

Real Time Evaluation
Project ADVANCE Niger



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Findings

Relevance/appropriateness

Globally, beneficiaries have affirmed that Project ADVANCE has significantly diminished their needs for food and diminished the malnutrition of children. The assistance they received allowed them to avoid additional loss of important assets. They were able to continue working in their fields ensuring a better harvest this season, preventing the sale of more animals and allowing them to avoid more debt. The decision to supply aid for 3 months ensured that beneficiaries had food before the next harvest while also allowing them to stock rather than consume their initial production. Beneficiary satisfaction was high. The assistance in August was particularly appreciated because they had the means to observe the fasting and celebrate the end of the month of Ramadan. One striking experience came from an elderly woman in Gao Banda who said that as a result of malnourishment last year, she had lost her eyesight and was unable to walk. "This year I have my sight and I can walk again." She stood up and walked. (If aid had arrived any later), "I would be lifeless" she said. Even so, there are still unsatisfied food needs at the community level which was evident by the need for beneficiaries to share rations with their neighbors who have not received vouchers.

The evaluation identified beneficiaries' other needs such as potable water, income generating activities, development of household gardens, school kitchens for students, malaria prevention and treatment that have not been taken into account by Project ADVANCE. Without these assets the affected population remains in a structurally vulnerable situation. The project has however changed the population's most urgent need for food. The other needs with the exception of water were taken into account in other programs (cash for work, blanket feeding, food for work) by CRS, OFDA, CAFOD, WFP and the Government of Niger.

Assessment

The CRS Niger Project ADVANCE team determined it was unnecessary to carry out an assessment first, because the government had already commissioned a pilot survey. Secondly, an assessment would take valuable time that was not perceived as necessary.

The results of the government pilot survey showed that 64.1% of the population of the department of Ouallam and 32.4% of the department of Tillaberi's was food insecure. The emergency responses by all intervening humanitarian actors (WFP, Plan Niger, CRS) used data from the official government report in targeting vulnerable areas, villages and households. According to the Project ADVANCE team, the government gave a directive in a subsequent report to provide assistance to 33% of the population in those regions during the initial response. This was carried out by the initial responders (Government of Niger and WFP-Plan Niger) in June and July.ⁱ

The government later repealed its initial directive permitting NGOs to provide responses larger than 33% in areas where need was greater. This permitted Plan Niger to provide aid to an additional 67% of households in Ouallam so that 100% of households there received assistance during the second direct distribution of aid in July. However, due to the complexity of calculating and providing rations to the precise number of vulnerable households in a given village, CRS planned, budgeted and provided rations

for 33% of the households in targeted villages of Ouallam and Tillaberi. This meant that in some villages all of the most vulnerable households did not receive aid while in other villages, it is possible that moderately vulnerable households did. This is because the actual number of very vulnerable households in a given department, commune and village is unique to each place. Each village went through their own participatory process for identifying the most vulnerable households but it was never exactly 33%. It might have been more, it might have been less. In spite of this, CRS applied a homogeneous solution to a heterogeneous reality which likely meant that in villages where the most vulnerable households were more than 33% of the total, not all of them received aid. This was evident from the respondents who said they shared their rations with households who did not receive vouchers. In villages where the number of vulnerable households was less than 33%, moderately vulnerable (less vulnerable) households received aid. There was no mechanism for comparing need across villages and distributing aid based on the highest need. Each village received aid for 33% of the households regardless of the actual number of households identified by the community as very vulnerable. No quick or easy solution was found to more accurately target households but perhaps this RTE will begin a discussion regarding how to be more responsive to the unique needs in each village.

In terms of the content of the assessment and subsequent planning, both responded exclusively to the most urgent food security needs of the affected villages and households. However, had the assessment and planning also taken into account the domains of protection, education, health, children's malnutrition, vulnerable populations (pregnant women and people living with HIV/AIDS) it would have not only allowed the project to better take into account the real needs of vulnerable groups in future disaster risk reduction projects, but to also take these needs into account during the emergency response.

Targeting Decisions

To select the most vulnerable households at the village level, a participatory process of 4 visits to each village was executed. A general assembly was held during the first visit to define the criteria that would determine the 3 classes of vulnerability among the households (very vulnerable, moderately vulnerable and vulnerable). Project managers began the discussion at the village level by presenting the standard criteria for targeting vulnerable households as defined by Niger's National Food Crisis Cell (CCA). The population then defined their own criteria of vulnerability which was added to the criteria of the CCA. During the second visit, the population was asked to classify village households in one class of vulnerability among the three categories previously defined. During the third visit, a reduced number of people designated by the population met with members of the project team to identify the names of all the heads of household in the village and create the lists according to the classes of vulnerability. During the final visit 33% of the most vulnerable heads of household are selected as beneficiaries of Project ADVANCE. The lists of heads of household are validated upon consensus in the general assembly.

Although the decision making process was designed to be very transparent, in certain villages like Sarakoira and Hyawonne, there was a communication gap in the targeting process among the women heads of household. Rather than participating in the general assembly, they were informed they would benefit from the project by the chef of the village or the canton. The majority of village beneficiaries

however participated in the process and knew how and why they were selected. While it is affirming that the village chiefs are including the most vulnerable women headed households, the targeting is designed for heads of household, whether men or women, to equally participate in the decision making related to village household selection. It is therefore preferred that women heads of household participate in the general assembly.

Vendors and Risk Management

Impacts of the intervention on vendors was not specifically addressed in this evaluation, however most vendors interviewed were selling between 100% and 800% more than they would on any given market day. Normally, vendors have to sell on credit but the project markets assured them actual payment. For some, the amount sold represented the equivalent of an entire month's earnings in a single day. Vendors who were unsatisfied were those who were not receiving any business, some of whom attributed this to the collusion between other vendors and village chiefs in that particular market. Selection of vendors was not systematized and therefore this question warrants further investigation.

Project ADVANCE intends to provide the necessary food assistance in a way that permits beneficiaries to choose from locally sourced food commodities such as cereals and legumes according to their preferences and needs. To know whether certain markets would be able to respond to the demand, the project commissioned a market study which indicated that the project could execute without risk. In addition, project managers increased the number of vendors to ensure the availability of necessary quantities. To avoid risks associated with bad roads during the rainy season, vendors were instructed to arrive at the market 24-48 hours before the market began. The result was sufficient locally sourced food assistance using exclusively local capacity that provided products at a competitive price.

Nutritional Choice

Beneficiaries prefer vouchers to the direct distribution of aid because they can choose the foods they prefer. Basic food items and other essential and culturally important commodities are available including millet, rice, oil, corn, beans and soya. Condiments are not available. However, any resources saved as a result of the assistance can be used to make those purchases. Beneficiaries were satisfied with the products available in the market.

It was interesting to note that although beans were provided as a protein source among the available commodities for purchase, beneficiaries were not buying them in great quantity. Project managers had encouraged beneficiaries to use 5000F CFA of the voucher value in beans. However, vendors explained that they sold fewer beans than expected in the first market so they supplied much less during the second distribution. The reason for this is not clear. It may have been an issue of cultural familiarity but it is more likely that the cost of beans was much higher than the cereal products, especially millet. To supply beneficiaries with a well rounded diet, a different project design will be needed. The incentives put in place by Project ADVANCE were not adequate to ensure that households purchased protein-rich foods.

Voucher Denomination

Beneficiaries were also limited in the quantities they could purchase. Vendors only sell millet by the 100kg sack for 23,000 F CFA (on average). So although the beneficiaries are provided 2 vouchers, (each is valued at 12,500F CFA) they make their entire purchase with a single vendor. The remaining value of the voucher is provided in kind, generally with 1-4 liters of cooking oil. Given that the 2 vouchers are not providing additional variety to beneficiaries, a single voucher valued at 25,000F CFA would be simpler for beneficiaries with limited numeracy skills and less costly to CRS in terms of time and resources spent on the anti-fraud and tracking stickers on each voucher. This seems to largely defeat the purpose of providing a marketplace for beneficiaries to make their purchases because they have little additional choice than they would in a direct distribution. This could be solved by either: 1) providing larger ration sizes and voucher amounts to permit beneficiaries to shop with various vendors or 2) providing smaller quantities of millet and rice with smaller denominations of vouchers to provide beneficiaries with more choice. However, beneficiaries prefer millet in large quantities so additional choice of smaller quantities in particular may not be a useful alternative.

Market Distortions

The beneficiaries and vendors were informed regarding how the food market functioned and vendors were informed of the need to sell at reasonable prices but because the markets are neither fair nor ordinary markets, the information provided was not sufficient for normal market rules to operate. For example, vendors met before the market opened in Djambala to fix the price for the day which limits the margin beneficiaries have to negotiate. However, the prices that were set at the market turned out to be fairly competitive prices compared with the Niamey cereal market and not intolerably high considering transport and handling costs.

Although there were a few exceptions in which some vendors set lower prices, people did not always buy at the lower price. Other factors that distort free market mechanisms are people's tendency to make their purchases from people they know, perhaps the vendor who has given them credit or from vendors of the same ethnic group.

Another distortion in the market was the case of a village chief under the influence of certain vendors who encouraged beneficiaries of his village to make their purchases with the same vendors. This creates the risk that vendors who did not try to influence the market and who did not sell will not return, permitting the market monopolization by the village chief and certain vendors.

There is not enough information on how the project has impacted the variation of price of cereal on different markets, however, based on the market distortions described above, it is clear that the systematization of quality assurance in food market operations can be improved. Partner ABC Ecologie took a step in that direction by informing the village chief who directed members of his village to specific vendors that his village would no longer be eligible to participate if he continued to unduly influence the market.

Learning Effectiveness

The Project ADVANCE team applied numerous and relevant lessons learned to the design of this intervention. A pilot project was conducted among 250 households in Tillabéri which permitted learning to inform the design and control systems. Project ADVANCE has also benefited from the experience of ABC Ecologie and Plan Niger. The process to identify the most vulnerable households was a coordinated effort which permitted the project to benefit from the combined experience among all the partners. During project design, the Project ADVANCE team also benefited from consultations with 2 CRS Burkina Faso staff who had participated in the emergency response to the flooding in Ouagadougou last year.

The CRS Program Manager for Project ADVANCE has been coordinating CRS' emergency projects since 2001. He has participated in at least 32 emergency interventions which have informed this effort. CRS' program assistant has 10 years of experience. CRS' partner, ABC Ecologie has more than 8 years of experience. They are familiar with the terrain and have mastered the methods of targeting households. They have proven effective mechanisms for emergency response, they have experience working with vouchers and are familiar with the cultural realities.

Project ADVANCE staff (24 agents, 2 CRS and 4 ABC Ecologie supervisors and 4 CRS staff) have received training on the voucher approach, on targeting beneficiaries and orientation to project forms (household census form, distribution records, recipient cards, etc).

Program and management effectiveness

Timeliness

According to beneficiaries, the aid arrived late. Suffering and loss of assets could have been avoided if aid had arrived earlier. We understand that the beneficiaries refer to aid as inclusive of all aid received beginning in June with the interventions by the Nigerien government and by Plan-WFP. CRS' intervention was preceded by these other earlier distributions to the same households. "Earlier" therefore meant prior to June when the first disbursement of aid was provided by the government in Ouallam and by Plan-WFP in Tillabéri. The late arrival of aid was due to the former administration's refusal to acknowledge that Niger was experiencing a food security crisis. It was not until the new administration was in place that aid was permitted to arrive freely to communities.

However if aid had arrived any later, increasingly negative coping mechanisms would have been used, including the sale of additional assets, migration, abandonment of the village, hunger and a humanitarian crisis that might have included the death of children. The women of Hyawonne explained what they would have done had aid arrived any later: First both men and women would walk a number of kilometers away from the village in search of wood to sell. They then turn around and walk back past the village to the nearest town, Djambala 10km away where they stay for 2-3 months selling wood. Other adult family members continue to supply the wood while children from the household bring food items back to the house that that adults purchase in town from the sale of wood. They earn 100-150F CFA for two days' work. Since few can afford to buy in times of crisis, it is not a profitable venture.

Frequency

Project managers hoped to provide aid every 15 days rather than monthly in order to help households moderate consumption through better management of their rations. However, beneficiaries have said that they prefer one market distribution per month because the cost of transportation is high. A greater discussion of transportation issues can be found in the Coverage: Equity section, page 13.

Quantity

The quantity of aid is not sufficient to satisfy everyone's needs. Nearly all beneficiaries in group interviews consume more than one sack of grain each month. A portion of it is shared with neighbors. Nine out of 12 groups interviewed said the amount of aid given was good or average but of course if more was available, they would certainly be glad to have it. Additional ways beneficiaries suggest to meet their food needs include: organizing a cash for work program in addition to the voucher, providing larger rations and providing credit to help families buy back animals they were forced to sell during the crisis. According to project team members, the project was initially constrained by a directive from the Nigerien Government to limit aid to 33% of villages and limit ration sizes to 100 kilo per household of 7 people. However when that restriction was lifted, the constraint in providing more aid and larger ration sizes was limited resources.

Quality

Quality verification is carried out on a sample of venter products from each market by a local laboratory and openly discussed at the venter debriefing meeting after each market day. Venders were informed 2 weeks before the 1st distribution that they must provide quality products. They were informed that product samples will be tested and the results will be openly discussed to ensure quality products in the market. Beneficiaries have no complaints about the quality of products provided at the ADVANCE market. According to them, the quality is the same as the products available in the ordinary market, although they prefer the taste of the products they themselves produce. This is an important reminder for emergency projects to reinforce the capacity of communities to return to their fields to produce for themselves. Beneficiaries provided other more sustainable interventions that CRS can consider for future projects that will build resiliency in this zone: (See Sustainability page 10.)

Efficiency

The voucher method for distributing food aid is very efficient—distribution is accomplished in just 6 days rather than 21 days required for direct distribution. In terms of the time people wait to receive the vouchers, however, some improvement is possible. In large markets, beneficiaries waited between 1-2 hours to receive their vouchers. In smaller markets, the wait was much shorter-- generally around 10 minutes although in a few cases people waited as long as an hour. It is possible to reduce the wait time by increasing the number of partner teams who distribute the vouchers. Market days are also social opportunities where people tend to spend the entire day. Even so, in the case of larger markets where various villages go, ABC Ecologie will review their current staff presence and determine how they can provide additional field teams to reduce the waiting time during voucher distribution.

Program Support Functions

CRS and ABC Ecologie effectively coordinated, agreed on their respective roles and responsibilities and reached consensus on the budget within a reasonable amount of time. Within CRS, the coordination of activities between programming and finance was also efficient: human resources and logistics were well coordinated for the effective recruitment and deployment of staff. ABC Ecologie Director has said that the recruited staff are skilled and have a motivating salary. The 12 ABC Ecologie teams and their supervisors were provided the necessary logistical support to permit them to rally all the targeted villages. In addition, vouchers were available for timely distributions.

The funding mechanism provided timely financing to the implementing partner. CRS received the finance agreement in June and financing in July. The protocol between ABC Ecologie and CRS was signed July 22 and the first 51,850,000F CFA was provided to ABC Ecologie August 8, 2010 (17 days later). The bank transfer takes a minimum of 3 days before the funds are available however, ABC Ecologie began to execute activities in the field 48 hours after notification by CRS that the funding had been sent to their bank account. This timeframe is much shorter than in previous experiences so the team was satisfied with the improvement.

Monitoring and Evaluation

ADVANCE uses a number of mechanisms to monitor its operations for rapid decision making. For the most part these have been effective in getting vouchers to the right beneficiaries, tracking product quality, products and quantities sold, resolving problems and making needed adjustments in the moment. However, to formalize the system and to better insure quality, satisfaction and fair practices in the market, some additional components of the M&E system will be useful. A customer satisfaction survey of beneficiaries and vendors in the next distribution will help project administrators assess the openness of the market and reinforce the necessary administrative functions. The team also recommends expediting the collection of necessary data on all the markets (beneficiary participation, vendor sales, etc.) and sharing the report prior to the start of the next market. Through the course of the RTE, project managers also identified the need for creating and maintaining a document that verifies that each vendor was paid by CRS. Currently, CRS tracks payments made to the vendor delegates who are responsible for distributing CRS' payment to the additional 14 vendors they represent in the region. However, no tracking mechanism exists to ensure that each vendor receives payment from the vendor delegates who represent them to CRS. Some important basic M&E planning should be reinforced to ensure the data collected is the right kind for the right purpose. For example, indicators and parties responsible for monitoring and analysis of data need to be defined, parties who will use results and those who need the information for decision making also need to be specified.

In the course of this RTE, the team learned that there is no place designated in the markets where beneficiaries can go if they have a question or complaint. To remedy this and to discourage any unethical market practices, ABC Ecologie and CRS staff have agreed they will circulate in the markets wearing uniform shirts and hats.

Connectedness and Sustainability

The project has minimized the risk of vulnerability by reinforcing positive coping strategies and reducing others. This has permitted vulnerable households to invest their time and effort in the activities that build on existing human, physical, natural and financial capital. The coping strategies that vouchers have reinforced include: increase in quantities prepared for each meal; increase the number of meals eaten per day; the strengthening and expansion of small businesses as a result of savings that families have afforded; vouchers have also reinforced the solidarity among neighbors through sharing food. Furthermore, vouchers have diminished the following negative coping strategies: migration out of the village; work for other people; sales of small animals; sale of wood; sale of herbs & leaves; consumption of uncommon (wild) foods; credit (debt); trading things for food and begging. It must be said however, that beneficiaries will go back to using the same negative coping mechanisms in the event of another crisis. According to village chiefs interviewed, coping strategies vary in intensity depending on the availability of food but the deficiency in this zone is considered permanent. Ouallam department has had a food deficit for 13 out of the past 13 years. Tillabéri has had food deficits for 10 years out of the past 13. Therefore the project has not addressed the root problems that create the same crises continually.

Next Phase

The third and final distribution will take place in October and will use the action plan presented in the following section to address some of the challenges identified earlier.

The post-crisis phase aims to reduce the vulnerability of villages and households in these areas through a disaster risk reduction effort. The team will be composed of a strong and diverse CRS team in coordination with government and civil society actors. To ensure sustainability, the post-crisis phase should take into account the following priorities identified by community members during the group interviews: increasing the capacity of women in the development of household gardens, support for agro-enterprise, drill wells, build water retention structures, assist with access to short cycle high quality seeds, increase capacity of households to diversify their activities, support natural resource management, land restoration and conservation.

Lessons Learned and Best Practices

The following tables list some of the lessons learned and best practices from the first two distributions that are being applied in the 3rd. They can be applied more widely to other emergency response interventions as well.

| Lessons Learned |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none">• If the government's response had been provided earlier, it would have reduced not only the time spent suffering especially by children who are largely affected, but would have also reduced the need for some of the coping strategies developed by the households to cope with the food crisis.• People prefer to choose products based on particular household needs that make the best use of available resources unlike direct distributions of free food. "It's as though we had money and went to the market freely." |

- The time taken by beneficiaries to access food using the voucher strategy is shorter and they do not feel as though they are being assisted. It is unlike the direct distribution of food, where waiting in long lines is required and the stigmatization is more pronounced.
- The voucher makes food accessible to populations in markets at affordable prices and develops public-private partnerships among the NGOs, vendors and transport providers while also supporting the local economy.
- Although the project intended to provide beneficiaries with a source of protein, beneficiaries did not buy available beans.
- Food for Work or Cash for Work programs that organized land conservation activities were exhausting for women, especially elderly women, but beneficiaries liked that it allowed them to recuperate additional land for planting.
- The women in most cases don't have carts for transport and experience enormous difficulty (lack of money) to assure the transport of food. Certain women prefer to walk long distances (10km) using a donkey to carry their sack. Others prefer to pay using the grain they purchased with the vouchers as a means of payment instead of taking a loan.
- Price fixing by certain vendors creates a distortion in the normal functioning of the market.
- Opening the market to all licensed vendors gives more choice and possibilities (of products and price) to beneficiaries
- The distribution took one day, not three to verify the identity before giving the voucher to the beneficiary. It was also not feasible for the beneficiaries to easily locate vendors after the market ended so 1 day for voucher distribution is sufficient.
- "The products helped us stay in the village to cultivate our own fields and protected us against migration."

Best Practices

- Creation of vouchers that carry the hologram and USAID hologram sticker and ID number help secure the vouchers and facilitate their administration and tracking.
- When possible use national level data to guide the targeting of villages and beneficiaries
- Application of a participatory and transparent process of beneficiary selection.
- The organization of the general assembly in the village permits the participation of the whole community when targeting households. However, certain additional tactics are needed to ensure all village members are present such as calling out the names of the different neighborhoods and representatives of people of different socio-economic classes.
- Good communication between the central authority, local authority, implementing partner, development actors, and community members in the planning and implementation.
- Disabled beneficiaries can be represented by one person of their choice and receive their coupon. In this case, the verification of the identity of the person sent by the beneficiary is verified in the presence of the village chief or a notable advisor in the community.
- The use of the vouchers through the circuit of vendors is less costly and is more effective for the program because there are no logistics or personnel management costs. The savings incurred as a result of saving the direct costs related to logistics and human resources have helped put more money

into vouchers to reach more beneficiaries.

- The signing protocol with the 14 agreed venter delegates rather than the 313 vendors facilitated the management and payment of the remaining vendors.
- Empowering teams with their own vehicles and the grouping of several villages in one place (weekly market, mosque and clinic) in lieu of distributions by village has allowed the response to move quickly. For example, the government took 21 days to cover this target while Project ADVANCE used 6 days to hit the same targets.
- Close monitoring, with appropriate incentives and consequences for unfair practices is required in food markets.
- Inform beneficiaries about the price of goods in the other markets to give them more opportunity to bargain effectively.
- Inform/explain to venders the processes of market operations using vouchers.
- Ensure the effective participation of venders in the markets in terms of available stock and transportation through good planning and communication.
- The project has reinforced the solidarity in the village because many households shared their food with households who hadn't received any.

Coverage

Complementarity with other Humanitarian Actors

CRS, Plan-Niger, the Government of Niger and other humanitarian actors under the authority of the Food Crisis Cell have coordinated in the planning of Project ADVANCE. The actors met to discuss and decide on the eligible villages, the population, the households to target and the method for doing so. CRS was the only actor using a voucher strategy to distribute food while the other actors (Government of Niger, Plan Niger and WFP) proceeded with direct distributions. Project AVANCE has effectively coordinated with the National Emergency Program and has succeeded in filling existing gaps in terms of access to food for most vulnerable households.

Equity

The National Food Survey of Households in Niger¹ indicates that the needs of different groups of vulnerable people (divorced or widowed women heads of household without the means of production and young children) should have first access to food, access to structures that address malnutrition in children, access to food at reasonable prices, access to pasture for animals, and access to water. However the most important need is the immediate access to food. Project ADVANCE gives vouchers to the men as well as the women heads of targeted vulnerable households of Ouallam and Tillabéri to buy food in the markets for their respective households. In some cases women heads of household delegate her children or a man in the village to go to the market in her place. Other vulnerable groups such as the elderly and disabled were not targeted specifically. Instead, beneficiaries are targeted at the household level and through the participatory and transparent process to identify the most vulnerable households; the elderly and disabled members are taken into account.

¹ Government of Niger- WFP National Food Survey of Households in Niger (April 2010):Executive Summary (May 2010)

Globally, in each village, the beneficiaries know why they were chosen and others were not chosen to participate. The targeting of beneficiaries overall is done equitably and transparently even though some insufficiencies are noted in the participation of certain women heads of household in the process of household selection.

However, the distribution method is not perfectly equitable for everyone. Beneficiaries live different distances from the market and some have more difficulty returning with their purchases. Nearly half of the groups interviewed revealed that transportation of food aid to beneficiaries' homes was difficult especially for people without carts or donkeys. Among the men and women interviewed, women were more likely to lack carts for transport and to experience significant difficulty (lack of money) to assure the transport of food. If a family member or neighbor could not aid in transport, it cost 500-1000F CFA to hire transportation help. If they don't have cash, certain women prefer to walk long distances (10km) using a donkey to carry their sack. Others prefer to pay using the grain they purchased with the vouchers as a means of payment instead of taking a loan.

Although equitable distribution is a Sphere standard, team members and some beneficiaries felt that the hardship wasn't extraordinary. The program market activities are organized on the same day and in the same market where the designated group of villages normally make their purchases. Going to the market is a regular activity and bringing purchases home is a normal cost for the same households on any given market day. In addition, because the market is held on the same day and place as the ordinary market, vulnerable groups are more likely to have assistance with transportation of their products because s/he will be more likely to locate a neighbor or family member who is also going to the market and who can help with transport.

Nevertheless, because Project ADVANCE is primarily an emergency food distribution project, not simply a market and because transportation seems to be a hardship for some, one solution would be to provide a limited number of transportation (donkey/cart) vouchers to each village. Beneficiaries receiving the transportation vouchers would be chosen using the same transparent process used for selecting most vulnerable households. The project would then cover the transportation costs for those determined by village consensus to need it the most.
