

MD



MONDAY DEVELOPMENTS MAGAZINE
The Latest Issues and Trends in International Development and Humanitarian Assistance

An Interview With
Sean Penn

Where Did the Money Go?

Shelter: Emergency vs. Permanent

Lessons From
An Urban Disaster

SPECIAL ISSUE

HAITI
ONE YEAR OF RECOVERY

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Moving Towards Partnership

One year ago, much of Port-au-Prince was reduced to rubble by its largest earthquake in almost 300 years. The impact on Haiti

was catastrophic, with the scope of urban destruction unprecedented for any desperately poor country, even as it was compounded by Hurricane Tomas and the outbreak of cholera. Responding to this disaster has been uniquely challenging for our community given its scope, urban landscape and the loss of government capacity, which was weak to begin with. Nevertheless, as highlighted in past issues of *Monday Developments*, the work of the NGO community remains an essential element of the global response, contributing to the stability of Haiti and the survival of its people.

The response has been far from perfect; but as mistakes are made, the time where finger pointing and blame will achieve any positive results has long passed. We—the NGO community, Haitian and donor governments, and the United Nations—need to strengthen our partnership to advance concrete solutions. Hundreds of thousands of Haitians will still require extensive and costly humanitarian support for months, if not years, until more lasting solutions are built. Our community’s work in temporary camps remains vast, from preventing and treating cholera to the protection of children and women.

Helping displaced Haitians, from home owners to renters, return to some form of viable home remains an uphill battle. The international community has the resources and will to help the Haitian government overcome these housing issues, but first the Haitian government needs to put a resettlement plan in place and follow through on much needed decisions. It is only with the ability to live in a secure environment without fear that the Haitian people can begin to resettle and participate in development processes that hold both their government and the international community accountable.

Preparing Haiti for future disasters must be integrated within long-term reconstruction strategies and projects. Building disaster risk reduction into reconstruction and long-term development plans will enable all actors, from Haitian government officials to civil society organizations and citizens, to prepare for the inevitable future disasters. By collaborating on disaster risk reduction efforts,



trust between the Haitian government interim reconstruction commission and Haitian people can built.

Reconstruction in Haiti is entering into a new phase as the presidential election results are due to be finalized January 16. Elevating the role of Haitian civil society in reconstruction is the only way to ensure true country ownership. Only through its civil society can the Haitian government be held accountable for its actions or lack thereof. While enhancing the capacity of local groups has been challenging, as U.S.-based NGOs we must provide space for local civil society and community groups to rebuild their neighborhoods, even if it slows down the pace of reconstruction. This consultation of local groups will become even more important as the new president and his staff transition into their roles as the leaders of reconstruction and longer-term development efforts. Including a dialogue with Haitian civil society must be a priority for the new Haitian government.

The professional U.S. NGO community is committed to aligning its efforts with the Haitian government to improve our relief, sustainable development and poverty reduction programs. It remains challenging to adapt to a landscape where weak government has hindered efforts. Yet as we seek solutions, the NGO community must continue to focus on deepening our partnerships with the Haitian government and civil society to ensure that we act within national plans, with stakeholder consultation and in ways that build Haitian capacity. We look forward to working alongside the new Haitian government as it coordinates reconstruction efforts to ensure Haiti enjoys the most prosperous future possible. It is only with cooperative and coordinated partnership between the Haitian government, civil society, donor governments, international NGOs and the UN that effective and sustainable reconstruction will be achieved. Our community must strive to empower Haitians to improve their own livelihoods in ways that are fully transparent. I look forward to working with you all to achieve these goals. ^{MD}

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InterAction welcomes submissions of news articles, opinions and announcements. Article submission does not guarantee inclusion in Monday Developments. We reserve the right to reject submissions for any reason. It is at the discretion of our editorial team as to which articles are published in individual issues.

All statements in articles are the sole opinion and responsibility of the authors.

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A limited number of subscriptions are made available to InterAction member agencies as part of their dues. Individual subscriptions cost \$80 a year (add \$15 for airmail delivery outside the U.S.) Samples are \$5, including postage. Additional discounts are available for bulk orders. Please allow 4-6 weeks for delivery. Advertising rates are available on request.

Heifer Names Ferrari as New CEO

Heifer Project International recently announced the selection of **Pierre Ferrari** as its new CEO.

Ferrari, who was born in Africa in 1950 in what was then the Belgian Congo, has more than 40 years of business experience, ranging from large consumer package goods organizations such as Coca-Cola USA to work with socially-oriented organizations like CARE and the Small Enterprise Assistance Fund. He succeeds interim CEO **Charles Stewart** and Heifer's longtime President and former CEO **Jo Luck**.

Ferrari is chair of the board for Ben & Jerry's Homemade Ice Cream and is a board member of the Small Enterprise Assistance Fund. Ferrari also sits on the advisory council for The Emory Ethics Center in Atlanta, and on the board of an Atlanta nonprofit that raises funds for Maji Mazuri, a Kenyan organization that helps children overcome poverty. He is an investor and director of Guayaki Sustainable Rainforest Products, and is president of Hot Fudge Social Venture Fund, and is a founder of EthixVentures and QuatreCinq LLC.

Doug Smith, Heifer International board chair, said, "I am truly honored to introduce Pierre as Heifer's new chief executive. The board conducted an international search for the strongest, most innovative CEO on the planet, and there is an ethos, a passion that Pierre embodies that sets him above."

Ferrari holds a master's degree in Economics from The University of Cambridge and a MBA from Harvard Business School.

Free SEA Prevention Trainings

It is the responsibility of all NGOs to prevent and respond to **sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA)** of beneficiaries by aid workers. During 2011, **InterAction**, with funding from the **State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration**, is hosting a series of workshops and activities designed to equip InterAction members with the necessary skills and knowledge to prevent and respond to SEA.

The workshops will be hands-on, interactive events employing a broad range of learning techniques to engage participants and encourage learning and sharing. Workshops will be led by highly skilled, trained staff from within InterAction's membership and the larger SEA community. All InterAction member NGOs are welcome

to send representatives to the workshops.

Workshop Schedule:

- Investigations Training
February 9-11, Washington, DC
- Management of Investigations
March 10, Washington, DC
- Community-based Complaints Mechanism Training
April, TBD
- Investigations Training
April, TBD
- Management of Investigations
June, TBD
- Community-based Complaints Mechanism Training
September, Washington, DC

For more information about these workshops, or InterAction's SEA sub-working group, please contact Margot Bokanga (mbokanga@interaction.org).



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
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InterAction Welcomes New Members

InterAction's Board of Directors recently approved the following three organizations as InterAction members. InterAction welcomes them to its community:


Creative Learning is dedicated to those in need, particularly the oppressed, the victimized and those with least opportunity, and directly helps families and communities to recover and improve their lives. It works to enhance the capacity of local organizations around the world to defend and protect human rights, providing children and families around the world—especially in areas of conflict—with an array of innovative learning tools and activities that present them with new possibilities.



Its success is rooted in its investment in small-scale, viable projects, such as those that promote youth programs, civil society

development, human rights, school and classroom improvements, and entrepreneurship.

Basic Education Coalition (BEC) represents 19 development, humanitarian assistance and advocacy organizations committed to bringing quality basic education programs to each child. Most of its members are program-based organizations, implementing basic education programs in developing countries around the world. Many of these members operate with grant funding from U.S. government agencies. BEC works to raise public and private support for quality basic education as a key element in economic development and human well-being.



BEC is an advocacy organization representing the interests of its members in raising public and private support for quality basic education. BEC itself does not conduct basic education programs in foreign countries. However, it does conduct advocacy in furtherance of these activities. It also seeks to influence public policy on basic education issues, including monitoring and evaluation, foreign aid reform, children in conflict and emergencies, education and HIV/AIDS, and early primary education and development.

InterAction is also pleased to welcome its second associate member, the **Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs at Maxwell School of Syracuse University, The Transnational NGO Initiative**, which examines the role of transnational NGOs in global governance, particularly the governance, leadership and effectiveness challenges facing transnational NGOs (TNGOs) today. The TNGO Initiative executes its mission through research and education, as well as extensive NGO practitioner engagement work.

The Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, which houses the TNGO Initiative, aims to broaden our knowledge concerning challenges to the quality of governance globally. Its mission is to extend, integrate, and focus the commitment of both the Maxwell School and the University to exploring the international and global concerns raised by an interdependent world of diverse cultures, economies and political systems. The Moynihan Institute's programs reflect a belief in the importance of maintaining a productive dialogue between the academic, policymaking and practitioner communities in the process of translating theory into practice and practice back into theory.



As an associate member, the TNGO Initiative will bring significant benefit to our community by translating academic theory into practice, and translate practice back into teaching and theory.


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Films Not To Miss...

By Sean Patrick Murphy



War Photographer (2001)

"Too many cameras and not enough food, this is what we've seen." That line from the Police song "Driven to Tears" sums it up nicely.

This film explores photojournalist James Nachtwey and his work in the world's hotspots from Nicaragua in the 1980s, to Rwanda and Kosovo in the 1990s, to South Africa, Ramallah, and Indonesia.

Interestingly, Nachtwey comes across as the total opposite of the hardened war photographer one might come to expect. He is taciturn and moves quietly among his subjects, almost as if he isn't there. In interviews he states that he wants to win over the people he photographs by treating them with dignity and respect. The stereotypical photojournalist would warm up to people only to abandon them once he gets the shots to fill his portfolio. Nachtwey has never made a Faustian bargain, has never sold his soul for the killer shot.

Two examples of how Nachtwey is different are shown in this film. He stresses that photos he has taken of starving people in Africa were taken at feeding stations—he did not find and abandon starving people in his travels. Also, a cameraman recounts how Nachtwey followed a mob intent on killing a man they were chasing and three times pleaded with them to spare the man. The man was summarily executed despite Nachtwey's efforts to intervene.

Nachtwey says he wants people to see the horrors of war and be galvanized to end it. His passion is quiet and determined. His treatment of the desperately poor in Indonesia is powerful and commendable. This documentary goes a long way to showing the viewer the true human cost of war.

War Photographer is available to rent.

Murphy can be reached at:
Lojano@comcast.net

Americans Drastically Overestimate Amount of U.S. Foreign Aid

A new WorldPublicOpinion.org/Knowledge Networks poll has found that the American public continues to vastly overestimate the amount of the federal budget that is devoted to foreign aid.

Asked to estimate how much of the federal budget goes to foreign aid the median estimate is 25 percent. Asked how much they thought would be an "appropriate" percentage the median response is 10 percent.

In fact just 1 percent of the federal budget goes to foreign aid. Even if one only includes the discretionary part of the federal budget, foreign aid represents only 2.6 percent.

This set of questions has been asked repeatedly since the **Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA)** first asked them in 1995, and it was subsequently asked by other organizations as well. Over the years the most common median estimate was that foreign aid represented 20 percent of the budget, most recently in a 2004 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

Thus the most recent number represents an increase of 5 points in the median estimate. **Steven Kull**, director of PIPA comments, "This increase may be due to Americans hearing more about aid efforts occurring in Iraq, Afghanistan and Haiti over the last few years. There have been some increases in foreign aid under both Presidents Bush and Obama, but, of course, nowhere near to the perceived level."

The median amount proposed as appropriate has consistently been 10 percent in other polls including the 2004 Chicago Council poll.

In the current poll estimates of foreign aid vary by education, growing more accurate with higher levels of education. Among those with less than a high school education the median estimate was that foreign aid represented an extraordinary 45 percent of the budget, those with only a high school diploma 25 percent, those with some college at 20 percent. However, even those with a college degree or higher still overestimate by a wide margin, with a median estimate of 15 percent of the budget.

Kull comments, "It is quite extraordinary that this extreme overestimation has persisted for so many years, even among those with higher education."

Overall, the percentage of respondents who estimated anywhere near the correct amount was quite small. Only 19 percent estimate that foreign aid is 5 percent or less of the budget.

On the question of how much of the budget should go to foreign aid only 42 percent say that the amount it should be is 5 percent of the budget or less and only 20 percent say that it should be 1 percent or less. The percentage saying that foreign aid should be eliminated is quite small—just 10 percent of respondents.

Those who identify themselves as Republican are somewhat lower in their estimates than Democrats. But Republicans still overestimate the amount with a median estimate of 20 percent, while Democrats have a median estimate of 25 percent and Independents 25 percent.

Attitudes about what percentage of the budget should go to foreign aid tend to track the amount estimated. The median preferred level is 5 percent for Republicans, and 10 percent for Democrats and Republicans.

The poll of 848 Americans was fielded from November 6 to 15, 2010. The margin of error is plus or minus 3.4 percent.



Development Web Resources



Have you bookmarked great international development and humanitarian websites in your browser? Ones with really useful information? Consider sharing them with the MD community. Send URLs, the topics they cover and a short description of each to cbrobst@interaction.org.

Disaster and Conflict

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) database

The IDMC database provides comprehensive and up-to-date information on situations of conflict-induced displacement around the world.

- www.internal-displacement.org/ (IDMC home)
- [www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BD0DA/\(httpPages\)/1DEE6B69E30F84A68025708F0058BE6D?OpenDocument](http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004BD0DA/(httpPages)/1DEE6B69E30F84A68025708F0058BE6D?OpenDocument) (database link)

ReliefWeb

An up to date collection of online maps related to natural disasters and conflicts.

- www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/doc114?OpenForm

Land and Natural Resources

Focus on Africa

An interactive media site that educates users on land and natural resource tenure issues in six sub-Saharan African countries—Mozambique, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Uganda, and Tanzania. The site uses a combination of slideshows, briefs, media and maps to give users a strong foundation on land rights in each of these countries.

- www.wri.org/property-rights-africa

USAID's PRRG Country Profiles

Detailed land and natural resource tenure issues in 62 countries globally. Profiles provide information on land, water, forest, and minerals resource rights, and are designed to give international development practitioners the background knowledge on these issues to ensure their programs have positive affects on each.

- <http://tpr.mportal.net/products/country-profiles>

Land Tenure Info

Provides land tenure, food security and regional data profiles for selected countries.

- www.landtenure.info/sito.html

ILC Commercial Pressures on Land Blog

Press reports, research papers, case studies and other relevant information about the new wave of commercial pressures on land.

- <http://www.landcoalition.org/cpl-blog>

IIED Empowerment and Land Rights

Project and publications of IIED on this theme.

- www.iied.org/theme/3/Empowerment+and+Land+Rights/projects

Oxfam Land Rights in Africa

Papers, journal articles and other publications on research to guide policy and law making on land.

- www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/learning/landrights/index.html

► **FY2011 appropriations remain unresolved**

As the lame duck closing session (the time on the congressional calendar when legislators who have been voted out of office wrap up their terms before the new legislators arrive early the next year) of the 111th Congress limps towards its close, a possible final resolution of fiscal year (FY) 2011 appropriations continues to elude lawmakers.

Current situation: None of the 12 appropriations bills for the fiscal year that started October 1, 2010, has passed either chamber so far. Funding for this year is currently proceeding under a Continuing Resolution (a bill that would continue to fund the federal budget at current FY2010 levels instead of agreeing on new levels for FY2011, also called a CR) passed September 30, which expired in December. Lawmakers will need to pass another CR, likely through sometime in February; meanwhile,

Total Discretionary Spending Enacted and Proposed
(as of 11/19/2010)

		Compared to FY2010
FY2010 enacted	\$1094 billion	—
FY2011 omnibus, currently reported	\$1108 billion	+ \$14 billion
FY2011 original Senate level	\$1114 billion	+ \$20 billion
FY2011 original House level	\$1121 billion	+ \$27 billion

Congress has two options on how to fund the remainder of FY2011.

Option 1—new CR: The first option is a new CR, extending FY2010 funding levels all the way through for the rest of the fiscal year (September 30, 2011). Total discretionary spending in the FY2010 was \$1.094 trillion, so a CR continuing at that level would mean about \$14 billion less in total discretionary spending than the omnibus as currently envisioned would contain. Lawmakers tried to enact this during the lame duck session, but as of press time they were unsuccessful.

Option 2—omnibus: House

and Senate Appropriators have been working on reconciling their bills and putting them together in one large “omnibus” bill, but Senate Democrats have been unable to muster the 60 votes required to move such an omnibus forward, despite Senate Democrats having agreed to lower the total amount of discretionary funding contained in the bills to \$1.108 trillion (\$6 billion less than the Senate had planned on and \$13 billion less than the House).


Complications: Complicating the picture is the existence of earmarks in some of the FY2011 bills. With House Republicans

planning a ban on such earmarks in 2011 when they assume power of the House and Senate Republicans having adopted a voluntary ban for their caucus as well just before Thanksgiving, the earmarks in the FY2011 bills may make an omnibus more difficult to support. Senate Appropriations Chairman Daniel Inouye (D-HA) has indicated an openness to at least considering the removal of such earmarks, albeit reluctantly.

► **USAID nominations continue**

On November 10, 2010, Eric Postel was nominated to be the Assistant Administrator for Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade. On December 1, Paige Alexander’s nomination for Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia went before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for review. No decisions have been made as of press time. ^{MD}

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TULANE UNIVERSITY'S MASTERS OF SCIENCE IN DISASTER RESILIENCE LEADERSHIP



Tulane Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy
Strengthening disaster assistance and humanitarian leadership globally to increase resilience in communities and individuals threatened by natural and manmade disasters

MASTERS OF SCIENCE IN DISASTER RESILIENCE LEADERSHIP

We live in an uncertain world where the number of people at risk from conflict and natural disasters has resulted in escalating numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees globally. With the UN reporting that five times more people are now affected by disasters than a generation ago, it is clear that our collective future depends upon the quality of leadership to save lives, alleviate suffering and increase the capacity of impacted communities to address the root causes of humanitarian crises that include chronic poverty and political marginalization.

The Disaster Resilience Leadership Studies (DRLS) Masters program is being offered through the Payson Center for International Development of Tulane Law School. The program is designed to advance the field of disaster resilience leadership by training and nurturing current and future leaders as well as promoting research and stimulating global innovation in the disaster resilience and humanitarian assistance community.

The DRLS Masters program is a 36 credit program that can be pursued in a traditional 2-year format, or can be taken in an accelerated 3 semester (12 month) timeframe. Half of the required credits must come from completion of core courses, including four courses representing each of the core academic pillars and two research based classes:

- Psychosocial and Behavioral Leadership Sciences (3 credits)
- Disaster Operations Leadership Management & Policy (3 credits)
- Leadership Analysis (3 credits)
- Environmental Hazards Sciences (3 credits)
- Research Methods (3 credits)
- Quantitative Analysis (3 credits)

Half of the required credits can be taken through electives chosen to best match the student's area of interest.

DISASTER RESILIENCE LEADERSHIP ACADEMY

MISSION

The Disaster Resilience Leadership Academy is dedicated to the systematic strengthening of global humanitarian leadership, a process that integrates education, research, and application, to achieve increased resilience in communities and individuals impacted by natural and manmade disasters.

ABOUT THE DRLA

DRLA is an interdisciplinary academic center that is the result of an inter-school collaboration that includes but is not limited to the Tulane University School of Law, School of Social Work, School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, A.B. Freeman School of Business, School of Architecture, and the Center for Bioenvironmental Research.

CONTACT INFORMATION

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200 BROADWAY, SUITE 203

NEW ORLEANS, LA 70118


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RESILIENCE LEADERSHIP





What *Really* Happened?

By **Linda Poteat**
Director, Disaster Response, InterAction

A closer look at some common criticisms of the post-quake response in Haiti.



NO ONE DOUBTS THE SCALE of the disaster caused by the Haiti earthquake. And no one doubts that the response has been massive. But as time has passed with little decrease in the scale of the needs, attention has highlighted certain concerns about both the initial response and ongoing efforts. These include: housing delays, coordination, the role of the military, integrating local perspectives and actors, the limited experience of NGOs in disaster response in urban settings, staffing issues (not enough experts and too much turnover) and why there wasn't more advance work that could have better limited the suffering. But a closer look shows that the picture was and is more complex, as are the lessons for future catastrophes. The Haiti earthquake lasted less than

a minute, but resulted in the deaths of over 230,000 people, and left 300,000 people injured and over one million people homeless. A natural disaster of this scale in a capital city is unusual. In Haiti, the quake destroyed infrastructure and killed many key government officials, UN senior staff and civil society leaders. This severely disrupted the normal functioning of the disaster response mechanisms of these groups, which normally work together to address such incidents in Haiti. Moreover the unimaginably large scale means long-term recovery will take years not months. After the Indian Ocean tsunami, it took nearly five years to get the majority of the displaced people back into permanent housing. Even in the U.S., families are still in FEMA trailers five years after Hurricane Katrina. The Haitian people

and their government face much more daunting challenges on their road to recovery; and the timelines and expectations need to reflect those challenges.

There have been some impressive achievements. Within a short period of time, people in many resettlement sites were receiving health care, water and sanitation services, and emergency shelter assistance. Agencies managed to provide approximately 1.5 million people with full coverage of basic emergency shelter assistance by May 1, before the heavy rains began. This is faster than in any other recent large-scale disaster response, including the 2004 tsunami, the 2005 Pakistan earthquake and the 2008 Burma cyclone. Private individuals around the world also stepped up, donating over \$1 billion to relief efforts. ►



◀ Paramedic Victor Matamoros examines 3 month old baby boy Amadou Archile, held by his mother Danielle in the tiny tent they are living in after their home was destroyed in the Haiti earthquake. Victor, who is with the Costa Rican Red Cross, volunteers with World Vision in Haiti. Baby Amadou was treated for eye and respiratory ailments.

Housing delays

But then things began to slow down as planning and mobilizing transitional shelter solutions proved to be a much greater challenge. Many families could not return to their homes, so the humanitarian community worked with the Haitian government to identify appropriate land on which to build the transitional shelters and to reach agreement on acceptable models for the transitional shelters. Both steps involved lengthy discussions and consultations. This, compounded by customs clearance delays for many transitional shelter materials, has prevented many NGOs from moving forward quickly with their programs and getting more families into transitional shelters in a timely manner.

Coordination

Many international NGOs had been working in Haiti for decades before the earthquake, with programs in a variety of sectors and geographical areas. These NGOs met regularly with Haitian government officials to discuss their programs and regularly submitted reports demonstrating how their work fit into Haiti's National Development Plan. But the earthquake redoubled need for coordination. And although the system is still imperfect,

The humanitarian community has done a better job this time in coming together for the purposes of coordination than in previous large natural disasters.

the humanitarian community has done a better job this time in coming together for the purposes of coordination than in previous large natural disasters. The key government official with whom the NGOs interacted previously died in the quake, but once his office began operating again, NGO contact resumed. NGOs also stepped up coordination amongst themselves: initially through the NGO Coordination Support Office established by Inter-Action and the European-based International Council of Voluntary Agencies and now through the NGO Coordination Committee managed by the NGOs themselves. NGO-UN coordination has also been underway from the start as NGOs have representation on the

UN-chaired Humanitarian Country Team and participate in the interagency cluster coordination system. NGOs sought out the cluster system, and though it was at times very frustrating, few actively refused to participate. Some informal, non-traditional emergency responders stayed outside the system, but the mature, professional NGOs made the time and assigned the staff to participate. Many first-time emergency responders were not familiar with the well-established humanitarian coordination structure and this led to confusion for many of these organizations. It would have been helpful had there been a "Clusters 101" or an emergency response orientation for new players to help them better understand how the humanitarian community does its work, its operating principles and standards, and how it coordinates.

Role of the U.S. military

The U.S. military, through Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) in Miami, was activated immediately for earthquake response; and it must be acknowledged that no other entity could have gotten the Port-au-Prince airport up and running as quickly and efficiently. The U.S. military also was instrumental in getting the port functioning soon thereafter, which facilitated the movement of a great deal of humanitarian aid. This was a clear example of a situation where the military has critical competencies the humanitarian community does not have, such as air traffic control and heavy lift capacity. And the humanitarian community needs to do a better job of understanding when the needs of a particular response extend beyond the community's capacity and to figure out how and when to better utilize military core competencies when needed. The humanitarian community could not have started the response without the U.S. military having opened up the airport and the seaport, but it did not move fast enough to use other key capacities such as engineering expertise and demolition equipment that would have been particularly useful in the

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urban context. Humanitarians need to be more proactive in reaching out when appropriate and in providing guidance to military leadership as early on as possible. On the positive side, the Civil Military Coordination Section of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs provided a liaison officer to SOUTHCOM within five days of the earthquake, which proved to be a key asset in facilitating planning and decision-making in Miami, and was a positive step forward in principled engagement with the military.

Integrating local perspectives and actors

After every disaster response, the humanitarian community is called to account for not having effectively integrated local actors into the coordination structure and hence the response itself. Haiti is no exception. As many government and UN buildings were destroyed, the UN logistics base at the airport became the coordination hub. However, the base was part of the pre-existing UN peace-keeping compound and, as a military installation, had very strict security. The stringent security measures, coupled with the fact that it took anywhere from 60-90 minutes to get there from most places in town, made it difficult for Haitians to attend the coordination meetings. In addition, few meetings were held in French, which made the long trip a waste of time for most Haitian participants. A great deal of effort was put into advocating for meetings to be held in French or Creole and for translators to be provided, but little progress was made. This problem remains and must be addressed by UN leadership to ensure that such an obvious mistake is not made in a future response.

Working in cities

The humanitarian community clearly needs to focus more on how to respond in an urban context. Most senior managers cut their teeth on rural response, so this is a difficult paradigm shift. As a first step, the tools already in use (Sphere Project and others) need to be reviewed and adapted for use in urban contexts. This is particularly important when looking at livelihoods and early recovery, and some NGOs were able to make the shift even in the Haiti context. For example, there were microfinance schemes in place before the earthquake that were functioning adequately. Many people defaulted on loans because of

the earthquake, but some NGOs used the lists from these microfinance schemes to help identify recipients of livelihoods grants, thus helping these people get back on their feet economically. NGOs also soon discovered that reaching out to local leadership through the *quartier* (neighborhood) system facilitated their ability to approach and consult with their beneficiaries. By using a pre-existing system trusted by the local population, these NGOs were better able to design programs and provide needed services. An interagency working group is also set to address the many challenges that need further attention such as how to address shelter and sanitation challenges in crowded urban areas.

Staffing

In the immediate aftermath of any mega-disaster, NGOs, UN agencies and others must scramble to find experienced emergency responders to deploy on short notice. The pool becomes much smaller if special skills such as language abilities are required. The limited global pool of relief experts is stretched over 30-40 countries around the world at any given time. So, when a mega-disaster strikes, there is very little additional talent to draw on. As a result, staff are pulled from other programs but cannot be spared for long periods of time. This means emergency teams tend to rotate through very quickly, which contributes to a lack of continuity on the ground. While rapid turnover impacts every part of the humanitarian system, in Haiti its effect on cluster coordination was particularly troublesome, as rapid changes in leadership resulted in significant shifts in priorities depending on the background of the new cluster coordinator and frequent requests for the rewriting of proposals. This was a major complaint from the NGO side in the early months and has been taken on as a key issue to be addressed by UN leadership.

The humanitarian community also needs to look much more closely at issues of global response capacity. As all indicators point to a significant uptick in natural disasters as a result of climate change, the humanitarian community—and NGOs in particular—need to take a hard look at their post vacancy rates and turnover percentages to better analyze how to recruit and retain the right individuals. If this issue is not addressed with some urgency, the global capacity to respond to disasters will be seriously impacted.

continued on page 54



a catastrophic earthquake occurred at Haiti, leaving more than 250,000 deaths and 10 million homeless people. It was one of the biggest disasters in the century. Since then, a lot of work has been made by some of the interaction members. [Learn more](#)



[SYAP 2010]
 ...project in [Haiti](#)
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 ...clusters in [Haiti](#)
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Camps
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Who is Doing What and Where

New Haiti Aid Map project lets users see the broad programmatic picture in practical detail.

By **Danielle Heiberg**, Program Associate, InterAction

THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EARTHQUAKE, coupled with the challenge of rebuilding in an urban setting, requires a more holistic approach than has been pursued in past humanitarian recovery efforts. Given the scale of the disaster, NGOs and donors recognize that in order to truly help build Haiti back better, the humanitarian community must expand its impact by building new partnerships.

To help foster partnerships amongst NGOs and strengthen corporate and NGO relationships, InterAction, in partnership with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Business Civic Leadership Center, is officially launching Haiti Aid Map (<http://haitiaidmap.org>). Funded by FedEx, Haiti Aid Map will provide NGOs, donors and the public with a snapshot of who is doing what, where. While this data was especially critical during the initial response to the earthquake to facilitate the relief effort, it is still vital one year later as the relief effort shifts into reconstruction.

A prototype of Haiti Aid Map, unveiled in summer of 2010, was the first step in creating a comprehensive look at the work NGOs are doing at the project level. The prototype enabled users to view detailed project information and to search projects by commune, sectors and organizations. The full site, launched later this month, will be organized similarly and provides more detailed information on projects including beneficiaries, donors and implementing partners. It will also feature maps that highlight specific aspects of NGO work to current critical needs. For example, one map features water, sanitation and health projects overlaid with data on the cholera outbreak. At press time, over 60 NGOs, both InterAction mem-

bers and non-members, have contributed data to Haiti Aid Map.

Haiti Aid Map will be a valuable resource for NGOs as they move from the recovery to reconstruction phase. An NGO with programs primarily focused on the health sector can use project data on Haiti Aid Map to partner with NGOs working in the same communes on food and nutrition programs, education and shelter. The compiled project data can also provide a better picture of communities or sectors that might be underserved.

"As an agency that has had a long-term presence in Haiti, we're often asked to refer other organizations. We will be able to use the Haiti [Aid] Map to respond to such requests as it provides so much relevant information on many of the active organizations in Haiti all in one place. In this regard, it offers one-stop shopping," said Nathalie Augustin, Director, Haiti Stakeholder Liaison, Save the Children.

The compiled project data can provide a better picture of communities or sectors that might be underserved.

In addition to strengthening relationships between NGOs, the corporate community can use Haiti Aid Map to make more informed decisions on where to direct their resources. "As the founding sponsor of this online tool, it is our hope that it will serve to facilitate communications between the NGOs represented on the map and the business community," said Shane O'Connor, Program Advisor, FedEx Global Citizenship. "It is our hope that

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Distinguishing Humanitarian Action from Development

► **It's time to stop understating the differences.**

By **Joel R. Charny**, Vice President for Humanitarian Policy and Practice, InterAction

WITH THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION talking about the importance of “whole of government” approaches to foreign engagement and the United Nations stressing the importance of integrated missions and “One UN,” there is an increasing threat to humanitarian action as an activity distinct from rehabilitation and long-term development. Even within the InterAction community there has been a tendency to downplay humanitarian response as a separate endeavor, as evidenced by the Modernizing Foreign Assistance Network focus on development as the primary aspect of foreign aid reform and the near complete absence of references to humanitarian work in InterAction’s draft strategic directions documents.

The distinction between humanitarian action and development is vital precisely because integrated approaches have the effect of turning humanitarian efforts into a tool to advance broader political interests. Humanitarian action is about saving lives, while adhering to the principles of *humanity* (the life of each person is valuable and worth saving); *impartiality* (the life-saving effort should be carried out without consideration of political or other affiliations and identities of the vulnerable people); and *independence* (the provision of life-saving assistance should be completely separate from and should not reflect the agendas of anyone other than the caregivers). While to the extent possible, humanitarian action should strengthen the capacity of the




The distinction ... is vital precisely because integrated approaches have the effect of turning humanitarian efforts into a tool to advance broader political interests.

survivors to recover and thrive in the medium- to long-term, it is fundamentally about meeting the urgent needs of vulnerable people.

When things become complicated is the minute the effort moves beyond immediate, life-saving action and begins to focus on strengthening the capacity of communities to rebuild. Such actions may begin within days of a sudden-onset emergency, such as the tsunami or the Haiti earthquake, and may exist side-by-side with humanitarian response for months in pro-

tracted emergencies, such as that in Darfur or in eastern Congo. For any recovery effort to be meaningful and sustainable, it has to be planned with the community and other local actors, including government officials, community-based organizations, religious institutions and so on. Indeed, as Haiti emerges slowly from the rubble, more and more voices—those of Haitian government officials, leaders of civil society organizations and former President Clinton in his role as special envoy—are criticizing the international NGO community for failing to engage sufficiently with local institutions.

Supporting recovery and initiating development activities are inherently political and are therefore outside the realm of the humanitarian principles listed above. There is confusion on this point even within our own InterAction community. Representatives of organizations accepting millions of dollars in U.S. government assistance in Afghanistan, where the U.S. is a belligerent, and in Pakistan, where the U.S. is engaged on an overt effort to win “hearts and minds,” regularly refer to their adherence to humanitarian principles. This can only be aspirational in these settings. The decision to accept U.S. government funding makes it virtually impossible. Further, for the efforts to be sustainable they must involve engagement with local actors with a political agenda, which makes being impartial and independent extremely difficult.

This is not about right and wrong. Virtually all InterAction members engaged in emergency response also support rehabilitation and development; and there are strong arguments for incorporating a development perspective into humanitarian actions. A world in which pure humanitarian action was the only way that international NGOs chose to engage would be a world of near-permanent suffering and vulnerability. Disaster risk reduction, rehabilitation and development are all vital activities that may serve to prevent conflict and suffering. Nonetheless, member agencies and InterAction itself need to be more conscious of the trade-offs involved in simultaneously engaging in humanitarian action, rehabilitation and development, and, once the choice for broad engagement is made, be more cautious about evoking humanitarian principles at the first sign of threat to an independence that may be illusory. 

Agree or disagree with what you’ve just read? **Send your comments to cbrobst@interaction.org**. Your thoughts may be shared in an upcoming issue of MD.

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A New Frontline Against Cholera

► **The threat of a serious epidemic looms over Haiti's already fragile recovery efforts.**

By **Fanny Devoucoux**, ACTED Haiti mission director, and **Cyril Dupré**, ACTED Washington

field in order to start with my team workers several blanket distributions of chlorine tablets and soap for hand-washing, I fell upon a very high number of sick men, women and children, in the courtyard of rural community centres. Trucks were coming from every surrounding community to transport the people affected by cholera, and nobody knew what was going on, a panic and anxiety similar to what happened in Port-au-Prince just after the earthquake.”

“In the area, the lack of knowledge of the local population in terms of basic hygiene makes it very vulnerable to such a deadly disease as cholera. Around here, everybody uses water from the river for drinking, cooking and washing, and because of the almost



The village of Petite Desdunes, in lower Artibonite, was flooded during October storms and was one of the first places hit by cholera.

IT IS OFTEN THE FRONTLINE, LOCAL community worker who is the most important tool in helping curb a rapidly-spreading disease like cholera. Indeed that has been the case in the lower Artibonite region where cholera was first identified in Haiti in October 2010.

With most international humanitarian groups focused on the capital and larger urban areas since the earthquake, groups like ours rely on community workers like Wilna Dorélian to help cope with such outbreaks.

Wilna, 33 years old, a resident in the village of Bac d'Aquin near Grande Saline is in charge of community mobilization activities for ACTED. As she graduated a couple of years ago from Port-au-Prince University, she made the decision to stay in Haiti while her family joined the diaspora overseas. She took over the

small rice farm of her parents, and started to support her community as a health worker. In late October, she feared a waterborne illness had struck her area when she heard from relatives that people in the community had been dying quickly from acute diarrhoea.

“I went immediately to St. Marc hospital where some patients who were victim of such diarrhoeas were taken care of, and was told by the director that a series of medical tests were ongoing, but that it was probably due to a water-borne disease,” recalled Wilna. A few days later, cholera was officially declared in the area and high numbers of deaths were reported.

She immediately told people in her village and community health workers to stop drinking water from the Artibonite River and the irrigation channels. “When I returned to the

complete lack of latrines people tend generally to defecate directly on the ground.”

Wilna has been actively involved in the earthquake emergency humanitarian response and is now dedicated to working on the ground in cholera-affected municipalities around St. Marc and along lower Artibonite. Her experience is making a difference as she has been able to rapidly inform the local authorities and community leaders, and has mobilized a network of voluntary health workers established by ACTED in recent years in the area.

In the lower Artibonite region, one of the most fertile areas of the country and a key rice producing region, daily workers coming from the north to the paddy fields were the first victims. The local fish industry was also hard hit, as raw or undercooked seafood was



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reported to be a potential source of contamination by the cholera bacterium, and small fishermen lost their main source of income.

Among the first victims of the January earthquake were children, who are an especially vulnerable group when it comes to cholera. They usually swim in irrigation channels and in the Artibonite River, and go to schools largely deprived of proper water and sanitation facilities.

The social impacts of the epidemic on a country already shattered by the earthquake are also a major threat, all the more so as families affected by cholera tend to become stigmatized by the rest of the community.

A massive information campaign via radio and other means has been undertaken to try and curb the spread of cholera, including messages on good hygiene. The use of treated or boiled water and chlorine as preventive means was widely promoted, but this is difficult and costly for many people who are struggling to make ends meet.

“To a large extent, getting access to safe water in the area has a cost, whether for the

purchase of chlorine tablets or gallons of water purified by reverse osmosis, and the situation is even more difficult since the earthquake. And boiling water requires extra charcoal that families can’t always afford. Even if the area of the lower Artibonite wasn’t directly affected by the earthquake, thousands of people living in

“To a large extent, getting access to safe water in the area has a cost.”

Port-au-Prince who originally came from the region moved back seeking refuge. Whereas they had expected to come back to the capital once the city was reconstructed, many of them finally decided to stay with their relatives and settle down. This massive population displacement represented an immediate pressure on local resources,” said Wilna.


The rapid intervention of local authorities, supported by the United Nations and NGOs involved in health and WASH, helped reduce the number of deaths in the area. But the issue


of vulnerability of populations in rural areas of Haiti underscores structural problems facing the country.

It also underlines the urgent need to shake up the health care system as well as improve water supply and sanitation infrastructures in order to better prevent and take care of the sick. A long term coherent intervention integrating all health, social and economic aspects of the crisis is required.

In the lower Artibonite region, the cholera epidemic is a sharp reminder of the challenges of reconstruction, as well as the urgent need to support and revitalize rural areas deprived of proper water and sanitation infrastructures and increasingly vulnerable since the disaster.

What Haiti needs to prevent a recurrence of this epidemic is a series of massive investments by the international community and the government of Haiti over the coming years, as well as a careful allocation of resources throughout the territory and a strong will to tackle underlying structural problems.

It also needs frontline community workers such as Wilna. 



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The Other Front Line

► **Advocacy in Washington makes a critical difference in Haiti.**

By **Annalise Udall Romoser**, Director of Public Policy, Lutheran World Relief

IN THE AFTERMATH OF HAITI'S EARTHQUAKE, BOTH THE media and the public have scrutinized relief efforts by NGOs. Receiving both praise and criticism, the pace and quality of rebuilding occupies the minds of those who care deeply about Haiti's future. Advocacy efforts closer to home, however, represent an untold story and one that may have just as much bearing on the nation's future as actions taken inside the country to rebuild.

Within 10 days of the earthquake, development and advocacy organizations came together in Washington, DC, to begin influencing the U.S. government's response to the crisis and help shape long-term development plans for the nation. "Moved by the extent of the disaster we knew we had to come together to press for a rapid and sustained U.S. response ... one that would avoid some past pitfalls of international assistance to Haiti," explains Lisa Haugaard Director of the Latin American Working Group. To a great extent, and thanks to strong coalition work, these organizations have already achieved their initial advocacy goals.

At the top of the advocacy list in January 2010 was ensuring passage of a supplemental spending bill to expedite emergency services and reconstruction efforts. Before President Obama released his budget request to Congress last February, representatives of many organiza-

◀ *Displaced Haitians line up for work removing rubble in Port-au-Prince. Advocacy efforts have focused on Haitian-led reconstruction and development informed by the proposals of Haitian civil society.*

tions had already submitted supplemental funding recommendations to the White House and prepared to meet with members of Congress to advance a "supplemental" for Haiti.

Advocacy efforts also prioritized support for Haitian-led reconstruction and sustainable development. On June 27, after months of work, countless meetings with congressional offices and actions taken by an estimated 10,000 constituents affiliated with these groups, Congress approved \$1.5 billion in supplemental funding for Haiti. Language from the U.S. Department of State accompanying this legislation explains that, "[T]he U.S. government will make strategic investments with a core objective of assisting Haiti in building its own institutions, capacity and opportunities for long-term growth."

This legislative victory came on the heels of another long-awaited advocacy win. Before the earthquake, groups had advocated for more than 10 years for Haiti to receive debt relief without harmful conditions. In the years preceding the earthquake, organizations argued that Haiti's exclusion from debt relief initiatives was inappropriate given the nation's level of poverty. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the rationale for debt relief was even more apparent: Haiti could not rebuild while making onerous loan payments. Over 400,000 Americans signed a petition calling for cancellation of Haiti's debt and organizations

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
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representing 30 million Americans signed a letter to U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner with the same request. On April 15, and in record time, Congress passed legislation calling for multilateral debt cancellation and grants, not loans, for Haiti. Almost all of Haiti's billion-dollar-debt has now been cancelled.

"This was an important victory," explains Melinda St. Louis of Jubilee USA. "For the first time, international institutions were forced to provide full debt relief after a natural disaster." Freeing up desperately needed national funds for reconstruction and development, debt cancellation is a critical step in Haiti's recovery process.

Smaller advocacy accomplishments abound, but their success cannot yet be measured. For example, NGO efforts to incorporate the proposals of Haitian civil society into reconstruction and development planning are ongoing. In July, Washington-based NGOs worked with the Congressional Black Caucus to include Haitian panelists in a congressional event called Focus on Haiti: The Road to Recovery. And over the last year, U.S. NGOs have facilitated the visits of Haitian civil society leaders to Capitol Hill to speak with members of Congress and help inform


Only through continued advocacy will U.S. government investments in Haiti reflect best practices from the field.

U.S. reconstruction and development strategies. Likewise, many NGOs are prioritizing efforts to ensure that consultation with Haitian civil society remains an integral part of anticipated U.S. government agriculture investments in Haiti through Feed the Future.

These advocacy victories can be celebrated for what

they represent: NGOs' commitment to quality, long-term and Haitian-led development in Haiti. Yet much advocacy work still remains if U.S. investments are to result in quality development for Haiti.

The Haiti Empowerment, Assistance and Rebuilding (HEAR) Act, for example, had yet to pass in Congress at the time of this writing, despite months of advocacy to promote its passage. Introduced by Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Robert Corker (R-TN), HEAR provides a framework for investment in Haiti that would advance best practices for development. The act articulates U.S. priorities for aid to Haiti, sets benchmarks for success and introduces a transparent reporting and accountability system. Ian Schwab, Associate Director for Advocacy at American Jewish World Service explains, "Currently, the HEAR Act is Congress' best tool to make sure U.S. funds for Haiti are effective and transparent. Congress would be wise to pass this legislation now and create a strong foundation for the many years of work ahead." To date, organizations show that more than 7,000 of their constituents have emailed or called Congress showing support for the passage of the HEAR Act.


As organizations work on the ground in Haiti to help rebuild, their colleagues in the U.S. must continue advocating. We have already made gains, but only through continued advocacy will U.S. government investments in Haiti reflect best practices from the field and advance the hopes of our Haitian counterparts. Ultimately, the future of Haiti will not only be defined by the bricks laid in country, but also by the doors we knock on in Congress. 

Questions and comments can be sent to the author at aromoser@lwr.org.

Sean Penn

The actor and humanitarian discusses his views on the involvement of the United States, NGOs, and his own charity in Haiti's recovery efforts.

Interview by **Sue Pleming**, Senior Director of Public Relations, InterAction



MONDAY DEVELOPMENTS: What do you see as the key challenges facing Haiti at the one-year mark following the earthquake?

SEAN PENN: The earthquake in essence only exacerbated existing problems that have plagued Haiti for some time: lack of available clean water and sanitation, lack of economic opportunity, a broken education system, and now a cholera epidemic. As we saw with the pockets of violence and general unrest surrounding the elections, this is an environment that is easily destabilized because people are not seeing change.

I have observed a lack of patience and knowledge from the international community regarding Haiti's road to recovery—many hold the expectation that Haiti will be fixed overnight. We must not forget

that billions in aid money pledged to the people of Haiti have yet to be delivered, and educating donors about where and how this money will be spent to ensure the most effective outcomes is a primary obligation.

MD: Going forward, what should the priorities be for donors, for international NGOs, and for charities like your own?

SP: People need safe shelter, they need solutions that are not temporary—and members of the international community need to strive to make long-term rebuilding efforts self-sustaining ones.

There also needs to be a greater sense of urgency in dealing with the cholera epidemic, especially in rural areas where people have no access to clean water and medical services. With adequate medical and material resources, cholera can be treated simply and effectively. But preventable deaths will continue to occur on a large scale if the international community does not make ending this epidemic a major priority.

MD: What is your assessment of the role of international NGOs in Haiti since the earthquake? What did we do right and where do you think we have failed?

SP: There has been a general lack of boldness to act at all, and fingers are extremely quick to point at the government of Haiti.

But it has been my experience that when common sense guides practical behavior, at the very least one can expect the government of Haiti's support. When the behavior goes beyond simply practical to proactive, that support becomes partnership.

MD: As INGOs, we are assessing what has been done in the past year—navel-gazing if you will. What lessons have you personally learned from your experiences in Haiti over the past year?

SP: What you will hear is that there are now frameworks in place, and project plans by multi-nationals, which adhere to the protocols of these frameworks. The projects are shelter-focused with connective tissues to basic services, but even the best funded among them are poised to take very small, cautious steps in terms of permanent housing. There are 1.2 million people displaced, and only small pilot projects in the foreseeable future.

I have observed the ongoing challenge of the definition and selection of beneficiaries; meaning among these extremely vulnerable populations, we can expect nothing more than demonstration models in 2011. The progress made in Haiti is difficult to quantify; the recent wave of social unrest coupled with the epidemic of cholera will pose significant challenges towards achieving measurable results.

Given that, we can most certainly expect next year's hurricane season to again threaten somewhere in the area of a million people who will still be living in tarp shelters and otherwise unsanitary and highly vulnerable conditions.

MD: What are the achievements of your charity in Haiti? How are you responding to the cholera crisis, for example?

SP: Our response to the cholera epidemic is aggressive and ongoing.

It's my view that the Haitian people would be better served by a complete do-over of the donors' conference.



ing. Following the initial outbreak we deployed a constant supply of medics and resources to some of the hardest-hit areas in the country. In early December, we partnered with the Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population (MSPP) and launched a comprehensive mission to assess ongoing medical and human resource needs and to deliver supplies nationwide. These operations have been conducted with particular emphasis on the ongoing epidemic in isolated rural areas. The collaboration targets existing Cholera Treatment Units (CTU's) and Cholera Treatment Centers (CTC's) that care for gravely ill patients, as well as newly affected areas where outbreaks were previously unreported. With the assistance of helicopters supplied by United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) and the government of the Dominican Republic, our missions have delivered over 20 tons of medical supplies and personnel throughout Haiti.

A central focus has also been community rebuilding efforts, including removing rubble from streets and neighborhoods and relocating families to more long-term housing solutions. The rubble clearing has encouraged Haitians to participate in spontaneous clearing efforts themselves. Every day we see evidence of people clearing rubble from their home sites by hand, almost doubling the effectiveness of our work. The emotional, physical and spiritual impact of rubble removal cannot be underestimated.

Despite the strides we've made, however, as long as parallel organizations focused on shelter and economic development find every reason to not act boldly—the life saving, the provision of clean water, the neighborhood returns, will all continue to be a small part of this very large situation. In order to enhance our proactive influence, we need funding. Simply put, increased financial support from the international community and increased transparency will increase results.

MD: How can we move from this band-aid relief to more sustainable development in Haiti?

SP: Quite frankly, in a time where most call for either a re-count or a complete do-over of the election, it's my view that the Haitian people would be better served by a complete do-over of the donors' conference. Rather than smoke-and-mirror pledges of money, the international donors would be held to the same value of their initial pledges, but they'd also have to specify what area of infrastructure they'd take responsibility to implement, and by what date, so the value of their pledges would come to completion.


We are incredibly conscious of the need to encourage sustainable

development in all aspects of operation. Our staff is predominantly Haitian as are many of our valued partners working with us in camp management, rubble removal, relocation, education, and countrywide health care. We've fully committed ourselves to influence and execute the intermingling of long-term sustainability and emergency relief.

MD: Should there be pride over how the United States and international NGOs have responded to the crisis in Haiti?

SP: Pride should come with results, and transparency is essential to achieving results. It is time for our country's donors to become better educated about where their dollars go and, in the future, to become active in guiding those dollars to the organizations that truly represent their intentions.

MD: Why do you care so much about Haiti? What is your personal attachment to the island? Are you in this for the long haul?

SP: Haiti's resilience in the face of so much suffering is unshakable. The humanity and prevailing spirit of the Haitian people is humbling, inspiring, and viscerally palpable. Once you experience it, it never leaves you. It's why I came here soon after the earthquake and stayed for 6 months straight. It's why I continue to spend so much time here. It's why I have said there will be no exit [from Haiti] for me until there is more life than death, and it's why I'm in this for the long haul. 



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So ... Where Did the Money Go?

Understanding the often complicated world of U.S. funding for Haiti.

By **Natalie Eisenbarth**, Senior Legislative Associate for Humanitarian Affairs, InterAction

THE EARTHQUAKE IN HAITI DEMANDED AN UNPRECEDENTED share of resources for immediate life-saving relief. And the long-term reconstruction process that has already begun will require sustained investments by the donor community for years to come. To date, the U.S. government has made considerable investments and commitments: for both immediate relief and long-term reconstruction. Meanwhile, much remains to be done; and that leaves many wondering where the money has gone. The many moving parts have only heightened the confusion. Knowing what the U.S. has committed and spent so far is important and will help sustain long-term interest in Haiti's recovery and reconstruction.

In the hours and days following the quake, the U.S. government responded swiftly and robustly, engaging numerous government bodies in addition to its lead international disaster response entity, USAID's Office for U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). OFDA led the way with a tremendous devotion of resources and human capital. It stretched what even under normal circumstances is a very limited budget for an agency tasked with regularly providing critical humanitarian relief for natural disasters and man-made crises around the world.

Funding for OFDA comes from the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) account. Until the U.S. government's 2010 fiscal year (FY2010), the already limited IDA resources had been further challenged by Congress' regular practice of only partially funding it and other international humanitarian accounts in the regular appropriations cycle; the rest of the yearly funding typically came later in the year in annual supplemental funding measures. Since 2001 these "supplementals" have been used to provide off-budget funding for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. An array of other priorities including humanitarian funding have been tacked onto these measures since their successful passage has generally been assured by Congress' willingness to fund defense needs related to the wars. The InterAction community had long advocated for fully funding anticipated international humanitarian response activities at the beginning of the fiscal year and only relying on supplementals when a major disaster demands significantly more resources than were anticipated. Since the timing of the supplementals varied from year to year and funding levels were often subject to great uncertainties, the U.S. government's primary international crisis response entities (OFDA, USAID's Food for Peace, and the State Department Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM)) were often left without sufficient certainty about their funding prospects to plan effectively beyond extremely short time-frames. Positive change came when, in



the FY2010 appropriations process, the Obama administration and the 111th Congress provided whole-year funding for OFDA's IDA account, PRM's Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) and other international humanitarian priorities in the regular appropriations bill.

However, while joint action by the administration and Congress to front-fund these accounts was a positive step, it did little to change the overall inconsistency between IDA funding levels and OFDA's massive mission. OFDA is tasked with meeting life-saving needs in protracted crises and sudden-onset emergencies around the world. When an event of Haiti's magnitude demands a tremendous share of its resources, OFDA often must divert funding away from life-saving programs in other parts of the world to meet the unexpected needs of the new crisis. Events in 2010 were no exception. Two weeks after the earthquake, OFDA's commitments in Haiti totaled over \$160 million: approximately 20 percent of OFDA's total approved FY2010 budget of \$845 million. By the end of September, OFDA spending in Haiti totaled over \$372 million or approximately 44 percent of its original budget level for the fiscal year. With critical ongoing efforts in places like Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan, as well as new emergencies such as Pakistan's massive floods later in the year, OFDA's commitments in Haiti—however necessary to address the devastation—represented a significant portion of funding for its account that was already stretched to capacity.

By the end of September, OFDA spending in Haiti totaled over \$372 million, or approximately 44 percent of its original budget level for the fiscal year.

In early February, InterAction heard from OFDA's NGO implementing partners that notices were being circulated about impending cuts to country programs in East Africa, Central Asia, Latin America and other regions in order to support USAID's massive response to Haiti. InterAction and its members responded with advocacy, encouraging swift action on an emergency supplemental measure that would replenish OFDA's account, enabling it to continue to respond in Haiti while also meeting life-saving needs in other ongoing and potential crises.

On March 24, the administration released its Haiti supplemental funding request. In addition to much needed humanitarian funding for OFDA and reimbursements to other parts of USAID and the State Department, the request also provided reimbursements and covered anticipated future costs for other U.S. government agencies that responded to the disaster: the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security and Treasury. The request also included funding for long-term reconstruction in Haiti. This "Haiti supplemental" joined another outstanding funding request from the administration for both military and non-military spending in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan (the "war supplemental"). The request, however, was just the beginning of a rocky, four-month road to final passage. Along the way, the critical funding for the humanitarian response accounts and important money for reconstruction in Haiti would be caught up in congressional disagreements over domestic spending priorities and politically charged negotiations about the increasingly controversial funding for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. On March 31, the U.S. and other donor nations held the International Donors' Conference towards a New Future for Haiti. At the conference the U.S. pledged \$1.15 billion for Haiti's long-term recovery and reconstruction. The administration's supplemental request was a major step towards putting its money where its mouth was.

The Senate was the first to act on the administration's request. In mid-May, it attached funding for the Haiti supplemental and the war supplemental to a domestic spending measure passed by the House in March that provided funding for the Federal Emergency Management Agency to replenish domestic disaster response accounts. The Senate's version increased funding for Haiti reconstruction by \$24 million above the administration's request, increased funding for OFDA's IDA account by \$110 million and provided funding for food assistance in line with the administration's request (\$150 million). The Senate also included an additional \$165 million for PRM's MRA account—a number that was not in the administration's original request. While PRM's participation in the earthquake response was minimal, the Senate responded to advocacy by InterAction and others to provide additional resources for global PRM programs in FY2010. The full Senate approved the bill on May 27.

In the House, their version of a bill to provide supplemental funding for emergency programs and long-term reconstruction in Haiti was drawn up. The House Appropriations Committee scheduled a markup hearing in late May to consider the bill, but the hearing was abruptly cancelled at the last moment. After much speculation, in early June House leadership intimated that rather than working with its own version of the Haiti supplemental bill, it would instead work with the version passed by the full Senate on May 27. The House had hit a major speed bump over disagreements between Democrats regarding whether to include additional funding for domestic education priorities.

In their final day before the Fourth of July recess, House leadership pushed through a vote on a modified version of the bill the Senate had passed on May 27, adding nearly \$23 billion in additional domestic spending. This domestic spending was off-set by cuts of other unspent money within the federal budget. This modified version received a cold reception in the Senate when lawmakers returned after the recess. Some in the Senate did not want the additional domestic spending; others took issue with the off-setting cuts. President Obama himself weighed in, threatening a veto of the measure if it was sent to him with a cut to his signature education program included in the House's package of off-sets. Not surprisingly, a July 23 Senate vote on the bill with the


House's additions was unsuccessful. After failing to pass the modified measure, the Senate sent its May 27 version back to the House. Finally, on July 27, the House cleared the original Senate-passed version, sending the combined supplemental bill to President Obama for his signature.

Despite the delay, the InterAction community hailed this as a success given the relatively small but critically important increases in humanitarian resources and a slight bump-up in reconstruction funding for Haiti relative to the administration's March request. The bill contained \$775 million in humanitarian funding (\$460 million for IDA, \$165 million for MRA, and \$150 million for emergency food assistance); nearly \$918 million for Haiti reconstruction; \$212 million for debt relief for Haiti; and nearly \$1.2 billion to reimburse the State Department, USAID and other agencies (including the Departments of Defense, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security and State) for costs associated with their response to the earthquake.

As is typical with appropriations measures of this nature, the bill stipulated that within 45 days of its enactment, the State Department, in consultation with USAID, should submit to the respective appropriations committees in both the House and Senate a spending plan for the \$918 million in reconstruction funding. The spending plan for Haiti was submitted within this timeframe—give or take a week or so—and what followed was a closed-door, back and forth between congressional appropriators and officials at State and USAID about the details of the spending plan.

Around this same time, reports were circulated citing delays in getting

reconstruction funding to Haiti. Many of these reports incorrectly conflated the authorization levels provided in the Haiti Empowerment and Reconstruction (HEAR) Act with the funding provided by the combined supplemental appropriations act approved and signed into law in July. The HEAR Act was introduced by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry (D-MA) and his committee colleague Senator Bob Corker (R-TN) in May. In late July, Representative John Conyers (D-MI) and a number of his colleagues introduced a similar measure in the House. Along with other critical components, the HEAR Act originally sought to authorize \$3.5 billion in assistance for Haiti to be provided over five years. While an important expression of congressional policy and commitment to long-term funding, this authorization (like any spending authorization) must be followed by separate appropriations legislation before any money will actually flow. Delay in passing the HEAR Act was not behind any perceived delays in reconstruction funding since nearly \$1 billion for reconstruction was already appropriated in July.

As of now, the U.S. has spent approximately \$1.1 billion in humanitarian relief (\$380 million of that has been spent by OFDA). On the long-term reconstruction side, approximately \$120 million of the \$918 million in funding appropriated by the July supplemental has been disbursed—this amount to a multi-donor trust fund managed by the World Bank called the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF). In addition to investments by the U.S., other donor nations will make contributions to this fund, which will be used for large projects prioritized by the government of Haiti. Other disbursements are expected in short order. 



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Strengthening Opportunities for Children with Disabilities

► Build back better with focus on inclusive education and disabilities services.

By **Steven M. Rothstein**, President, Perkins School for the Blind

EARTHQUAKES MAKE NEWS. THE world pays attention, at least for awhile. For a child with a disability in Haiti, life balances on a razor's edge. It is now even more urgent that the world pay attention to these most vulnerable children.

A ray of hope emerged in the spring of 2009 when the Haitian parliament ratified the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and a government secretary responsible for disability was appointed. A national plan was drafted to advance greater participation of people with disabilities in Haitian society, importantly providing and improving inclusive education for all students with disabilities.

Even before the earthquake, the Women's Refugee Commission estimated that 200,000 Haitian children lived with disabilities. That number has greatly increased since the disaster and subsequent cholera outbreak. Education, the key to independence and advancement in any society, has been rare for children with disabilities. Organizations such as St. Vincent's School for Handicapped Children and Wings of Hope have made impressive strides. Even so, the office of the Minister of Disabilities estimates that only 4 percent of children with disabilities attended school at all. After the earthquake, that number has shrunk to just a few thousand.

As the list of important needs in Haiti grows, we must look deeper for ways to ensure that those most at risk receive the very best we can offer. Our global society will, indeed, be judged by how well it treats those who are most vulnerable. As one blind child in Haiti succeeds, we all succeed. If we fail that child, we all fail.

Much is being written about rebuilding



Our global society will, indeed, be judged by how well it treats those who are most vulnerable.

Haiti. The theme "build back better" expresses the objective of restoring Haiti not to former conditions, but to better than it was. The U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities outlines the framework to launch advances for people who are disabled. The job is obviously much larger now and will require a massive, coordinated effort from the entire international community to ensure that children with disabilities have educational opportunities. Piecemeal development efforts cannot succeed. Unity is required: international NGOs working arm-in-arm with the Haitian government and the many local organizations committed to rebuilding.

The Haitian Association for the Blind and Partially Sighted (SHAA) has redoubled its

◀ *St. Vincent's School for Handicapped Children in Port-au-Prince, the first such school in Haiti, was founded in 1945. Before the earthquake, the facilities provided not only education to children with a wide range of disabilities, but also medical, physical therapy and social work services for the entire community.*

Genie, a young woman with physical disabilities who had attended St. Vincent's School since childhood, was trapped under the earthquake's rubble. She was pulled from under the collapsed walls of her room and continued her studies in the make-shift school. She passed her exams in May and is attending a professional secretarial school.

efforts. They not only focus on disaster relief for persons who are visually impaired, but also have a plan to "build back better" and address inequities that existed before the earthquake. SHAA's plan is a collaboration with the World Blind Union, Perkins School for the Blind and others to develop infrastructure and provide direct services, thus ensuring availability and access to inclusive education, rehabilitation and social services. The renewed plan deals with the new needs created by the earthquake.

The key now is to remain focused, vocal, active and vigilant. The cholera epidemic, political challenges and construction delays will grab headlines. School rooms for children with special needs may not be front-page news, but the way forward for Haiti will be through education for all its citizens. To "build back better," we all must make it possible for every Haitian to have the chance to acquire the knowledge and skills to participate fully in an improved Haiti. **MD**


A CONVERSATION
WITH...



Tom Adams

U.S. Special Coordinator for Haiti

By **Sue Fleming**, Senior Director of Public Relations, InterAction



For U.S. Special Coordinator for Haiti Thomas Adams, creating jobs—as well as containing cholera and strengthening Haiti’s government—is the key challenge at the one-year mark since the January 12 earthquake.

“Haiti needs a lot of things, but the single most important thing Haiti needs is jobs. At the end of the day, we are not going to be successful in Haiti unless we can create jobs,” said Adams, who was appointed to the role last September.

“As we move along through cholera, hurricanes and everything else, we cannot take our eye off the ball here,” he said of his focus on jobs.

In an exclusive interview with *Monday Developments*, Adams outlined U.S. plans to help build two new industrial zones over the next two to three years in Haiti, with the goal of helping the country grow economically and

ultimately be less dependent on foreign aid.

“It seems to be coming together pretty well,” said Adams of the industrial zones.

There are no accurate statistics on Haiti’s overall unemployment rate, but USAID estimates it could be as high as 70-80 percent in the formal sector. Haiti ranks 145th out of 169 countries on the U.N.’s Human Development Index in 2010.

Adams said Washington was working with private partners to create the industrial zones: one in Cap Haitien in the north and the other close to the capital. Both will focus on the garment and textiles sector, taking advantage of a law signed by President Barack Obama last May, which expands duty-free access to the U.S. market for Haitian textile and apparel exports and extends existing trade preferences.

The first phase of the industrial zone in Cape Haitien should be complete by early 2012, initially creating about 20,000 jobs, he said. This could grow to about 65,000 direct and indirect jobs by around 2014. Haiti’s government has already provided the land, with the first chunk amounting to about 75 hectares, with plans to double it. The United States aims to help construct buildings, modernize the electricity sector, fix ports nearby as well as provide housing for many of the workers, easing congestion in the cities.

The second industrial zone will be near Port-au-Prince, with the direct aim of easing overcrowding in the capital, where hundreds and thousands of people displaced by the earthquake are still in tented camps. This project would be about six months to a year behind the Cap Haitien model, said Adams, and was also expected to create about 20,000 new jobs to begin with.

Funding is still being worked out, but at the UN donors conference last March the

United States pledged \$1.13 billion in new money for sustainable development work on top of \$1.5 billion spent on earthquake relief.

Focus on agriculture too

The U.S. government plans to focus its development money in three key corridors: the Cap Haitien corridor in the north, Saint Marc and the Port-au-Prince area. The strategy has four pillars: infrastructure and energy; food and economic security; health and other basic services; and governance and rule of law.

Adams said another effort was to make the agriculture sector more efficient. It currently employs about 60 percent of the population but contributes only 25 percent towards GDP.

Low farming productivity is a result of small, one-hectare plots, degraded watersheds and inefficient market and transportation systems—all problems the Obama administration would seek to address.

“They have to get out of the 19th century way of doing business and get into the 21st—and they are willing to do it.”

Adams concedes, however, that the current investment climate may be a tough sell to some. The education system is in shambles, the judicial system needs rebuilding and the government was further weakened by the earthquake.

Haiti needs to reform and modernize its economy and improve the way it does business. For example, the World Bank estimates it takes about 105 days to register a business there—about double the amount of time in other Latin American and Caribbean nations.

“They have to get out of the 19th century way of doing business and get into the 21st—and they are willing to do it,” said Adams.

Another challenge is how to improve the credibility of the Haitian government. “We often speak to Haitians who say ‘don’t give a dime to our government’ but the government does do some things well and is doing things better. Ultimately it has to be strengthened ... the Haitian people need to be convinced of

that more than I do and that is the challenge going forward.”

“It is going to take time to tune up the government.”

Getting people out of camps in the capital is difficult—even if their homes are habitable. Recent opinion polls show that many Haitians would prefer to stay in camps rather than return to paying rent and to neighborhoods where health clinics, schools and other facilities may not be as readily available.

“It is not really astonishing if you realize that before the earthquake nobody took care of the poor. The poor were viewed as such an overwhelming group that it was daunting to deal with them. Now, even though imperfectly, they have been provided with water, shelter. We are putting schools in their camps, health clinics.”

In the more immediate term, there is a question of how to remove rubble from the streets. By the end of November, only about 5 percent of the debris had been taken away, an eyesore and frustration for locals and NGOs alike.

Managing expectations

The U.S., other international donors and NGOs are struggling to manage the expectations of the local population, although Adams says Haitians tend to be more realistic than many in America, for example.

“There is a view that Haiti was a nice little island paradise and all we have to do is kind of restore it to what it was, when in fact it wasn’t good (before the quake),” said Adams. “Haitians may be more realistic than we give them credit for. Haitians do see things going on there. So while people want it to be faster, I don’t think they are so disappointed yet.”

He added of his own country: “Americans are pragmatic, can-do people. Half of American households gave money for Haiti and they want to see it fixed up sooner rather than later. I think our job and that of NGOs going forward is how to make people more realistic.”


Asked how he graded the work of the many international NGOs in Haiti, Adams said they were doing “pretty well,” adding it usually took about 18 months for groups to hit their stride following a massive disaster—at least that

was the case in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami.

Going forward, coordination could, however, be improved, suggested Adams, adding that the U.S. government could also do a better job “reinforcing winners and cutting our losses.” He cited shelter as an example where it might be better for contractors to do the work rather than NGOs.

“I think we have to take a look at who is most effective in this area. A lot of the NGOs I saw are figuring it out and are picking up their pace. But it has been a hard learning experience. There are a lot of curve balls that get thrown to you there.”

His message to NGOs was that Haiti was a long-term effort.

“I think the challenge will be to keep our attention on Haiti long enough to get that pendulum swung the right way so that the economy is growing. There have been inconsistent policies and attention to Haiti in the past and I make no excuses for that. Now our policies on Haiti and our resources are really enough to give a good chance to getting it right. But it will not be quick or easy.” 

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An Urban Disaster: Lessons New & Old

► **Disaster planning for an increasingly urban world.**

By **Nan Buzard**, Sr. Director, International Disaster Response & Program, American Red Cross

SINCE HAITI'S EARTHQUAKE, THERE has been renewed focus on the prevalence of urban disasters. This widespread sense of urgency is very welcome because agencies such as UNHCR (the UN refugee agency), the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, UN-Habitat (the UN housing agency) and others have been sounding the alarm for more than a decade. Following a World Disasters Report (WDR) that focused on urban risk in 1998, the Red Cross again examined urban disasters in its 2010 WDR, which reported that more than half of the world's population lives in cities, up from 30 percent in 1950. And by 2030, the urban population is expected to exceed 5 billion people. Four years from now, an estimated 23 cities will have populations of more than 10 million people, compared to just one in 1950. While the megacities dominate conversations and are rightly of great concern, the projections suggest that the largest growth in coming decades will be in small- and medium-sized cities (500,000 to 1.5 million), almost entirely in the developing world. These numbers make it essential that disaster response and risk reduction become fundamental to the planning and management of cities.

This phenomenal urban growth is largely fueled by the migration of rural



populations to urban centers and has resulted in large numbers of highly vulnerable people living in poorly constructed, multi-story buildings, frequently on unsuitable land (e.g., flood plains, steep hillsides, ravines) with narrow roads and lacking basic urban planning or water and sanitation systems.

Other characteristics of urban areas include their reliance on transportation and other infrastructure for the supply of food and other goods. As well, environmental degradation due to population pressure often presents additional risks (e.g., depleted aquifers, flash flooding due to deforestation). The interdependence between social, economic and environmental systems and the large populations of cities is fundamental to understanding disaster response in urban settings. It is the nexus of these systems and the sheer density of population that creates the complexity of

urban disaster planning and response. It is much easier to feed, shelter and care for a thousand people than for a million.


This complexity characterized the Haitian context when the earthquake struck Haiti.

Port-au-Prince, the administrative, logistical, political and financial center of the country, was paralyzed by the collapse of physical infrastructure and the enormous loss of life, including many government employees. In addition, the UN headquarters was destroyed. The blow to both Haiti's government and the UN left a substantial gap in disaster response and coordination. In addition, the close proximity of Haiti to the United States and the Haitian diaspora community living there, the high level of media interest in catastrophic disasters, and the large number of NGOs already working in Haiti created an environment with an overwhelming number of stakeholders with differing perspectives.

Though the contexts may vary and contingency planning and disaster management education could mitigate this, some level of chaos should be planned for when preparing for future large-scale urban disasters. In Haiti, the compromised airport, seaports and roads created a chaotic environment in which the issue of the sequence of aid became fraught. This was compounded by the paucity of available government and UN actors, which in turn led to a decision-making vacuum. For example, questions were raised as to how long search and rescue teams should continue their work and whether those assets should be given higher priority over the movement of field hospitals, medical personnel, and emergency food and shelter. In the absence of coordinated decision-making, search and rescue may have continued for longer than might otherwise have been decided. As well, planes carrying non-emergency personnel were given priority in a context where only limited flights could be accommodated. Good contingency planning by all countries and potential responders could help resolve these questions related to sequencing, thus providing a framework in which to allow clear decision-making on aid activity.

Because of the dense population in Port-au-Prince, the lack of flat land and

Photo: FrankBirds - Fotolia.com; opposite, Benjamin Myers



The interdependence between social, economic and environmental systems and the large populations of cities is fundamental to understanding disaster response in urban settings.

Urban DRR

By Shana O'Brien,
Disaster Response Intern, InterAction

In recognition of International Day for Disaster Reduction, marked each year on the second Wednesday of October, InterAction's Disaster Risk Reduction Working Group and the American Red Cross hosted *Haiti: A Wake Up Call for Urban Disasters*. Julie Sell from the American Red Cross moderated the event and panelists included **Abhas Jha** (World Bank), **Chuck Setchell** (USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance), **Franck Daphnis** (Development Innovations Group) and **Robert Buckley** (the Rockefeller Foundation).

The theme of the event was lessons learned from the Haiti earthquake. Event participants discussed ways disaster risk reduction (DRR) interventions can help prevent future disasters in urban settings from being as destructive as the Haitian earthquake. While addressing challenges—such as rubble removal, ambiguous property rights, and rural-to-urban migration—that make disasters particularly complicated and damaging in urban settings, the session offered a number of key action points for better urban DRR going forward:

- **Refocus attention on urban land-use planning and safe shelter construction**, as improvements in these areas can significantly reduce the negative impacts of disasters in urban settings.
- **Understand the necessity and long-term cost-effectiveness of DRR programs**, including improving early warning data.
- **Increase the skills and technical capacity of NGO staff to work in urban settings**, as NGOs have historically worked predominantly in rural areas.
- **Focus on including local populations** in disaster response efforts.
- **Take a different approach to resettlement and reconstruction efforts** in urban settings. Ambiguous property rights, large renting populations, rubble removal, lack of data on homeowners and the creation of new slums complicate urban reconstruction. Additionally, focus must be turned to neighborhood reconstruction rather than household reconstruction.
- **Focus on factors that may increase future disasters**, such as climate change and population growth.

As urban disasters become an increasingly significant issue, the international community must increase its efforts to build safer, more resilient urban communities and improve its urban disaster response. Incorporating lessons from Haiti and other urban disasters is a critical part of that effort.

InterAction's Disaster Risk Reduction Working Group meets the third Wednesday of every month from 11:00am-12:30pm at InterAction.



the vast amount of rubble, there was little space available for planned emergency settlements. As a result, people settled spontaneously on any available land, sometimes perched dangerously on top of mounds of rubble or in extremely compromised locations where flooding, landslides or even busy roads put their lives at risk. The spontaneous and crowded settlements, which lacked light at night and general security, exposed women and children to sexual and gender-based violence in many areas. Future responses should include urban planners and engineers in early response teams to carefully consider the issues of protection. There are growing numbers of institutions using new technologies to analyze hazards: for example, the use of geographic information systems with environmental modeling and information on infrastructure and demographics to produce maps that can facilitate preparedness and response.

Ideally, emergency shelter should transition to recovery and reconstruction. However, in addition to mass rubble removal (which has no corresponding interagency coordination cluster in the humanitarian system), urban settings often present complex issues of land title and ownership, as is the case in Haiti. While tents have been easily erected on public spaces or rented land, temporary and permanent shelters raise far more difficult issues. Furthermore, many of Haiti's urban dwellers are renters or squatters and multi-story buildings will not be quickly rebuilt. Some people have refused to move to more favorable conditions, preferring instead to stay in the city associated with livelihoods and services. These issues have dramatically slowed the re-building in Haiti.

Corresponding to the population density, cities are more likely to have many more levels of authority, bureaucracy and permissions. Some operational freedoms experienced in rural or remote areas will not be available in

cities. For international aid agencies, “working in the field” has to be redefined to include urban settings in both policy and practice. A willingness and ability to work with local authorities is not only appropriate but also necessary. The tools of most aid agencies do not adequately address the realities of urban disasters.

While there are lessons to learn from the Haiti response, we should also ask what lessons are truly new and different from the lessons that we keep “learning” decade after decade in disasters in all settings. Many of the lessons are not new: knowing the sociopolitical context, listening to the people affected, and working with local and national authorities. Much of the international aid community struggles to apply them even though they should be basic elements of any intervention in any context.

But there are specific things we can do:

- Support systematic contingency planning at local, national and regional levels with a wide range of stakeholders;
- Equip members of the general population with basic first aid and light search and rescue skills that can save lives;
- Increase knowledge and use of new technologies to provide urgently needed mapping and analysis;
- Include urban planning, environmental expertise and contemporary relief interventions (such as the use of cash) in skill sets of response agencies; and
- Provide more flexible financing mechanisms, especially related to housing.

Whatever can be improved in disaster response, and there is much, it will only be a band-aid in addressing the enormous vulnerability of those 5 billion people who will be living in urban areas by 2030 unless we focus substantial efforts and resources on disaster risk reduction in cities. **MD**



Maximizing Early Recovery

► **An object lesson in the benefit of including long-term goals in emergency relief efforts.**

By **Merry Fitzpatrick**, former Director of Disaster Response for World Concern

THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE Haiti earthquake was astonishing in its sheer destruction and loss of life. It is an event unmatched in Haitian history and will change the course of its future. While the Haiti earthquake and its humanitarian response cannot compare with the Rwandan genocide or the war in Sierra Leone in terms of human suffering, it was certainly one of the most intense and logistically difficult humanitarian responses.

Haiti's proximity and close ties to the U.S. resulted in intense media scrutiny and pressure to be seen to be "doing something." Responding to this pressure, the humanitarian community distributed goods to people very quickly considering the chaos and logistical constraints, but in a manner that encouraged families to move into large IDP (internally displaced persons) camps and actually slowed the long-term recovery process.

By returning to the concept of "early recov-

ery" as a cross-cutting theme that can influence elements like distribution strategies, rather than designating specific activities as early recovery, we can improve recovery rates for populations in disasters. This isn't as simple as it sounds and it has implications in such disparate elements as program design, media relations, staffing and coordination strategies. Before most responders boarded their various planes, the ALNAP (Advanced Learning Network for Accountability and Performance) Responding to Earthquakes 2008 report was being disseminated and pored over. Within this most timely report are very practical suggestions about how to frame the initial response to foster the fastest and most complete recovery. Many are simply restatements of best practices. Others are valuable insights into the recovery process and the likely preferences of the survivors. Unfortunately, these lessons were only partially heeded, buried under the pressure to respond quickly enough to satisfy

the media and our own organizations—often more quickly than the situation warranted, such as with the shelter and distributions of items other than food (known in the field as "non-food items" or NFIs). If we had fully taken into account the lessons, goods would have been distributed closer to families' homes through existing community structures and would have fostered recovery rather than pushing people into camps and hindering recovery.

Two particular lessons from the ALNAP report were especially pertinent to incorporating early recovery into the distribution of shelter material and other NFIs. The first was that "Agencies should, if at all possible, support people's desire to remain near their homes, as relocation damages social networks." The second wisely noted that "There is no gap or stability phase between relief and recovery as may occur with refugee emergencies or similar complex emergencies. Households begin their recovery efforts immediately after the earthquake." This proved to be very true. Though the city had a stunned feeling to it for several weeks after the quake, by the end of the first week, families had gathered their wits and their remaining belongings to begin looking to the future. Many were already salvaging building materials and modifying livelihood strategies. Their recovery strategies were heavily influenced by the way in which the humanitarian community designed its earliest responses. Many moved away from their homes, abandoning social networks and attempts to protect their exposed household goods in order to gain access to necessary distributed goods only available in camps.

The standard mechanism to coordinate the activities of all the humanitarian agencies involved in a response is called the cluster system, with each sector (e.g., health, food, water) having its own cluster. Although the cluster system was quickly activated, cluster lead agencies for the various types of assistance were dealing with many of their own losses while simultaneously conducting their own programs plus trying to coordinate a very large group of very independent-minded agencies, all with an impaired communications infrastructure. At one point, several clusters had more than 400 agencies participating. With different specialists attending different cluster meetings, there was little interaction among the clusters except to pass information on the who-what-where tables. There was no real cross-flow or collaboration on strategies. This cross-flow is

crucial for the success of such cross-cutting themes as protection and early recovery whose real impact lies not in their own activities, but in influencing the activities of all sectors.

Cluster meetings were dominated by discussions to sort out who was doing what and where in the city. But there were small moments when each cluster would discuss the strategy about how they would approach the aspects of the disaster for which they were responsible. These short discussions on strategy were tiny moments buried within the chaos of 18- to 20-hour days filled with hundreds of decisions. The importance of these discussions in influencing the design of service delivery, and the subsequent influence on the recovery strategies families would be forced to take, was not recognized within the noise of so much else.

It was originally the role of the early recovery cluster to point out these potential long-term impacts in order to influence design in a way that would help support families' own recovery strategies and encourage the overall recovery process. Over time, this role has been overshadowed by other activities given to the early recovery cluster to coordinate, such as cash-for-work and other cash transfer programming. In the Haiti early recovery cluster, there was a general misunderstanding of the role and real potential of this cluster. Instead of discussions on how to influence the design of on-going activities to ensure the promotion of recovery, the early recovery cluster sought to coordinate its own activities. While this served as an important platform for launching these very necessary activities, the cluster may have missed its best opportunity to promote early recovery by failing to influence the design of initial response activities in the way that the protection cluster often does. For example, by influencing the way goods were distributed, more families might have been able to receive the goods they needed without having to abandon their home sites, thus allowing them to pursue their own strategies and putting less burden on the camps.

Shelter was a very key sector that needed the support and advice of the early recovery cluster, but didn't know it. In the midst of the rubble, many Haitians were counting their blessings—one of which was that the earthquake happened in the dry winter months so sleeping in the open was not a physical burden for a couple of months. Families quickly set up makeshift shelters of sheets to provide a small measure of privacy and the nights were cool and pleasant until the first

rains in March. Because so much of the impact of an earthquake involves the loss of shelter, shelter immediately became an unequivocal priority. And yet the lack of shelter was not life-threatening. There was time available to develop other delivery options that could deliver goods and services to people, supporting their recovery strategies, without making them feel they needed to move away from their homes to receive the help they needed.

The shelter cluster decided to provide emergency shelter through the distribution of tarps and, when possible, rope and poles. Feeling pressure to provide shelter quickly to large numbers of people, tens of thousands of the

There were small moments when each cluster would discuss [...] how they would approach the aspects of the disaster for which they were responsible. These short discussions on strategy were tiny moments buried within the chaos of 18- to 20-hour days filled with hundreds of decisions.

ubiquitous blue tarps were issued to NGOs to distribute to families without shelter. Amidst the long discussions to sort out who was distributing tarps where, one of those important little discussions on strategy came up—an unrecognized opportunity to affect the direction of the recovery. The default distribution method was to go to where the most people were concentrated, the newly forming IDP camps, and distribute tarps in these camps. Several agencies in the discussion tried to discourage distributing goods in camps rather than neighborhoods because distribution in the camps would force families to move away from their home sites to get needed support. The detrimental impact of this on long-term recovery was not recognized at the time. No

definitive strategy was set and each agency was left to decide its own course of action.

Studies on the 2005 Pakistan earthquake showed that six months after the quake, families that had managed to remain closer to their homes and out of camps had nearly fully recovered, while those that had been moved to camps had barely started the recovery process. In both Haiti and Pakistan, indirectly encouraging large centralized camps through distribution methods also created high concentrations of people with few services. Although the thousands of small neighborhood camps in Port-au-Prince were a nightmare for agencies to track and manage, they required much less support and management. People were closer to homes and social networks that would provide many basic services like toilets, water and protection of goods from outsiders. In the larger encampments, these systems broke down and people became more dependent on the already over-burdened relief agencies. Also, the only open places big enough for these camps, other than the plaza in front of the Presidential Palace, were in areas especially vulnerable to flooding during the rainy season.

In the end, because it was logistically easier for the responding agencies and faster to accumulate numbers of people served, most agencies distributed tarps in encampments rather than in neighborhoods. But other agencies did insist on a neighborhood model, working through local neighborhood committees already in place. In the end, it took slightly more staff to distribute in neighborhoods, but not more time.

Comités de Quartier are local, informal neighborhood groups that usually encompass one or two streets in Port-au-Prince and have wildly varying levels of organizational capacity. Immediately after the quake, most neighborhoods activated this system to prevent outsiders from looting items from their damaged homes. Agencies with a view towards the longer-term recovery chose to work through these committees to distribute not only shelter materials, but also other goods and services. Where committees were weak or absent, these agencies sought to strengthen them or facilitate their development. Initially, the fear was that this dispersed method would take considerably longer and use more logistical resources. In the end, the fluid and often riotous nature of the larger IDP camps made registration and distribution very awkward; while in the neighborhoods, much of the onus of coordina-

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Temporary shelters are an important step on the path to permanent housing.

Reconstruction Challenges & Opportunities

► Moving from emergency and transitional shelter into permanent housing.

By **Mario C. Flores**, Director, Disaster Response Field Operations, Habitat for Humanity International, and **Irantzu Serra Lasa**, Shelter Advisor, Program Integration with International Response & Programs, American Red Cross

MORE THAN 1.3 MILLION PEOPLE IN HAITI STILL remain displaced. Most live in one of the 1,300 or so camps throughout the greater Port-au-Prince conurbation, including Pétion-Ville, Carrefour and Croix-des-Bouquets.

Despite the best efforts of aid organizations focused on shelter, reconstruction of adequate housing for all those displaced remains elusive and challenging. Even the early recovery programs to construct transitional shelters have taken more time than anticipated to scale up, facing some of the same obstacles that affect permanent reconstruction. Shelter organizations within the interagency Haiti shelter cluster plan to have 125,000 transitional shelters built by the end of 2011. As of December 2010, approximately 86,000 transitional shelters have funding and some 20,000 have been completed throughout the country. Understanding the obstacles to reconstruction in urban

areas and how to overcome them while also helping affected households, particularly those displaced in proximity camps, is critical. This understanding should inform shelter interventions that lead to safer permanent housing in upgraded neighborhoods with reduced vulnerabilities. (Proximity camps are camps created by displaced people near the neighborhoods where they lived.)

The earthquake struck at the center of Haiti's social, political and economic base, further debilitating an already struggling country. Several pre-earthquake vulnerabilities increased the severity of the damage and have magnified the difficulty in recovery. These include:

- The overall poverty of the population. Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the Western Hemisphere, with more than 70 percent of the population living on less than the equivalent of \$2 per day. Most people seriously affected by the earthquake were already living below the poverty line.
- A pervasive political and social crisis including the lack of effective governability, which created a fragile country with weakened institutions to support disaster recovery.
- The lack of enforceable building codes and a complete absence of earthquake-resistant building regulations. Additionally, most housing stock in Haiti is non-engineered, resulting in sub-standard quality less able to withstand natural hazards.
- The absence of a comprehensive, up-to-date urban planning policy. This meant there was little strategic urban development and risk management in land use, which allowed for the creation of extremely high-risk settlements perched on slopes and ravines in urban areas.



The removal of at least 20 million cubic yards of rubble is one of the biggest obstacles to reconstruction.

- A dysfunctional, disjointed land rights system that only registered a small percentage of the existing land parcels. This makes it extremely difficult to map and identify land ownership and tenure agreements supportive of reconstruction investments.

It is also important to remember that Haitians are no strangers to disasters, large and small. The country has suffered regularly from hurricanes and tropical storm damage, including a barrage of storms in 2008 from which it had not fully recovered when the earthquake struck.

These pre-existing problems exacerbate the reconstruction challenges. For example, the concentration of destruction in densely populated Port-au-Prince makes it difficult to access damaged homes and buildings for demolition or repair and to implement transitional shelter and permanent reconstruction programs. Indeed, the lack of a clear policy and strategy for the removal of at least 20 million cubic yards of rubble is one of the biggest obstacles to reconstruction.

Pathways to recovery

To date, shelter assistance by humanitarian actors, including international nongovernmental organizations, has focused primarily on two shorter-term shelter interventions. During the first months after the disaster, the priority was addressing the immediate shelter needs of the population by distributing emergency shelter items such as tools, shelter kits, tarpaulins, tents and other non-food items for household use. Since then, the focus has shifted to constructing transitional shelters (which can provide better protection while more permanent housing is being built), along with cash-for-work initiatives for rubble clearance. However, it is an accepted fact that the complex urban context will make the cash-for-work process quite slow in removing the rubble as needed to build more permanent structures and people will still need a place to live in the interim, such as transitional shelter.

Moreover, any shelter intervention without a clear vision of a shelter continuum that ends in a durable, permanent solution runs the risk of becoming a dead end for families and communities, more likely to result in the creation of unsafe neighborhoods or slums. The question, therefore, is: *transition to what?* It is important to have a strategy that will take affected households all the way from homelessness and displacement to resettlement in a durable, permanent home. The strategy must focus on the “process” as well as the “product” of permanent housing, so that reconstruction can empower and increase capacity and resilience of households and communities.

From camps to homes

One part of this continuum must be a strategy for closing or transforming the camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). There are

several options:

- Support households in their return to safe, rebuilt neighborhoods;
- Support households in relocating to new planned sites (“green-field” developments), if returning to their old neighborhoods is impossible due to unsafe locations or the inability to secure tenure arrangements;
- Transform current camps into new urban settlements integrated to existing neighborhoods through tenure agreements, de-densification and provision of basic infrastructure; and
- Support those who prefer to relocate outside the affected areas in host communities.

A major issue for people who relocate (to new settlements or host communities) will be ensuring there is an economic base for sustained livelihoods. For those moving away from their original homes, support must include a parallel strategy to provide access to livelihoods, a key element to ensuring sustainability. In this regard, providing transportation options and pairing relocation sites with strategic investments in development corridors by mixing industrial, institutional, commercial and residential land is one tactic that should be explored in coordination with the government and relevant economic actors. Implementing these options will entail facing the challenges already mentioned, including the lack of clear government policies and strategy for land access and tenure. But they must be addressed in order to get people to move out of the camps.

Reconstructing neighborhoods

One of the most obvious pathways to recovery focuses on the return of IDPs to existing neighborhoods. This path is particularly interesting because it allows for the reestablishment of pre-earthquake social and economic structures and livelihoods.

▼ More than 1.3 million people in Haiti are still displaced. Most live in one of the 1,300 or so camps throughout greater Port-au-Prince.



According to the October 29, 2010, press release on the structural damage assessment data by the Haitian Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications (MTPTC), approximately 54 percent of assessed residential buildings have been marked as green (safe to return to), 25 percent have been marked as yellow (need repairs at various levels to make them safe), and 20 percent were tagged as red (in need of demolition or major repairs). The 1 percent remaining is still being assessed. These findings suggest that approximately three-fourths of all residential buildings in Port-au-Prince are currently safe or will be safe to return to when repaired. In mid-November, the MTPTC presented the preliminary version of the Yellow House Repair Guidelines to the interagency Haiti shelter cluster, a first and hopeful step in the path to reconstruction and the return of families to their original neighborhoods.

It is important to take into account not only the housing stock to be repaired or rebuilt, but also the elements that create livable urban settlements. For example, a list of services need to be considered, such as the repair or introduction of access (roads, streets and pedestrian pathways), drainage (Port-au-Prince is flood-prone and neighborhoods on hillsides must divert rainwater into canals), water supply and sanitation, electricity and providing open spaces for communal facilities. The return to such safer, cleaner and better served homes and neighborhoods is also of utmost importance to reduce the risk of future epidemics such as the current cholera crisis.

NGOs can facilitate the return of IDPs to safe neighborhoods in various ways, depending on their expertise and capabilities. Examples include:


- Implement community-based strategies involving neighborhoods and camps, in collaboration with the local authorities. Interventions can seek to reach a consensus on the redevelopment of the neighborhoods, map the existing tenure arrangements and property rights, identify any conflicts and agree on the changes the neighborhood will need to undertake to be safer and more livable.
- Refine procedures to follow up on houses assessed as “repairable” in existing neighborhoods, as a result of the structural damage assessments (ATC-20) in support of reconstruction or pilot repair programs. Procedures should include a framework for repair, inspections and quality assurance or certification of the repairs.
- No one organization alone will be able to accomplish all the necessary tasks, so international NGO partnerships should be encouraged to launch holistic pilots to address reconstruction options with a neighborhood approach, such as:
 - » Repairing damaged houses;
 - » Transforming proximity camps in Port-au-Prince into integrated neighborhoods of the city;
 - » Upgrading existing transitional shelters;
 - » In-filling new housing projects close to established neighborhood areas; and
 - » Repairing or upgrading basic service infrastructure (such as access, drainage and water supply); and
- Facilitate the development of demand-oriented programs to fill the gaps of housing value chains such as technical assistance, construction skills training, testing of construction materials and housing finance services, among others. By providing such services, NGOs could support owner-driven reconstruction


Even in the absence of a clear legal framework to facilitate reconstruction at scale, many shelter NGOs are already involving affected

communities at the neighborhood level to support reconstruction with a bottom-up approach. Both Habitat for Humanity and the American Red Cross believe that this is a promising path for action.


The need for advocacy

Advocacy is needed to validate these processes and inform the development of policies necessary to support scaled up reconstruction efforts. Advocacy is also needed to enable the process of controlled expropriation of land where strategic camps within the consolidated urban area of Port-au-Prince can be transformed into new neighborhoods. Underlying all the challenges and opportunities, there is a clear path and urgent need for NGOs and other actors to advocate to the government of Haiti, the Interim Haiti Reconstruction Commission, the World Bank, the United Nations and the wider donor community for a framework of policies that will enable permanent reconstruction at scale and ensure the overall legality and transparency of the recovery process. Progress will continue, at a much slower rate, until there are clear directives and basic policy agreements to guide reconstruction and move forward toward greater stability and opportunities for Haiti.

To rebuild efficiently, effectively and with long-term sustainability in mind, a blueprint for change must be developed before reconstruction at scale begins. The “process” must be built before the “house.” Once the blueprint (in the form of policies and operational processes) is clear, civil society, including the Haitian population and NGOs, will be better positioned to contribute to building a brighter and better future for Haiti. 



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Market Assessments as a Driving Force for Humanitarian Response

► Analyzing key markets and systems in fast-moving crises.

By **Julie March**, Agriculture and Food Security Advisor, and **Laura Meissner**, Economic Recovery Advisor, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

IT'S HARD TO FIX A PROBLEM UNLESS you understand what the problem is. Humanitarian needs assessments can determine what affected populations lack, but more is needed to understand the context surrounding those needs and how local markets can meet them.

The Haitian earthquake response drew a host of humanitarian actors from agencies around the world, trying to meet pressing needs in many sectors, including agriculture, livelihoods, nutrition, shelter, health, water and sanitation, among others.

Most humanitarian agencies strive to “do no harm” and to meet immediate needs in a way that does not undermine longer-term recovery. In this spirit, humanitarian agencies employed several rigorous assessment methodologies at the beginning of the Haiti earthquake response. These included the seed system security assessment (SSSA) tool and the Emergency Market Mapping & Analysis (EMMA) toolkit, which were used to identify the appropriate responses.

Seed interventions were proposed in the early days of the Haitian earthquake response but the need for assessment prior to response was clear. Significant strides have been made in diagnosing the causes of seed insecurity to inform response design. Emergency food security responses have long suffered from the assumption that food insecurity implicates seed insecurity and can be treated with seed provision.

Over the last several years, research has enabled the disaggregation of food security and seed security by confirming that the two are not consistently causally linked. A poor harvest does not necessarily mean a lack of seed or an inability to produce enough food for the next year, just as a seasonal hunger gap can not always be linked to a lack of seed. For many years, assumed seed need was treated with a single response: direct distribution of seed. Consecutive seasons of seed distributions to the same beneficiaries led specialists to question why food insecurity woes were not diminishing with the provision of seed, and to begin to investigate a wider range of delivery options based on the cause of possible seed insecurity.

Seed system pioneers such as Louise Sperling of the Center for International Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) and Tom Remington of Catholic Relief Services began to explore market-based approaches. Local markets proved to be a core, reliable source of seed, especially for poor farmers and for all in periods of stress. Interventions such as seed vouchers or fairs, support to traders, vendors and seed multipliers served to strengthen such crucial markets (and regional livelihoods) as well as address a wider range of causes of seed insecurity, including access, availability, quality and varietal preference. With an expanded range of intervention options regularly in use by the humanitarian community, correctly diagnosing the problem intensifies the need

for information on the seed system in country. With these new response options available, accurate and timely information was necessary to select the right response.

With the support of USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Dr. Sperling has created a step-by-step guide, *When Disaster Strikes: A Guide to Assessing Seed System Security*. The guide takes humanitarian actors through seven steps that allow them to analyze the effects of the disaster on seed systems, map the condition of the system prior to the emergency and identify possible problems to address. (http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/work/Africa/Documents/sss_manual_ciat.pdf)

This tool allows organizations to include the formal and informal (including farmer and local market) seed systems and to refine analysis based on whether the problems are caused by chronic stress or the direct result of the recent shock.

Immediately following the Haiti earthquake, a team, co-lead by Dr. Sperling (CIAT) and CRS with representatives from many groups involved in the response, performed a SSSA. Although early reports suggested widespread devastation to the agricultural sector, the SSSA findings were quite different. Through interviews with more than 1,000 people and site visits throughout the country, the assessment revealed that the greatest impact of the earthquake on the farming population was the loss of assets and the additional burden on poor households as

Although the value of such assessments is well understood, institutionalizing their use as a prerequisite to program design can be a massive organizational challenge.

the affected population sought shelter with friends and relatives living outside the capital city region. Seed loss as a direct result of the disaster was minimal. The findings also highlighted the regularity with which farmers rely on the local markets for seed (rather than own seed). The importance of informal grain markets for seed security during periods of

instability is frequently underestimated or misunderstood. A better understanding of the role the markets play in farmer seed sourcing can facilitate recovery.

What was apparent through data analysis was the chronic depression of the Haitian seed system. Eighty-six percent of farmers had not accessed a new variety in the past five years. Supporting the markets farmers already use can be a method of strengthening the seed system overall. Funds that would have been spent bringing in emergency seed can be directed toward addressing chronic weaknesses within the system and promoting innovation. USAID development programming is already focused on longer-term support to the agricultural system through programs such as the Watershed Initiative for National Natural Environmental Resources (WINNER), a five year multi-faceted program designed to comprehensively build Haiti's agricultural infrastructure, capacity and productivity.

Undoubtedly, assessment information after the emergency can support the targeting of efforts of such programs. SSSAs have influenced response design in a number of countries, most recently Haiti and Zimbabwe. (<http://www.ciat.cgiar.org/work/Africa/Pages/SeedSystemsUnderStress.aspx>)

Similar to the SSSA, the Emergency Market Mapping & Analysis (EMMA) toolkit is designed to enable humanitarian to quickly assess the pre- and post-disaster state of critical market systems (such as markets for wheat, corrugated iron sheeting or agricultural labor) shortly after a rapid-onset crisis. EMMA was designed by a consortium of

NGOs including the International Rescue Committee, Oxfam, Practical Action, and InterAction with support from OFDA.

The developers saw that too often, needed relief items were available in local markets, or supply could have been easily restarted. Responders, however, had no rapid way to determine which goods and services could be sourced locally, how to fix blockages in supply chains, or how to use cash or vouchers to restore demand and help affected people. EMMA provides such a rapid diagnostic. It relies on the concept of the market system: the complex web of individuals, businesses, services, structures and rules that together produce, trade and consume a given good or service in a given area. Depending on the functioning of the market system and how it has been affected by the crisis, humanitarians can determine what types of interventions (cash, vouchers, direct distribution, rehabilitating market infrastructure, or support to key market actors) can most effectively and efficiently connect affected people to the goods and income they need.

Over 28 EMMA assessments have been completed to date. These include, for example, four assessments (including on wheat and cement) in Kyrgyzstan following civil unrest last June; ten assessments in different provinces of Pakistan following the recent floods; and six assessments in Port-au-Prince and southeast Haiti following the earthquake. These have produced findings that directly informed programming. For example, the Pakistan EMMA assessments revealed strong demand for agricultural labor in the plains of post-flood Khyber Pakhtunkwa (KPK) province, meaning that cash-for-work programs (a common post-disaster program option) would need to be closely limited to specific areas and populations in order to avoid harming agricultural livelihoods. In Sindh province, by contrast, cash-for-work programs were recommended. All EMMA assessments are posted publicly on www.emma-toolkit.info for any agency to read and use in program design, contributing to a spirit of collaboration and information sharing for a more effective response.

Although the value of such assessments is well understood, institutionalizing their use as a prerequisite to program design can be a massive organizational challenge. In the wake of a disaster, the media, the public, host and donor governments, the humanitarian community and the affected population together exert tremendous pressure for an immediate response. Indeed, assessments can delay response, especially if there is a shortage of people on the ground trained in the methodology.

Organizational resources—including the number of staff and the resources available for training—and organizational culture can also constrain use of these tools. A proper assessment will highlight which interventions will be most effective—which may not be the interventions in which the assessing agencies are most skilled. For example, a seed fair or voucher program may be the best way to meet the need for agricultural inputs. However, an agency may be better skilled and experienced in direct distribution and therefore needs help in learning how to implement a seed fair.

The value of assessments is difficult to articulate. Humanitarian work's most compelling stories are of our quick-impact donations and interventions. These images are perceptible "proof" of the effect of our work and play an important role in expressing the value of humanitarian aid to the public. However, responding without careful analysis and assessment can lead to unintended harmful effects. A surgeon would not start operating without a clear diagnosis of what ails the patient; likewise, we as humanitarians must take the time to

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Meeting Haiti's Urgent Reproductive Health Needs

► **The challenges are high, but there are ways to overcome remaining obstacles.**

By **Sandra Krause**, Director, Reproductive Health Program, and **Joan Timoney**, Director of External Relations, Women's Refugee Commission

THE IMPORTANCE OF PROVIDING essential reproductive health care from the start of an emergency was crystal clear in Haiti last January. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, an estimated 63,000 pregnant women were living in Port-au-Prince—at least 9,000 of whom could be expected to need emergency obstetric care. And some 120,000 people in Haiti were living with the HIV virus according to UNAIDS. To women and girls, the risks of sexual violence and exploitation were considerably heightened by overcrowded, insecure camps and the struggle to access food and other basic services.

Under international standards, the Minimum Initial Service Package (MISP) is the set of priority reproductive health activities that should be part of any initial humanitarian response. MISP activities include immediately establishing coordination mechanisms, providing emergency care and delivery supplies to prevent maternal and newborn death and disability, minimizing the transmission of HIV, preventing sexual violence and caring for survivors, and laying the groundwork for delivery of comprehensive reproductive health

services as early as possible.

All elements of the MISP were critically needed in Haiti from day one. And they had to be implemented in a highly challenging operational environment where most of the capital city was devastated, many hospitals were damaged or destroyed and logistics were severely compromised.

As health care providers and advocates reflect on the reproductive health response over the last year, it is clear that much more must be done to improve the quality of care for people in Port-au-Prince and other hard-hit areas. And there are important lessons from this response that should help inform the international community's efforts in future disasters.

Challenges in the initial response

InterAction members CARE, Save the Children and the Women's Refugee Commission, along with the International Planned Parenthood Federation, were part of a team that conducted an assessment of MISP implementation four months into the Haiti response. We found some encouraging indicators of increased attention to reproductive health.

But the team also documented areas where urgent action was required to meet MISP standards and address serious gaps in the delivery of care.

On the positive side of the ledger, humanitarian and development organizations were much more aware of the urgent need to address reproductive health concerns in this emergency than in previous crises we had studied. MISP implementation activities were represented at historic levels in the February 2010 UN flash appeal. The coordination-facilitating interagency health cluster was quickly established, and a reproductive health working group jointly led by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the Haitian Ministry of Public Health and Population was created within two weeks. Reproductive health kits containing medicines and supplies for three months were initially available thanks in part to emergency preparedness planning efforts. HIV prevention and response programs, which were strong before the earthquake, were quickly re-started. By all accounts, there were adequate supplies of free condoms in the early weeks of the crisis and a concerted effort was initiated soon after the disaster to ensure that antiretrovirals were available for HIV/AIDS patients.

Unfortunately, progress was not sustained as the emergency continued. Effective coordination was seriously hampered by a lack of

administrative and logistical support for the reproductive health coordinator in the early weeks of the crisis. There was also high turnover in this critical position, with five coordinators cycling through in four months. Coordination efforts in affected areas outside Port-au-Prince were very slow to get underway. The large number of organizations working in health also contributed to difficulties with coordination and data collection. Because the coordination meetings in Port-au-Prince were held at the UN logistics base, it was difficult for Haitian groups to engage effectively with the working group. This led to missed opportunities to gather information and develop and support local networks. Supplies of essential reproductive health kits were quickly exhausted. At the time of our assessment visit last spring, there was a one to three month backlog, particularly in the resupply of clean delivery kits and pregnancy tests. We heard numerous reports that free condoms were no longer available. Almost five months into the response, MISP-related activities in the flash



“Everything that you could possibly think of got worse, especially for us women.”

appeal were only 45 percent funded. This made it difficult to initiate and quickly scale up what are by definition priority reproductive health activities.

Our assessment team found that two critical areas of the MISP were poorly addressed from the very start: emergency obstetric and newborn care, and prevention of sexual violence and care for survivors. These were also areas of great concern for health care providers and Haitian women before the earthquake. As one young woman in Leogane told us, “Everything that you could possibly think of got worse, especially for us women.” Before the earthquake, the mortality rate for expectant mothers in Haiti was the highest in the Western Hemisphere. Well into the response, emergency obstetric care remained quite limited in Port-au-Prince and even more limited in remote areas. Mobile clinics could not provide this care and many communities did not know where to send women with problem pregnancies. Lack of transport was also a serious issue and cost appeared to be a major barrier. Delivery is free in public facilities, but women may still need to pay for medicines, needles, food and other items. Displaced women we interviewed reported that it was common to deliver with the assistance of a midwife, traditional birth attendant or family members if hospital care was out of reach. These comments were particularly troubling in view of the decreased supply of trained midwives and the difficulties many women reported in obtaining clean delivery kits.

Health care providers in Port-au-Prince and outlying areas also identified inadequate care for newborns in health facilities as a major concern. There were no public neonatology services in Haiti and ensuring quality care for newborns remains a serious gap in the reproductive health system.


The MISP requirement to give priority attention to preventing sexual violence and caring for survivors remains largely unmet. Poor security

planning, weak integration of protection considerations across humanitarian response sectors, inadequate camp management and limited access to food and other necessities have all combined to increase the risks to women and girls. Medical and mental health services for rape survivors remain insufficient; information about how and where to refer survivors has been spotty at best. Teen pregnancies and complications from unsafe abortion are reportedly on the rise. Women’s organizations and local groups that could provide assistance have been poorly engaged and supported.

Finally, family planning, which is an important component of reproductive health care, continues to be an area of concern. The Ministry of Public Health and Population has longstanding family planning programs; and development organizations continued to make family planning available in the aftermath of the earthquake, although some organizations reported supply shortages. But with unmet need for family planning estimated at 38 percent before the disaster, it is imperative to address family planning more effectively as part of the disaster response.

The road ahead

Responsible parties must continue their efforts to improve the delivery of reproductive health care during the ongoing emergency and lay the groundwork for a stronger system as Haiti rebuilds. Key steps include:

- Strengthen reproductive health coordination by funding full time reproductive health coordinators at the national and sub-national levels for at least the next six months and provide coordinators with additional administrative and logistics staff support. Continue to identify and support counterparts at the Haitian Ministry to whom responsibilities can be transferred.
- Ensure that other clusters whose performance contributes to the quality of reproductive health response are also strengthened, especially protection, the gender-based violence sub-cluster and camp management.
- Improve communication and coordination across the clusters and with Haitian organizations.
- Prioritize a more effective response from national authorities, the UN system and non-governmental organizations to prevent and respond to sexual violence.
- Scale up efforts to provide emergency obstetric care and newborn care. Provide communities with better information on how to access care that is reliable and affordable. Together with the Ministry of Public Health and Population, develop and implement a plan to train additional midwives.
- Ensure adequate funding is available for all reproductive health supplies that are essential to successful MISP implementation and family planning programs.
- Correct supply chain disruptions.
- Establish or strengthen adolescent reproductive health services, including access to emergency contraception and family planning. Include adolescents in the program planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.
- Continue to work closely with the Ministry of Public Health and Population and other authorities to ensure that reproductive health needs are fully reflected in future emergency preparedness and disaster risk reduction planning.
- Encourage staff of international and local development organizations to take the MISP self-training available at <http://misp.rhrc.org>. 



Have you gathered lessons learned from your work in the field that could benefit others? Send your summary of less than 1000 words to cbrobst@interaction.org and share your expertise with the entire NGO community.

Best Practices

Best Practices and Innovations Initiative Second Round Winners

INTERACTION IS PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE the winners of the second round of our Best Practices and Innovations (BPI) Initiative, which focused on agriculture and rural livelihoods. The BPI Initiative was launched in September 2009 with the support of the International Fund for Agriculture Development to promote information sharing on effective program approaches and improve practice standards. All submissions were reviewed by a selection committee of experts and evaluated according to five criteria: evidence of effectiveness/success, efficiency/cost-effectiveness, equitable outcomes for women and men, sustainability and replicability/adaptability. The winners were recently recognized at an event at InterAction. For more on these interventions and the BPI Initiative visit www.interaction.org/best-practices-innovations.

ADRA International
Best Practice Award for Agroforestry, Extension Services/Farmer Training and Horticulture Production

In response to chronic food insecurity in rural Ghana, ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency) International created **Sustainable Rural Livelihood Enhancement & Poverty Reduction**



Through the Establishment of Perennial Tree Crops. Funded by USAID, this food security integrated program used an agroforestry approach that enabled smallholder farmers to establish citrus and mango trees, intercropped with staple crops such as maize, beans, plantains and vegetables. Key strategies included training in improved agricultural techniques and farming as a business, strengthening market linkages and provision of agricultural inputs and credit. Enhanced productivity for staple crops and increased incomes from trees—from \$345 per acre for citrus and \$1,379 per acre for mangos—helped households reduce the food shortage from four months to just over

one month and contributed to sustained income and a break in the poverty cycle. ADRA's approach to agroforestry, supported by capacity building and market linkages, offers great opportunities for sustainable rural livelihood enhancement and poverty reduction.

Africare
Innovation Award for Access to Markets, Nutrition and Value Chain Development

Africare's Zimbabwe Soybean Market Linkage Project significantly improved the food security and incomes of over 2,000 smallholder farmers by promoting soybean production, marketing and processing.



Experienced community-based facilitators and extension staff trained 5,000 farmers in soybean production and processing. Women and children are excited to now have once scarce protein in abundance (a 40 percent increase) in a wide array of forms such as soy beverages, soy burgers, fritters and soymilk. Lucrative markets are

now accessible to association members due to robust research and dissemination of market information through information centers and the consolidation and marketing of soybean and soybean products (edible oil and soybean cake (stock feed)). Three oil-pressing plants established through a revolving loan fund are providing a local market for soybean, employment and value addition by 73 percent. The project is a model for replication in other regions.

Freedom from Hunger
Innovation Award for Access to Financial Services, Gender Integration and Food Security

Freedom from Hunger's **Microfinance and Health Protection** initiative tested the feasibility and sustainability of adding health protection options for microfinance clients. Five microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Africa, Asia and Latin America added combinations of health education, health financing and



linkages to healthcare providers and products at an average annual marginal cost to MFIs of just 29 cents per client family—dropping the average annual profit of participating MFIs by just 2 percent (from 26 to 24 percent). Despite this small cost, research indicates clients have better health knowledge and behaviors, and health services

are now more available through participating MFIs to over 600,000 clients who represent 3.5 million family members.

Heifer International
Best Practice Award for Livestock Production, Producer Associations & Cooperatives and Value Chain Development

Through the **Integrated Dairy Development Project in Albania**, Heifer International



has empowered 630 families in rural areas to increase their food and income by transforming subsistence farms into a sustainable resource while increasing cooperation between farmers. The donation of heifers, combined with effective technical assistance and training on community development, dairy food chain, milk quality, hygiene, and marketing and business plans provided an added value to individual farmers. The establishment of farmer associations and their active role in community life has provided direct assistance to families and increased access and visibility in the market, encouraging greater

cooperation and partnerships with different stakeholders.

Winrock International
Innovation Award for Natural Resources Management and Productivity

Multiple-use water services (MUS) is a consumer-oriented approach to water service delivery that takes people's multiple domestic and



WINROCK
INTERNATIONAL

productive water needs as the starting point to plan, finance and manage integrated water services. In the Zinder region of Niger, Winrock International's innovative **Water for Health and Wealth** MUS project, funded by USAID and Coca-Cola, is helping poor households gain access to water for drinking, food production and income generation using locally manufactured pumps. By taking an integrated approach to water services, Winrock is helping households reduce water-related diseases and turn limited gardens into a year-round source of income with benefits to both health and livelihoods.

Considering Animal Welfare

Implementing an animal and attitudinal survey in Port-au-Prince.

By **Melanie Gall**, Assistant Professor, Geography and Anthropology Disaster Science and Management Program, Louisiana State University; **Warren Eller**, Associate Professor, Department of Public Administration, University of North Carolina Pembroke; **Dick Green**, Emergency Relief Manager for Disasters, International Fund for Animal Welfare; and **William J. Fielding**, Director of Planning, College of The Bahamas, New Providence

RECOGNIZING THAT THERE would be a significant impact on animals after Haiti's earthquake, the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) and the World Society for Protection of Animals (WSPA) formed the Animal Relief Coalition of Haiti (ARCH) to bring aid to people and animals. Working with the Ministry of Agricul-

ture, Natural Resources, and Rural Development (MARNDR), ARCH and its 21 member agencies created a \$1.04 million fund for addressing animal issues. The relief plan identified five objectives:

- Provide a mobile veterinary clinic;
- Develop a cold chain for vaccines;



- Conduct public and educational outreach on animal welfare, disease prevention and disaster preparedness;
- Support reconstruction of the National Laboratory (which primarily deals with the identification of zoonotic diseases); and
- Survey animal population in Port-au-Prince.

Before any long-term animal welfare planning could begin, an accurate estimate of the animal population was necessary. This article outlines the process of

conducting an animal-related survey in post-earthquake Port-au-Prince.

Developing the survey

The survey focused on three areas: (1) estimating the numbers of cats and dogs in Port-au-Prince, pre- and post-earthquake; (2) obtaining basic information about the care of pets in Port-au-Prince; and (3) the awareness of zoonotic diseases such as rabies. Lessons learned from similar studies conducted elsewhere in the Caribbean assisted the design team

in developing the survey. The questions were translated into Creole and then back-translated into English to ensure validity. The research team, a Haitian focus group and MARNDR staff assessed the Creole version to ensure its appropriateness for Haitian respondents. They also tested the reliability of the questions reliability through the focus group and through a pilot study of 200 surveys.

Methodology

Generally speaking, Caribbean people are wary of strangers knocking on their doors and are often a reluctance to divulge information. Surveying people for their opinions is also less common in this region than elsewhere, so establishing trust between interviewee and interviewer is essential. To increase respondents' trust, local Haitians were trained as primary interviewers. The training consisted of a day and a half long workshop covering surveyor safety, data management, GPS navigation and safety matters such as emergency egress, teamwork and aspects of non-verbal communication. The data management segment reviewed the underlying dimensions of each question and how the responses translated into quantifiable data. The GPS training taught surveyors to navigate the grid system to ensure representative sampling. To augment the lectures and discussions, the research team used demonstrations and role-playing exercises.

MARNDR recruited 18 surveyors, who were then put into four teams based on their experience and skill sets. Each team designated a team leader responsible for overall team conduct and safety. A security guard, a safety officer and a project manager accompanied the survey teams in the field. For the first three

days following the training, the research team also joined the surveyors to assess efficacy and efficiency of survey protocols. This provided the opportunity to refine the data collection process in supplemental training conducted during end-of-day safety reviews and daily morning briefings. The survey process had three phases: pilot study (July); initial survey (September) to collect 1,500 surveys; and final survey (November) to collect remaining surveys (approximately 2,500). Phase II (September) collected 1,264 surveys, covering approximately 17 square kilometers (55 percent) of downtown Port-au-Prince.

Data collection

In the absence of resources to include every household as in a census, we needed a sampling plan: a structured approach to estimate the number of animals before and after the earthquake based on data from a subset of the population. Given the lack of household demographic data by which the population could have been stratified, the team collected data using a spatially stratified sampling method. To avoid convenience sampling and to increase accuracy, we partitioned the downtown area into grids of 200 by 200 meters. A total of 554 grids formed the basis of the survey. We aimed to visit each grid and randomly sample participants. The number of surveys to be collected within each grid was pre-determined based on the pre-earthquake population density as well as the presence of IDP camps. We drew on a number of data sources including the 2003 Haitian census, remotely sense imagery from the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (via the Haiti Earthquake Data Portal) and data from the Camp Coordination and Camp Man-



agement (CCCM) Cluster in Haiti that it posted online through its Google group.

Lessons learned

Conducting a survey even under normal situations requires a good deal of preparation. But conducting a survey in Haiti following the earthquake also presented a number of unique challenges and generated valuable lessons:

- As the survey was routed through the various groups for approval, additional questions were added. While this ensured buy-in and support across all stakeholders, the length of the survey (24 questions) was ultimately too long, taking approximately 15 minutes to complete;
- Expedited training presents challenges that are further compounded by language differences. Having translators well-trained on the intent and goals of the study was essential;
- Conducting a survey using GIS (geographic information systems) methodology and technology ensures even coverage of the study area and avoids clustering, but it also requires significant logistical effort, planning and training;

◀ *Animal Relief Coalition for Haiti (ARCH) team members verify their GPS coordinates while conducting surveys in downtown Port-au-Prince 8 months after the earthquake.*

- Map reading skills and the ability to use a GPS handheld device were critical to the success of this sampling method;
- An additional day of training would have improved efficacy and efficiency;
- Having focus groups in-country and conducting a pilot study improved reliability and validity;
- Surveyors had extensive animal training, which gave them a better understanding of the intent of the survey;
- Providing opportunities for team building before and during the survey process improved morale, safety and productivity;
- Following the training, a relatively "easy" zone was selected for the first surveying, which allowed for adjustments to be made and increased surveyor confidence;
- Having researchers in the field for the first three days allowed for immediate feedback and adjustments to the surveying process;
- Willingness of the entire team to adjust plans at theoretical and practical levels improved efficiency and efficacy;
- Reconnoitering survey areas to identify high risk zones prior to team deployment was critical to a safe and successful survey; and
- Conducting debriefs immediately after day's work and briefings prior to beginning a new day was effective in identifying and highlighting critical areas.

Geographic Targeting for Comprehensive Coverage

The pros and cons of working away from the spotlight.

By **Adam Koons**, Director, Relief and Humanitarian Assistance, IRD

TRYING TO DRIVE THROUGH Port-au-Prince just days after the earthquake, we encountered an impressive and large range of emergency relief agencies. A few weeks later there were a great many more.

But driving further out of the city itself, towards the actual epicenter of the earthquake, the number of disasters response agencies we saw dropped dramatically.

As a new agency in Haiti, IRD (International Relief & Development) was using a targeting strategy that has served us well in other emergency responses such as in Gulfport, Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina, and in the Tank and Dera Ismail Khan districts of Pakistan during the conflict-induced IDP (internally displaced persons) crisis of 2009.

As in New Orleans and in the Malakand district of Pakistan, in Haiti, the perceived greatest need and largest concentration of people and destruction were attracting—as well they should—the greatest amount of attention and immediate assistance. This is a very good and necessary approach. It responds to the need for prioritization and triage. Some of the agencies with

long-standing programs in Port-au-Prince scaled up their efforts. Many that had been working in Haiti for a long time were able to shift resources and leverage existing contacts and capacities. Others, just arriving, with little pre-existing knowledge of Haiti, focused on the most obvious needs with the most direct access. This resulted in an overwhelming response, saturating the capital city.

We moved away from the spotlight as it were. For an agency new to Haiti, but with extensive global emergency response experience in difficult environments, we chose to seek out the potential gaps off the main track. So we went to the town of Leogane, about 20 kilometers southwest of Port-au-Prince. There were indeed a few key aid agencies present and they also were just getting started because there had been virtually no pre-existing international NGO programs in this area. (And indeed, we did not actually go to the very edge of the damage zone; other agencies traveled further from the capital and implemented very much needed and effective programs.)

Leogane, with pre-earthquake



population of about 150,000, had been severely damaged. Over 90 percent of housing had been destroyed or badly damaged and almost 100 percent of the people were living outside. Another important factor was that Leogane is both peri-urban and semi-rural, with numerous village settlements in its catchment and a livelihood system built on agriculture.

The decision to focus on Leogane proved operationally to be effective and productive. Some of the reasons and consequences were:

- We were able to provide urgently needed assistance to an underserved area early in the relief process;
- Other agencies did not have particularly stronger local knowledge or contacts, and so we were not infringing on other work or relationships;
- The local authorities were more able to coordinate because they were not overwhelmed with numerous external entities vying for attention; in fact, we were the very first agency to contact and establish coordination with the mayor of Leogane;

- The local population was not overwhelmed by “assessment fatigue” from multiple agencies coming to identify needs;
- The relatively few agencies working in the area facilitated more effective and efficient inter-agency communication and coordination; and
- As a new agency, in a new location we had the flexibility to develop programs that were not locked in to a particular set of activities or locations, or expectations already locked in from previous work in the country.

Programmatically, the nature of the area also proved to lend itself to more holistic activities with less complex obstacles than existed in Port-au-Prince. These included:

- People who were displaced to locations at or reasonably near their original homes (thus avoiding the huge settlements and camps in the capital that became such a challenge to support);
- People who had secure tenure of their home sites (in contrast, in Port-au-Prince a large number of the people

- displaced were renters);
- Programs could include multi-sectoral activities, such as shelter and water, sanitation and hygiene (instead of coordinating many different agencies providing a single component of relief); and
 - Agricultural recovery and livelihood activities could be started in the same locations, allowing continuity of beneficiary groups, logistics and management.

In speaking of the strategy of choosing Leogane, our Program Director, Marinka Baumann said, “As the area of operations was defined at such an early stage of IRD’s presence in Haiti, it allowed us to focus directly on strategizing the implementation of the programs. A good example is the shelter program. We were able to select an appropriate shelter

design, procure required materials locally, and start construction ahead of most other NGOs. By targeting smaller settlements of displaced population we could actually target 100 percent of the t-shelter needs and dismantle the temporary camps. This not only improve families’ living conditions, it also facilitated economic recovery of the community as a whole. It meant people did not have to migrate to urban areas to find jobs because the locally existing social and economic support structures were revitalized before collapsing entirely.”

Likewise, our Haiti Country Director, Yvette Gonzalez noted that, “Targeting Leogane enabled IRD to work closely with local authorities, readily access communities for assessments and follow up, and deliver results quickly at a critical time. Our team has been able to respond to the needs of the communi-

ties while proving to the Haitian government and to our donors that we are serious about making an impact: that we are willing to bridge the gaps, support the Haitian people and collaborate with other actors to get the job done.”

But no plan or strategy is perfect. Being new on the ground and our targeting choice also created challenges such as:

- A lack of existing structures suitable for office and/or warehouse purposes;
- Less support from the interagency logistics cluster in terms of assisting with efforts to obtain warehousing structures known as Wiikhalls (the focus was instead on Port-au-Prince);
- Long commutes that increased risks for the team and decreased working hours until we could establish our office and warehouse facilities; and

- Limited number of qualified staff with previous NGO experience in Leogane, as most such individuals are in Port-au-Prince.

What is the lesson and practice at the core of this issue? In such cases as Haiti, Mississippi, Pakistan and others, the key issue is somewhat similar to that of problems we are all aware of in food security access. It is not a lack of supply; it is an issue of distribution, access and coverage. The same holds true for disasters where there is always a clearly defined focal point, but nonetheless, the distribution and coverage of NGOs has to address the marginalized and peripheral areas.

The author would like to thank Yvette Gonzalez and Marinka Baumann for their assistance in developing this article.

Community-Based, Faith-Partner Networks

The many benefits of local, faith-based collaboration.

By **Linda Unger**, Staff Writer, United Methodist Committee on Relief

OVER THE COURSE OF THE year since the earthquake in Haiti, the United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR) has confirmed one very solid best practice: Effective response to any emergency is possible for our organization when it ensures that it is working within the realities of the people it serves.

For UMCOR, a faith-based

relief and development organization, relying, in the case of Haiti, on the community-based networks of our faith partners in the region—the Methodist Church of Haiti (EMH), the Dominican Evangelical Church (IED), the ACT Alliance and others—helps UMCOR see the aftermath of the January 2010 disaster through the eyes of the people affected



▲ Thanks to the relationships of the Methodist Church of Haiti with local communities, an UMCOR-sponsored distribution of food and water purification tablets came off without difficulty in the days immediately following the earthquake. The church identified the most vulnerable members of the communities to receive assistance and led the orderly distribution.

by it and respond accordingly.

UMCOR’s work has long followed this model in response to U.S.-based emergencies; and it was particularly put to the test in response to the survivors of

hurricanes Katrina and Rita on the Gulf Coast in 2005. Because of the sheer magnitude of the earthquake, the country’s proximity to the U.S. and its long-established Christian population

with its developed community networks, Haiti is helping UMCOR refine the approach and put into effect mechanisms meant to strengthen it.

There are three things to keep in mind about this approach:

1. It is not only community-based but community-led;
2. It is part of a two-pronged strategy that relies equally on trusted community networks and UMCOR's professional expertise in international relief and development; and
3. It is a long-term strategy that seeks to provide both immediate disaster relief and positive, quality-of-life change to the affected population.

Community-based and community-led

In the days immediately following the earthquake, when flights into the country via the Dominican Republic were full and vehicles for overland transport scarce, UMCOR partners in the region provided the logistical support necessary to get our disaster response personnel into Haiti in a timely manner to assess damage, needs and UMCOR's capacity for response.

Bahamas Methodist Habitat made one of its fleet of small, private airplanes available and shuttled UMCOR's international disaster response executive, Melissa Crutchfield, and a small delegation into Santo Domingo. From there, IED helped lease a vehicle and provided drivers for the overland route into Haiti. IED and ACT Alliance helped gather much-needed material support, including medicines, which the delegation was able to bring to Haitian earthquake survivors.

Once in Haiti, the UMCOR delegation was met by our principle community-based faith partner there, the Methodist Church of Haiti. "We started a long conversation with EMH,"

says Crutchfield. "They are the ones who are in the communities and who know best what's going on. We went and saw the affected areas, and EMH set the agenda."

This dynamic allowed the UMCOR delegation instant rapport and a trusted point of entry into the affected communities according to Crutchfield. Because UMCOR already had a relationship with this long-established church, which the communities knew well, the delegation did not need to use valuable response time to build trust; trust was already established.

Two-pronged strategy

EMH personnel took the UMCOR delegation around Port-au-Prince and other areas to view the effects of the disaster and meet with communities where the earthquake had the greatest impact. The church set up town-hall-style meetings in which the UMCOR delegation heard directly about needs and began to assess both immediate and long-term actions.

"Because we're a faith-based organization, a lot of what we do is to listen to and be with the people," explains Crutchfield. "When I first started in disaster response work, [former UMCOR head] Sam Dixon [who died in the Haiti earthquake] said to me, 'I want you to provide a ministry of presence.' That has always stayed with me. It allows us a more comprehensive approach as it is balanced with meeting physical needs and being proactive."

In situations of disaster, then, the greatest advantage to being a faith-based organization and relying on community-based, faith-partner networks is being plugged into "both sides" of the disaster response equation. UMCOR's coordination with faith-based networks, on the one

hand, and with the international professional disaster response sector, on the other, is dynamic, fluid and mutually supportive.

"The population's trust in the church transfers trust to us and allows us an immediate presence; and our professional expertise in disaster response allows us to provide services within the bigger picture of the professional disaster response network," Crutchfield says.

Based on the EMH-facilitated community meetings, UMCOR developed a strategy that includes projects in reconstruction, livelihoods, education and health. UMCOR's participation in the UN-led cluster groups in Haiti and with other secular partners is bringing those projects to life while ensuring adherence to international standards.

Long-term, quality of life change


Relying on the community-based networks of UMCOR's faith partners positions the organization to identify and achieve long-term goals in a disaster-affected area such as Haiti.

"Where we excel is in long-term recovery," says Crutchfield. "We remain engaged as long as necessary, helping people to improve their lot in life versus responding to the emergency only. We seek to identify long-term needs and goals so that when we step away, the pursuit of those needs and goals will continue." In other words, she says, "We are looking for change, for positive and progressive rehabilitation."

UMCOR is supporting EMH as the church seeks to build its own disaster response committee—a team of professionals with the capacity to confront emergencies—and an interdisciplinary team, which will focus on long-term development objectives. It is also helping the

church to put into place systems of accountability and transparency, which will serve its goal of self-reliance.

"In this way," Crutchfield says, "our collaboration has a future orientation."


That orientation toward the future beyond the emergency also will help to ensure that UMCOR's community-based faith partners remain a faithful mirror of the realities of the communities they and we serve. 

Mapping

continued from page 15

this tool will be especially helpful for small- to medium-sized businesses that have resources to give and that want to see where they may best be applied in relief and recovery work."

The utility of having all of this project data in one place extends beyond partnership building. "The map shows the scope of each agency's humanitarian work on the ground, which makes it a valuable tool for transparency and accountability," according to Michael Delaney, Oxfam America Director of Humanitarian Response. With the increased attention on the large amount of money pledged for recovery and reconstruction, the public and donors want a clearer picture of where and how money is being spent.

Haiti Aid Map is part of a broader mapping initiative that InterAction will roll out in 2011. InterAction is developing a map that will showcase the work of its members in the field of food security and agriculture. The larger mapping initiative will not only strengthen partnerships, but also increase the visibility of the work of the NGO community around the world. 

To learn more or to participate in the mapping initiative, please email mappinginfo@interaction.org.



Projects

Does your organization implement unique projects or programs? Share them with the *Monday Developments* community. Send your project's name, implementing organization, location and funder(s) along with a brief description of 400 words or less to cbrobst@interaction.org

Santé pour le Développement et la Stabilité d'Haiti (SDSH)

Organization

Management Sciences for Health (MSH)

Location

Haiti

Funders

USAID

The Project

"In my last month of pregnancy, the topic at the rally post [rural outreach clinic] was danger signs in pregnancy. I paid attention, but was confident everything would go well," said Nathalie Francois, a 32-year-old mother of three.

A couple weeks later, Natalie's legs swelled and she started bleeding. "I understood that I was at risk even this late in my pregnancy. I knew I needed go to the health center as my *matrone* had recommended."

At the clinic, the nurses discovered Nathalie's high blood pressure, a sign of preeclampsia, a dangerous complication in pregnancy. They referred her to a health center where she received necessary care and safely gave birth three days later. Natalie's community birth attendant (or *matrone*) and the clinic staff who cared for her are trained and supported by the USAID-funded, Management Sciences for Health-led *Santé pour le Développement et la Stabilité d'Haiti* (SDSH) project. Working through local NGOs, SDSH increases access to basic health information and care, including maternal and child health, HIV and AIDS, and tuberculosis services for over 4 million people, 43 percent of Haiti's population. SDSH operates 147 health facilities and nearly 4,000 rally posts.

Most Haitian women prefer to deliver at home, so SDSH builds *matrones*' capacity

to support mothers during pregnancy and delivery or to refer mothers to facilities when danger signs are present. *Matrones* work with their clients and facility staff to develop birth plans. They counsel on breastfeeding and family planning and refer women to facilities for pre- and postnatal care, including immunizations. After birth, the *matrones* make four visits to the mother and newborn. In some areas, *matrones* accompany HIV-positive women to facilities to ensure they receive antiretroviral medication and verify that the babies receive a dose after delivery.

Haiti's Ministry of Health and Population is a strong partner and supporter. "The 22-module training they [the *matrones*] receive is solid," said Meme Belcina, Reproductive Manager for the North-East departmental directorate for the Ministry of Health. "Over three months, with a lesson per week, they learn about woman's health in general, as well as prenatal and postpartum care."

SDSH focuses on providing integrated care at all levels of the health system. Community health workers are key in the continuum of care between home and facility and are a valuable resource that can be mobilized in emergencies such as the current cholera outbreak.

Mobile Money for Haiti's Rural Unbanked

Organization

Mercy Corps

Location

Haiti

Funders

USAID Emergency Food Security Program, USAID-HIFIVE (Haiti Integrated Finance for Value Chains and Enterprises), Private Individuals

The Project

In Haiti, where few people have traditional bank accounts, but 85 percent of the population has access to a cell phone, mobile technology has powerful potential to bring first-time financial services to the poor in a secure, convenient and affordable manner.

Mercy Corps has partnered with mobile network operator Voilà and Haitian bank Unibank to introduce Haiti's first "mobile wallets," accounts linked to cell phones that have the ability to store funds, transfer money and make in-store purchases. The Mobile Money for Haiti's Rural Unbanked initiative is helping drive the development and adoption of mobile money in Haiti by using it to safely and efficiently deliver cash assistance to earthquake-affected families in the Central Plateau and Artibonite Valley. By bringing financial services to the unbanked in Haiti, Mercy Corps is empowering the rural poor and micro-entrepreneurs with the tools to lift themselves out of poverty.

A similar service called M-PESA is already a success in Kenya, giving more than 10 million Kenyans access to basic banking services through their phones. For poor families, bank accounts—especially savings accounts—are critical to improving their financial stability.

Today, Mercy Corps is using mobile technology to deliver food aid to earthquake-affected families through a USAID Emergency Food Security Program. This program provides vouchers for the local or regional procurement of food to 20,000 earthquake-affected families in the Central Plateau and Lower Artibonite. In Saint Marc, Mercy Corps is using the mobile wallet in lieu of paper vouchers, transferring \$40 each month for nine months to 5,000 earthquake-affected families to spend on rice, beans, corn flour and cooking oil at their neighborhood markets. Families also have the option to store some of these funds on their phone rather than cashing

Projects

them all at once. The Mobile Money for Haiti's Rural Unbanked initiative identifies and mobilizes program participants and vendors, trains them to use the mobile wallet technology and m-commerce system, and has served as a mobile money incubator, providing feedback to Voilà to improve and further develop its mobile money services.

Early feedback from program participants has been positive. "I like this way of paying. The process is easy to learn and there's less risk involved," said Pierre Louis Jacques, a 43-year-old Haitian father. Sylmanie Prophete, a 27-year-old woman noted, "It's a very good way of paying people because it's very discrete; people don't know your business. It's between us, Mercy Corps and the bank."

Over the next nine months, approximately 100,000 Haitians in the impoverished Central Plateau and Lower Artibonite regions will use the mobile wallet service to receive and make payments as part of their participation in Mercy Corps' cash-based assistance programs. And, as a result of the success of the Mobile Money for Haiti's Rural Unbanked initiative, Voilà and Unibank have now commercially launched a national mobile money service, called "T-CASH" (telephone cash), to the broader Haitian public.

Empowering Haitians Through Volunteerism & the Bamboo Piggy Bank Initiative

Organization

Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation

Location

Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Funders

Local Haitians

The Project

The empowerment of local Haitians is essential for the long-term recovery of Haiti.

Buddhist Tzu Chi Foundation is a volunteer-based organization, with relief workers worldwide volunteering their time and money for travel expenses to help people in distress. In every country where the foundation is engaged in disaster relief work, volunteers strive to inspire locals to take up the same spirit of volunteerism and join the

efforts to help their compatriots.

The foundation's volunteers from the United States, Dominican Republic, St. Martin, Argentina and Canada provided continuous aid in Haiti for several months starting in January 2010. They also held a series of volunteer trainings for over 1,000 local Haitians. After their training, the Haitian men and women have continued to dedicate their time and efforts—often despite their lack of basic necessities—to help those in even greater need.

These brave souls strive to raise the spirit of compassion and self-empowerment among their compatriots. One effort in this spirit is the Bamboo Piggy Bank initiative, where locals are encouraged to save a small amount of money every day to help others in their community. This practice mirrors the humble origins of the foundation and helps remind the donors that even if they are poor themselves, they still have the power to help others. This initiative has quickly gathered many donors and the funds are used exclusively for local charity work, creating a cycle of love and kindness.

Other projects initiated by local volunteers include orphanage visits, home visits, cholera prevention education, hygiene education and back-to-school projects. The Haitian volunteers help children who cannot afford the tuition fees to get back to school; they also support the children and their parents through home visits, after-school activities, and excursions. In addition, the volunteers educate their communities in safe hygiene practices such as hand hygiene and water treatment for cholera prevention. These projects are carried out with the spirit of "respect, gratitude and love," where the volunteers care for their compatriots with a smile or a hug and deliver aid with both hands and a bow.

These small-scale, low-cost projects run by local Haitian volunteers have a big impact in empowering and organizing their communities and will be of great importance for the country's future.

For more information, please contact Grace Chen at gracechen@us.tzuchi.org.

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PROFAMIL

Organization

International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF)/ Western Hemisphere Region

Location

Haiti

Funders

The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The David and Lucille Packard Foundation, The Summit Foundation, The Irving Harris Foundation, BMZ, Del Mar Global Trust, The Nirvana Mañana Institute

The Project

For more than 20 years, PROFAMIL, IPPF's Haitian Member Association, has provided sexual and reproductive health (SRH) care to local Haitian communities.

PROFAMIL was severely affected by the January 2010 earthquake. Two of its clinics, in Port-au-Prince and Jacmel, were destroyed, and its Acting Executive Director at the time died while undergoing surgery after suffering serious wounds.

A year later, PROFAMIL's network of health centers, mobile medical teams and community volunteers is persevering: providing essential health care, alongside maternity and SRH services.

Despite the obstacles, PROFAMIL's staff has remained committed to the health and welfare of fellow Haitians at every step. They quickly salvaged what medical equipment and supplies they could from the destroyed clinics and resumed delivering health services to the many thousands of homeless and displaced people who gathered at the tented camps. PROFAMIL community promoters have gone back out into the streets and are once again working to engage young people through youth activities. Under new leadership, PROFAMIL is once again poised to be a leader in SRH in Haiti.

PROFAMIL is also working in partnership with several key organizations on the ground.

Projects

They are collaborating with the International Rescue Committee to coordinate a response to the sad reality of increased sexual violence, because in the aftermath of a disaster or conflict, pregnancy-related deaths and incidences of rape and sexual violence often soar, as attention shifts towards disaster relief efforts.

Many women lose access to family planning services, exposing them to unwanted pregnancy, and, in cases of rape, access to emergency contraception and counselling. This means that PROFAMIL's work has become even more indispensable. To respond, sexual and reproductive health posts have been established in Port-au-Prince, Jacmel and Petit Grove. These posts are partnered family planning clinics, staffed with an auxiliary nurse and two promoters who distribute contraception and provide counselling and education to key areas lacking SRH services.

PROFAMIL will soon open new facilities in prefabricated structures that are more durable than the tents it currently uses. These medical facilities will be located in central Port-au-Prince and other affected areas and will offer comprehensive, accessible SRH services. PROFAMIL medical teams will continue to expand their work in coordination with other emergency services near the tented camps where many of those made homeless by the earthquake have gathered, and in reaching the internally displaced who are not in the camps.

Rubble to Reconstruction

Organization

Catholic Relief Services

Location

Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Funders

Haiti Tractor, the UNIBANK Foundation, CEMEX

The Project

A few months ago, a group of neighbors in the Port-au-Prince community of Delmas 62 banded together and literally knocked on the door of Catholic Relief Services (CRS) to ask for help. Displaced from their homes after the earthquake, they were living in a nearby

camp and wanted to move back.

Impressed by the cohesion and initiative of the community members, some CRS staff went to the neighborhood and found a group of densely packed houses, most of them destroyed, perched on a steep hillside. The rubble of the demolished houses would have to be carried out by hand and the pieces of temporary shelters would have to be carried in.

"We said, 'we can't promise anything,'" said Kevin Osborne of CRS. "The topography and geography was daunting."

But innovation and collaboration overcame the obstacles. Working with members of the Delmas 62 community, CRS initiated a pilot rubble-crushing project that combines rubble removal and livelihoods. Using hand-cranked crushers, community members have organized and are processing rubble into gravel and sand for sale and use in local construction projects, including CRS' own shelter program. Instead of a traditional cash for work approach, community members earn income based on how much sand and gravel they produce and sell.

With their plots of land cleared and land title established, CRS has erected wooden transitional shelters that residents have painted with lively colors. Many of the t-shelter floors were poured with concrete made with rubble from the community. No longer in tents, they have become a neighborhood again.

Recently, CRS expanded the rubble crushing livelihoods project to the Carrefour and Christ Roi communities. Production has increased from 1-2 cubic meters of rubble per day per machine to five cubic meters (or the equivalent of 250 five-gallon buckets) per eight-hour shift. Some of the communities now work night crews and multiple day shifts to increase their production and income.

Rubble to Reconstruction is part of CRS' Community Resettlement and Recovery Program, a community-based approach to helping families to resettle in their neighborhoods of origin. This holistic approach requires coordination of all the relevant sector teams and encompasses rubble removal (through Cash for Work in most places), t-shelter construction, livelihoods recovery, protection and facilities for water sanitation and hygiene (WASH). "We're attempting to preserve the social tissue of the country. We're rebuilding

communities, not just houses," said Scott Campbell, who until recently served as the country representative for CRS in Haiti. "We're putting up transitional shelters street by street, community by community."

Healing Hands Spinal Cord Injury Program

Organization

Team Canada Healing Hands/ Healing Hands for Haiti

Location

Haiti

Funders

Team Canada Healing Hands, Handicap International, Healing Hands for Haiti

The Project

St. Boniface Hospital in Fond-des-Blancs, a rural town about 70 miles outside Port-au-Prince, was physically untouched by the earthquake in January 2010. Primarily a general medical and community hospital, it was one location among a handful that began accepting patients with spinal cord injuries (SCI) who were recovering from operations performed at other hospitals and in need of rehabilitation.

Pre-earthquake, there was virtually no in-country expertise in SCI management and rehabilitation care. The hospital's willingness to take on challenging cases has made a huge difference for patients with spinal injuries. Without the help of hospitals like St. Boniface that began accepting SCI patients, the outcome for these patients would likely have been grim.

There are a number of NGOs in the country, including Team Canada Healing Hands and Healing Hands for Haiti, Project Medishare and Handicap International, who, along with local partners, are providing rehabilitation training for local health workers and outpatient SCI care. Team Canada Healing Hands recognized the need for more specialized programs geared toward serving the needs of SCI patients and has spearheaded the establishment of the Healing Hands Spinal Cord Injury (SCI) Rehabilitation Program.

The SCI program includes expatriate SCI

volunteer teams working collaboratively with Haitian medical professionals. Together they identify service, education and equipment needs, and develop recommendations and strategies to meet those needs. These teams provide training sessions to Haitian hospitals and clinic staff on SCI topics and work collaboratively in a mentorship model to grow local capacity.

Extreme limitations exist in Haiti, such as no stable transportation, limited supplies, minimal human resources and limited capacity for acute care. Program objectives include developing an acute and longer-term rehabilitation plan, funding for ongoing support of SCI rehab centers, creating community-based expertise and providing formal training programs. Since the earthquake, the Haitian government has expressed a desire to bring accredited physiotherapy and occupational therapy training to the country.

Establishing long term rehab facilities will ensure the ability to manage SCI into the future. Spinal cord injuries can result from road accidents, industrial accidents, illness or violence—indicating an ongoing need for specialized expertise and care.

The pain of recovery is not always physical. The Healing Hands SCI project is taking a number of steps to meet these needs. Peer support groups are being established with the guidance of psychologists and social workers to support those now learning how to cope with the emotional stresses of being disabled. Family and patient instruction are offered so that they learn how to live with disability and become self sufficient. Skills and vocational training ensure success upon discharge. Training and education programs are being offered in local nursing schools so that SCI training is now included in the curriculum.

Ongoing communication and awareness within the community and throughout the country is a continuing objective of the Healing Hands Spinal Cord Injury Rehabilitation Program. De-stigmatizing disability is an important part of giving back independence and dignity to persons with spinal cord injuries.

For more information please visit www.healinghandsforhaiti.org, www.tchh.org or email teamcanada@tchhmca or Marnie Hughes at marnie@communicationartistry.ca.

Haiti Out-of-School Youth Livelihood Initiative (IDEJEN)

Organization

Education Development Center, IDEJEN (project now an independent NGO)

Location

Haiti

Funders

USAID, International Organization for Migration


The Project

When the earthquake struck Haiti, thousands of youth were ready to respond. In Artibonite, peer educators trained in psychosocial support headed to local clinics to help people displaced by the earthquake. In Port-au-Prince, 1,110 young people cleaned up debris and waste in and around camps and the city, and 150 installed latrines in camps and at schools. In Grand Goave, 60 youth built transitional shelters. In total, approximately 1,500 youth have been involved in earthquake response activities.

Just one or two years earlier, many of these young people were viewed as good-for-nothings with little to contribute to society. Some were involved in gangs. Some sat at home. Others eked out a living selling on the streets. All of them were out-of-school youth who had either never attended school or had dropped out before the fourth grade. Now, they are contributing to their communities, transforming society's view of out-of-school youth, and earning an income at the same time.

The Haitian Out-of-School Youth Livelihood Initiative (known locally as IDEJEN) was formed in 2003 to provide youth with the skills they need to develop sustainable livelihoods. After researching Haiti's vulnerable, out-of-school youth population, IDEJEN developed a comprehensive, non-formal basic education program, followed by six months of livelihood support called *accompagnement*. IDEJEN recognized that for this population training, even "youth-driven" was not enough. These young people needed guidance as they forged their way back into society with a new start-up kit of tools ranging

from the concrete (a hammer or trowel) to the less obvious (literacy and numeracy). The more than 200 partnerships that Education Development Center and IDEJEN have developed with community-based organizations, government agencies and private enterprises across eight geographic departments have been essential to IDEJEN's success in both training youth and linking them to employment opportunities; and combined with a significant cadre of well-trained and eager-to-work youth, they have formed a strong foundation for IDEJEN's capacity to respond quickly and efficiently following disaster.


In May 2010, with support from EDC, IDEJEN was officially recognized by the Ministry of Planning and launched as a local NGO. Youth participation and strong partnerships remain at the center of IDEJEN's success and sustainability. And while IDEJEN youth have found employment and been re-integrated into society in the years since the initiative began, the earthquake has heightened the need for the skills these youth now possess. The response of IDEJEN and its young members has contributed to recovery, altering Haitian perceptions of out-of-school youth. 

Market Assessments

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understand the problems, and their causes, to inform the solutions.

The arrival of the SSSA, EMMA and other rapid assessment tools has brought the humanitarian field a long way. Yet more needs to be done. Even "rapid" methodologies often result in analyses being released weeks and often months post-crisis—long after many decisions about procurement of much-needed items have been made. Some agencies are trying to overcome this challenge by organizing assessments in crisis-prone areas *before* the next disaster strikes. EMMA assessments on critical markets in Haiti and Pakistan in 2008 made it much faster and easier to update data when massive disasters hit those countries in 2010.

Assessment methods will prove themselves over time. With repeated use, more and more humanitarian agencies will both see the value in conducting assessments and integrate them as a natural and necessary step in humanitarian response. Through better assessments, our "success stories" will increase and last long after relief interventions end. 



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Events

JANUARY

5 – 7 January
7th International Conference on Environmental, Cultural, Economic and Social Sustainability

Hamilton, New Zealand
<http://onsustainability.com/conference-2011>

16 January
A Time of Remembrance and Action
Washington, DC
www.reformationdc.org

20 January
InsideNGO's Young Professionals Forum Presents Full Day Workshop
Washington, DC
<https://sites.google.com/a/insidengo.org/dcyp0111/>

23 – 25 January
The 2011 International Conference on Asia Pacific Business Innovation & Technology Management
Bali, Indonesia
www.cibit.url.tw/APBITM/2011Winter.htm

24 – 27 January
Business Education and Poverty Reduction
Bangkok, Thailand
www.icbme.com

26 – 27 January
AchieVe Global Talent©: Empowering staff to achieve individual and organizational goals from Day One
Washington, DC
<https://sites.google.com/a/insidengo.org/dchrtalent0111/>

27 January
International Day of Commemoration to honour the victims of the Holocaust Global

www.un.org/holocaustremembrance/

FEBRUARY

3 – 4 February
InsideNGO Workshop: USAID Proposal Development
Washington, DC
<https://sites.google.com/a/insidengo.org/dcproposals0211/>

4 February
World Cancer Day
www.who.int/mediacentre/events/annual/world_cancer_day/en/index.html

15 – 17 February
Gender and Infrastructure Workshop for the Africa Region
Tunis, Tunisia
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22758228~menuPK:34482~pagePK:2524753~piPK:51421526~theSitePK:4607,00.html>

17 – 18 February
4th Annual SPMA International Conference on Public Administration
The School of Public Management and Administration (SPMA), University of Pretoria South Africa
<http://web.up.ac.za/default.as>

[p?ipkCategoryID=14582&subid=14582&ipklookid=3&ArticleID=224](http://www.un.org/p?ipkCategoryID=14582&subid=14582&ipklookid=3&ArticleID=224)

20 February
World Day of Social Justice
<http://un.org/esa/socdev/social/intldays/IntlJustice/>

22 – 24 February
USAID/Federal Rules & Regulations
Washington, DC
<https://sites.google.com/a/insidengo.org/dcrr0211/home>

MARCH

TBD March
3rd Annual Event on the Women's Empowerment Principles
New York, New York
Contact: Lauren Gula, gula@un.org

1 – 3 March
Fourth Annual Poverty and Social Protection Conference
Bangkok, Thailand
www.conferencealerts.com/seeconf.mv?q=ca1ia8h6

7 – 9 March
INTED2011 (International Technology, Education and Development Conference)
Valencia, Spain
www.conferencealerts.com/seeconf.mv?q=ca1i0663


22 March
World Water Day
www.unesco.org/water/water_celebrations/

Long-Term Goals

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tion and distribution was laid on the communities themselves who had a vested interest in a rapid, orderly process. Several committees even agreed to organize their own transportation of the goods, accompanied by agency staff to ensure accountability. The result was that families received their goods in their own neighborhoods just as quickly, and often more quickly and certainly with more dignity, than those in camps, and more importantly, were able to remain near their homes.

These newly empowered committees with direct connections to responding agencies were then able to take on more complex roles, such as expressing specific needs or organizing cash-for-work and reconstruction activities, speeding their pace as well. By working through these committees, one relatively small agency has been one of the most successful agencies in housing repair and shelter construction: at one point having provided fully 40 percent of all transitional and permanent shelter.

A stronger early recovery cluster that better understands its cross-cutting purpose could influence those important little strategy discussions within other clusters and vastly improve the rate of recovery in similar natural disasters in the future. By highlighting the ripple effect the design of the earliest response activities can have on the long-term recovery, the early recovery cluster could move beyond its limited focus on coordinating specific activities and do more to promote faster, more complete recovery. 



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We seek candidates that are reflective of the diversity of Peace Corps and our Volunteers.

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We seek candidates that are reflective of the diversity of Peace Corps and our Volunteers.

Administrative Officers must be United States citizens and must not have been associated with intelligence activities. Candidates should have work experience managing a program or business, and managing/supporting staff and/or volunteers. Since approximately 90 percent of Peace Corps staff at each post are host country nationals, cross-cultural communication skills are critical.

The salary range for these positions is \$61,759 - \$138,137. All Peace Corps U.S. direct hire positions are time limited. Employees are appointed for a 30-month tour and may be granted a second tour for a maximum of five years (60 months) with the agency.



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*While many of these positions do not require fluency in a language, some do. We anticipate a specific need for fluent French, Portuguese and Spanish speakers.

Lessons Learned

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Reducing the risks

One of the key takeaways from the Haiti earthquake is the need for increased focus on disaster risk reduction, particularly in high-risk countries. Disaster preparedness and mitigation activities can be integrated into long-term development programs in ways that promote community-led response mechanisms and minimize the need for external assistance. In Haiti, the international community had long worked with the Haitian government on hurricane contingency planning. Unfortunately, the planning did not include earthquake response, even though Haiti lies

on three significant fault lines. However, because there were coordination structures already in place for hurricane response, those structures were quickly activated after the earthquake and eventually formed the basis for the Humanitarian Country Team. Going forward, contingency planning and coordination infrastructure should be prioritized in countries at risk for natural hazards (as well as those at risk for political instability) as better advance preparation can lead to a more efficient and effective response.

The earthquake response in Haiti has been a massive undertaking and fraught with challenges, but the humanitarian community was able to provide assistance to the affected population in a way that minimized excess loss of

life for those left vulnerable after the earthquake. Already the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere before the earthquake, Haiti will have an especially difficult time recovering. However, the strong NGO community in Haiti that has long worked there remains committed to accompanying the Haitian people and its government through the recovery process. A key challenge is whether the humanitarian community can take the "lessons identified" during the earthquake response and turn at least some of them into "lessons learned"—both in the current Haiti response and in future. We owe it to the people we serve to make our best efforts to improve our performance with each response.

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