaining sections consider the following specific aspects of the crisis response: How well did the system engage with communities and with non-system actors: local, national, international? How well was the response financed and how accountable was it? How well were issues of risk, security and access managed? The focus throughout is on coordination and collective performance across the component parts of

the system. While much of this is about processes, we take the question of collective effectiveness and impact as the essential backdrop to the evaluation.

1.2.0 The RTE – purpose, scope, criteria, method

1.2.1 The full generic terms of reference for the Horn of Africa drought real time evaluations are included in the Annex. For purposes of clarity and focus, the RTE team established a simplified framework of enquiry based on the Terms of Reference (ToR), revolving around the overarching question: *How well did the component parts of the international humanitarian system³ work together and with others to address the drought crisis in Somalia 2010-2012?* Under this heading various sub-questions were considered:

- Was the response *timely*? In terms of (i) preventive action, (ii) relief action?
- Was the response *proportionate* to the scale and evolution of the crisis?
What level of coverage of needs was achieved over time?
- How appropriate was the response to the priority needs of those worst affected?
Including gender, age, socio-economic factors.
- How *accountable* was the response to aid recipients and to donors? How accountable were the various humanitarian bodies to each other?
- How *efficient* was the response, in terms of cost of delivery and net value transfer, to affected households?
- How *effective* was the response in tackling priority needs? How do we know?

1.2.2 In relation to these criteria the evaluation asked: to the extent that the response was lacking, what were the main constraints and what efforts were made to overcome them? What has been learned from this?

1.2.3 In order to answer the above a series of process-related questions formed the substantive basis of enquiry for the RTE:

1. How effectively did the international system 'read' the developing situation?
2. How well coordinated was the international response in terms of joint analysis, strategy, policy, planning and implementation – including information management?
3. How well did the international system work with others?
4. How well financed has the international response been?
5. How has the international response been accountable to aid recipients and donors?
6. How well have risks and operational constraints been managed?
7. What lessons have been learned from the drought response?
How should these change future practice?

This report is largely structured around these questions.

1.2.4 As with other Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluations, the primary purpose of this RTE was a learning one, though it also serves an accountability purpose. Given the emphasis on (collective) learning, the RTE is not as judgmental in performance terms as other forms of evaluation might be. It is suggested that where issues of performance and accountability are raised, these may require further investigation through other evaluation processes, whether conducted by individual agencies or otherwise.

1.2.5 A particular issue in this regard concerns the performance and accountability of the Clusters. It has not been possible within the scope of this RTE to evaluate individual Cluster performance; but given the concerns raised by many of those interviewed over Cluster performance, it is suggested that this requires further examination – including the *basis* on which performance is assessed. In particular the question of *what* the Clusters are accountable for, *who* within the Cluster is accountable for what, and *to whom* they are accountable, appears to need urgent clarification from a management perspective.⁴ See further section 4 below.

1.2.6 The team was not tasked with evaluating the performance of individual agencies, nor was it asked to attempt to establish the impact of the collective response. Where reference is made to impact and effectiveness, it is largely with regard to the adequacy of existing mechanisms for determining impact and monitoring progress. The issues of programme quality and compliance with standards were also largely beyond the scope of the evaluation, given the lack of access to programmes.

1.2.7 It should be noted that the current evaluation was ‘real time’ only in the sense that the drought crisis and the response to it were continuing at the time of the RTE. Though conducted in February 2012, much of the subject matter of the RTE concerns what happened in 2011 and the RTE is therefore both a retrospective and forward-looking exercise. Understanding what happened in the run up to the 2011 crisis and during the subsequent response seems to the RTE team to provide an essential basis for reviewing the performance of the response system for Somalia and taking remedial action in order to better address current and future crises. The need to do so is pressing given the seriousness of the prevailing situation in the country.

1.3.0 Method and limitations

1.3.1 The RTE team was severely limited in its ability to travel in Somalia, for the same reasons of secure access that continue to hamper the assistance programme. The questions listed above were pursued mainly through (i) a series of key informant interviews, largely in Nairobi; and (ii) through documentary review, including the minutes of the HCT (and earlier IASC) and of the Inter-Cluster Working Group (ICWG). This was supplemented by desk analysis⁵ and by field visits to Mogadishu, Hargeisa and the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya. Here it was possible to talk directly with drought-affected communities about the situation from which they had fled. This included (in Dadaab) separate focus group discussions with men and women.

1.3.2 Given the RTE team’s limited ability to access affected communities, a concerted effort was made to speak with local NGOs and local authorities in Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Nairobi. The presence on the team of a Somali-origin consultant allowed both greater freedom of movement and contact in Mogadishu and for interviews to be conducted in Somali. In total around 20 local organisations were consulted along with a number of local authorities. The team considered the response to the crises in Somaliland and Puntland (where the drought emergency was largely over by mid-2011) as well as in South Central Somalia. However the main focus is on the latter given the extremity of the situation there and the issues raised in attempting to respond to need in such a challenging environment.

1.3.3 The provisional findings of the RTE team were presented and discussed at a participatory

workshop in Nairobi on February 27 2012, attended by UN agencies, international and national NGOs and donor representatives.⁶ This was used in part to validate and refine the conclusions and recommendations that now appear in the current report.

1.3.4 The RTE team's brief was to review the drought response, not humanitarian response in general. Given the recent retrospective evaluation of humanitarian action in South Central Somalia 2005-10 undertaken by DARA,⁷ the current RTE attempted to avoid duplication, although inevitably there is some overlap. This report does not rely on the findings of the DARA report in reaching its conclusions.

1.3.5 Some topics of general humanitarian concern are given relatively little coverage in the RTE because they relate only indirectly to the drought response. This includes protection of civilians, though some consideration is given to forced displacement and the denial of access to assistance as protection concerns. The related issue of 'humanitarian space' has been much debated and analysed elsewhere⁸ and the topic is not revisited here except in relation to specific problems of access. Other limits were set by the ToR and by the time and resources available to the RTE team.

1.3.6 One final limitation should be mentioned. It is characteristic of the humanitarian response in Somalia that it is based on relatively little hard assessment data. While reference is made to the data available from sources such as FSNAU and FEWS Net, this evaluation is less grounded in quantitative data than might be expected in other contexts. Most of the available quantitative data concerns the question of outputs and of 'Who does What Where / When' (3/4W) – though even that was found to be often out of date or missing.

1.4.0 Response to the drought crisis: context and evolution

1.4.1 Evaluating the collective international response to the drought crisis requires some analysis of the historical, political and socio-economic background. We have space here to mention only a few of the relevant factors.

1.4.2 First is the history of international, and specifically UN, involvement in Somalia since the fall of Siad Barre in 1991. The failed international intervention in the early 1990s began as a response to another humanitarian crisis. But the history of that time and of the failed political agenda of UNOSOM II have left a legacy of local mistrust and a bunker mentality still characterised UN operations in Mogadishu during the current crisis. From the pursuit of General Aideed to the pursuit of Al Shabaab by a Security Council -mandated African Union Mission in Somali (AMISOM) force on behalf of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the UN has found itself involved in political-military agendas which have sometimes been in tension with its humanitarian role. Certainly it makes it difficult for UN humanitarian agencies to maintain the perception of neutrality and impartiality, and has been a primary cause of a rift in relations between international NGOs (fearful of association) and UN agencies. The involvement of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) member states and NGOs from Turkey and elsewhere in response to the recent crisis has been an interesting and significant development that partly reflects the perceived compromised position of the UN, its agencies and traditional partners.

1.4.3 The counter-terrorist agenda has had an impact on humanitarian action in other ways. Recent UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on Somalia (1844, 1972, etc.) and the counter-terrorist legislation of the US and other key donor governments have laid tight conditions on the provision of aid as well as prohibiting engagement with Al Shabaab. The Monitoring Group on Somalia (SMG), established by the UNSC as a watchdog on the issue of compliance with sanctions, stated in its report in March 2010 *inter alia* that large quantities of WFP food had been diverted and that WFP had been working through contractors with direct terrorist links. Though WFP strongly contested this, the climate created by the SMG report was a powerful shaping force on donors' and agencies' thinking and action in 2010 and 2011. International donors themselves reported being highly risk-averse throughout 2010 and the first half of 2011, with their aid departments under considerable political pressure in this regard.⁹ Perhaps inevitably given its reliance on these funding sources, this risk aversion permeated the humanitarian system more generally. The CAP 2011 process explicitly reflected this attitude,¹⁰ with the CAP being tailored to match expectations of what the donors would wear. Overall there were some powerful external disincentives on the humanitarian system to 'call' a major crisis.

1.4.4 In Resolution 1972 (March 2011) the UNSC decided that the asset freeze established by Resolution 1844 (2008) should not apply (for a period of 16 months) to "the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources" necessary for the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance by UN agencies and designated NGO partners. Meanwhile, the HC was required to report to the UNSC every 120 days under Resolution 1916 about the protection of urgent humanitarian assistance under the sanctions regime. The major shift in the funding picture came in July 2011 with the easing of the restrictions imposed by the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) since 2009, which had seen US aid drop by 88%, from USD \$237 million in 2008 to USD \$20 million in 2011.¹¹ Since the US contribution had previously made up nearly 40% of all assistance to Somalia, these restrictions had had a dramatic effect on programme budgets. Despite the ambiguity surrounding the OFAC declaration that it 'would not pursue' cases of unintended material benefit to terrorist groups resulting from humanitarian assistance, the easing of US restrictions helped unlock funding on the scale required to respond to the famine crisis.¹²

1.4.5 The current situation in Somalia sees pressure being brought to bear on the humanitarian system from a number of directions. From the perspective of the TFG and AMISOM, such assistance is an essential element in consolidating their territorial gains made and securing local support following the 'clearance' of formerly Al Shabaab controlled areas in Mogadishu, Beletweyn and elsewhere. More broadly there has been political pressure from the TFG and others for assistance to be delivered as part of a 'peace dividend'.¹³ The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) has had to resist such pressure and maintain the principle of delivery of aid on the basis of need alone.¹⁴ The international humanitarian community has been united in its concern to prevent the politicisation of relief to Somalia, though many feel it has been swimming against the tide over the past decade. The approach to the current crisis has been a pragmatic one, taking opportunities to deliver assistance as access has allowed, while attempting to establish 'bottom lines' for the principled negotiation and the conduct of relief assistance programmes.¹⁵

1.4.6 The crisis of food access in particular is in part a function of the role that humanitarian assistance has played in the Somali food economy – and the impact of withdrawing that assistance. When WFP was forced to leave South Central Somalia it left a substantial hole. Even in a good year Somalia as a whole is in food deficit, producing only around 40% of its cereal needs. Around

20-30% of the remaining deficit is made up through commercial imports. But it is reckoned that the remainder (around 30%) had, prior to 2010, been provided through the aid system and the WFP pipeline.¹⁶ The withdrawal of such an essential component of the food economy had consequences that were probably underestimated, masked by the good rains of late 2009 and first half of 2010.

1.4.7 In this context it should also be said that even in better years rates of malnutrition well above agreed international emergency limits are common in parts of South Central Somalia and accepted as 'normal'.¹⁷ This may in part explain why conditions in Somalia have to become so extreme before the international community responds with scaled-up assistance.

Section 2.

Reading the situation: Early warning, needs assessment and joint analysis

2.1.0 Working with uncertainty:

The problem of access and information

2.1.1 Any analysis of humanitarian responses in Somalia has to begin by recognising both the complexity of the context and the extreme challenge of the operating environment. This is not an easy environment to understand or to work in. Nothing can replace detailed local knowledge; but reliable and up to date local information is hard to come by in large parts of Somalia, particularly in those highly insecure areas of South and Central Somalia that are contested or which are controlled by Al Shabaab or local militia. The restrictions on agency access and consequent lack of field presence compound the problem. Among the limitations is a lack of reliable baseline data: even in relatively stable Somaliland, population estimates vary from 1.8 to 3.5 million depending on the source.¹⁸ Insecurity means both a constantly changing context and limited access for international agencies, which in turn means limited ability to gather or to verify data even through local staff or partners. There is no in-country system for health information or nutrition surveillance.

2.1.2 Various things follow from this:

- A *high degree of uncertainty* pervades much of the central (Nairobi-based) discussion and decision making by agencies, clusters and the HCT. This in turn makes generating consensus difficult. Even at local level information sharing is weak.
- Where reliable information is available it often refers to a period weeks or months in the past, so there is a significant *time lag* built into the picture under consideration.
- Sources are limited and heavy reliance is placed on a *few* sources (particularly FSNAU and FEWS NET), which are based on periodic surveys and are primarily food-security related.

2.1.3 This is a context where needs assessment cannot be undertaken at will. But as we argue below the whole question of needs assessment has received too little attention.

2.1.4 As a result of the above, the information available to the various component parts of the international system (including donors) about the humanitarian situation in Somalia – particularly in the South Central area – tends to be patchy, out of date and often of doubtful reliability. Much of the information is historic and output-based and therefore of limited utility in making decisions about future responses. However there is also systematic collection of real time food price and other ‘trend’ data, including the changing terms of trade between livestock and cereals. Most of those interviewed for the RTE felt that existing data sources in 2011 gave an adequate information basis for early warning purposes, if not for programming purposes.

2.2.0 Early warning and the response to alerts

2.2.1 Despite the difficulties of obtaining information, Somalia has one of the most sophisticated early warning systems in Africa. The outputs from the independent FSNAU and FEWS NET, based on surveys and surveillance, constitute a food security and general humanitarian alert system that is able to monitor changes in crucial variables (including weather and production trends, nutritional status, market prices) and to map the trends so as to provide both a current/historic picture of human stress and a predictive map of how that picture is likely to develop in the short to medium term.

THE CHANGING NARRATIVE OF CRISIS 2010-12

It is instructive to consider the way the crisis in Somalia was characterised and how this changed over time. Reviewing the minutes of the HCT and ICWG provides a picture of shifting attitudes to the problem.

Early in 2011, this was seen largely as a **distress migration** crisis, with unseasonal movements noted and rising numbers of internally displaced people. This was related to a **water access** crisis, with people moving in search of water for themselves and their animals.

As 2011 progressed, the crisis came increasingly to be seen as a **food security** crisis, and specifically a **food access** crisis. The effect of escalating food prices was noted, and the worsening of terms of trade for livestock and manual labour.

From the end of June 2011, the situation became characterised as a **nutrition crisis** as the results of the FSNAU surveys were reported. By July 20th, this was officially defined as a full blown **famine** in two regions of southern Somalia. The effect of this on international opinion, combined with the images emerging from the refugee camps in Dadaab (Kenya) and Dollo Ado (Ethiopia), was dramatic. In the words of one respondent 'it is hard to overstate the impact of the 'F' word'.

The period since November 2011 is characterised by some as '**post-famine**', and there is some evidence that the donors see the crisis as having passed. But most believe the situation remains critical in spite of good *Deyr* rains in late 2011 – particularly since the delivery capacity of the international system is substantially depleted by the Al Shabaab agency bans.

Source: HCT/ICWG meeting minutes 2011; interviews

2.2.2 In the case of the current crisis early warnings were first given in August 2010. From August to December 2010 FEWS NET in its *La Niña* briefs and Somalia alerts, and FSNAU in its press releases, were warning of an impending food security crisis. Thus in August 2010 FEWS NET was reporting that despite good *Gu* rains the situation remained critical. '*Very high levels of acute malnutrition*

continue, and the forecasts for the October-December Deyr season are below average. Poor Deyr rains could push a higher number of pastoral and agro-pastoral households into crisis. Contingency planning and additional support to the 2010 CAP are needed.' In November it reported that, based on analysis of likely *La Niña* effects, poor rains were likely to result in a *'worse than usual January-March lean season, offsetting the modest recovery in household food security which occurred during 2009/10 following three years of drought'*. Over the course of the first half of 2011 these warnings became more urgent as *'extreme food insecurity'* was predicted following the failure of the *Deyr* rains (20% of normal) threatened to be compounded by poor *Gu* rains. In March, FSNAU and FEWS NET issue joint statements warning that if the *Gu* rains fail there may be large-scale crisis migration and localised famine. They call for *'additional contingency planning given the possibility of a major crisis'* and note the likely impact of restrictions to humanitarian access.¹⁹

2.2.3 From the IASC/HCT minutes and the 2011 CAP, it seems that these warnings registered only to a limited extent. The CAP was put together before the failure of the 2010 *Deyr* rains became apparent – and there had been good rains in 2009 (*Deyr*) and 2010 (*Gu*). The 2011 CAP notes the threat posed by the predicted *La Niña* event in 2011 but gives no real sense of impending crisis. Rather it was assumed that the previous good harvests had helped establish a degree of resilience²⁰ and the financial request in the CAP was actually lower than the previous year based less on anticipated needs than on what was felt to be a *'realistic'* expectation of donor response at the time.²¹ That said, the HC declared drought in December 2010 and allocated some Emergency Reserve resources from the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF). The Food and Agriculture/ Livelihoods Clusters had also highlighted in December the need for concerted planning in response to the impending drought crisis.²²

2.2.4 Analysis by the FSNAU following the failure of the 2010 *Deyr* rains led to a 20% upward revision of people in need of humanitarian assistance, from 2 million to 2.4 million. The briefing given to the HCT and ICWG by FSNAU and Somalia Water and Land Information Management²³ on April 28 2011 indicated a very poor if not yet catastrophic situation in southern regions. Early optimism that the *Gu* rains would be reasonable was subsequently dashed. When the nutritional data from the subsequent June assessment by FSNAU was shown to the OCHA head of office she recalls being *'shocked'*.²⁴ That sense of surprise seems to have been widely shared with some describing how it had *'come out of the blue'*.²⁵ Even FSNAU staff were surprised at the extent of the increase in levels of acute malnutrition – with the *'global'* figure (GAM) now averaging over 40% in southern regions and the *'severe'* figure (SAM) nearly 20%, with correspondingly high mortality rates.²⁶ Yet a reading of the early warning outputs suggests that this was an outcome whose possibility was already foreseen, and rising GAM rates had been reported by FSNAU from early in the year.

2.2.5 The formal early warning mechanisms were the main but not the only source of early warning. Evidence from admissions from health units and out-patient therapeutic feeding centres did not appear to show a marked upward trend in early 2011.²⁷ However anecdotal reports coming from the field, particularly from international and their local NGO partners, suggested a rapidly deteriorating picture in the early part of 2011. The early drying up of the Lower Shabelle River was noted with alarm, as were the pictures of thousands of cattle and other livestock that had died through lack of access to water and pasture. Unseasonal migration patterns were also noted, including unusual migration to Mogadishu in January 2011.²⁸ Yet this evidence was largely discounted. As one UN official put it, *'many were saying this is part of the annual cycle of drought'*.²⁹ There was considerable distrust of the piecemeal evidence coming from agencies relating to particular projects or villages.

As a UN cluster official said 'we thought it might be deliberately exaggerated, but we were not able to go and cross check the reports. We just didn't know if we could trust the data'.³⁰

2.2.6 The early warning mechanisms are generally agreed to have produced detailed and high quality data that was widely relied upon by decision makers. Arguably the message sometimes got lost in the sheer detail of the presentations and could have been more clearly distilled for managers.³¹ Some of those interviewed raised questions about the methods used, and noted that FSNAU relied too heavily on twice-yearly surveys.³² There was little ongoing surveillance (food prices being an exception), with the consequence that results reflected a historical rather than a real time picture. Some also questioned the 'post famine' analysis that showed what they took to be an implausible improvement over a short space of time; but admitted they lacked alternative data sources to challenge this.³³ The RTE team was not in a position to make a judgement on this issue.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 'FAMINE'

Although famine tends to be treated as a distinct situational category, the distinction between 'famine' and 'humanitarian emergency' in the UN classification system (or 'extreme food insecurity' in the terms of FEWS NET) is a technical one and a matter of degree rather than type. Based on the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) scale, famine exists when at least 20 per cent of the population cannot access to basic food requirements, global acute malnutrition exceeds 30 %, and the death rate exceeds 2/10,000/ day for the entire population.

The humanitarian imperative to act in the face of a developing crisis on this scale remains the same, whether or not it may otherwise lead to full-blown famine. Yet the term 'famine' has particular resonance in the public mind. That being so, the earlier use of terms like 'pre-famine' may be appropriate and justified in contexts like this one – though only in cases where the risk factors are exceptionally high. In this case, FEWS NET, FSNAU and others were warning in March 2011 of possible 'localised famine' if the 'worst case scenario assumptions' were realised. Given the significant likelihood of those scenarios developing and the catastrophic consequences that would follow, the risk management imperative was to plan for these scenarios.

2.3 Needs assessment

2.3.1 Early warning of the kind described above is not the same as humanitarian needs assessment. This demands both *situational* and *response* analysis, takes account of capacities and priority needs among different sectors in society and of different livelihood groups in different locations. It also requires a multi-sectoral approach. The early warning mechanisms, although they incorporate some non-food related data (health etc.), are essentially food security focused. The technical director of FSNAU said when interviewed 'we are not a needs assessment mechanism'.³⁴ Yet to a great extent these mechanisms have been taken to define needs and to substitute for broader

needs assessment. Though the clusters have made some attempts to establish a picture of needs for their respective sectors, for the most part they are operated on the basis of planned outputs and gaps in geographic coverage.

2.3.2 The standard process by which the humanitarian system assesses the requirement for international response is through more or less formal processes of needs assessment. Much of the global effort to standardise needs assessment has related to rapid onset disasters³⁵ but some well-established mechanisms exist for food security assessment. These include baseline assessment tools (WFP's Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis and Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping), crop and food supply assessment processes (the joint FAO-WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions), WFP's Emergency Food Security Assessment and Joint Assessment Missions (WFP/HCR). These were not able to be deployed in the Somalia case and the work of FSNAU and FEWS NET was only partially able to substitute. United Nations Development Programme population baseline figures from 2005 provided an uncertain (and out of date) set of denominators for calculating numbers in need.

2.3.3 The adoption of a multi-sector assessment tool as recommended in the DARA evaluation³⁶ is mentioned in the HCT and ICWG meeting minutes but at the time of this RTE this had yet to be finalised. While the development of such common tools is important, it is only a means to an end. The more important questions concern the use and requirement for information by decision-makers, and the process by which both 'technical' and more context-based analysis can be better informed across the sectors. The adoption of tools also pre-supposes the capacity of agencies to use them. Concern about the lack of technical capacity of partners was expressed by some UN agencies and clusters, who noted that assessments received often did not conform to acceptable levels of quality.³⁷

2.3.4 The relative absence of needs assessment can only partly be explained by problems of access, though the access constraints are very substantial.³⁸ It featured very little in discussions at the ICWG, though an Assessment and Information Management group was formed and tasked with agreeing a common tool for assessment. For their part, INGOs reported reasonable access, mostly through national staff, up until mid-late 2011. Yet there seems to have been a lack of investment by NGOs in basic data collection and analysis, a gap which clusters were not able to fill. Given the crucial role that NGOs have traditionally played in this area, this was a major gap. One senior NGO representative described the situation as follows: 'We have become dependent on FSNAU, that's why NGOs don't have independent assessments or monitoring'.

2.3.5 A number of suggestions were made on this topic at the workshop held in Nairobi to discuss the provisional findings of this RTE.³⁹ These linked with the joint planning and operations topics covered in the next sections and included:

- Establishing criteria for vetting individual agency assessments to contribute to the overall analysis.
- Setting up sub-working group from within the ICWG in order to establish broad consensus on situational and response analysis. This should report to (and be tasked by) the HCT, helping the community to speak with one authoritative voice on a given situation. INGOs and UN agencies would need to dedicate senior level experts to participate in this process.
- Inviting external experts to balance the group and provide independent perspectives.

2.3.6 The second of these proposals in particular seems to the RTE team to be an essential step towards progress.

2.3.7 Needs assessment is as much about understanding people's priorities, coping mechanisms and normal practices as it is about data collection and technical analysis. The relative lack of proximity of international agencies to people in Somalia makes this aspect of assessment very hard to achieve. 'Remote management' and working through unfamiliar partners creates a considerable distance, making the changing situation of households hard to read. Nor do local perceptions of priorities always tally with international perceptions. For example, as one respondent noted, 'nobody in Somalia thinks of assistance as being based on needs: it is about fair shares'.⁴⁰ Establishing a needs basis for interventions has evidently proved difficult for many sectors. Re-establishing closer engagement with communities over time will be a necessary step towards this.

2.4 Main findings

- The early warning mechanisms largely performed as they were designed to, giving detailed and accurate early warning advice – and urging appropriate contingency planning.
- The warnings were not responded to by the humanitarian agencies or the donors in such a way as to allow timely and proportionate preparedness, planning and early response.
- Needs assessment has been largely neglected, with undue reliance on early warning systems that are not designed to provide an assessment of needs.
- The ICWG did not provide a 'joined up' analysis of the evolving crisis in late 2010/early 2011 and should have been tasked to do so by the HCT.
- The current outlook for early warning is poor. With FSNAU enumerators now banned, nutritional surveys are currently not possible. It is urgent to try to fill this gap.
- There is also an urgent need for establishment of health (disease) and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) surveillance. The 3-5 year plan developed by the WASH Strategic Advisory Group identified the lack of needs assessment as a key gap and includes the priority action of having a "live map" of water sources across Somalia.

Section 3.

Coordinated action (1): Joint strategy, policy and planning

3.1.0 Overview

3.1.1 The CAP of 2011 provided the framework for the response to the drought crisis, even after the declaration of famine in July. The basic rationale of the CAP was taken to remain valid, although the strategic priorities were revised mid-year. On this basis, the decision was made not to issue a Flash Appeal but rather to make an 'emergency revision' of the CAP. The mid-year Emergency Revision provided a somewhat revised strategic framework, and individual clusters (and groups of clusters) designed their own strategies. There was no one overall response strategy for the crisis response even after famine was declared, though inter-cluster coordination resulted in 'sub-strategies' – notably that between the WASH, Agriculture and Livelihoods, Nutrition and Health Clusters.⁴¹ A number of contingency plans were also prepared, although again no overarching contingency plan existed for the kind of massively scaled-up response that was eventually mounted in reaction to the famine.⁴²

3.1.2 As noted above agencies and donors were slow to wake up to the full implications of the early warning information. Various factors were at work here. The funding climate was poor, donors were highly risk averse in the light of the Monitoring Group's report,⁴³ and full US OFAC restrictions were still in place – meaning in effect that the US was out of the picture as a donor until the middle of 2011.

3.1.3 Another factor concerns apparent inertia around the CAP 2011. This had taken a considerable collective effort to achieve consensus and appears to have led to unwillingness to contemplate a radical change of direction or priorities. Indeed the minutes of the HCT indicate that the steps taken in terms of releasing CHF money and reviewing contingency plans were considered at the time to be adequate to the task. The focus on how to spend the relatively small CHF appeared to divert attention from the revised scale of response that was urgently required. At this stage in late 2010/early 2011, the contingency of a full blown famine was not on the HCT's or ICWG's radar – perhaps because it was simply too big to contemplate.

3.1.4 In addition to the lack of willing donors and systemic inertia, the in-country context at the time has to be taken into account. Response options were limited in South Central Somalia. Access was limited in the worst affected areas, as was delivery capacity in the absence of WFP and an Al Shabaab ban on food distributions. The protracted debate over alternative food security interventions – particularly market interventions through cash and vouchers – was not resolved until the issue was forced by the July famine declaration and the demand for greatly scaled-up response.

3.1.5 Not all agencies were severely hampered by lack of access. Many INGOs continued to work in South Central areas through local staff and local partners throughout 2011. Among the UN agencies UNICEF and FAO continued to have good access for most of the year. UNICEF in particular played

an essential gap-filling role, even resorting to general food distribution – with all the attendant logistical problems of establishing food pipelines – in order to ensure that those receiving nutritional support were getting a basic ration (without which the rationale for nutritional support is undermined). For their part, FAO took on a crucial role in short and medium term food security in the second half of 2011, particularly with cash/voucher schemes and by helping farmers plant in time to take advantage of what turned out to be a very good *Deyr* rainy season.

3.2.0 Contingency planning

3.2.1 The minutes of the HCT and ICWG show that considerable efforts went into contingency planning at the cluster level. In late 2010 these were largely concerned with the potential for increased conflict in South Central Somalia.⁴⁴ But at the November 2010 HCT meeting, FAO noted the need for a contingency plan for La Niña.⁴⁵ WFP at this stage was warning about potential breaks in the food pipeline after February 2011, and was doubtful considering the incompressible delivery time (3-5 months) that it could deliver food quickly in South Central even if the operational environment changed dramatically.⁴⁶ No answer was given to the HC when he asked about plans for addressing the food gap.⁴⁷

3.2.2 Even by January 27 the following year much of the requested work on contingency plans remained outstanding.⁴⁸ No response was made to the calls for an overall La Niña contingency plan, though FEWS NET and FSNAU repeated the call in relation to central regions in February⁴⁹ and plans were being made for Mogadishu.⁵⁰ Most of the concern at this time was with potential developments in Mogadishu, the nearby Afgooye corridor, and the Gedo border regions.

3.2.3 The inadequacy of existing scenario planning was raised at a joint HCT/ICWG meeting in March 2011.⁵¹ Not until September 2011 were overarching Somalia scenarios presented by OCHA in relation to the preparation of the 2012 CAP.

3.2.4 One significant gap in contingency planning concerned the eventuality that WFP having withdrawn from Al Shabaab-controlled areas might not be able to resume its operations in those areas. There appears to have been a lack of concerted planning for the likely scenario that others would have to try to substitute for WFP's role. The on-going evaluation of WFP's country portfolio highlights this lack of joint contingency planning and the fact that it took many months for WFP's supplementary food resources to be handed over to UNICEF.⁵²

3.3.0 Joint strategy and response planning

3.3.1 The purpose of a strategy in this context is largely to ensure that programme decisions tend towards the same goals, ensuring consistency and complementarity of approach. In the case of the Somalia drought response the strategic priorities for humanitarian assistance were set by the CAP 2011:


- Provide life-saving assistance to 380,000 people living in HE, the most vulnerable of the 1.46 million IDPs and those affected by new crises.
- Increase livelihoods and livelihood assets to protect populations from future shocks (p26>)

A FAILURE OF EARLY RESPONSE

The factors noted above led in the view of the RTE team to a systemic failure of early response. This has two aspects:

- A failure of prevention action, tackling the proximate causes of vulnerability through urgent livelihoods intervention, so building short-term resilience and reducing the need for relief
- A failure of scaled-up early relief, tackling the most acute symptoms of the crisis at the time when such assistance was most needed in early to mid-2011

The absence of an overall contingency plan for major crisis response meant that planning for a massively scaled up response only really took place in July 2011. Given the lead times involved, this needed to have happened in January/February at the latest if the preventive and relief agendas were to be addressed at the time required. The following diagram illustrates the problem. It is indicative only – precise data on implementation are not available and these are in any case incommensurable quantities. But it shows what we believe to be an essentially ‘true’ picture of the relationship between the ‘crisis curve’, the funding curve and the response curve during 2011.⁵³ The most striking feature of this is the gap between crisis severity and funding availability, and then between funding and response implementation.



The call for earlier relief is self-explanatory, but prevention is rather less so. What kinds of intervention, at what stage, might have had a preventive effect such as to ‘flatten’ the crisis curve and reduce its duration? Various opinions on this were expressed by those consulted for the RTE. Much of what was proposed lay within the domain of scaled-up livelihood support such as to prevent catastrophic livelihood failure e.g. provision of fodder, de-stocking programmes etc. to prevent loss of herds. Some felt that earlier intervention with cash support, including cash for work, could have relieved some of the extreme pressure on household incomes. Other forms of market intervention, particularly with a view to price-stabilisation, were also suggested.

The distinction between ‘relief’ and ‘prevention’ is clearly not absolute here, though a distinction can be drawn between longer-term resilience or disaster risk reduction measures and shorter-term (‘acute’) preventive action. The RTE team was not able to draw specific conclusions as to the appropriate forms of early intervention for different livelihood groups in this case; but notes that such intervention is likely to be dependent on the ability to adapt pre-existing programmes to new circumstances.

and prevent those in acute food and livelihoods crisis from deteriorating into HE, capitalising on the 2009 *Deyr* and 2010 *Gu* rains where possible.

- Provide vulnerable populations with a minimum package of life-sustaining basic services
- Strengthen the protective environment for civilian populations through advocacy, including with local authorities, community mobilisation, and access to services

3.3.2 To these are added 'response strategies' to improve the quality of response, concerning respect for humanitarian principles, access, preparedness, transparency, accountability and gender awareness.

3.3.3 The conceptual shift from a 'straight' relief approach based on food aid, to an approach based equally on livelihood support and 'resilience', had occurred some two years earlier.⁵⁴ CAP 2011 built on this shift of emphasis with a major increase in the funds requested for agriculture and livelihoods. To some extent this reflected the reality of WFP's absence from South Central Somalia, but it marked a more general strategic shift – and was accompanied by a shift of emphasis from food distribution to food access. As the drought crisis deepened in 2011 it forced a re-appraisal of priorities. The basic template remained the CAP 2011; but a new 'three-pronged approach' to humanitarian action is defined in the Emergency Revision relating to the prevention of new displacement and assistance to those already displaced.⁵⁵

3.3.4 By this stage (July 2011) the population described as being 'in crisis' nationwide has risen to 3.7 million, of whom around 2.8 million were thought to be in the south of the country. In total, 3.2 million are said to need life-saving assistance, up from 2 million in the 2011 CAP. 'Tens of thousands' are said to have already died 'in the last few months', of whom the majority were children. Under-five's death rates were catastrophic: more than 4/10,000/day in all areas of the south. Over 184,000 had fled the effects of the crisis to neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia and 167,000 were said to be internally displaced (most to Mogadishu) by 'conflict and drought'.⁵⁶

3.3.5 It is important to distinguish joint strategies from those of individual agencies, whose mandates and established working practices may all dictate a certain course of action. It was suggested to the RTE team that agencies often appear to have made individual programme decisions and then rationalised these within the context of the CAP, cluster, CHF or other framework.⁵⁷ Much of the effort towards common strategy in this case took place in the clusters, with the process of agreeing criteria for CHF proposals acting as a catalyst. One cluster coordinator noted the difficulty clusters had in engaging partners around an agreed strategy without a sound funding base.⁵⁸ Another respondent put it thus: 'our strategy is just the sum total of cluster strategies'.⁵⁹ That said, as noted above, some clusters agreed mutual strategies and responsibility frameworks, such as that agreed between WASH and Health clusters for prevention and response to outbreaks of cholera and acute watery diarrhoea.

3.3.6 One of the tendencies described to the RTE team was for lead agency strategies to dominate over collective strategies in the clusters and common fora (HCT, ICWG).⁶⁰ The lack of clear common strategy in response to the drought crisis may have been both a cause and effect of that tendency.

3.3.7 The earlier strategic discussions in the HCT concern the need to prevent the movement of people due to drought.⁶¹ The Agriculture and Livelihoods Cluster, together with the WASH Cluster, presented a position paper on drought response to the HCT and ICWG at a joint meeting on

December 25 2010. At the same meeting the WFP representative argued the need *'to look at the whole picture (a strategic overview) of the impending drought crisis and the impact it will have on the population'*. The overall strategic priorities of the 2011 CAP remained in place until a strategic re-assessment in June 2011 as part of the mid-year review of the CAP.⁶² As part of this the Agriculture and Livelihoods Cluster was to *'increase their activities in the southern regions, particularly where food distributions are not taking place. This is to demonstrate clearly how Agriculture and Livelihoods can assist in covering the gap left by the absence of food distributions and how their activities can help reduce malnutrition. The cluster should indicate activities planned to take advantage of the next expected normal Deyr rains'*. This they subsequently did.

3.3.8 Other strategies emerged following famine declaration, including a tri-cluster strategy from the Nutrition, Food, and Agriculture/Livelihoods Clusters. Even then the HCT/ICWG minutes record that *'members were concerned that the strategy does not respond to the new developments of the situation. The strategy should be more comprehensive [and] indicate specific objectives...'*⁶³ The minutes note the comment that *'given that the situation on the ground is changing rapidly a multi-cluster strategy would be useful, outlining a comprehensive response plan by region for all c clusters'*. This never emerged in practice. At the same meeting it was agreed that the HC would meet with WFP and ICRC to discuss a broader food strategy framework. In the view of the RTE team such a meeting should have taken place several months earlier, given the likely implications of the WFP absence from southern areas since January 2010.

3.3.9 The loss of food aid as a major response option in South Central Somalia raised the difficult question of how to scale up response to the crisis as its full magnitude became apparent in mid-2011. The Agriculture/Livelihoods and WASH position paper had argued the need for pre-emptive action back in December 2010, which it said was needed *'to protect livelihoods and avoid costly lifesaving emergency interventions'*. In practice this was not done on any scale.⁶⁴ What was clear from a relatively early date was that scaled up food aid was not going to be an option; yet the question of what might replace it took months, was delayed⁶⁵ and took months to resolve. The issue was rather obscured by WFP's continued assertion that it intended to resume food distributions in the worst affected areas, and its stated opposition to cash-based alternatives.⁶⁶

3.3.10 The role of NGOs in both implementing and promoting cash-based alternatives to food aid was significant. The cash-based response working group was one of the more impressive examples of NGO coordination during the crisis response and it played a significant advocacy role. In April 2011 a request was made to the HC and HCT to issue a statement supporting the use of large-scale cash transfer programmes as a viable and effective means of addressing critical food and livelihood insecurity in South Central Somalia. Specifically, it was requested that the donor community be urged to support the scaling up of cash responses. The request was not acted upon but an inter-cluster working group on cash transfers was subsequently established.

3.3.11 When the possibility of scaled up cash-based interventions was directly addressed by the HCT on July 14 2011, there was still a feeling that not enough was known about its likely impact. Feasibility studies had left the ideological issues unresolved, and there were debates about the extent to which the market supply was elastic enough to meet increased demand for food. It took the subsequent famine declaration, and huge external pressure from agency headquarters and donors to scale up, to force the issue – though it remained for many a high risk strategy. In particular there were fears, expressed most vocally by WFP, that such interventions would cause inflationary

effects, taking food in the markets even further out of reach of those who needed it. Interventions to increase the supply of locally produced cereals through markets along with demand-side interventions (e.g. cash and vouchers) that improve purchasing power of the affected households were proposed to counter this effect.⁶⁷ In the end, the question became not whether to use cash and vouchers but how to manage the associated risks.⁶⁸

3.3.12 The need for an annual ICWG Somalia contingency plan was discussed and agreed at the ICWG meeting of January 18 2012, alongside the need for an annual ICWG strategy and work plan.⁷¹ This is a positive step, as is the suggestion that this should constitute the basis for preparedness and prioritisation of resource allocation, particularly the CHF. But it is essential that it include the possible requirement for a more radical re-alignment of strategic priorities and resource requirements, and that the donors be closely involved in this discussion. It is also essential that the HCT (including thereby the main agencies) should ultimately 'own' the process and be committed to it. Given the regional aspects of drought response and mitigation planning, links should be made to the IASC plan of action for the Horn of Africa and related processes.⁷²

On strategic leadership and accountability

One of the general findings of the RTE was that there was a lack of strategic leadership from the key coordinating bodies at crucial moments in the crisis response. The performance of *individuals* is beyond the scope of the RTE, but this is an important related question – though one that appears hard to evaluate. In this context, it is worth noting the content of the IASC Transformative Agenda, which emphasises 'enhanced accountability of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and members of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) for the achievement of collective results'.⁶⁹ It also stresses that 'the HCT and IASC organizations will act on specific early warning indicators to engage in inter-agency contingency planning and coordinated preparedness to improve collective response readiness'.⁷⁰

Part of the problem in the Somalia case seems to be structural, relating to unclear lines of responsibility and accountability between (inter alia) the HC and HCT, the ICWG and HCT, and between the clusters, cluster lead agencies and the HCT. The fact that management reporting lines are mainly vertical (through agency hierarchies) rather than horizontal through country-based coordination mechanisms poses a challenge in terms of accountability. But this in itself should not prevent establishing stronger lines of mutual accountability between the relevant bodies and individuals within them. Establishing clearer task management relationships is one part of this, along with stronger individual 'ownership' of joint decisions and analysis.

In 2011, it appears from the relevant meeting minutes that a decision to change direction was never presented for decision by the HCT. It is suggested that strategic decisions of this kind may need to be 'forced' onto the agenda for consideration by the HCT when certain situational criteria are met, including the failure of a single rainy season. Without such a mechanism there is a danger that institutional inertia and 'business as usual' will continue to dominate the agenda. This is linked to the need for contingency plans that are considered for activation against pre-agreed criteria.

The ICWG is not currently configured to play the strategic role that it could and should. The role of the OCHA-based Inter-Cluster Coordinator could be strengthened by upgrading the post and appointing a senior person with strong leadership and facilitation skills.

3.3.13 Responding to needs in urban and peri-urban areas appears to have been a relative weakness in the crisis response. Such responses raise particular problems, not least to do with shifting or 'hidden' displaced populations and uncertain population figures, as well as major problems of operational security in conflict-affected areas. One issue raised at the workshop held in Nairobi to discuss the provisional findings of this RTE was the need to distinguish more clearly between the demands of responding in urban and in rural settings. This affected both the kinds of needs involved and the modes of responding. The RTE team agrees with this analysis and suggests that meeting the specific needs of displaced and host communities in urban settings in Somalia be the subject of a commissioned study. It is notable that two of the populations that were declared to be in famine in 2011 were the displaced populations in Mogadishu and Afgooye; and these have proved among the most difficult communities to provide with the necessary assistance.

3.3.14 The question of agreeing common policy positions and messages came into sharp focus following the mid-year scale up in response to famine. The HC in particular was insistent on the need for common positions 'given the expected close scrutiny from the media and the international community at large'.⁷³ While common positions had previously been agreed on a number of issues such as civil-military distinction and the need to prevent politicisation of the humanitarian agenda, from this point on they take on a more formal character and are described as 'HCT positions'. OCHA was requested to set up a joint UN-NGO communication meeting with the aim to agree common messages, and agencies 'should be persuading their headquarters and donors on using common messaging'.⁷⁴

3.4.0 Main findings

- There was a systemic failure of early response by agencies and donors, both in terms of preventive action and early relief.
- The failure of the implementing agencies to make joint contingency plans (at an early stage of the crisis) for major scale up in response to drought was a serious omission, given the foreseeable consequences of the failure of the 2011 *Gu* rains. The issue was raised on several occasions in HCT but not acted on. Having actionable plans in place, with donor agreement on funding criteria, could in theory have brought action forward by several months. That said, many factors may have combined to prevent this, including donor unwillingness and access issues.
- In relation to the drought crisis, neither the HCT nor the ICWG showed the strategic leadership required to change course in a way that would have allowed timely response to the crisis. Decisions about a scaled-up response were delayed until the extremity of the crisis became undeniable and the external pressure to act became intense.
- The ICWG was dominated by operational issues and briefings which left little space for inter-cluster strategic planning in response to the crisis. It is not currently configured to play the strategic role that it could and should.
- Ideological battles contributed to a failure to resolve issues about programme approach – and specifically about the use of cash and vouchers – until the famine declaration forced the issue. This prevented earlier use of such approaches at a time when they might have had more preventive effect.
- Over-focus on the use of available resources – in particular the CHF – contributed to a failure to anticipate and react to the scale of the impending crisis, which was of a different order of magnitude to the resources then available.

- Following the famine declaration and release of new funds the HCT became noticeably more focused and business-like. The revision of the CAP, coordinated by OCHA, was achieved swiftly and effectively once the decision to do so was taken.
 - The lack of overarching strategy and the increasingly bilateral approach of donors and major agencies led to some fragmentation of response plans and the by-passing of clusters as the scale up proceeded in the second half of 2011.
 - It is essential that the ICWG annual contingency plan include the possible requirement for a radical re-alignment of strategic priorities and resource requirements and that the donors be closely involved in this discussion. It is also essential that the HCT (including thereby the main agencies) should ultimately 'own' the contingency planning process and be committed to it.
 - Responding to needs in urban areas appears to have been a relative weakness in the crisis response. The specific demands of meeting the needs of displaced and host communities in urban settings should be reviewed by the ICWG.
-

The system diagram on Page 31 illustrates the main elements of the international system as it operated in Somalia during most of 2011. It shows many of the main actors and relationships involved but is not intended to be comprehensive.

A number of things should be noted:

(i) Funding flowed mainly from 'traditional' donors through the CAP and (related) CHF mechanism, either directly to implementing agencies or through UN and INGO intermediaries. But as the year progressed, two phenomena became apparent. One was the large but unquantified scale of 'non-traditional' donor funding, particularly from OIC member states like Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Most of this by-passed the CAP, though the large Saudi contribution was an exception to this. The second was that much of the scaled-up funding even from traditional donors by-passed the CAP from July 2011 onwards, as bilateral contributions became the norm. In total around \$500 million of the \$1.3 billion passed outside the CAP process.

(ii) As 2011 progressed, the system relied increasingly heavily on local implementing agencies in South/Central areas – particularly after the Al Shabaab ban on many international agencies in late 2011. By the end of 2011, only FAO among the UN agencies shown was still permitted to operate directly in Shabaab-controlled areas of South Central Somalia. The ICRC, itself 'banned' in January 2012, has worked with and through the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS).

(iii) A number of key implementing agencies operated essentially outside the UN-led coordination system (HCT/clusters). These included the ICRC and SRCS, MSF, and a number of INGOs from OIC member states (notably Turkey) whose funding came largely from 'non-traditional' donor sources.


(iv) Coordination of international action with local authorities depended very much on location. In Somaliland and Puntland, coordination was mainly with government entities. In South/ Central Somalia, it was with a range of actors including TFG, District Commissioners and community level structures – including the village drought committees established by Al Shabaab. Depending on time and place, the operating restrictions imposed on international actors were more or less onerous, and the degree of access and accountability to local people highly variable.

(v) The relationship between the implementing and coordination wings of the 'system' is problematic. In theory, the coordination wing sets the collective strategic parameters within which responses are


designed and implemented. In practice, the big agencies and their agendas dominate both sides of the picture. From the feedback received by the RTE team, the policies and programmes of cluster lead agencies tended to dominate cluster decisions, adding to uncertainty about the status and accountability of clusters themselves as distinct from lead agency partners. Similarly, the HC's role often involved mediating between the interests of the various agencies, while the ability of the HCT to act as a strategic decision-making body was inevitably limited by the need to reconcile those interests as well as agencies' own independent decision-making processes.

On the relationship between funding, implementation and coordination


INTERNATIONAL



SOMALIA District/local (field)



SOMALIA District/local (field)



Section 4.

Coordinated action (2): Joint operational structures and processes

4.1.0 Overview: Adapting to the changing environment 2010-12

4.1.1 This section is concerned with operational coordination and the structures and processes by which it was pursued in relation to the drought crisis response. This includes the coordination of agency programmes, implementation of cluster plans, the operational function of the ICWG, the management of operational information within the system (including the production of 'Who does What, Where and When' information) and the coordination of programme monitoring.

4.1.2 Much of this lies within the mandate of OCHA, but this is primarily a review of the collective performance under these headings. One common theme is the relationship and sometimes tension between the implementation and coordination wings of the system as illustrated in the humanitarian system diagram (see Annex). There is also a strong connection with the previous section on joint strategy and planning, and some of the issues concerned with inter-cluster strategies are considered here.

4.1.3 One general comment on coordination in the Somalia context is worth quoting: 'People started to create parallel systems of meetings because nothing useful was discussed in the main meetings'.⁷⁵ The observations of the RTE team suggest that a number of parallel systems of meetings were indeed created, which raises questions about the utility of the 'mainstream' coordination processes. Some of the related issues are discussed below.

4.2.0 The cluster system and field-level coordination

4.2.1 Coordination of humanitarian action in Somalia is largely dominated by the cluster structure based in Nairobi. Apart from its role in joint sectoral planning, the cluster plays a key role in deciding what goes into the CAP and how CHF funds should be allocated. As the in full architecture is mainly made up of cluster plans, response to the drought in the second half of 2011 essentially resulted in a scaling up cluster plans within the framework of the CAP Emergency Revision. The work pace and number of meetings held by OCHA and the clusters sharply increased following the declaration of famine.

4.2.2 In addition to the Nairobi-based clusters, OCHA and the clusters made efforts to ensure the functioning of a field coordination structure, essentially made up of three regional coordination hubs (Galkayo, Gedo/Mandera and Mogadishu) and, more recently, in Beletweyn. Although

attempts were made over the period under review to hold inter-cluster meetings within Al Shabaab controlled areas, real coordination proved impossible. Officially-announced coordination meetings would often imply in full presence to these meetings, resulting in difficulties linked to imposed agenda or instructions diverging from good practice. Conversely, unannounced meetings would involve too many risks for the organisers. As a result, between meetings of field clusters were held outside of these areas, mainly in neighbouring Kenya (Mandera, Liboi) or in Galkayo and Mogadishu. While this dealt with one problem, it created others, including the risk of less reliable information and logistical difficulties for local partners. OCHA facilitated these meetings.

4.2.3 OCHA tried to ensure meetings of ICWGs at the above-mentioned hubs. The Clusters themselves had variable degrees of organisation at field level. Some, like WASH, established strong regional clusters early in 2011, facilitated by regional 'focal points' (local NGOs). The weaker clusters often failed to get established: finding experienced staff to chair meetings proved to be a challenge and some cluster focal points failed to attend or were not appointed. It is therefore difficult to gauge what part these regional clusters and ICWGs played in the overall response and how far the national clusters align their strategic response to address needs assessed at field level. Although telephone support from national to field clusters on technical issues was frequent, field clusters inputs appeared to have been limited to local information exchange. Discussions about needs assessments, for example, appeared not to have been frequent.

4.2.4 Reinforcement of field clusters may also have been hampered by the strong top-down clusters' and ICWG's approach (Nairobi to the field). Although decision-making level is likely to remain in Nairobi in the future, clusters should consider ways to reinforce field cluster's role in the collection and consolidation of information without over-burdening them in the process.⁷⁶

4.2.5 OCHA itself struggled to place experienced staff in regional posts, including Mogadishu and Hargeisa. Many of those interviewed in the field and in Nairobi commented on the weakness this created in overall coordination.⁷⁷ Senior OCHA staff also expressed the view that they were under-resourced in this respect.⁷⁸ The lack of consistent senior OCHA presence in Mogadishu is mentioned as a particular problem, though the OCHA head of office did her best to compensate by spending around half of her time travelling to Mogadishu and other regional centres. This was commendable but was not a substitute for a dedicated OCHA presence at a time when the situation of drought-related IDPs in and around Mogadishu was particularly serious.⁷⁹ In Hargeisa, the absence of an experienced OCHA staff member in the middle of 2011 meant that OCHA essentially 'missed the boat' according to one respondent,⁸⁰ since the drought crisis was essentially over by May. While Hargeisa is arguably not a top priority for OCHA presence, not least because the Government of Somaliland has its own disaster response coordination mechanism, it certainly diminished OCHA's influence and led to a more disjointed international support role than would otherwise have been the case.

4.2.6 The question of a regional hub or hubs for South Central Somalia deserves particular attention. Until now Mogadishu has played the role of a regional hub for the coordination of Lower and Middle Shabelle and for the protection and assistance of IDPs in the area. However several factors suggest the possibility of an upgraded role of Mogadishu as a hub for the whole South Central zone. Firstly, security and accommodation conditions have improved, allowing clusters to meet more regularly. Secondly, the presence of a deputy HC in Mogadishu provides the hub with senior leadership.⁸¹ Thirdly, Somali NGOs appear to have improved access to Mogadishu,⁸² which allows a better collection of information on South Central needs and response than in the past.

4.2.7 Having said that, the pace at which military events are proceeding in South Central mean that other options may be opening up for regional hubs – including the option of a network of sub-regional hubs. This was discussed at the workshop to look at the provisional results of the RTE, and the following four hub configuration was suggested, reporting back to clusters in Nairobi:

- Mogadishu (covering Banadir and the Shabelles)
- Baidoa (covering Bay, Bakool and Gedo)
- Kismayo or Jilib (covering Jubas)
- Beletweyn (covering Hiraan and Galguduud)

4.2.8 In any case, the hub(s) for the region should be located in such a way as to facilitate a decentralisation of information sharing and decision making.

4.3.0 Performance of the clusters

4.3.1 When looking at the overall cluster response to the drought, most of those consulted agreed that it was lacking in a number of respects. The first was at the strategic level, where the development of cluster and inter-cluster response strategies was patchy – and no integrated multi-cluster strategy existed. In the Somalia context, strong links in particular between Food, Agriculture and Livelihoods, Nutrition, Health and WASH clusters are absolutely necessary. The most radical way to ensure those links is to merge clusters, as was done recently with the Food and Agriculture and Livelihoods clusters. But this should be done only in particular circumstances⁸³ and strong bilateral inter-cluster relations and establishment of convergence criteria should usually suffice.

4.3.2 A further option to explore, with regard to cross-cluster coherence, is the development-integrated geographic-based multi-cluster plans – by region, multi-region or zone. By way of comparison it is worth noting that the CAP response in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is organised on such a basis (in that case through regional plans). Although problems of access in many areas appear much greater in Somalia than in Eastern DRC, it is an option worth considering. This would allow the adoption of a series of multi-cluster regional plans responding more closely to locally-defined needs. This approach, although difficult in view of the still fragile structure of regional hubs, might stimulate reflection at field level, motivate local partners and increase a sense of local ownership of the humanitarian response. An alternative, less ambitious option, would be to move towards sector-specific plans for each region.

4.3.3 The performance of individual clusters has been variable. For example, many of those consulted cited WASH and Agriculture and Livelihoods as good examples, while Health was felt to be problematic.⁸⁴ The difficult relationship between cluster coordinator and lead agency was felt by some to be at the root of the problem, along with ambiguity about the accountability of clusters and cluster leads. The matrix of responsibilities defined at the ICWG retreat in December 2011 should go some way to resolving this, though it had yet to be endorsed at the time the RTE team was in Nairobi.

4.3.4 Other issues were raised in relation to cluster performance during the crisis. Some felt that the role of clusters as the gatekeepers for funding submissions was problematic, both because it changed the dynamics of coordination ('it becomes all about the money' as one respondent put it) and because it places a great burden on cluster coordinators when their time might be better

spent on more strategic issues. However, the majority opinion of those consulted appeared to be in favour of retaining the role of clusters in reviewing and filtering CHF, Emergency Reserve and CAP proposals for submission to the formal approval processes.⁸⁵ This was felt by OCHA staff consulted to be essential to getting participation in the clusters, though some also noted that the sheer numbers of participants (around one hundred in some cases) made it difficult for the cluster to function effectively as a strategic body. To deal with this problem, the WASH cluster had appointed a strategic advisory group whose remit explicitly excluded fund mobilisation.

4.3.5 As with so many processes, the performance of individual clusters appears to have been influenced heavily by the qualities of the coordinator. Some interviewees suggested that, given the significance of this function, cluster coordinators should be selected with particular care, chosen in part for their ability to chair a group effectively and (once proven in post) then mandated for a substantial period of time. In the past, performance appears to have been affected by frequent absence or turnover of staff, and the weak performance of the cluster co-chairs. Some of the reasons suggested for this poor performance included the lack of adequate remuneration for such positions, lack of clear responsibilities for Cluster Coordinators, and work overload due to the combination of programme and coordination responsibilities including fund mobilisation.⁸⁶ These and related issues need to be addressed.

4.3.6 The relative lack of engagement in the clusters by the major INGOs is of particular concern. This is a conundrum. NGOs expressed a reluctance to attend dysfunctional cluster meetings – one official even going so far as to say that ‘clusters have been a disaster here and should be scrapped’.⁸⁷ Yet the lack of quality is in part a reflection of the non-engagement of the major NGOs. The lack of technical capacity in the clusters was noted by some as a major problem,⁸⁸ and this is another reason for attempting to ensure the participation of the larger INGOs. A frank exchange on this is called for between cluster lead agencies, cluster coordinators and INGOs – mediated by OCHA and the Inter-Cluster Coordinator. It is essential that the issues are resolved and the INGOs persuaded to re-engage if the cluster model is to work in the Somalia context.

4.4.0 Information management

4.4.1 This is a big topic in its own right and, as with the subject of clusters, many of the issues are generic to the Somalia programme as a whole rather than drought-crisis specific. However, the way information has been managed during the crisis response demands some analysis, and this inevitably raises questions of more general relevance to the system.

4.4.2 One basic function overseen by OCHA is to keep track of who is doing what, where and when – using the so-called ‘3W’ or ‘4W’ matrixes generated by the clusters. Many of those consulted commented that the information from the 3W/4W mechanism was patchy and unreliable. Even where the relevant matrices were filled out, the suspicion was voiced by one OCHA official that ‘agencies may not be delivering what they say they are delivering’. As one commentator put it ‘we seem to be able to be more accurate about the food security situation than about what we are actually doing about it’.⁸⁹ More than one donor expressed considerable frustration about this apparent inability of the system to account for its own basic activities.⁹⁰ Where information was provided, it was often in a form too vague as to time, place and quantities to be useful for operational purposes. That said, a considerable investment has been made in information

management capacity. The WASH cluster, for example, appointed a dedicated information management specialist in March 2011 with the result that the quality and depth of information presented in the 4W matrix improved significantly. Most other clusters also engaged an information management specialist during the course of the year.

4.4.3 With respect to the information function of the clusters, various views were expressed. One ICRC official complained that it was hard to get accurate information from the Food and Agriculture and Livelihoods clusters and that their reporting was misleading: 'They just add up the number of beneficiaries, regardless of what was actually distributed'.⁹¹ The same official added more generally: 'We don't know when, where and what others are distributing', making it very hard to coordinate activities.

4.4.4 On the other hand, those charged with providing the information were not always clear why it was being asked for and whose purpose it served – particularly with regard to what some saw as unrealistic information demands from OCHA. As one respondent said 'OCHA think their job is sitreps – but it makes no difference to what we do, it is a waste of time. Information needs to be related to decision making or accountability. The constant argument over numbers is pointless'.⁹² Another noted 'OCHA requested weekly reporting of a large excel spread sheet, with response split per region, during the key part of the famine response. Cluster Coordinators opposed this on numerous occasions, but were informed that at global level were insisting on this frequency of reporting. So we did our best to provide information.'⁹³ A simpler format that could be shared with others was recommended, along with a summary of information requirements provided at an early stage of a crisis response.⁹⁴

4.4.5 Almost equal frustration was expressed by OCHA staff in their attempts to get accurate information from clusters. They felt, with some justification, that information demands from headquarters level and decision makers in the wider humanitarian community (donors included) were simply not understood by the clusters. These demands and their own coordination role required them to collect information to feed into the dashboard, sitreps and so on.⁹⁵ Providing this information was, they pointed out, a core function of the clusters; though they acknowledged that collecting and checking information from field clusters and local partners was a very difficult task.

4.4.6 It is clear that there are widely divergent views on the use and production of information. It is hard not to sympathise with all parties, given the various demands and competing pressures they face. The OCHA website is widely agreed to be an excellent resource, and much useful information is certainly recorded there for both 'internal' and 'external' audiences. Yet there does appear to be a disproportionate amount of time spent recording, communicating and correcting information that is often of doubtful use and even more doubtful credibility. This suggests the need for a review of information needs and information management, in order to try and streamline demands and get greater buy-in for the essential processes of information and communication.

4.5.0 Monitoring performance

4.5.1 At the 'top line' level, collective performance is measured in relation to progress against strategic goals in the CAP and the related targets set by sector/cluster. Thus the CAP for 2012 has a section reviewing the year 2011 and achievements against the strategic objectives set in the

2011 CAP. These targets had been revised sharply upwards in the mid-year Emergency Revision of the CAP. The basic metric of performance here is 'target beneficiary numbers (by sector/cluster)' versus 'numbers of people actually reached' – sometimes expressed as a percentage (e.g. in the dashboard). This 'coverage' approach to performance measurement has some merits, not least that it appears to allow for fairly precise quantification. Yet it is also problematic in a number of ways.

4.5.2 First, 'beneficiaries reached' is a vague quantity, prompting the further questions: reached where, when, with what? In this regard it was suggested by a number of those interviewed that agencies were 'generous' in their estimates of coverage. Second, the targets themselves appear to have been set in part at least on the basis of available resources rather than assessed need. Third, programme coverage is only one aspect of performance. It tells us nothing about quality of delivery, relevance of programmes to changing needs or indeed the effect of the interventions concerned. This reflects the highly output-driven (rather than outcome-driven) nature of performance monitoring in Somalia.

4.5.3 In some ways the current approach is a reasonable one. From a review of previous CAPs one sees that the objective of setting clear outputs and monitoring them is still relatively new to the Somalia CAP system and is already a quite difficult task to achieve.⁹⁶ Monitoring and evaluation based on outcome indicators may appear a bridge too far at present. Yet, as suggested by some interviewees, increased attention to impact appears essential, especially within the framework of a more strategic approach by clusters, ICWG and HCT. This requires thinking about both the short and medium term impacts on populations of humanitarian action, essential in a context where shocks are recurrent and where building resilience is an acknowledged priority. Some way of measuring the contribution of a given intervention to resilience to future shocks is essential if the strategic ambitions reflected in the CAP 2012 are to be met.

4.5.4 Reviewing this issue in relation to the drought crisis, it is clear that the major increase in livelihoods programming during the drought response falls squarely within this category of 'dual purpose' intervention. It is beyond the scope of this RTE to consider the issue of 'impact indicators' in any depth. One route worth exploring is the use of risk reduction indicators, based on the demonstrable reduction of known risk factors and thus exposure to harm in the face of future shocks. These would need to be correlated against 'global' outcome indicators such as those relating to household income, food security, nutrition and health.

4.5.5 At a more practical, operational level, new and innovative thinking is required to get a better understanding of the impact of programmes on households and communities. This is especially important for those programmes operated through 'remote management' and local partnerships, where the international system is largely 'flying blind'. This is partly a matter of accountability, but also more practically of being able to make more rational strategic and operational decisions about whether a given approach is working as intended, or whether an alternative approach is called for.⁹⁷

4.6.0 Main findings

- The issue of establishing a decentralised humanitarian hub or hubs for South Central Somalia needs to be addressed in the near future. Two basic alternatives are proposed.
- A frank exchange is called for between cluster lead agencies, cluster coordinators and NGOs

concerning the working of clusters and the participation of INGOs. It is essential that the issue of participation is resolved if the cluster model is to work in the Somalia context.

- A review of information needs and information management is needed, in order to try and streamline information demands and achieve greater buy-in for the essential processes of information collection and communication.
- Current performance evaluation is heavily oriented towards coverage and output indicators. In a context where shocks are recurrent and where building resilience is an acknowledged priority, increased attention to the question of both short and medium-term *impact* of interventions appears essential, in the context of a more strategic approach by clusters, ICWG and HCT.

Section 5.

Working with others: Communities, local agencies and government bodies

5.1.0 Views of the affected communities

5.1.1 The response by the international humanitarian system is just one part of the response to the crisis. Communities, including diaspora members, helped each other. Local government and businesses have played an important role in many areas of the country; and members of the international OIC have played a vital role and devoted substantial resources⁹⁸ to assisting drought victims. In spite of the absence of effective national government services, the established international humanitarian system is by no means operating in a 'relief vacuum'; nor are government donors the only funders. Indeed OCHA's financial tracking service lists private individual and organisations as making up the largest single financial contribution to the crisis response at USD 148.6 million or nearly 11% of total funding.⁹⁹

5.1.2 In short, it is important to understand and support the role played by other ('non-system') actors, who are often able to react more quickly and to operate where international agencies cannot.

5.1.3 Local authorities, local NGOs, and drought victims interviewed in Somaliland, Mogadishu and in Dadaab described the 2011 drought as one of the 'worst and deadliest' ever to hit Somalia.¹⁰⁰ It has severely affected large numbers of pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and the rural poor population in South and Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland.

5.1.4 Interviews and discussions with displaced people in Mogadishu, Dadaab refugee camps and Hargeisa described the losses that pastoralists suffered in terms of losing their entire herds¹⁰¹ to the drought – meaning for them loss of livelihood and overall purchasing power. The failure of the rains has led to shortages of water and pasture and put pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in a highly vulnerable position where they were unable to grow their own subsistence food. For many, these losses have led to their displacement from their rural homes to various cities and towns in Puntland, Somaliland and Mogadishu as well as to refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia.¹⁰²

5.1.5 Local NGOs,¹⁰³ businesses, members of Somali diaspora¹⁰⁴ and local people¹⁰⁵ were the first groups to respond to the drought in affected areas, collecting funds¹⁰⁶ to assist the drought-affected population. Funds collected by local businesses and members of the diaspora were used to deliver water trucking, purchase non-perishable food, clothing and non-food items for drought-affected populations in larger cities and towns. The people of Somaliland collected and donated USD \$700,000 to the drought victims in Somalia, which was delivered by Hadrawi, a famous poet,

to Mogadishu. Interviews with district commissioners and members of local NGOs highlighted the importance of such intervention by the local businesses and members of the diaspora as providing a 'timely response to immediate needs'.

5.1.6 In many areas of South Central Somalia, international humanitarian aid agencies have not been able to access and engage directly with drought-affected communities. The ban imposed by Al Shabaab and the effects of insecurity not only restricted international aid agencies and their local partners from accessing the affected populations; it also denied the people concerned the ability to access humanitarian assistance in their own home areas. Discussion with drought-affected people who were displaced from Al Shabaab controlled areas highlighted the effects of Al Shabaab's ban on aid agencies in terms of people's ability to access both humanitarian and developmental assistance.¹⁰⁷ As the situation got worse and there was no assistance available, many women, children and elderly people left to seek help outside Al Shabaab controlled areas - something that Al Shabaab were unable to prevent. As one woman living in Ifo II East (Dadaab, Kenya) put it "there was nothing Al Shabaab could do for the drought victims to stop them from migrating to other areas for assistance". Those who left and gained access to humanitarian assistance were able to send some of the assistance they received from aid agencies to family members left behind in Al Shabaab controlled areas.

5.1.7 In interviews three main reasons were given to explain why more women and children than men left their home areas and sought refuge in the camps in Dadaab and elsewhere. First, Al Shabaab restricted the migration of men and older boys to TFG controlled areas, Kenya and Ethiopia. Second, migrating from one's village or town to areas controlled by TFG and outside Somalia required resources. It was too costly for all members of the family to migrate together, and most of the refugees who came to Dadaab borrowed money from individuals in their former villages and towns. Men and older boys stayed behind to pay off the debts, which facilitated the migration of other family members to non-Shabaab areas where they could access assistance. Third, men and older boys stayed behind to keep an eye on their family farms and homes. In discussions with women who were affected by the drought in Dadaab and Mogadishu, it was stated that "all of us could not leave at the same time and abandon our family properties. Men and older boys were left behind to safeguard the land and other assets belonging to the family".




5.1.8 In interviews with local NGOs in Mogadishu and Nairobi, the view was expressed that the Nairobi-based humanitarian system missed a number of opportunities to intervene much earlier with disaster risk reduction programmes to reduce the effects of the crisis. Because of this, the drought-affected population became desperate for immediate assistance and many left their villages, towns and regions to search for such assistance. According to a leader of a local NGO interviewed in Mogadishu, as early as May 2011 "drought-affected people from Lower and Middle Shabelles, Bay and Bakol were coming in large numbers to the city and were setting up temporary shelters in any empty spaces they could find". A leader of one of local NGO stated "when we informed the UN about the imminent drought, they did not listen to us. When the famine hit, then they came too late".¹⁰⁸

5.1.9 The lack of early intervention and lack of access to immediate humanitarian assistance in the droughtaffected areas compounded the effect of eroded coping mechanisms. The stress on families and communities not only led to deaths, malnutrition and disease¹⁰⁹ but also to massive drought-related displacement from Bay, Bakol, Gedo, Middle and Lower Shabelle, Middle and

Lower Jubas¹¹⁰ to Kenya, Ethiopia, and TFG-controlled areas including Mogadishu. According to a male pastoralist who lost all of his animals “I lost all of my herd one by one. The few that survived

Patterns of distress migration to Dadaab, Dolo Ado and Mogadishu during 2011

The following graphs, based on data collected by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its population movement tracking project, illustrate the pattern of mainly drought-related distress migration from areas of South Central Somalia. A clear peak of movement between May and July is evident in each case.



were too skinny to be sold and they died later. Had we had access to food, water and assistance to save the few emaciated animals that survived, I would not have left to Dadaab camp". A female drought victim interviewed in Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya also states "we exhausted all our ways of coping to remain in Somalia. Leaving for Kenya [Dadaab] became the only option for us to look for access to immediate assistance and survive". A male farmer from Hudur explained "if we could find earlier assistance in my town, we would not have left for Dadaab. Coming to Dadaab cost us money which we borrowed from someone. I lost two young children on the way to Dadaab".¹¹¹

5.1.10 The drought also affected and displaced large numbers of pastoralists and rural poor in Sool, Sanaag, Sahil and the Awdal areas of Somaliland, who ended up in IDP camps in Hargeisa and Burco. International humanitarian interventions came late to Somaliland, according to local authorities. Like other governments in Somalia and Puntland, the Somaliland government also lacked the resources to respond to the drought. But due to pressures from clan leaders they mobilised resources and carried out water trucking to various villages through the National Environment Research and Disaster Preparedness and Management Authority in Somaliland (NERAD).¹¹²

5.1.11 The effects of drought and famine had distinct gender dimensions. It placed an enormous burden on women to find food and other essentials for their families and forced them to migrate with their small children without their husbands. This placed them in a vulnerable position where they become exposed to gender-based violence. An IDP mother from Gedo said "when the drought got worse, it became extremely difficult for mothers like me to keep our children fed. As children got weaker and sick due to malnutrition and other illnesses, we mothers witnessed the death of our young ones and took care of our malnourished and sick children in difficult circumstances". The prevailing insecurity in border areas posed a lot of risks for the migrants, including exposure to violence. Discussion with community leaders in Dadaab noted that "drought-affected women who came to Dadaab informed us that they encountered a number of dangers, including robbery and rape. Unknown armed groups attacked them and robbed them of the little money and the meagre possessions they had with them in order to get to Dadaab". Interviews with IDP women in Dadaab underlined that "even drought-affected women with malnourished and sick children were not spared from robbery and rape".

5.1.12 According to those interviewed, the humanitarian response to drought-affected population's needs in Mogadishu came late. A large number of children and adults died or became critically ill while waiting for assistance. Where assistance was provided it saved lives and had a major impact on suffering. Drought victims reported receiving various forms of assistance: cash relief, food vouchers, WASH, basic healthcare, non-food items and nutrition programmes for children that needed special nutritional support. Vulnerable host communities were also assisted and received food rations, nutritional support and non-food items. One of the drought victims interviewed in Dadaab stressed that "if we had not left Bay and Bakol and come to Mogadishu, we could have all been dead by now". Such assistance enabled them to recover and regain their strength to return to their places of origin and resume their previous livelihoods.

5.1.13 Discussion with UNHCR staff in Dadaab, international and local NGOs and local authorities, including the Somalia National Disaster Management Authority (SNDMA) in Mogadishu, noted that some farmers who were affected and displaced by the drought after recovering from it have returned to their villages and towns when the rains returned.¹¹³ Some former drought refugees have also voluntarily returned from Dadaab and some drought victims in Dadaab and Mogadishu

have sought the support of aid agencies to return to their original places, though mass return is not expected. A number of aid agencies in Mogadishu assisted families that were willing to return with food rations, shelter material and pocket money ranging from USD 100 to 150 per household. There remains a need to establish a comprehensive resettlement programme that will provide assistance to the drought displaced that are ready and willing to return to their places of origin. The TFG, particularly together with the SNDMA, Puntland's Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency and Somaliland's NERAD need to play active roles in working with aid agencies to implement appropriate resettlement programmes.

5.2.0 Working with local and community-based organisations

5.2.1 Due to insecurity and lack of access to South and Central regions, many international aid agencies (UN and INGO) have relied on their local staff and local NGOs to implement projects in drought-affected areas. Local partners' capacities were assessed before they were chosen as partners by UN and INGOs. Discussion with leaders of local actors noted that they received trainings on financial management, project reporting and ways of meeting standards and principles including 'do no harm'. Local NGOs have close contact with drought-affected communities and were able to operate in areas controlled by Al Shabaab.

5.2.2 Interviews with drought-displaced people in Dadaab and Mogadishu suggested that local NGOs shared information about their projects in an accessible manner, including them in the selection of beneficiaries for emergency assistance. The majority of international aid agencies, together with their local partners, established feedback mechanisms to ensure accountability to targeted communities. Such mechanisms enabled the recipient communities to voice their own concerns and submit complaints on the quality of service they received, selection criteria and so on. That said, the agency focus on outputs rather than outcomes may mean that wider effects of aid interventions (positive and negative) are not adequately accounted for in the feedback mechanisms.

5.2.3 Affected communities expressed a desire to be included in the decision-making processes for the coordination mechanisms. Local NGOs and international aid agencies highlighted that they work directly with community leaders¹¹⁴ in all receiving communities in the implementation of their projects. However some community leaders in Dadaab and in Mogadishu stated that they are not included and consulted when programs are designed, planned or implemented. It is essential to promote the participation of men and women in all stages of the project cycle.

5.3.0 Working with local authorities

5.3.1 The protracted armed conflict in Somalia destroyed all previously existing state institutions including early warning and disaster response systems. In response to the 2011 drought, the TFG partially recognised its role and responsibility to contribute to the relief response. It established the SNDMA in August 2011 to coordinate national drought response; but this body lacks the resources and planning capacities to coordinate humanitarian responses. In spite of these challenges the TFG, through its SNDMA-sponsored water-trucking, distributed food aid from OIC and other Islamic

organisations. Interviews with local NGOs confirmed that when operating in TFG controlled areas they cooperate and coordinate well with TFG and local governors, including district commissioners. The SNDMA deserves to be given support and to be included in coordination efforts.

5.4.0 Main findings

- Many of the drought responses in South and Central regions were concentrated in Mogadishu and the Afgooye corridor. Yet the large numbers of drought IDPs in these areas did not receive assistance at the time they most needed it in 2011. When famine came it hit these groups particularly hard.
- Access to newly 'liberated' areas including Baidoa and Beletweyn is still limited and remains a challenge to both local and international aid agencies.
- The humanitarian aid delivered by various actors has helped drought victims in Dadaab, Mogadishu and Hargeisa to recover some of the immediate impacts of the food crisis. Famine may be 'over' in South and Central Somalia, but many displaced drought victims in Dadaab refugee camps, Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Puntland, are still dependent on humanitarian assistance. They will need substantial help if they are to return to settle in their home areas.
- Local agencies have a number of comparative advantages over international actors. Those that lack technical and administrative capacity need support from international sources to build that capacity. This should pay long term dividends.
- Likewise, local authorities deserve support in fulfilling their mandates. Capacity at present is low, but it is essential that legitimate authorities be enabled to take on a primary role in service provision and assistance, and that they are able to be held to account for this role.

Section 6.

Funding, accountability and programme efficiency

6.1.0 Overview of funding issues

6.1.1 This aspect of the RTE was informed by asking to what extent the timing and scale of available funding enabled – or was a constraint – on effective response to the drought crisis.

This involved a consideration of international donor policy in relation to Somalia as well as of the use of the CHF and Emergency Reserve facility. It also involved some consideration of the CAP as a planning tool.

6.1.2 Some of the background to donor attitudes to funding in Somalia is described in section 1 above. Certainly the climate was sceptical and risk averse in 2010, and the CAP 2011 had deliberately been kept modest for that reason. This remained the situation until the declaration of famine in mid-2011. At that point political pressure to respond saw a dramatic shift in both the volume of funding made available and the terms on which it was disbursed.

6.1.3 Funding for the CAP had been slow up until July 2011 and the point at which famine was declared.¹¹⁵ Rather than issue a Flash Appeal for the crisis response, the decision was taken to produce an emergency revision of the CAP, in place of the normal mid-year revision. This had the advantage of ensuring consistency of approach, but the revision came much later than was required. One respondent suggested that the humanitarian system might be ‘trapped’ by the CAP, and that it needed to be seen as an evolving plan rather than being set in stone.

6.1.4 The Emergency Revision of the CAP contained a request for double the amount of the original CAP (USD 1.06 million). Agencies expressed concerns about their capacity to absorb such a large increase in funds in the remaining five months of the year.¹¹⁶ Donors responded quickly and generously, though of the USD 1.3 billion eventually raised only USD 800 million went through the CAP, the rest being given bilaterally to agencies. This relative shift from multilateral to bilateral donations reflected both a desire for swift implementation and perhaps for greater individual donor visibility.¹¹⁷ The re-emergence of the US as a donor was a major factor in the rapid scale up. As one official put it “once famine was declared, everyone treated it like a rapid onset”.¹¹⁸ This organisational change of gear was felt both in donor and agency headquarters, with Somalia rapidly becoming a corporate priority for resourcing. Yet the donors interviewed also recognised that their response came late. As one put it “We have to acknowledge that we missed the crisis”. Yet the same respondent felt that even if more compelling data had been available earlier “we would not have responded until we saw the pictures on the television”.

6.1.5 The CHF was widely felt to have been crucial in allowing some early action in response to the emerging crisis – although as noted above it may also have diverted attention from the necessary scale of response. For the donors, the CHF allows them to transfer risk to the fund administrator. For the agencies, the CHF is a crucial source of funding. Many of those consulted believed that the

CHF had enhanced coordination and widened participation since it was open to local as well as international NGOs. It was closely tied to the CAP, with only projects in the CAP being eligible for CHF funding (though funds allocated from the Emergency Reserve within the CHF are free of this requirement). Many also felt that the approval process for the CHF was too heavy, involving a two month review process through the clusters.¹¹⁹ Indeed some of the cluster coordinators reported spending a large proportion of their time reviewing CHF proposals. As one reported of approval processes generally: 'I estimate with CAP, CHF and ER, I spent approximately 40% of my time in 2011 on fund mobilisation'. It was suggested by one respondent that pre-screening of short form proposals (two to three pages) would speed the CHF process, with only those substantive proposals being reviewed that passed this stage. This seems sensible, though other options should also be considered.

6.1.6 The Emergency Reserve facility within the CHF was also felt to have played a valuable role, although again some felt that the approval process was much too lengthy at six weeks. 'It should only take 3 days' one official remarked.¹²⁰

6.1.7 Many of those consulted felt that the one year planning cycle of the CAP was unhelpful in the context of Somalia and that a longer timeframe for planning was required, despite the volatility of the context.¹²¹ Certainly in relation to the resilience and risk reduction agendas, the necessary interventions need to be conceived over at least two to three years. Whether donor budget cycles would allow such a change to be reflected in budgetary terms is another matter. While some (like DfID in the UK) plan over a three year timeframe, most operate within the standard one year cycle and would struggle to make forward commitments beyond that.¹²² This should not, however, prevent medium-term planning by the humanitarian community in order to locate the annual CAP within a broader timeframe.

6.2.0 Financial accountability

6.2.1 Accountability has been and continues to be a major issue for donors. Fears about lack of accountability, particularly with regard to counter-terrorism legislation, coloured attitudes in 2010 and the first half of 2011. Among individual donors the UK Department for International Development and the European Commission for Humanitarian Aid were singled out for praise by agencies for their relative flexibility in this regard. But it was not until July 2011 that things really changed. From this point there was a noticeable loosening of accountability requirements, reflected also in the licence given by OFAC in the US. 'Famine is different' as one donor representative said. 'Our political masters want us to make it go away by Christmas'.¹²³ Once famine was declared there was pressure to spend quickly. Many worried about this, particularly given the reliance on 'remote control' and the high level of dependence on untried local partners. 'Where was the capacity, where was the accountability?'¹²⁴ Donors were sceptical about claims by agencies to be monitoring through third parties, particularly as some seemed to struggle even to report against outputs. Some worried that the most basic operating principles were being sacrificed.¹²⁵

6.2.2 The accountability agenda also had a bearing on the types of programme funded. For example one major donor official remarked 'We could and should have allowed partners to switch earlier to cash – but there was extreme pressure on accountability and great scepticism about

remote control'.¹²⁶ Cash distribution was acknowledged to be risky though using the *hawala* system was felt in part to mitigate the risk. The main trigger for cash intervention was the lack of access for food distribution and the need for a rapidly scale-able form of programming.

6.2.3 The 'post-famine' period since December 2011 has seen a noticeable change of attitude if not an immediate change of policy by the donors. As one put it 'We can't any longer justify the aid risks we took last year'. The same official felt that his government was likely to get tougher on reporting in 2012.

6.2.4 Current accountability expectations are based on reporting against outputs. This is a modest requirement, although one that is not currently being met consistently. Agencies ought to be able to account for what they and their partners have delivered in a given place at a given time to a defined recipient population. But this is not to say that output reporting is sufficient: the goal should remain accountability for outcomes. While this is difficult to achieve in the current operating environment, some aspects of it should be practically achievable. As a minimum, agencies should take steps to find out what role their assistance is playing in the lives of recipients and how the particular input is used and valued by households; for example, what proportion of the household economy is made up by cash or commodities distributed. Knowing this and how such aid is used is the first step to allowing more needs-responsive programming.

6.3.0 Donor coordination

6.3.1 Coordination among donors was reported to have worked well on an informal basis, though many of the donors consulted felt that the formal HCT donor meetings were not useful or strategic.¹²⁷ One of the striking features of the Somalia drought response has been the involvement of donors from outside the normal group of humanitarian donors. The contributions of OIC members have been very significant, though hard to quantify since they were not coordinated through the mainstream system. Saudi Arabia was a notable exception to this pattern, being the third largest single contributor to the CAP in 2011.

6.4.0 Programme efficiency and the transfer of value

6.4.1 The efficiency of the drought crisis response has been difficult to evaluate in the absence of data on costs. Some of the donors consulted were concerned at the costs associated with long delivery chains involved in providing assistance in South Central Somalia. Some were also concerned at the high cost of maintaining international NGO offices in Nairobi.¹²⁸ One donor official worried at the costs of delivery being budgeted by local partners. 'We know it costs money to provide assistance safely but some of the costs seem inflated'.¹²⁹ The sheer number of individual projects in each cluster was raised by one respondent as an indication of inefficiency, since each had its own related costs. 'We should be funding fewer, larger projects'.¹³⁰

6.4.2 A more general worry expressed by a number of donors concerned the amount of value actually being transferred to the intended beneficiary given the costs of delivery through a chain of agencies, each of which took a share, adding to transaction costs.¹³¹ Some suspected the value

transferred to be worryingly low, but with limited monitoring it was hard to make the judgement. This deserves much closer investigation.

6.4.3 One aspect of efficiency that was more visible was the level of carry forward of funds and stock, which gave an indication of the extent to which agencies had been able to deliver on their commitments. Precise figures were not available to the RTE team. But donor representatives indicated that obstacles to implementation and limited absorptive capacity had meant that there was a higher than usual level of carry forward into 2012. In some cases it was suggested that project budgets were underspent by as much as 20-30%.¹³²

6.5 Main findings

- The lack of available funding in the period August 2010 to June 2011 was a major constraint on early action in response to the crisis.
- Funding made available in July 2011 allowed rapid scale up of the international response on terms that were flexible and appropriate in the circumstances.
- The CHF played a valuable role, although it was not of the size necessary to fund early action on the necessary scale. Over-focus on the CHF distracted attention from the true funding requirements.
- The process of the CHF could still be improved in terms of bureaucracy and speed of proposal review, and options to streamline the process should be considered.
- The one year planning timeframe of the CAP is unduly restrictive. The HCT and other coordination bodies should consider planning on a two-year rolling basis in order to locate the CAP in a wider timeframe.
- Agencies cannot expect to continue to be allowed such latitude in terms of accountability in 2012 as in 2011. Basic standards of monitoring and reporting need to be re-established, if necessary using new methods of oversight.
- Accountability for outputs is currently weak and urgently needs strengthening. The goal should remain accountability against outcomes. As a minimum agencies should take steps to better understand what role their assistance is playing in the lives of recipients.
- The question of efficiency and 'value added' of current approaches to implementation is under scrutiny. Agencies should review their operating costs and ensure that these are justified and comparable to those of their peers.

Section 7.

Managing aid risks, insecurity and restricted access

7.1.0 Managing aid risks in Somalia

7.1.1 The extreme risk aversion of donors in 2010 and 2011 was noted in earlier sections, relating primarily to fears about diversion of aid and providing 'material benefit' to terrorist organisations. Inevitably that risk aversion affected the humanitarian system more generally, compounding fears about staff and operational security. In the end, it took a declaration of famine for concerns about aid-related risks to be outweighed by external considerations – essentially the prospect of mass starvation. The strategic logic may have been flawed, since the risk had already been largely 'realised' at that point: it was too late to avert famine, and the only hope was to stop it spreading and reduce its intensity and duration. But the risk management logic is understandable: however great the risk of diversion or loss of aid, the prospect of continued famine is worse.

7.1.2 This raises a more general point about risk management in a context like Somalia: that institutional risk management has to be understood against the backdrop of contextual risks that aid interventions are designed to tackle.¹³³ While fiduciary risk (e.g. of loss or diversion of aid) is a necessary concern, the parameters within which it is managed have to be set in a way that is appropriate to the context. In this case, many felt that those parameters were too narrow in 2010 and the first half of 2011.¹³⁴ Having been greatly widened in the second half of 2011, including reduced expectations on aid accountability, the expectation is that they will be narrowed again in what is generally seen as a 'post-famine' phase, even though the contextual risks remain high.

7.1.3 The operational humanitarian agencies face multiple risk management challenges, including those related to security and accountability. But the aspect of perhaps greatest significance for this RTE concerns contingency planning. As described in earlier sections, the known external risk factors in late 2010 and early 2011 were such as to signal an exceptionally high risk of a major food security crisis. Given the relatively high probability of that scenario and the catastrophic consequences that would follow if it developed, the imperative in risk management terms was to plan for this worst case scenario. The failure to do so, while understandable given the extreme problems of access and funding, appears in retrospect to represent a failure of appropriate risk management.

7.2.0 Risk management and the role of the Risk Management Unit (RMU)

7.2.1 Following the events of 2010 concerning the withdrawal of WFP and the report of the SMG alleging wide scale diversion of aid and use of contractors with terrorist links (see section 1),

a review of risk management practice in the humanitarian sector was instigated by the in full/HC's office. Pressure from donors, themselves under scrutiny from domestic bodies under counter-terrorist legislation, became intense and a general atmosphere of risk aversion prevailed.¹³⁵

7.2.2 Against this backdrop the RMU was established in the RC's office in Nairobi. The agenda of the RMU concerns the management of aid risks, particularly the fiduciary risks that go with receiving donor funding and being accountable for its proper use. Apart from playing a general advisory role and providing training on risk management, the RMU maintains a database of implementing partners and contractors used by the international system. The main purpose is to allow contracting agencies to share their experience of working with a given partner, thereby (it is hoped) preventing new partnerships from being formed with unreliable or otherwise undesirable partners. Given the extent to which reliance has been placed on these partnerships, and risk essentially transferred to local partners, the database is potentially of great significance.

7.2.3 To date the database is not fully operational and there are considerable data gaps, perhaps because of unwillingness on the part of some agencies to share the relevant information. Some felt that the RMU did not play the role it should have done in the earlier stages of the crisis in providing support and advice to agencies faced with difficult risk management judgements concerning programme choice, including the scaling up of cash-based approaches.¹³⁶ Nevertheless, the initiative is widely agreed to be valuable and is appreciated by the donors, who expressed a desire to receive more feedback on the use of the database and the work of the RMU more generally.¹³⁷ As donor accountability requirements tighten, as they are likely to do, the question of due diligence in partnerships is likely to become more significant.

7.3.0 Security management and the role of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UN DSS)

7.3.1 Somalia has become the most dangerous operating environment in the world for aid agencies over the past few years.¹³⁸ Security management has therefore become one of the most pressing concerns for implementing agencies, including those operating by 'remote control', since their local staff face considerable danger through association. The business of security management has become notably more professional in recent years. For UN agencies, the responsible body on security is UN DSS which inter alia is responsible for setting Minimum Operational Security Standards (MOSS) for a given country and field location. The HC is the designated official for Somalia, and the working relationship between HC and UN DSS appears to be a good one. There is also reported to be good cooperation between UN and NGOs through the Saving Lives Together initiative.¹³⁹

7.3.2 Having visited Mogadishu and seen the security apparatus at first hand, and having discussed security arrangements elsewhere in Somalia, the RTE team concluded that every effort was being made by DSS Somalia to create an enabling environment for the humanitarian mission, despite the difficulties of the operating environment. This has not always been the team's experience in other country contexts. Many of the difficulties encountered by staff in Mogadishu e.g. in travelling out from the UN compound, were related to reliance on infrequent AMISOM escorts. The security of humanitarian personnel appears not to have been a priority for AMISOM, and for too long staff have

largely been confined to their compound – with significant impact on their ability to address the urgent needs of IDPs and others in and around Mogadishu. Active steps are being taken to reduce dependence on this force.¹⁴⁰ In parallel with this, civil-military coordination is being strengthened on the humanitarian side both with respect to AMISOM and other forces operating in Somalia.

7.3.3 For their part NGOs organise their own security, where necessary contracting local militia. In the HCT they expressed the need to coordinate with AMISOM but wanted OCHA to act as a ‘firewall’.¹⁴¹ One of the concerns is the encroachment of AMISOM into the humanitarian arena. The UN and NGOs are united in insisting the IASC guidelines on the use of military assets be respected.

7.4.0 Securing access

7.4.1 Lack of secure access was by far the greatest operational constraint facing the humanitarian response to the crisis. Opinion was divided among those consulted on whether the HC and OCHA could have done more to negotiate safe access to South Central Somalia during this time. Some felt the HC could have done more to facilitate access both with TFG/AMISOM and with other political and military actors. Others felt that he and the OCHA head of office had done all they reasonably could in this respect; and some (particularly the INGOs) said they did not want to have UN officials negotiating on their behalf.¹⁴² At the HCT meeting of July 14 2011, a twin track approach was agreed with regard to negotiating access: the HC would lead dialogue at the central level, while agencies would continue to carry out humanitarian negotiations at regional and local level. Both would use the established ground rules.¹⁴³ This followed the statement by Al Shabaab on July 6 that ‘Muslim and non-Muslim’ agencies ‘whose objective is only humanitarian relief are free to operate’ in Al Shabaab territory in liaison with the Al Shabaab drought committee. The statement appeared to be rescinded after the UN declaration of famine and subsequent lifting of US funding restrictions.¹⁴⁴

7.4.2 On the question of the extent of access at different times, this was a matter of surprising divergence of views¹⁴⁵ – perhaps because of differences as to what is meant by ‘access’. The views expressed also differed by agency type and the mode of aid engagement. INGOs tended to be more optimistic about being able to access areas including those controlled by Al Shabaab, although they were subject to serious restrictions and repeated attempts to tax aid deliveries. Indeed, some expressed the view that working in Al Shabaab-controlled areas was more secure and predictable than working in some other contested areas of Somalia, including those supposed to be controlled by the TFG.¹⁴⁶ For the most part, only local staff were able to operate in these areas throughout the crisis period; though following the agency bans in November 2011, even these staff were unable to operate.

7.4.3 The lasting effect of the multi-agency ban by Al Shabaab in November 2011 remained uncertain at the time at which the RTE was being conducted (February 2012). The ban has not been uniformly enforced and some agencies appear to be able to work through local affiliates. Others have had to stop or relocate their programmes.¹⁴⁷ The ban on the ICRC in January 2012 has potentially far reaching consequences, though the nature and extent of the ban remains unclear.¹⁴⁸ Just as significant for access may be the effect of the current military offensives, the capture of territory by AMISOM and Ethiopian forces and a resulting change of tactics by Al Shabaab. Some indeed fear a return to the ‘warlordism’ of the past decade and renewed clan-based feuding.¹⁴⁹

7.5.0 Main findings

- The failure to plan for the worst case scenario in late 2010 and early 2011 was a serious risk management failure.
- The establishment of the RMU and its database of partners is an important initiative, not least for its potential to establish greater confidence in the due diligence process in partner selection. It has yet to fully prove its worth in practice.
- UNDSS has played a constructive role in seeking to enable humanitarian action in Somalia during the crisis response and in designing appropriate MOSS. It has some way to go in helping establish alternative security arrangements in Mogadishu and elsewhere to the previous AMISOM-dependent arrangements.
- Responsibility for negotiating access has been a sensitive subject. The RTE team conclude that the role played by the HC and OCHA head of office in this regard was an appropriate one, and that division of responsibilities between HC, OCHA and agencies has been pragmatic if not always clearly understood.
- The effect of the agency bans remains uncertain, but puts an even greater significance on effective contingency planning, given the range of possible scenarios in 2012 and beyond. The significant absence of WFP from much of South Central Somalia is now compounded by the banning of most UN agencies and many INGOs, creating a potentially disastrous capacity gap.

Section 8.

Conclusions & Recommendations

8.1.1 General conclusions

General conclusion 1:

Famine was not inevitable, nor was the scale of human suffering caused by the drought crisis. The political and military actors (Somali and international) whose conduct restricted people's access to humanitarian assistance bear primary responsibility for the failure to respond earlier and more decisively. Earlier action could have prevented or at least substantially mitigated the worst aspects of the crisis, but this did not happen on the scale required. The reasons are largely political, but the international humanitarian system (including the donors) itself shares some responsibility for this failure. While some important early action was taken using available pooled funds, it was not on the scale required by the situation.

August 2010 and June 2011

There was a systemic failure of contingency planning and early action in response to the emergent crisis in Somalia in late 2010 and early 2011. This was a failure both of preventive action and of early relief, the combination of which could have mitigated some of the worst aspects of the crisis. While many external factors made early action difficult, including major constraints on funding and access, the responsible mechanisms of the humanitarian system – including the HCT and ICWG – did not function as well as they should have done to ensure the necessary change of strategy at the time required, in spite of the weight of early warning evidence available to them. In particular, the absence of WFP from South Central Somalia and the lack of any compensating food security mechanism were underestimated as critical risk factors.

General conclusion 2:

The famine response when it came was proportionate and appropriate, though the extent of effective implementation is still uncertain, as is the impact of the response on the overall situation. Scaled-up implementation came well after the crisis had peaked in mid-2011 but it appears to have had at least a substantial mitigating effect on the scale and intensity of the food and livelihoods crisis, and to have prevented the spread of famine to Gedo region.

July to November 2011

Declaring famine in July 2011 was the right decision. The subsequent planning (CAP revision) and scale up by HCT and clusters, in close discussion with donors, was impressive. The change of food

security strategy, particularly use of market-based interventions like cash and vouchers, appears to have been appropriate and fears of major inflationary effects proved unfounded. Nevertheless by the time a scaled up response was mounted (September – November), the peak of the crisis had passed. While the interventions provided essential relief to populations in South Central Somalia, it is hard to judge on the available evidence whether they had a more profound impact on the course of famine. More work is required to determine this.

General conclusion 3:

Though famine conditions have passed, the situation remains critical for hundreds of thousands of Somalis. The potential for rapid deterioration remains, and delivery capacity has been seriously compromised by the Al Shabaab bans. The humanitarian agencies and donors need to take urgent action to plan for the potential contingencies in 2012 and beyond.

January 2012 to date, and the outlook for 2012

Despite good *Deyr* rains in late 2011, the situation remains volatile and dangerous for many communities particularly in South Central Somalia. The political and security situation is in flux. This, together with the agency bans imposed by Al Shabaab in late 2011, render the capacity of the international humanitarian system to operate effectively even more uncertain than in 2011. To date (end of February 2012) there do not appear to be effective 'global' contingency plans in place nor a clear plan to deal with the effect of agency bans in Al Shabaab areas.

8.1.2 Conclusions against the evaluation criteria

Timeliness: The initial response was not timely: there was a major failure of early response. The subsequent scale up in response to the famine situation was swift, but the lag in implementation meant that the peak of the crisis was missed by some months.

Proportionality: Early responses were clearly not proportionate to need. The response to the post-July situation was much more so, although operational constraints meant patchy coverage.

Appropriateness: The switch to market-based food security interventions appears to have been warranted. Considerable innovation was shown in the post-July response. The medium-term resilience agenda is crucial but needs better configuration with relief modes.

Efficiency: The cost of delivery through local partners appears to have been very high in some cases. The actual value transferred to affected communities and individual households is uncertain due to lack of follow-up. A large under-spend on many 2011 budgets and unused stocks reflects the challenge of absorption capacity in the prevailing environment in South Central Somalia.

Accountability: Accountability standards ('up' and 'down') were met only to a limited extent in South Central areas. This is one of weakest aspects of the response and this cannot all be attributed to operational constraints. With heavy dependence on local partner delivery and reporting, significant quality control and monitoring issues were reported. Donors showed flexibility but there is growing pressure to improve this aspect of programming.

Effectiveness: Definite conclusions about impact e.g. of cash and voucher interventions cannot be

drawn from the available evidence¹⁵⁰ – although there was substantial and demonstrable reduction in known risk factors in the main areas of focus. Little evidence is available on outcomes, and even outputs remain uncertain.

8.2.0 Thematic conclusions and recommendations

8.2.1 Early warning and needs assessment

Overall conclusion: Formal early warning information systems worked largely as intended, though the response was weak. These systems are only one part of what is required. Needs assessment generally is the responsibility of humanitarian agencies, clusters and related coordination mechanisms (including OCHA). Joint needs assessment and cross-Cluster analysis is weak.

Recommendations:

1. A joint needs assessment process (situation and response analysis) should be established independently of FSNAU and FEWS NET, coordinated through a designated sub-group of the ICWG. A light review by the ICWG of existing needs assessment and information gathering mechanisms and requirements is suggested as a basis for this.
2. ICWG and clusters should be formally tasked with needs assessment and cross-sector analysis in response to major crises, facilitated by OCHA and reporting to HCT. INGOs and UN agencies should dedicate senior experts (including external experts as appropriate) to participate in this process.
3. Urgent priority should be given to establishing surveillance systems for nutrition, health and WASH in Somalia. This should be considered in tandem with the recommendation to establish decentralised cluster hubs. For WASH, the proposed 'live map' of water sources is an important initiative that should be funded.

8.2.2 Joint strategy, policy and planning

Overall conclusion: There was a systemic failure of early response by agencies and donors in terms of preventive action and early relief. Neither the HCT nor the ICWG showed the strategic leadership required to change course to allow a timely and proportionate response to the crisis. It is suggested that strategic decisions of this kind may need to be 'forced' onto the agenda for consideration by the HCT when certain situational criteria are met.

This is related to the lack of contingency planning for early action. Over-emphasis on the CHF risks diverting attention from the necessary scale of planning and funding needed both for early action in response to major county-wide crises as well as for the essential resilience agenda. In a context as vulnerable as that of South Central Somalia, the failure of one rainy season, together with other risk factors should put the whole system on high alert. Specifically:

- It should trigger immediate consideration by the HCT of the need to implement a short-term livelihood support package, based on existing programmes and prepared in advance (costed and agreed with donors).
- It should be the subject of a detailed (costed) contingency plan for a major scale up of lifesav-

ing activities, to be adapted and activated against certain criteria – worked out in collaboration with donors – including failure of subsequent second rains.

Recommendations:

1. Costed contingency plans should, as a matter of priority, be drawn up for:
 - (i) A large scale 'preventive' package of livelihood support to be implemented against agreed criteria, including the failure of a single rainy season.
 - (ii) A major relief response to be triggered against agreed criteria, including the failure of a second consecutive rainy season. This is a matter for both the HCT, ICWG and clusters in close collaboration with the major donors.
2. The HCT and ICWG should review their respective mandates and working practices, particularly with regard to strategic decision making and cross-sector analysis, in the light of the findings of the RTE.
3. The role of the OCHA-based Inter-Cluster Coordinator should be strengthened by upgrading the post and appointing a senior person with strong leadership and facilitation skills.
4. The specific demands of meeting the needs of displaced and host communities in urban settings should be reviewed by the ICWG. A commissioned cross-sectoral study might assist in this analysis.

8.2.3 Joint operational structures and processes

Overall conclusion: Coordination mechanisms have strengthened since 2009, but neither the HCT, ICWG nor the clusters play the strategic role they should. Individual agency agendas dominate and strategic decisions are being avoided. The INGOs are semi-detached. Field level coordination is weak and cluster coordination is top-down. A review of information needs and information management is needed in order to try to rationalise current overwhelming information demands. The basis of performance evaluation also needs to be reviewed.

Recommendations:

1. A shift of gravity is required towards field-level coordination. Either Mogadishu should be established as a full zonal hub for South Central Somalia, or else a network of field-based sub-regional hubs should be established as soon as practicable.
2. Clusters and Cluster Coordinators should devote more time to joint planning and less to proposal vetting for the CAP, CHF and ER.
3. Clearer lines of accountability and decision making need to be established between HCT, ICWG and clusters Clusters – and within the clusters themselves. The matrix drawn up by the ICWG should be either endorsed by the HCT or revised.
4. The issue of INGO participation in clusters should be addressed as part of a more general review of cluster performance. OCHA should initiate a process of consultation on this.
5. A light independent review of information needs and processes should be undertaken with a view to resolving the current system overload. The HCT should request OCHA to commission this.

8.2.4 Working with others

Overall conclusion: A closer working relationship with local agencies and local authorities will be necessary to deliver on both relief and resilience agendas. Where local capacity (technical and administrative) is weak, partnerships should allow for practical steps to be taken to strengthen capacity over time. More can also be done to build relationships with OIC bodies. Most importantly, new ways of engaging with communities over time and establishing trust is a prerequisite for successful intervention in the longer term.

Many of the drought responses in South and Central regions were concentrated in Mogadishu and the Afgooye corridor. Yet the large numbers of drought IDPs in these areas did not receive assistance at the time they most needed it in 2011. When famine came it hit these groups particularly hard.

Recommendations

1. Establish a harmonisation mechanism with OIC in Mogadishu, at both general and sectoral coordination levels.
2. In light of the growing dependence on local capacities, the HCT should task the clusters through the ICWG with conducting a local capacity review by region taking account of capacity in key sectors.
3. On the basis of the above review the HCT should ask OCHA to draw up an investment plan for capacity strengthening in key areas in discussion with partners and donors.

8.2.5 Funding, accountability and programme efficiency

Overall conclusion: The lack of available funding in the period August 2010 to June 2011 was a major constraint on early action in response to the crisis. Funding made available in July 2011 allowed rapid scale up on terms that were flexible and appropriate in the circumstances. The CHF played a valuable role, although it was not of the size necessary to fund early action on the necessary scale and the approval process remains too cumbersome. Accountability remains very weak and current (weak) reporting against outputs is no substitute for reporting against outcomes.

A general worry expressed by a number of donors concerned the amount of value actually being transferred to the intended beneficiary, given the costs of delivery. Some suspected the value transferred to be worryingly low, but with limited monitoring it was hard to make the judgement. This deserves much closer investigation.

Recommendations:

1. Output reporting is currently weak and needs urgent attention if the most basic accountability standards are to be met. OCHA should discuss with agencies and clusters the problems involved and ways of resolving them.
2. More investment is needed in assessing outcomes, linked to efforts to improve needs

assessment. As a minimum, agencies should take steps to understand what role their assistance is playing in the lives of recipients. Action on this could be linked to the proposed review of 'value transfer' proposed below.

3. OCHA should be asked by the HCT to propose options for speeding up and simplifying the review process for CHF proposals. A 'pre-screening' system for proposals is suggested as one possible option.
4. The HCT should instigate a study on the question of 'value transfer' through current programme modalities in Somalia, to shed light on the relative efficiency and effectiveness of different modes of programming. OCHA should be asked to propose terms of reference for such a study and to commission it, with due reference to existing programme evaluations such as that commissioned by UNICEF on the use of cash and vouchers.
5. The HCT and other coordination bodies should consider planning on a two-year rolling basis in order to locate the CAP in a wider timeframe.

8.2.6 Managing aid risks, insecurity and restricted access

Overall conclusion: Risk management is at the heart of the challenges facing managers in relation to Somalia. A high degree of risk aversion characterised donor and agency policy in 2010 and first half 2011. The famine response represented a reversal of attitudes that came later than it should have done given the known risk factors. The failure to plan for the worst case scenario in late 2010 and early 2011 was a serious risk management failure.

The attitude of UNDSS to enabling access has been positive, but practice is often too restrictive, in part because of AMISOM restrictions. Mogadishu and surrounds is one example where more freedom of movement is warranted and urgently needed. The current division of labour access negotiation between the HC and agencies seems appropriate. Given the increasing reliance on local partners, due diligence is essential and RMU has an important role to play in this.

Recommendations:

1. The HCT should review its approach to risk management in relation to the external risk environment, and should adapt its planning processes accordingly.
2. The RMU should consult users about the database of partners concerning the practical utility of this resource and should take steps to adapt it accordingly.
3. Urgent steps are needed to ensure greater freedom of operation in Mogadishu and newly-cleared areas of South Central Somalia. This is likely to require security arrangements that are not exclusively or mainly dependent on AMISOM.

End Notes.

1. Joint press release FSNAU/FEWS-NET 5th September 2011; UK DfID Aid Factsheet 28th January 2012. Such extremely broad estimates of mortality give an indication of the highly speculative nature of much information about Somalia.
2. No precise distinction can be made between the 'drought' displaced and those displaced mainly by conflict and other factors. It seems safe to say that a combination of primarily economic factors including loss of purchasing power and livelihood collapse, together with the absence of compensating relief, accounted for the majority of Somalis displaced in 2011. This estimate takes into account numbers of 'drought displaced' into Kenya (Dadaab) and Ethiopia (Dollo Ado) in 2011, as estimated by UNHCR; as well as the numbers of those displaced to Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia during the course of the year.
3. For the purposes of this report, the international humanitarian system is taken to include relevant international donors and common funds, UN agencies and offices, the International Red Cross/Red Crescent movement, international NGOs, and related coordination structures like the Humanitarian Country Team and sectoral Clusters. The question of how well these actors and structures engaged with the relevant national and local actors is one of the questions addressed in the RTE.
4. Interviews Nairobi
5. Desk analysis in support of the RTE was conducted under the supervision of Dr Hugo Slim at the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, part of the Department of Politics and International Relations at Oxford University. The lead researcher was Emma Lochery, D.Phil candidate in politics. The main topics of analysis were the patterns of forced migration relating to the drought crisis, and the relationship between Al Shabbab and the international humanitarian system.
6. A report of that workshop is separately available from OCHA Evaluation and Guidance Section in New York
7. Report commissioned by the IASC/Humanitarian Country Team for Somalia, available at the OCHA Somalia website
8. See for example the ODI/HPG paper 'Humanitarian space in Somalia: a scarce commodity' (April 2012) at <http://reliefweb.int/node/493457>
9. Interviews Nairobi
10. Interviews Nairobi
11. Source: Humanitarian funding analysis for Somalia - OCHA, March 2011 (at OCHA Online)
12. The lifting of US restrictions was in part a response to a declaration from Al Shabaab in early July 2011 that assistance would now be accepted in areas under its control, even from non-Moslem actors. That declaration was subsequently rescinded after the US announcement.
13. HCT Minutes: 10 March 2011; 9 January 2012
14. HCT 10 March 2011
15. These include the IASC 'Negotiation Ground Rules', the NGO Position Paper on Operating Principles and Red Lines, and the UNCT Policy on Humanitarian Engagement, all drawn up in 2009. None appears to have been consistently applied (see ODI paper cited above.)
16. Interview WFP Nairobi .
17. This includes GAM rates routinely over 15% in parts of southern Somalia. During the conduct of the RTE, the FSNAU technical director warned about this tendency to 'normalise' such unacceptably high levels of malnutrition, disease and death. This is a subject point that has been forcefully repeatedly raised in the past by Mark Bradbury, the British expert on Somalia: see for example 'Normalising the crisis in Africa' - Disasters Journal, 22(4) ODI/Blackwell Publishing, 1998.
18. Interviews in Hargeisa. Lower figure from UNDP 2005; higher from government sources.
19. FSNAU/FEWS NET East Africa Food Security Alert – March 15 2011
20. Interview Nairobi.
21. This was also a reflection of the poor donor funding climate, and a deliberate move to present a more 'modest' package to a sceptical donor audience.
22. IASC/ICWG 21 January 2010
23. Somalia Water and Land Information Management
24. Interview Nairobi.
25. Interview Nairobi
26. Monitoring, July 25 2011
27. One respondent suggested that this was because resources in these facilities were so limited that people had stopped attending

28. In January 2011, around 24,200 IDPs arrived in Mogadishu, which was at the time still largely under Al Shabaab control with only limited areas controlled by the TFG. The reasons remain somewhat uncertain. After the merging of Hisbul Islam into Al Shabaab in December 2010, the Afgooye corridor was under Al Shabaab control. Roland Marchal writes that many people may have moved from the Afgooye corridor back to TFG area in Mogadishu because "While they knew how to deal with Hisbul Islaam militias without changing their social habits, the take-over by al-Shabaab was not a promise of compromise." See Roland Marchal, "The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujaheddin in Somalia", March 2011, report available at <http://www.ceri-sciences-po.org/ressource/shabaab.pdf>, p.
29. Interview Nairobi.
30. Interview Nairobi
31. Interviews Nairobi
32. Interviews Nairobi, Mogadishu
33. Interview Nairobi
34. Interview Nairobi
35. See for example the work of the IASC Needs Assessment Task Force and the development of the MIRA tool
36. See report referenced above in note 6 above DARA evaluation, p.65 (Recommendation 16)
37. Interviews Nairobi; feedback on first draft RTE report.
38. It should also be noted that Al Shabaab were highly suspicious of the activities of those undertaking assessments and collecting data, as reflected in the letter of 28 November 2011 in which they announced the ban on sixteen agencies.
39. See separate report of workshop.
40. Interview Nairobi.
41. On the background to this, see minutes of 'Inter-Cluster Strategy Meeting on Addressing Food Crisis and Malnutrition in Southern Somalia' 28th June 2011.
42. In this context, it is worth noting the substance of the IASC Transformative Agenda, including the emphasis on improved strategic planning at the country level that 'clarifies the collective results that the humanitarian community sets out to achieve and identifies how clusters and organizations will contribute to them' (Chapeau and Compendium of Actions, 19 January 2012)
43. Donor interviews Nairobi
44. IASC 9th September 2010
45. IASC/ICWG 25 November 2010
46. ibid
47. ibid
48. IASC 27 January 2011
49. HCT/ICWG February 24th 2011
50. ibid
51. HCT/ICWG March 24th 2011
52. Draft Country Portfolio Evaluation for Somalia (May 2012) – WFP, Rome
53. The crisis curve is based on a number of factors including distress migration figures patterns, malnutrition and mortality figures and changes in food prices. The funding curve is essentially an accurate representation of the pattern of funding through the year, based on figures from OCHA of funding flows through the year. The response curve is an approximation based on evidence from interviews – reliable data on implementation was not available to the RTE team.
54. Interviews with HC and OCHA head of office
55. Consolidated Appeal Emergency Revision – August 2011 (UN OCHA)
56. ibid
57. Interview Nairobi
58. Comment at Nairobi workshop to discuss provisional results of RTE
59. Interview Nairobi
60. Interviews Nairobi

61. IASC January 13th 2011
62. HCT ad hoc meeting June 20th 2011
63. HCT/ICWG July 28th 2011
64. The question of what package of interventions might have had this pre-emptive effect is a matter of some debate, although most agree that livelihood support to vulnerable agro-pastoralists, including livestock interventions, would have been a central component. Oddly, the discussion around the mid-year review of the CAP included a call for 'early action' to be included in the review.
65. HCT/ICWG April 24th 2011
66. Interviews Nairobi
67. 'Food Market and Supply Conditions in South Somalia', WFP 2012
68. HCT ad hoc meeting 25th July 2011
69. IASC 'Transformative Agenda - Chapeau and Compendium of Actions, 19 January 2012'
70. ibid
71. ICWG January 18th 2012
72. See <http://onerresponse.info/GlobalClusters/Agriculture/publicdocuments/Proposal%20for%20Implementing%20Plan%20of%20Action%20for%20Horn%20of%20Africa.pdf>
73. ibid
74. HCT/ICWG July 28th 2011
75. Interview Nairobi
76. See also DARA evaluation, 52 and 54.
77. Interviews Hargeisa, Mogadishu, Nairobi
78. Interviews Nairobi
79. It should be noted that two of the three groups declared to be in famine conditions in July 2011 were the Mogadishu and Afgooye corridor displaced populations. That said, it should also be recognised that these areas were largely under Al Shabaab control until August 2011.
80. Interview Hargeisa
81. For its part, the Health Cluster intends to appoint a Cluster coordinator in Mogadishu at the same level as Nairobi's Cluster coordinator.
82. Commercial flights to Mogadishu have increased.
83. In this context, it is interesting to note that in 2006 the health and nutrition clusters decided to merge at field level: see IASC (Nov 2, 2006) GRUNEWALD, F. & Team. Somalia: Real Time Evaluation of the 2006 Emergency Response, p. 23.
84. Interviews Nairobi
85. This appeared to be the consensus view at the workshop held in Nairobi in February 2012 to review the provisional findings of the RTE.
86. Interviews Nairobi
87. Interview Nairobi
88. Interview Nairobi
89. Interview Nairobi
90. Interviews Nairobi
91. Interview Nairobi
92. Interview Nairobi
93. Feedback on draft RTE report
94. ibid
95. Interview Nairobi

96. See DARA evaluation, p. 22. In fact, monitoring on the basis of outputs is still relatively new to the CAP system worldwide.
97. Some efforts are already underway to address these issues. UNICEF's Humanitarian Performance Management System is one such.
98. The RTE team was not able to establish the amount of OIC-member funding, though it is known to be substantial. The contribution of Saudi Arabia alone (USD 58.8 million) was the third largest individual donor contribution to the 2011 CAP.
99. See http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/ocha_R24c_C193_Y2011_asof___1203291627.pdf
100. Previous droughts have tended to affect specific regions but the 2011 drought affected the entire country.
101. There is no reliable data to indicate the percentage of livestock lost in the 2011 drought. Discussion with pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in Dadaab estimate the percentage of livestock perished as around 90 per cent. There were no de-stocking programmes in Puntland, Somaliland and South and Central. Pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in drought hit areas say they 'helplessly watched their livestock die'.
102. Drought victims that came to Mogadishu were settling in inhabitable and destroyed buildings in the city while others who could not find space built temporary shelters in open fields.
103. Local NGOs made appeals to business groups and members of Somali diaspora to assist their brothers and sisters affected by the drought.
104. The Somali diaspora have been supporting family members left behind in Somalia for over two decades. When the drought crisis hit Somalia, they donated unquantified additional sums for the drought victims.
105. This includes school children and women involved in small scale businesses.
106. The exact amounts of resources collected by these entities are unknown and are un-documented.
107. WFP reports that in some areas, NGOs refused to take WFP food (feedback on RTE draft report)
108. Interviews Mogadishu
109. There are no official statistics available that can verify the number of deaths caused by the drought and famine in Somalia.
110. These regions are in South and Central Somalia where the drought hit hard and access to deliver humanitarian was challenged due to AS's ban.
111. Interviews Dadaab
112. NERAD is an agency established in 2004 and given a mandate to respond to humanitarian crisis occurring in Somaliland by then government in Somaliland.
113. Those who voluntarily returned are men and older boys, returning to farm while women and children are left behind in IDP camps.
114. DP community committees / leaders consist of more men than women.
115. Ref funding trends paper from OCHA
116. HCT/ICWG July 28th 2011
117. Donor interview Nairobi
118. Donor interview Nairobi
119. This point was raised also in the DARA evaluation
120. Interview Nairobi
121. Interviews Nairobi
122. Donor interviews Nairobi
123. Interview Nairobi
124. ibid
125. Donor interview Nairobi
126. Donor interview Nairobi
127. Donor interviews Nairobi
128. One senior NGO representative made the counter case as follows: 'For us, working in AS areas, Nairobi is a safe haven. If we were in Mogadishu we would be associated with the TFG agenda. For the same reason we have to be careful working 'cleared' areas'.

129. Interview Nairobi
130. Interview Nairobi
131. This subject is also covered in the DARA evaluation (p.63, para 179)
132. Donor lnterview Nairobi
133. On this topic, see the 2011 OECD paper Aid Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts at <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/17/47672264.pdf>
134. Interviews Nairobi
135. Donor lnterviews Nairobi
136. Interviews Nairobi; feedback on draft RTE report.
137. Donor lnterviews Nairobi
- [138. Ref Stoddard et al]
139. Interviews Nairobi, Mogadishu. See Saving Lives Together: A Framework for improving Security Arrangements among IGOs, NGOs and the UN in the Field (2010 revision) – UNDSS, New York (www.saving-lives-together.org)
140. HCT October 18th 2011
141. HCT August 11th 2011
142. Interviews Nairobi
143. The ‘Negotiation Ground Rules’ established by the country IASC in 2009
144. Ref Zimmerman (2011); ReliefWeb
145. See for example HCT May 26th 2011
146. Interviews Nairobi; Mogadishu. According to both Roland Marchal and the International Crisis Group, the presence of Al Shabaab in some areas quelled longstanding inter-clan fighting. When Al Shabaab leaves those areas, these conflicts may re-emerge.
147. NGO interviews Nairobi
148. HCT February 1st 2012
- [149. Refs Marchal etc]
150. A collaborative evaluation has been commissioned by UNICEF and its partners covering the programmes funded by the larger donors through nine NGOs.

ANNEXES

REAL-TIME EVALUATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE HORN OF AFRICA DROUGHT CRISIS

**SOMALIA
2011–2012**

VALID

James Darcy, Paul Bonard, Shukria Dini

**Evaluation commissioned by
the Inter Agency Standing Committee**

MAY 2012

Funding for the evaluation was provided by
UNICEF, OCHA, UNHCR, WFP, FAO and Save the Children



Annex 1. Matrix of findings and recommendations

Topic	Main findings	Recommendations
Early warning and assessment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The early warning mechanisms largely performed as they were designed to, giving detailed and accurate early warning advice – and urging appropriate contingency planning. b. The warnings were not responded to by the humanitarian agencies or the donors in such a way as to allow timely and proportionate preparedness, planning and early response. c. Needs assessment has been largely neglected, with undue reliance on early warning systems that are not designed to provide an assessment of needs d. The Inter-Cluster Working Group did not provide a ‘joined up’ analysis of the evolving crisis in late 2010/early 2011 and should have been tasked to do so by the HCT e. The current outlook for early warning is poor. With FSNAU enumerators now banned, nutritional surveys are currently not possible. It is urgent to try to fill this gap. f. There is also an urgent need for establishment of health (disease) and WASH surveillance. The 3-5 year plan developed by the WASH Strategic Advisory Group identified the lack of needs assessment as a key gap and includes the priority action of having a “live map” of water sources across Somalia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A joint needs assessment process (situation & response analysis) should be established independently of FSNAU and FEWS NET, coordinated through a designated sub-group of the ICWG. A light review by the ICWG of existing needs assessment and information gathering mechanisms and requirements is suggested as a basis for this. 2. ICWG and Clusters should be formally tasked with needs assessment and cross-sector analysis in response to major crises, facilitated by OCHA and reporting to HCT. INGOs and UN agencies should dedicate senior experts (including external experts as appropriate) to participate in this process. 3. Urgent priority should be given to establishing surveillance systems for nutrition, health and WASH in Somalia. This should be considered in tandem with the recommendation to establish decentralised cluster hubs.
Joint strategy and planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. There was a systemic failure of early response by agencies and donors, both in terms of preventive action and early relief. b. The failure of the implementing agencies to make joint contingency plans (at an early stage of the crisis) for major scale up in response to drought was a serious omission, given the foreseeable consequences of the failure of the 2011 gu rains. The issue was raised on several occasions in HCT but not acted on. Having actionable plans in place, with donor agreement on funding criteria, could in theory have brought action forward by several months. That said, many factors may have combined to prevent this, including donor unwillingness and access issues. c. In relation to the drought crisis, neither the HCT nor the ICWG showed the strategic leadership required to change course in way that would have allowed timely response to the crisis. Decisions about scaled-up response were delayed until the extremity of the crisis became undeniable and the external pressure to act became intense. d. The ICWG was dominated by operational issues and briefings which left little space for inter-Cluster strategic planning in response to the crisis. It is not currently configured to play the strategic role that it could and should. e. Ideological battles contributed to a failure to resolve issues about programme approach – and specifically about the use of cash and vouchers – until the famine declaration forced the issue. This prevented earlier use of such approaches at a time when they might have had more preventive effect 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Costed contingency plans should, as a matter of priority, be drawn up for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) A large scale ‘preventive’ package of livelihood support to be implemented against agreed criteria, including in the event of the failure of a single rainy season. ii) A major relief response to be triggered against agreed criteria, including the failure of a second consecutive rainy season. This is a matter for both the ICWG and HCT, ICWG and clusters, in close collaboration with the major donors. 2. The HCT and ICWG urgently need to review their respective mandates and working >

Joint strategy and planning cont'd	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> f. Over-focus on the use of available resources – in particular the CHF – contributed to a failure to anticipate and react to the scale of the impending crisis, which was of a different order of magnitude to the resources then available. g. Following the famine declaration and release of new funds, the HCT became noticeably more focused and business-like. The revision of the CAP, coordinated by OCHA, was achieved swiftly and effectively once the decision to do so was taken. h. The lack of overarching strategy and the increasingly bilateral approach of donors and major agencies led to some fragmentation of response plans and the by-passing of Clusters as the scale up proceeded in the second half of 2011. i. It is essential that the ICWG annual contingency plan include the possible requirement for a radical re-alignment of strategic priorities and resource requirements, and that the donors be closely involved in this discussion. It is also essential that the HCT (including thereby the main agencies) should ultimately 'own' the contingency planning process and be committed to it. j. Responding to needs in urban areas appears to have been a relative weakness in the crisis response. The specific demands of meeting the needs of displaced and host communities in urban settings should be reviewed by the ICWG. 	<p>practices, particularly with regard strategic decision making and cross-sector analysis, in the light of the findings of the RTE.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. The role of the OCHA-based Inter-Cluster Coordinator should be strengthened by upgrading the post and appointing a senior person with strong leadership and facilitation skills.
Coordination structures and processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. The issue of establishing a decentralised humanitarian hub or hubs for South Central Somalia needs to be addressed in the near future. Two basic alternatives are proposed. b. A frank exchange is called for between Cluster lead agencies, Cluster coordinators and NGOs concerning the working of Clusters and the participation of INGOs. It is essential that the issue of participation is resolved if the Cluster model is to work in the Somalia context. c. A review of information needs and information management is needed, in order to try and streamline information demands and achieve greater buy-in for the essential processes of information collection and communication. d. Current performance evaluation is heavily oriented towards coverage and output indicators. In a context where shocks are recurrent and where building resilience is an acknowledged priority, increased attention to the question of both short and medium-term impact of interventions appears essential, in the context of a more strategic approach by Clusters, ICWG and HCT. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A shift of gravity is required towards field-level coordination. Either Mogadishu should be established as full zonal hub for South Central Somalia, or else a network of field-based sub-regional hubs should be established as soon as practicable. 2. Clusters and Cluster Coordinators should devote more time to joint planning and less to proposal vetting for the CAP, CHF and ER allocations. 3. Clearer lines of accountability and decision making need to be established between HCT, ICWG and Clusters – and within these bodies themselves. The matrix drawn up by the ICWG should be either endorsed by the HCT or revised. 4. The issue of INGO participation in Clusters should be addressed as part of a more general review of Cluster performance. OCHA should initiate a process of consultation on this. 5. A light independent review of information needs and processes should be undertaken with a view to resolving the current system overload. The HCT should request OCHA to commission this.
Working with others: communities, local agencies, government bodies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Many of the drought responses in South and Central regions were concentrated in Mogadishu and the Afgooye corridor. Yet the large numbers of drought IDPs in these areas did not receive assistance at the time they most needed it in 2011. When famine came, it hit these groups particularly hard. b. Access to newly 'liberated' areas including Baidoa, Beledweyne is still limited and remains a challenge to both local and international aid agencies. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Establish a harmonisation mechanism with OIC in Mogadishu, at both general and sectoral coordination levels. 2. In light of the growing dependence on local >

**Working with others:
communities, local agencies,
government bodies cont'd**

- c. The humanitarian aid delivered by various actors has helped drought victims in Dadaab, Mogadishu, and Hargeisa to recover some of the immediate impacts of the food crisis. Famine may be 'over' in South and Central Somalia, but many displaced drought victims in Dadaab refugee camps, Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Puntland are still dependent on humanitarian assistance. They will need substantial help if they are to return to settle in their home areas.
- d. Local agencies have a number of comparative advantages over international actors. Those that lack technical and administrative capacity need support from international sources to build that capacity. This should pay long-term dividends.
- e. Likewise, local authorities deserve support in fulfilling their mandates. Capacity at present is low, but it is essential that legitimate authorities be enabled to take on a primary role in service provision and assistance, and that they be held to account for this role.

capacities, the HCT should task the Clusters through the ICWG with conducting a local capacity review by region taking account of capacity in key sectors.

- 3. On the basis of the above review, the HCT should ask OCHA to draw up an investment plan for capacity strengthening in key areas in discussion with partners and donors.

**Funding, accountability,
programme efficiency**

- a. The lack of available funding in the period August 2010 to June 2011 was a major constraint on early action in response to the crisis.
- b. Funding made available in July 2011 allowed rapid scale up of the international response on terms that were flexible and appropriate in the circumstances.
- c. The CHF played a valuable role, although it was not of the size necessary to fund early action on the necessary scale. Over-focus on the CHF distracted attention from the true funding requirements.
- d. The process of the CHF could still be improved in terms of bureaucracy and speed of proposal review. and options to streamline the process should be considered.
- e. The one year planning timeframe of the CAP is unduly restrictive. The HCT and other coordination bodies should consider planning on a two-year rolling basis in order to locate the CAP in a wider timeframe.
- f. Agencies cannot expect to continue to be allowed such latitude in terms of accountability in 2012 as in 2011. Basic standards of monitoring and reporting need to be re-established, if necessary using new methods of oversight.
- g. Accountability for outputs is currently weak and urgently needs strengthening. The goal should remain accountability against outcomes. As a minimum, agencies should take steps to understand what role their assistance is playing in the lives of recipients.
- h. The question of efficiency and 'value added' of current approaches to implementation is under scrutiny. Agencies should review their operating costs and ensure that these are justified and comparable to those of their peers.

- 1. Output reporting is currently weak and needs urgent attention if the most basic accountability standards are to be met. OCHA should discuss with agencies and clusters the problems involved and ways of resolving them.
- 2. More investment is needed in assessing outcomes, linked to efforts to improve needs assessment. As a minimum, agencies should take steps to understand what role their assistance is playing in the lives of recipients. Action on this could be linked to the proposed review of 'value transfer' proposed below.
- 3. OCHA should be asked by the HCT to propose options for speeding up and simplifying the review process for CHF proposals. A 'pre-screening' system for proposals is suggested as one possible option to speed up and simplify the review process.
- 4. The HCT should instigate a study on the question of 'value transfer' through current programme modalities in Somalia, to shed light on the relative efficiency and effectiveness of different modes of programming. OCHA should be asked to propose terms of reference for such a study and to commission it.
- 5. The HCT and other coordination bodies should consider planning on a two-year rolling basis in order to locate the CAP in a wider timeframe.

Managing aid risks, security and restricted access

- a. The failure to plan for the worst case scenario in late 2010 and early 2011 was a serious risk management failure.
 - b. The establishment of the Risk Management Unit and its database of partners is an important initiative, not least for its potential to establish greater confidence in the due diligence process in partner selection. It has yet to fully prove its worth in practice.
 - c. UN DSS has played a constructive role in seeking to enable humanitarian action in Somalia during the crisis response and in designing appropriate MOSS. It has some way to go in helping establish alternative security arrangements in Mogadishu and elsewhere to the previous AMISOM-dependent arrangements.
 - d. Responsibility for negotiating access has been a sensitive subject. The RTE team conclude that the role played by the HC and OCHA head of office in this regard was an appropriate one, and that division of responsibilities between HC, OCHA and agencies has been pragmatic if not always clearly understood.
 - e. The effect of the agency bans remains uncertain, but puts an even greater significance on effective contingency planning, given the range of possible scenarios in 2012 and beyond. The significant absence of WFP from much of South Central Somalia is now compounded by the banning of most UN agencies and many INGOs, creating a potentially disastrous capacity gap.
1. The HCT should review its approach to risk management in relation to the external risk environment, and should adapt its planning processes accordingly.
 2. The Risk Management Unit's should consult users about the database of partners concerning the practical utility of this resource and should take steps to adapt it accordingly.
 3. Urgent steps are needed to ensure greater freedom of operation in Mogadishu and newly-cleared areas of South Central Somalia. This is likely to require security arrangements that are not exclusively or mainly dependent on AMISOM.

Annex 2

IASC Real Time Evaluation (IASC RTE) of the Humanitarian Response to the Horn of Africa Drought Crisis Terms of Reference Final DRAFT 13 November 2011

1. INTRODUCTION & RATIONALE

The Horn of Africa is experiencing the most severe food crisis in the world today. This is compounded by insecurity in Somalia and large refugee caseloads in Kenya and Ethiopia. Over 12 million people in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia are severely affected and in urgent need of humanitarian aid, and there is no likelihood of this situation improving before the end of 2011. As the humanitarian emergencies in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia meet the “automatic trigger” criteria endorsed by IASC Working Group in July 2010, the Emergency Relief Coordinator requested an IASC Real Time Evaluation (IASC RTE) in the Horn of Africa sub-region.

The full IASC RTE of the Horn of Africa will consist of four separate assessment missions that will provide four sets of workshops, and four reports, plus an additional synthesis report. The four different missions will be designed to meet the needs of four target groups; the HCTs, Clusters, Government, Red Cross/Red Crescent, and NGO’s involved in the humanitarian response in 1) Somalia, 2) Kenya and 3) Ethiopia and 4) the regional response structure in Nairobi. An evaluation synthesis will highlight common issues and findings across the country and regional level assessments. This approach matches the response structure, and will enable country teams to receive targeted and timely analysis and support to facilitate actions for improved response. A preparatory mission was conducted to refine this ToR, identify key issues and stakeholders, and develop an evaluation plan in consultation with decision makers.

2. OBJECTIVES AND USE

The main objectives of IASC RTEs are to provide real-time feedback to the Humanitarian Country Teams, lesson learning for the future and to seek out the views of affected people on the quality of the response.

The IASC RTE aims to be a light and self-sufficient evaluation (i.e., with a footprint that does not unduly burden the country team) but will nonetheless provides a clear understanding of the key issues and challenges of the response through rigorous evidence-based analysis (triangulation, document analysis, key informant interviews etc.). Based on the assessment of the current situation, the IASC RTE will support the three HCTs and regional fora and mechanisms to develop and agree to clear plans of action to address key coordination problems or operational bottlenecks with the overall aim of enabling a more effective response moving forward. Its purpose is not to substitute for other evaluations that IASC members may conduct for their own purposes.

3. METHODOLOGY

An IASC RTE is a rapid participatory assessment, conducted during the early stages of a humanitarian operation which almost simultaneously feeds back its findings for immediate use by the broader humanitarian community at the field level. These evaluations differ from other forms of humanitarian evaluation in their speed of mobilization; their narrow scope focusing on inter-agency coordination; a methodological approach that seeks to enhance participation and minimize evaluators’ “footprint”; and their emphasis on participatory end-of-mission feedback and remedial action planning by the HCTs.

The applied methods for the RTE shall be light and participatory, yet rigorous enough to lend credibility to its conclusions and recommendations. The evaluation will be carried out through analyses of various sources of information including desk reviews; field visits where possible; interviews with key stakeholders (affected population, UN, I/NGOs, donors, governments); systematic analysis of remotely gathered data (documentary evidence, monitoring data where available); and through cross-validation of data.¹ The country and regional level analysis will also consider, as relevant, operational support to refugee and IDP camps, and the linkages with country, regional and corporate levels. While maintaining independence, the evaluation will seek the views of all parties, including the affected population. Evaluation teams will serve as 'facilitators', and as critical friends to the HCT, encouraging and assisting field personnel, both individually and collectively, to look critically at their operations and find creative solutions to problems.

The focus of analysis and learning will be on the ongoing country-level responses in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, and the functioning of the different regional fora and mechanisms in Nairobi. An evaluation team will be deployed to each affected country and facilitate a series of workshops with stakeholders as appropriate. These workshops will support country team learning and help initiate follow-up and needed corrective actions. A matrix of findings, conclusions and recommendations will be shared with the HCT prior to the workshops.

4. FOCUS & KEY ISSUES

The major thrust of the IASC RTE will be its focus on the *effectiveness and efficiency of the coordination and management systems*, and addressing critical issues related to both the provision of relief and to the transition to recovery. As noted above, it will broadly define inter-agency collaboration to include established formal coordination structures (e.g., the cluster system) as well as other forms of coordination, such as coordination in the refugee camps, formal and informal programmatic coordination, coordination across HCTs in the region, communication in the early warning systems in this slow-onset crisis, joint needs assessments as the foundation for the response, regional coordination by way of the Regional Humanitarian Partnership Team (RHPT), and other areas of collaboration.

The IASC RTE Evaluation framework displays crucial characteristics of an 'ideal humanitarian response', and is available at <http://oneresponse.info/Coordination/IARTE>. It serves as a communication tool between all stakeholders and can therefore be referred to as a means of developing relevant findings and recommendations. In-country consultations were held as part of the ToR finalization process for each country, and there is also some scope to focus in on the priority areas of the framework based on inputs from the in-country Advisory Group. Emerging out of the IA RTE framework is a series of generic evaluation questions that can be tailored to address the specific context of the present crisis in the Horn of Africa subsequent to the aforementioned scoping mission. The specific key issues that each part of this IASC RTE will address have been agreed to with the relevant HCT and stakeholders and are attached as separate annexes for Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia and regional issues.

Please note that the IASC RTE Evaluation framework has been designed to consider and assess a single country humanitarian response. Therefore it is not expected that the regional part of the RTE

1 In order to support the consultant team, members of the Evaluation Management Group have agreed to gather information relevant to the main questions: e.g. Situation Reports, description of cluster and camp coordination arrangements, description of agency response arrangements, main contact lists of key humanitarian stakeholders, any existing monitoring data or evaluative reports, key communications, etc.

will look at all of the questions listed in the framework, as these will be covered in the country specific analysis.

The generic questions to be addressed in each national context are the following:

Situation, Context and Needs

- *What were the main (security or other) events which hampered the response?*
- *What parts of the affected populations benefitted from humanitarian assistance?*
- *Have coordinated assessments of the needs of all parts of the populations, men and boys, women and girls and vulnerable groups been performed?*

Specific questions:

- Has a common needs assessment and analysis been carried out and if yes / by whom, has it been used in planning and response?
- What proportions of the affected population could be assisted? Who was excluded, and what were the key barriers to full access? Has humanitarian assistance been impartial, i.e., based strictly according to needs?
- How was the early warning system used? Did donors allocate funding, and did agencies respond to take pre-emptive action?
- What critical factors (e.g., security events, infrastructure, procedures, access, enabling environment, etc.) help explain why the response was or was not delivered in an adequate and timely manner? In insecure operating environments, how has this affected humanitarian responsibilities to uphold strict neutrality, i.e., to ensure that humanitarian action does not have the appearance of favoring any party to a conflict?
- How far has the humanitarian response been tailored to meet national and local needs and ensure ownership at these levels by, and accountability to, affected populations? What measures are in place to ensure transparency in humanitarian action?
- To what extent have the needs of all segments of the population, men and boys, women and girls and vulnerable groups been assessed and the response tailored to the differential needs of the specific subpopulations? Do the assessment mission reports and related strategies reflect such discussions with all segments of the population?
- Have the identification of humanitarian priorities been based on sex/age disaggregated data and gender analysis of these data, and other key drivers of marginalization, including by livelihood system or ethnic affiliation?
- Has information about the humanitarian response been communicated in a manner that is widely accessible to the affected people in the region of the Horn of Africa? Are feedback mechanisms in place that link beneficiary concerns to adaptations in humanitarian strategies/approaches?

Strategic and operational planning and resource mobilization

Overarching question:

- *Have relevant, prioritized, inclusive and appropriate strategic and response plans been developed in a timely way and based on analysis of the common needs assessment at all levels?*
- *Were the appeals issued in a timely way and responded to?*

Specific questions:

- How effective has the overall inter-agency planning and management process been?
- How timely, relevant and coherently inter-linked have the various appeals, strategies and operation plans been?
- To what extent have these been based on an inclusive, prioritized and coordinated needs

assessment and analysis that reflects the views of various international and national stakeholders, including government, civil society organizations and affected populations (including socially excluded groups and groups and individuals vulnerable to human rights violations due to discrimination and stigma)?

- How adequately has the political, economic and security dimensions of the country and regional context been considered in assessments, planning and provision of assistance, protection and transitions to early recovery efforts?
- How sufficient have funding flows been, both in quantity and timeliness, so as to allow humanitarian actors to respond effectively to both humanitarian and time-critical early recovery needs?
- Was there any meaningful presence of gender expertise to inform the planning processes? Was there funding for activities to enhance capacity for integrating gender equality in strategies and programs?

Coordination and Connectedness

Overarching questions:

- *Has an inclusive and well-managed coordination system been established/strengthened early on, including with the national (federal, provincial, district level) actors, the military and all other relevant stakeholders?*
- *Were activities planned in support to pre-existing response plans, structures and capacities?*
- *Have local capacities been involved, used and strengthened and have partnerships with civil society organizations been built-up?*
- *Was the coordination system supported by an efficient communication and information management system (e.g., enhancing information flow within the field, between field and HQs)?*
- *How adequately have cross-cutting issues be dealt with in all aspects of the response and in all clusters/ sectors?*

Specific questions:

- In what ways, if any, has the cluster approach led to a more strategic response in terms of predictable leadership, partnership, cohesiveness and accountability?
- How effective has inter-cluster coordination been (with specific focus on cross cutting issues, cash/voucher transfer schemes, Protection and Early Recovery)?
- How effectively has the humanitarian community coordinated the response with the Government (at federal, provincial and district level) and the national military force?
- In what ways, if any, has the government's leadership capacity been strengthened as it has the primary responsibility to respond to its people's needs?
- In what ways, if any, have national and local capacities been capitalized on and strengthened (e.g., in needs assessments?)
- In areas of protracted crisis, how do we ensure that the response supports, rather than undermines, community resilience?
- How effectively have cross-cutting issues been addressed in the cluster response? Was there a network to ensure information sharing and gap filling on cross-cutting issues across programs and sectors
- Has statistical evidence been gathered disaggregated by sex and age and other key markers of social distinction influencing patterns of risk and vulnerability?

Response covering the needs and set standards

Overarching question:

- *What were the main operational results, and the positive and negative outcomes for all segments of the affected population, during each phase?*

- *Have critical gaps and issues been identified and addressed in a timely way system-wide and by each Cluster?*
- *Have appropriate common standards been adapted/applied within the coordination systems (globally and for each Cluster) and to what degree have these been met?*

Specific questions:

- How timely and successful is the humanitarian response in delivering against stated objectives/ indicators (as per cluster work plans at the global and the country level, individual agencies' articulated benchmarks)?
- Have the Clusters been instrumental in identifying and addressing critical gaps early on?
- What segments of the affected population could and could not be assisted, and why?
- What is the humanitarian system's level of commitment and compliance to national standards as well as international standards (such as SPHERE, INEE, LEGS, some subset of the Core Commitments for Children in Humanitarian Action, HAP 2007 Standard in Humanitarian Accountability and Quality Management (and as updated 2011), Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief, guidance on civil-military relations and protected humanitarian space and on gender equality)?

Additional questions and key issues raised during the Evaluation Preparatory Mission are listed as an annex to the Terms of Reference.

5. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

The IASC RTE will be overseen by the evaluation Management Group (MG) established on a voluntary basis from members of the IASC IA RTE Steering Group.² In-Country Advisory Groups will be established to provide feedback and advice to the evaluation team during the planning phase and the evaluation mission. Members will attend the workshops, review and provide input on draft reports, and help coordinate the follow up process and monitoring of action plans.

6. EVALUATION TEAM, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND DELIVERABLES

The services of independent consultant company/research institutes will be sought to undertake different components of the evaluation. The first seven deliverables are relevant to the assessments in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, and the regional level, and the last deliverable highlights the evaluation synthesis.

1. Field visits to the affected country to gather information and evidence on issues described in this ToR. Field visits will take place over a 3-week period.
2. A matrix of findings, conclusions and recommendations.
3. Presentations and lessons-learned workshops to HCT in each affected country and the regional level, as appropriate. The workshops are considered, together with the final evaluation report, as the primary output of the evaluation. The purpose of the workshops is to present and discuss findings, conclusions and recommendations and reformulate them if necessary and to identify key actors and timelines to respond to these recommendations.
4. An outcome summary (2-5 pages) of workshops (one week after workshops).

² The MG is chaired by OCHA and composed of evaluation managers from UNICEF, UNHCR, the International Rescue Committee (representing the International Council of Voluntary Agencies), Oxfam, WFP, FAO and CARE (representing the Emergency Capacity Building Project). On an ad-hoc basis, heads of evaluation may join EMG meetings, as necessary.

5. A draft IASC RTE report (2 weeks after workshops).
6. A final IASC RTE report containing an executive summary of less than 2,000 words and a main text of less than 10,000 words, both inclusive of clear and concise recommendations. Annexes should include a list of interviewees, bibliography, a description of method(s) employed, and any other relevant materials. (1 week after final stakeholder comments on draft report).
7. A matrix outlining comments received to the draft evaluation report, whether they were accepted, partially accepted or rejected, and the rationale for that decision.

Synthesis Report

8. A synthesis report will be prepared containing an executive summary of no more than 2,000 words and a main text of no more than 10,000 words. The synthesis will be based on the country and regional level reports, and will highlight the key issues and findings relevant to both the response in the Horn of Africa and the broader humanitarian community.

7. DURATION OF EVALUATION AND TENTATIVE TIMEPLAN

A planning mission was conducted to Nairobi, October 31-November 6 and Addis Ababa, November 6-November 10. The mission dates for each part of the IASC RTE is included in the annexes.

Additional key issues for Somalia

1. Risk Management
Is the current strategy for risk management adequate, and how well do agencies comply with the strategy? How can risk management be better integrated into the management of the CHF?
2. Humanitarian Financing
Has the CHF for Somalia been effective at improving co-ordination in the sense of addressing gaps? How does the responsibility of the Cluster Leads to manage the CHF affect their role as a neutral broker and coordinator?
3. Coordination
Are the core cluster functions appropriate and are the clusters equipped to deal with them? How effectively are the clusters coping with assigned responsibilities? Are recent innovations and structural consolidations to the cluster system in Somalia relevant and useful? (e.g. new food security cluster) Is the number of clusters right? Are current efforts to strengthen the co-ordination arrangements in Mogadishu adequate? How are non-traditional actors, and other key actors such as ICRC, and MSF integrated with the existing coordination structures? How has the humanitarian community managed in kind donations from new actors? To what extent is meaningful coordination conducted remotely? How top down vs bottom up are the co-ordination systems? Are decisions being taken at the appropriate locations and levels? How do common services contribute to or strengthen coordination efforts?
4. Information Management
Are information flows and co-ordination flows around health and WASH adequate? Do information flows facilitate a balanced response to the needs of the population? Do all actors have confidence in the information made available? Is the HCT able to report on results and to support humanitarian co-ordination efforts with credible analysis? Are current reporting formats adequate and useful? Are recent changes being introduced likely to improve IM functions? Are the current periodicities of reporting appropriate?

5. Humanitarian Space
How does the use of AU military assets affect co-ordination systems? What consequences are there for delivery? How does the location of the clusters within the Transitional Government affect the co-ordination arrangements, and participation of all stakeholders? How is the integration process in Somalia affecting the engagements of different actors in the broader humanitarian co-ordination system both in Nairobi and in Somalia?
6. Advocacy
Is the co-ordination system doing an adequate job of communication and advocacy? Are common positions being developed?
7. Security
How do the security coordination arrangements and security requirements affect the humanitarian response?
8. Remote Management
In response to the challenges with directly accessing project areas, how effective are remote management systems operating?
9. Protection
Although included in the standard terms of reference as a cross-cutting issue, due to the importance and challenges of protection in Somalia, the RTE will consider in greater depth the coordination of the protection response.

Annex 3

SCHEDULE OF INTERVIEWS

INGO = International NGO
SNGO = Somali NGO

Organisation	Type	Name	Post / location	Date interviewed
ACF	INGO	Shaswat SARAF	Head of Mission, Nairobi	22.02.2012
African Rescue Committee (AFREC) (Nairobi)		John WANJOHI	Senior Program Manager	21.02.2012
CANDLELIGHT	SNGO	Shukri. H. ISMAIL	Hargeisa	08.02.2012
		Abdillahi KHALIL		08.02.2012
CARE (Somaliland)	INGO	Abdullah IMAN	Hargeisa	08.02.2012
CESVI	INGO	Massimiliano M. PALMA	Head of Regional Office	22.02.2012
Comprehensive Community Based Rehabilitation in Somaliland (CCBRS)	SNGO	Fahran Abdi SULEMAN	Hargeisa	08.02.2012
CONCERN	INGO	Sarah ROBINSON	Country Director	21.02.2012
CPD	SNGO	Abdilkarim DAUD		15.02.2012

DFID	Donor	Simon LITTLE Sebastian FOUQUET	Evaluation Advisory Group Humanitarian Advisor	27.02.2012
District of Hamar Weyne, Mogadishu	Govt.	District Commissioner of Hamar Weyne District, Mogadishu		15.02.2012
District of Hodar, Mogadishu	Govt.	District Commissioner of Hodan District, Mogadishu		15.02.2012
DRC (Somaliland) DRC (Nairobi) DRC (Nairobi)	INGO	Hassan ADNAN		08.02.2012
		Abdirizak AHMED		15.02.2012
		Peter KLANSOE	Regional Director	23.02.2012
ECHO	Donor	Philippe ROYAN		
FAO	UN	Luca ALINOVI	Officer in charge	30.01.2012
		Francesco BALDO	Agriculture & Livelihoods Cluster Coordinator	01.02.2012
		Mohammed FAYAD	Hargeisa	08.02.2012
FEWSNET	Other	Abdullahi. D. KHALIF	Country Representative	25.02.2012
FSNAU	Other	Grainne MOLONEY	Technical Director	08.02.2012
		Warsame FARAH	Hargeisa	10.02.2012
HARD	SNGO	Abdi HASSAN	Executive Director	16.02.2012

HAVOYOCO (Somaliland)	SNGO	Ismail MOHAMED	Hargeisa	10.02.2012
HC/RC	UN	Mark BOWDEN Killian KLEINSCHMIDT	HC/RC Deputy HC	31.01.2012 14.02.2012
HC/RC's Office	UN	Matthew LESLIE	Head of Security Management Unit	17.02.2012
Hijra	SNGO	Mohamed Hassan Elmi Amir Hassan Abdillahi	Health Coordinator Logistic and Security Officer	15.02.2012
ICRC	INGO	Olivier HUMBERT- DROZ	Deputy Head of Delegation	
Islamic Relief	INGO	Abdirizak Mohammed HASSAN		15.02.2012
		Jam HASHI		15.02.2012
MURDO	SNGO	Sheik SAEED		15.02.2012
Muslim Aid	INGO	Ahmed ABDI		15.02.2012
National Environment, Research and Disaster Secretariat (NERAD), Somaliland Government	Govt	Mohamed Muse AWALE	Commissioner	09.02.2012
NETHERLANDS EMBASSY	Donor	Stef DEUTEKOM	Nairobi	10.02.2012
NGO Consortium for Somalia	INGO	Tanya SCHUMER	Coordinator	20.02.2012
Nomadic Assistance for Peace and Development (NAPAD)	SNGO	Nur Muse Abdi	Finance / Admin Manager	21.02.2012
NRC	INGO	Hassan KHAIRE	Regional Director	22.02.2012

OCHA	UN	Kiki GBEHO	Head of Office	30.01.2012
		Paul THOMAS	Deputy Head of Office	30.01.2012
		Pierre BRY	Head of Funding Unit	02.02.2012
		Nicolas ROST	Donor Relations Officer / CHF	02.02.2012
		Birgitte HOTZEN	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	06.02.2012
		Kristine VERHOEVEN	Head of CAP Unit	02.02.2012
		Abdirahman Mohamed ADJI	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	08.02.2012
		David WOMBLE	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	06.02.2012
		Victor LAHAI	Head of OCHA Bosasso Office	28.02.2012
		Mohamud Saeed NOOH	Humanitarian Affairs Analyst	28.02.2012
		David LUBARI-LOMINYO	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	14.02.2012
		Mustafa Muhumed OMER	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	27.02.2012
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)	Donor	Mohamed Gacal Noor	Deputy Country Director, Somalia	19.02.2012
OXFAM GB (Somaliland)	INGO	Philimon MAJWA	Hargeisa	08.02.2012
Qatar Red Crescent	INGO	Abdirisak Siyad	Field Programs Manager	19.02.2012
SAACID- Somalia	SNGO	Abdillahi Mohamed Haider	Chief of Operations	19.02.2012

Social-Life and Agricultural Development Organization (SADO)	SNGO	Guhad Muhammad Adan Abdullahi Abdulle Abdirizak Mohamed Abdi	Program Officer Food Security and Livelihood Program Officer BOT Chairman	21.02.2012
Save the Children UK	INGO	Ben FOOT Abdulkadir Ore AHMED Sonya ZAMBAKIDES	Country Director	15.02.2012
SCC	INGO	Abdullahi MOHAMUD		15.02.2012
SDC	Donor	Clara VAN PRAAG	Evaluation Advisory Group	27.02.2012
Somali Transformation Group (SOMTRAG) (Somaliland)	SNGO	Ibrahim SAHARDID	Hargeisa	08.02.2012
Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) (Somaliland)	SNGO	Shuaib Mohoud AHMED	Hargeisa	08.02.2012
Somali National Disaster Management Agency (TFG)	Govt.	Abdilahi Mohamed Shirwa	Chairperson	18.02.2012
Somali Women Development Centre	SNGO	Nadiya Sufi Abdi,		18.02.2012
Save Somali Women and Children	SNGO	Amina Haji Elmi	Director	18.02.2012
SOPHPA	SNGO	Abdi Ali ABDI		15.02.2012
SOS-Children's Village - Somalia	SNGO	Othman Mohamed Wangara	National Emergency Coordinator	19.02.2012
SWDC	SNGO	Nadia SUUFI		15.02.2012

TAKULO Somali community (Somaliland)	SNGO	Omer JAMA	Hargeisa	08.02.2012
TROCAIRE	INGO	Aude GALLIE	Country Director	24.02.2012
UNDP	UN	Alvaro RODRIGUEZ	Country Director	31.01.2012
UNDSS	UN	Omar CASTIGLIONI	Representative	10.02.2012
UNHCR	UN	Ali DHER	Protection Cluster Coordinator	31.01.2012
		Richard EVANS	Emergency Shelter/ NFI cluster Coordinator	31.01.2012
		Maurice AZONNANKPO	Protection Officer Bosasso	28/02/2012

UNICEF	UN	Leo MATUNGA	Nutrition Cluster Coordinator	30.01/01.02.2012
		Hannan SULEIMAN	Deputy Representative	30.01.2012
		Deborah BOWERS	Strategic Planner	30.01.2012
		Kathryn HARRIS	WASH Cluster Head	01.02.2012
		Mohammed el FATIH	Senior WASH Coordinator	08.02.2012
		Peter HAILEY	Head of Nutrition, UNICEF	21.02.2012
		Nancy BALFOUR	Head of WASH, UNICEF	21.02.2012
		Tai Ring TEH	WASH Cluster Coordinator (Somaliland)	08.02.2012
		Mannfred WINNEFIELD	Education Cluster Coordinator (Somaliland)	08.02.2012
USAID	Donor	Sureka KHANDAGLE	Nairobi Embassy	
		(with Food for Peace colleague)		
		Tom RODGERS	Nairobi	10.02.2012
WAMY	SNGO	Mahad MOHAMED		15.02.2012
		Warsame ALI		15.02.2012
WARDI	SNGO	Ahmed Ali OSMAN		15.02.2012

WFP	UN	Stefano PORRETTI	Country Director	31.01.2012
		Mark GORDON	Food Assistance Cluster Coordinator	01.02.2012
		John MYRAUNET	Logistics Cluster Coordinator	01.02.2012
		Thomas THOMPSON	Global Logistics Cluster Coordinator	01.02.2012
		Happygod JOHN	Hargeisa Cluster Lead	09.02.2012
WHO	UN	Kamran MASHADI	Health Cluster Coordinator	27.02.2012
		Dr. OMAR	Deputy Representative	24.02.2012
WORLD VISION INTERNATIONAL (Somaliland)	INGO	Edwin Siala	Hargeisa	08.02.2012
ZamZam Foundation-Somalia	SNGO	Omar Jama	Program Manager	19.02.2012

Annex 4

List of documents consulted

- Agriculture and Livelihoods & Wash Cluster Somalia (2012). Position Paper on Drought Response.
- Agriculture and Livelihoods cluster (22 September 2010). Humanitarian contingency plan.
- CARE International (August 2011). Somalia Drought Assessment Report.
- Education cluster (22 September 2010). Humanitarian contingency plan.
- Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) Early Warning Products and Briefings covering Somalia in the 11 months leading up to the July 20, 2011 famine declaration.
- Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET)(27 June, 2010). Somalia Food Security Alert.
- Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET)(August 23, 2010). Somalia Food Security Alert.
- Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET)(August 2010). Executive Brief: La Nina and Food Security in East Africa.
- Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET)(September 2010). Executive Brief: La Nina and Food Security in East Africa.
- Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET)(November 2, 2010). East Africa Food Security Alert.
- Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET)(January 31, 2011). East Africa Food Security Update.
- Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET)(February 23, 2011). East Africa Food Security Alert.
- Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET)(March 15, 2011). East Africa Food Security Alert.
- Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET)(March 21, 2011). East Africa Food Security Alert.
- Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET)(June 7, 2011). East Africa Food Security Alert.
- Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET)(June 14, 2011). Past Year one of the driest on record in the eastern Horn.
- Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET)/ Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia (FSNAU) (July 20, 2011), Famine Declaration.
- FAO/FSNAU (September 2010). Concept of operations – FSNAU/FAO Somali National Staff.
- FAO – Concept of operations (August 2011)– FAO National Monitoring and Planning Staff Southern Somalia
- Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia (FSNAU) (September 17, 2010). Post Gu Report, Technical Series Report No VI.32.
- Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia (FSNAU) (September 27, 2010). Post Gu Report, Technical Series Report No VI.33.
- Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia (FSNAU) (February 25, 2011). Post Gu Report, Technical Series Report No VI.35.

Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia (FSNAU) (March 4, 2011). Post Gu Report, Technical Series Report No VI.36.

Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia (FSNAU) (September 28, 2011). Post Gu Report, Technical Series Report No VI.41.

Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia (FSNAU) (October 8, 2011). Post Gu Report, Technical Series Report No VI.42.

HEALTH cluster (22 September 2010). Humanitarian contingency plan.

Humanitarian Country Team (2010-2011). Minutes of meetings.

IASC/DARA (2011). Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response in South Central Somalia.

IASC (Nov 2, 2006) GRUNEWALD, F. & Team. Somalia: Real Time Evaluation of the 2006 Emergency Response

IASC (August 2010). Guidance Note on Field Cluster Focal Points

IASC (August 26, 2010). Guidance Note on Field Cluster Coordination.

IASC In country advisory Group Somalia (28 February 2012). Minutes of meeting.

ICRC (2011) Public reporting on Somalia

Inter-cluster (28 June 2011). Minutes of Inter-Cluster strategy (Wash, Agriculture and livelihoods, nutrition, health) meeting on addressing food crisis and malnutrition in south Somalia.

Inter-cluster Working Group (2010-2011). Minutes of meetings.

Inter-cluster Working Group (2011). Retreat minutes.

International Crisis Group (21 February 2011). Africa Report no 170. Somalia: the transitional Government on life support.

LOGISTICS Cluster Somalia (2011). Overview of the First Three Months for the response to the Somalia Famine Crisis

LOGISTICS cluster (22 September 2010). Humanitarian contingency plan.

MSF (2011). Public Reporting on Somalia

National Environment Preparedness and management authority of Somaliland (NERAD)(april 2008). Master proposal for operationalizing of revised strategic plan (2008-2012).

NORWEGIAN CHURCH AID (2010). Evaluation Report of Programmes in Gedo, Mogadishu and Somaliland.

NUTRITION cluster (22 September 2010). Humanitarian contingency plan.

OCHA MOGADISHU (15 February, 2012). Facts and figures Afgoye Corridor-Lower Shabelle Regions Somalia.

OCHA SOMALIA (January 2010 to September 2011). Somalia Humanitarian Overview.

OCHA SOMALIA. CAP 2011

OCHA SOMALIA. CAP 2012

OCHA SOMALIA. Emergency Review of CAP 2011

OCHA SOMALIA. Mid-Term Review of CAP 2011

OCHA (March 2, 2012). CAP End of Year Report Coordination Input.

OCHA SOMALIA (January 2012). Impact of the Al Shabaab Ban on Humanitarian operations.

OCHA SOMALIA (November 2011). Humanitarian dashboard Somalia.

OCHA SOMALIA (23 August 2011). Draft Timeline for the Somalia Cap 2012 Process.

OCHA SOMALIA (05 August 2011). Draft CAP 2012 Process Timeline.

OCHA SOMALIA. Introduction to risk management, training guide (2010 to 2013).

OCHA SOMALIA (16 September 2010). Humanitarian Contingency Plan (draft).

OCHA SOMALIA (March 2011). Humanitarian Contingency Plan (final).

OCHA SOMALIA (2011) End of cycle Review 2011.

Office for supervising the affairs of Foreign Agencies (OSAFA, Al Shabaab)(28 November 2011). OSAFA Fact-Finding Committee Performance Appraisal.

PANEL OF EXPERTS AND MONITORING GROUP ON SOMALIA (July 18, 2011) Report submitted in accordance with Resolution 1916 (2010). S/2011/433.

PROTECTION cluster. Humanitarian contingency plan (22 September 2010).

SHELTER cluster. Humanitarian contingency plan (22 September 2010).

SIDA (Dec. 2010) MOWJEE, T. & SWEENEY H. Evaluation of SIDA's Humanitarian Assistance, Case study report Somalia (Dec. 2010).

SPHERE Handbook (2011).

UNDSS (7 September 2011). Options for security escorts to support UN activities in Mogadishu.

UNDSS. Security requirements for UN staff in Somalia.

UNDSS (16 September 2011). Recommendation to the SMT-WG on 16 September 2011.

UNDSS/OCHA (07 July 2011). Joint Security and Humanitarian assessment. Mission to Dolo.

UNDSS/WFP/OCHA (26 April 2011). Mission report to Galgaduud region.

UNDSS. Enabling Humanitarian access (powerpoint presentation).

UNDSS (30 August 2010). Concept of operations, road movement in Somalia.

UNDSS (January 2011). Programme criticality. Criteria and draft Framework (powerpoint presentation).

UNHABITAT (13 April 2008). Final evaluation report of the Somalia Urban Development Programme (SUDP).

UN Security Council Resolutions: S/RES/1950 (2010); S/RES/1964 (2010); S/RES/1972 (2011); S/RES/1976 (2011); S/RES/2002 (2011); S/RES/2010 (2011); S/RES/2015 (2011); S/RES/2020 (2011).

Wash Cluster Somalia (31 July 2011). Emergency reserve criteria.

Wash Cluster Somalia (29 July 2011). Wash Cluster 3-5 year plan.

Wash Cluster Somalia (26 April 2011). Strategic Advisory Group.

Wash Cluster Somalia (06 January 2012). Wash/Health – AWD/Cholera Responsibilities

Wash cluster (22 September 2010). Humanitarian contingency plan.

Wash Cluster Somalia. Wash Cluster Selection criteria for CHF second allocation draft.

Wash Cluster Somalia (04 January 2010). Selection criteria for drought.

Wash Cluster Somalia: Strategic Operational Framework (SOF) 2012.

Wash Cluster (17 February 2010). Recommended activities to improve convergence with Health and Nutrition agencies in the area of your WASH intervention.

Wash Cluster (22 February 2010). Recommended activities to improve convergence with Education agencies in the area of your WASH intervention.

Wash Cluster (10 December 2010). Drought response and cluster position paper.

Wash Cluster (07 September 2011) Do no harm guide for wash programmes.

Annex 5

ON METHODOLOGY

As described in section 1.2 of the report, the methods adopted by the evaluation team were dictated in part by the questions being asked and in part by practical considerations and the availability of data. In other circumstances, more quantitative data might have been expected to be available for analysis; but as described in the report, the data available for Somalia – even concerning programme outputs – is both limited and often of doubtful reliability. The other major constraint for the evaluation was the inability to access programme areas, making questions about programme quality, relevance and effectiveness impossible to assess at first hand, and making it difficult to assess the effectiveness of field-level coordination.

Based on its understanding of the ToR, the RTE team decided to focus its enquiry on the overarching question: *How well did the component parts of the international humanitarian system work together and with others to address the drought crisis in Somalia 2010-2012?* This simplification was suggested by initial interviews, and from it a series of sub-questions was developed to guide the subsequent interviews, group discussions and the writing of the report, as follows:

1. How effectively did the international system ‘read’ the developing situation?
2. How well coordinated was the international response in terms of joint analysis, strategy, policy, planning and implementation – including information management.
3. How well did the international system work with others?
4. How well financed has the international response been?
5. How has the international response been accountable to aid recipients and donors?
6. How well have risks and operational constraints been managed?
7. What lessons have been learned from the drought response? How should these change future practice?

Answers to these questions were sought from key informant interviews, group discussions (with agencies and with drought refugees), and a review of key documents (see separate Annex). In the circumstances, direct observation played only a small part in the enquiry. Apart from food security briefings in Nairobi, some inter-cluster meetings and security briefings were attended in Mogadishu; and it was possible to see a few of the IDP camps in Mogadishu and to get a sense of the exceptionally poor conditions in which displaced people were living and how little assistance they had received.

The evaluation team was based out of Nairobi during February 2012, travelling to Hargeisa (Somaliland) for four days, Mogadishu for five days and Dadaab for two days. Key informant interviews were held as shown in the following table.

	INGO	SNGO	UN (incl clusters)	Donor	Govt	Other
Nairobi	16	10	29	8		3
Hargeisa	3	7	5		1	
Mogadishu	2	9	4		3	
	21	26	38	8	4	3

Given the lack of direct access to drought-affected communities (other than refugees), and given the significance of the role played by local organisations in the delivery of assistance, a particular effort was made to consult such organisations in all the locations visited. This also gave valuable alternative perspectives on how the international aid system for Somalia was working.

Group discussions were held as follows:

- Roundtable discussions with international and Somali NGOs in Mogadishu and Hargeisa.
- Focus group discussions with drought refugees in Dadaab camp
- Discussions with the in-country advisory group for the RTE
- Discussion at the one-day feedback workshop held in Nairobi review the provisional findings of the RTE

The focus group discussions in Dadaab involved discussion with separate groups of women and of men, as well as with a mixed group. This allowed some different gender perspectives to emerge, as reflected in section 5 of the report. A total of 59 refugees were involved in these discussions, invited to participate by UNHCR [check basis – names supplied] from amongst those who were displaced during the course of 2011 primarily by drought. Discussions were conducted in Somali language. The questions asked related primarily to the experience of the refugees in their home areas of Somalia, the factors that had caused them to leave and the factors that would affect their decision to return.

Finally, with regard to documentary evidence, more emphasis than usual was given to an analysis of the minutes of the Humanitarian Country Team and to a lesser extent the Inter-Cluster Working Group. While it is recognised that minutes of this kind present only a partial picture of collective thinking and decision-making, they nevertheless provide a valuable guide to the evolving collective thought process and mood as well as a record of key discussions and decisions. They also provide a valuable counterpart to the key informant interviews, given that subjective memory – especially of events that may have happened year in the past – is inevitably fallible.

While other documents were consulted, no formal systematic review was made of data in the available documentation, partly because of the patchy nature of the data presented. The RTE team struggled to obtain documentation from the clusters in particular, suggesting that record keeping is at least variable between the different clusters.

